What Should Germany Have Done?

[Jon Clarke]

Right but the request is still outstanding; you are to kindly provide the DATE and MILITARY DISTRICTS that Russia had ordered mobilized prior to 29 July 1914, to prove your point that Russia had actually undertaken mobilization prior to July 29 1914.

It is not my claim but Zuber's and German military intelligence, I therefore suggest that you direct the request for further details to him. I am a bit surprised that you did not accept the quote I provided as you have previously been a strong advocate of Zuber's opinions and have claimed on several occasions that German military intelligence was the best in the world in 1914. Presumably your reluctance to accept their opinions in this instance is due to the fact that they are somewhat inconvenient for your position more than a belief that they are wrong. BTW given your perchant for demanding citations of others, perhaps you'd like to provide evidence that Zuber and German military intelligence were wrong. At the moment, all you seem to have is your opinion.

As I have told you before, in 1912 the Russians recoiled from calling out the Kiev military district because they feared this would cause a world war.

Surely it would have been the Warsaw district that the Russians would have recoiled from calling out as the Kiev district would 'threaten' Austria, not Germany. Unfortunately for your argument, Zuber indicates that the Russians did indeed increase troop numbers in this district in 1912:

It was clear to the Germans on 21 November [1912] that the Russians were conducting a gradual undeclared mobilisation. The Russian did not discharge the oldest group of draftees, as they normally would have done. This meant that the peacetime strength of the Russian army increased by 400,000. The active army regiments in the military districts of Vilna and Warsaw, opposite East Prussia [my emphasis], rose to a present-for-duty strength of 3,400 men, higher than the wartime strength.

That’s because the German doctrine for defining what 'mobilization' meant was the moment in time a military district posted red banners ordering all reservists to report to active duty.

So if the Russians had not put any posters up, the Germans wouldn't have reacted? The claim, made I repeat by Zuber not me, is that over a period of three months and at a time of international tension, German military intelligence reported a series of Russian military preparations which, in their opinion, amounted to an 'undeclared mobilization'. Despite this 'provocation', war did not automatically follow but 18 months later the mere announcement of general mobilization and the putting up of red posters resulted in a German declaration of war within a couple of days.

[Jon Clarke]

You've casually moved the markers by claiming that Berchtold thought any combat at all with Serbia would cause a war with Russia. Citation for that please. 

Oh dear - perhaps you should be a bit more selective about your demands for citations? The minutes of the Council of Ministers on 7 July 1914 state that:

He [Berchtold] was clear in his own mind that hostilities with Serbia would entail war with Russia.

“France and Russia, not withstanding their profound love of peace and their sincere efforts to avoid bloodshed, had decided to break the pride of Germany at any price, and to make her stop, once and for all, treading upon the toes of her neighbours.”

I'm surprised that you cannot find where it came from a quick search via googlebooks brings up the following quote from Barnes of all people:

In 1916 Sazonov apparently forgot for a moment that he was a diplomat and indulged in some amazing frankness. In a communique to the Russkoe Slovo he said at this time of his motives for entering the war:
Herr Bethmann-Hollweg maintains that France and Russia would never have dared to accept the challenge of Germany if they had not been sure of the support of England. But the real political situation was the following, even if the Chancellor will not admit it: In reality, France and Russia, notwithstanding their profound love for peace and their sincere efforts to avoid bloodshed, had decided to break the pride of Germany at any price, and to make her stop, once for all, treading on the toes of her neighbors.

The full quote is quite interesting as it contradicts one of Peter's main claims, namely that Russia and France would not have acted without British (covert) support. Of course, if you simply take the one sentence out of its context, it will certainly can be made to look more incriminating whereas Sazonov's main point is that France & Russia had decided by themselves that enough was enough - hardly surprising after Morocco (twice) and Bosnia.

[glenn239]

The full quote is quite interesting as it contradicts one of Peter's main claims, namely that Russia and France would not have acted without British (covert) support.

I’m interested in the quote within the context of Sazonov’s view of Berchtold’s moves. If indeed Sazonov said it then Berchtold’s tactics of trying to repeat an 1878 situation of negotiation and fighting was not going to succeed, because for Sazonov matters had become global in character.

He [Berchtold] was clear in his own mind that hostilities with Serbia would entail war with Russia.

Well, we can get into combing the whole Red Book if you’d like, but right in the first paragraph of the July 7th meeting is the opinion of the President of the council,

He is by no means convinced that an expedition to Servia must necessarily involve us in a war with Russia

The German position was that annexations would cause war with Russia, but if these were renounced war could be avoided.

BTW it also means that, contrary to your claim, Berchtold's 'conditional acceptance' of mediation the following day was nothing but an insincere diplomatic feint.

The Austrian records of the 31 July council meeting prove that Berchtold's offer was entirely sincere. As per the decision of the council, Berchtold demanded the flexibility to continue on with war operations in Serbia even as the Powers shaped the conditions of peace.

Germany had made it clear that she would support Austria under any circumstances...

Germany took the position that it was up to Austria to decide her relations with Serbia. Once the note was actually issued the Germans took the position that this formed the material conditions of their promise to Austria.

So that's Conrad, Gellinek & the Russian military who believed that a war between Austria and Serbia would be quick...

I’ll dig for the reference for 90 days when I get time. In the meantime, the statement you posted indicates that the initial campaign against Serbia would be done quickly, not that Serbia would be finished off by it. This you can see from the reference of a march ‘through’ Belgrade, which is barely inside the northern border of the country and doesn't even scratch the surface of the formidable mountain positions ranging far to the south.

[glenn239]

So if the Russians had not put any posters up, the Germans wouldn't have reacted?

You and I know that on 31 July Moltke sent an agent across the border to bring back to him a red mobilization poster, and it was this poster that he considered absolute proof that Russia was mobilizing. You can’t alter his doctrine to something more handy when assessing his behaviour. You have to stick to his doctrine. If you have examples in previous crises where any Russian military district put up these posters to call out all reserve classes, then post the information. AFAIK, it had never happened until 29 July 1914.

Austria did decide to order general mobilization at almost the same time as Russia and without any knowledge of the Russian decision.

Russia ordered the mobilization of 1.2 million men at Austria on 29 July and Austria responded on 31 July. The Austrians were fully aware of the Russian decision that was taken 29 July when they made theirs on 31 July. With 45 to 53 Russian divisions moving to Galicia, it is not possible to argue the Austrians required any further information on 31 July to counter-mobilize their remaining 28 divisions to Galicia.

As you have argued for many years that only general mobilization meant war (I'm pretty sure I can find quotes if you want), surely you must accept that during the afternoon of 30 July Austria decided to go to war against Russia.

I’ve stated that mobilization meant some form of war in 100% of the Great Power general mobilizations. You continue to argue against the history to state otherwise. When Austria mobilized, war with Serbia was inevitable. That is still entirely consistent with the fact that mobilization meant a war would follow. If you are suggesting Austria must fight Russia, no. Austria was content to hang fire in Galicia - but the war would continue in the south.

if we follow this to its logical conclusion, it means that to a certain extent, the Russian decision was irrelevant as a cause of the war because the Austrian decision would have brought about war even if the Tsar had refused to agree to Sazonov's request.

No, if we follow to the logical conclusion the Russian mobilization at Austria made Germany’s subsequent decisions of no consequence because the Russian mobilization determined there would be Great Power war. The Austrian mobilization only determined there would be a 3rd Balkans War. Surely after 10,000 repetitions this fundamental argument of Peter’s, it must have registered? :^)

I seem to recall stating previously that the Austrian decision was understandable given the Russian partial mobilization but then it has never been my position that mobilization of any type automatically meant war.

Yes, but in years of invitation there are yet no examples were a Great Power general mobilization was made and war did not follow. The closest precedent to your position we’ve yet found is the Prussian partial mobilization of 1859, but do recall that in this instance it was a partial, not general mobilization, it involved no concentration of forces on the Rhine, (and therefore was not mobilization in the sense we are discussing) and I seem to recall providing a citation that the French had warned the Prussians any concentration on the Rhine would be seen as an act of war. Along with the observation that the French army could be well east of the Rhine long before Prussia could hope to finish concentrating.

[Terry Duncan]

When Austria mobilized, war with Serbia was inevitable. That is still entirely consistent with the fact that mobilization meant a war would follow. If you are suggesting Austria must fight Russia, no. Austria was content to hang fire in Galicia - but the war would continue in the south.

By that same token, Russia was perfectly happy to hang fire against Germany and throw the rest of her fully mobilized weight against Austria. Nations have to mobilize troops in their respective military areas, this is not actually 'against; the nearest nation, they or the bulk of them could be moved against another power as had happened in the Russo-Japanese War. You cannot have it that Austrian actions only meany war against Serbia and deny that Russian actions could have meant war against only Austria.

No, if we follow to the logical conclusion the Russian mobilization at Austria made Germany’s subsequent decisions of no consequence because the Russian mobilization determined there would be Great Power war.

No. The Austrian actions and refusals to discuss things made a Great Power war inevitable, nothing forced Germany to act any more than Russia was forced to act.

The Austrian mobilization only determined there would be a 3rd Balkans War. Surely after 10,000 repetitions this fundamental argument of Peter’s, it must have registered? :^)

Repetition of rubbish adds no other quality than to make it voluminous rubbish. A 3rd Balkan War under the circumstances of 1914 was not possible in isolation, which is of course what Berchtold, Hoyos, Zimmerman etc concluded. The idea that 'Nation B' will put aside its own interests so 'Nation A' can aggrandize itself at 'Nation B's' expense is utterly devoid of connection with reality.

[Jon Clarke]

I’m interested in the quote within the context of Sazonov’s view of Berchtold’s moves

But Sazonov was not talking about his view of Berchtold moves was he? Instead he was explaining that Russia and France had not been dependent on British approval as Bethmann had claimed. What you have done is to take a single sentence out of its correct context and apply it in a such a way to give it an interpretation it was never intended to have. Oddly enough it's a tactic that's mainly used by one 'side' of the WWI argument - I wonder why?

Well, we can get into combing the whole Red Book if you’d like, but right in the first paragraph of the July 7th meeting is the opinion of the President of the council,

Mea culpa. I was a tad lazy and used the text of the minutes of the 7 July posted on http://www.firstworldwar.com assuming that it would be (reasonably) accurate/honest. However I have just checked the full version of the minutes in Geiss's July 1914, Selected Documents and it is clear that the version on the website has been changed to make it appear that Berchtold said 'hostilities with Serbia would entail war with Russia' whereas the actual minutes indicate that he said exactly the opposite. In my book that's unforgivable and I will not use that site again and would recommend others avoid it as well. Apologies for the confusion.

The Austrian records of the 31 July council meeting prove that Berchtold's offer was entirely sincere.

No they don't. It is quite clear from the minutes that the intention behind the 'offer' (which was not an offer at all but simply a re-statement of the Austrian position) was to give the impression that the British proposal was not being, as Bilinksi put it, 'refused brusquely'.

In the meantime, the statement you posted indicates that the initial campaign against Serbia would be done quickly, not that Serbia would be finished off by it. This you can see from the reference of a march ‘through’ Belgrade, which is barely inside the northern border of the country and doesn't even scratch the surface of the formidable mountain positions ranging far to the south.

That's easily disproved by the part of the quote that stated that 'Austrian forces would first ‘settle accounts’ with Serbia before turning north against the major threat'. The use of the term 'settle accounts' makes it quite clear that the Austrians were not simply talking about a march through Belgrade but rather the removal of the Serbian 'threat' in its entirety. Incidentally you keep talking about 'formidable mountain positions' but have yet to provide any information about them. Indeed the events of 1915 would suggest that they were not as formidable as you claim.

[Jon Clarke]

You and I know that on 31 July Moltke sent an agent across the border to bring back to him a red mobilization poster, and it was this poster that he considered absolute proof that Russia was mobilizing.

That's not what you were claiming though. You said 'what mobilization meant was the moment in time a military district posted red banners'. In any case, Moltke did not receive copies of the poster until after Pourtales' telegram had arrived as Albertini makes clear:

But even before confirmation arrived by these channels, the telegram from Pourtalès reached the Wilhelmstrasse at 11.40 a.m., having been dispatched from St. Petersburg at 11.20 a.m.:

As I have pointed out, the German haste in 1914 in issuing ultimata and declaring war within two days simply because an order had been issued is in marked contrast to their inactivity in 1912/13 when they failed to act similarly over something their own military intelligence believed to be an undeclared mobilization against them.

Russia ordered the mobilization of 1.2 million men at Austria on 29 July and Austria responded on 31 July. The Austrians were fully aware of the Russian decision that was taken 29 July when they made theirs on 31 July. With 45 to 53 Russian divisions moving to Galicia, it is not possible to argue the Austrians required any further information on 31 July to counter-mobilize their remaining 28 divisions to Galicia.

No one is suggesting that the Austrian decision wasn't a sensible precaution in view of the earlier Russian decision to order partial mobilization but that's not what's under discussion here. How many times over the years have you demanded that people provide evidence of cases where a Great Power has mobilized the whole of its armed forces against another Great Power and war has not followed? The fact that you then ignore or discount any evidence put forward is irrelevant - your position has always been that general, not partial, mobilization represented an irrevocable decision to go to war. The Austrians must therefore, according to your own criteria, have decided on 30 July to go to war against Russia even though they were unaware of any corresponding decision by the Russians.

[Jon Clarke]

I’ve stated that mobilization meant some form of war in 100% of the Great Power general mobilizations.

No you have never qualified your claim, you have always stated that in your opinion general mobilization meant war. A quick check of this board for example find the following example from 2008 (I am sure that I could find plenty of other examples on this and other boards if you want):

No Great Power ever mobilized its entire army against another Great Power for the purpose of negotiation between 1815 and 1913. In all cases, when full mobilization occurred, it was war.

As I have said previously, it's no real issue with me because I don't hold that any mobilization automatically meant war but you most certainly have done. It is therefore quite amusing rather than acknowledging the contradiction in your position on this issue, you now try to introduce a qualification that it only meant 'some form of war'. I hope that you are not intending to absent yourself from this thread as you have elsewhere when your claims were shown to be incorrect?

When Austria mobilized, war with Serbia was inevitable. That is still entirely consistent with the fact that mobilization meant a war would follow. If you are suggesting Austria must fight Russia, no. Austria was content to hang fire in Galicia - but the war would continue in the south.

Serbia was not a Great Power (as you have stressed on many occasions) and Austria had already ordered a partial mobilization against her. The decision to order general mobilization was made in respect of Russia and no-one else. As Terry points out, you can't have it both ways - if, as you claim, the Russian decision to order general mobilization represented a decision for war with Germany then the Austrian decision must have represented a decision for war against Russia.

[Jon Clarke]

No, if we follow to the logical conclusion the Russian mobilization at Austria made Germany’s subsequent decisions of no consequence because the Russian mobilization determined there would be Great Power war. 

No the momentum towards war was unstoppable at this point and the Austrian decision would have resulted in war regardless of events in Russia. An easy way to illustrate this is to consider a simple 'what-if' scenario - what if the Tsar had told Sazonov to go and take a long walk off a short plank - he wasn't going to order hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths?

Whilst the military (and Sazonov) would have been unhappy, nobody (as Dobrorolski pointed out) would have dared defy the Tsar in July 1914. However any 'respite' would have been short-lived once Shebeko's telegram containing news of the Austrian decision arrived shortly after midnight. Sazonov would undoubtedly have used this to convince the Tsar to change his mind as not only did the terms of their alliance with France require them to mobilize if any one of the Triple Alliance mobilized but they would also have known that the Austrian decision would require Germany to act similarly. This was of course confirmed by Moltke in his discussions with the Austrian military attaché and in his telegram to Conrad.

The logical conclusion from this scenario is, as I suggested previously, that - to a certain extent - the Russian decision on 30 July was irrelevant as a cause of the war. In the OTL news of the Russian decision allowed the Germans to use it as a pretext for their actions but, even though in this ATL there was no such pretext, the outcome (i.e. German general mobilization and war) would have been exactly the same. This is not to excuse the Russian decision but rather to try and put it in some sort of proper context.

[glenn239]

You cannot have it that Austrian actions only meany war against Serbia and deny that Russian actions could have meant war against only Austria.

An Austro-Serbian war in isolation was a strategic possibility – provided that Austria did not attempt annexations and responded to mediation. It was possible because the security of no Great Power was threatened. It was Russia’s choice that this outcome did not happen. An Austro-Russian war in isolation was never a possibility – and that was Germany’s choice.

In my book that's unforgivable and I will not use that site again and would recommend others avoid it as well. Apologies for the confusion.

None required. I thought the Red Book has the President making the comment about war with Russia not being inevitable, not Berchtold. I also have found, as a general impression, that distortions of the Austrian Red Book are out there. Even the note of 23 July seems to have different versions.

No they don't. It is quite clear from the minutes that the intention behind the 'offer' (which was not an offer at all but simply a re-statement of the Austrian position) was to give the impression that the British proposal was not being, as Bilinksi put it, 'refused brusquely'.

The Austrians gave the conditions by which they would accept British mediation between Austria and Serbia to the resolution of their dispute. This was a big concession on the Austrian part – prior to 31 July Berchtold had not even admitted that the Austro-Serbian dispute was even to have outside mediation, (Grey's earlier proposal for a conference being rejected in Vienna outright). But that day he conceded the role of mediator to Great Britain, a friend of Russia. That was a clear, unmistakable signal that Austria intended to settle the war with Serbia in a manner that was consistent with Grey’s honest mediation. Therefore, that the end of the war would be on terms Russia could accept. However, the Russians ignored this signal – Sazonov had no intention of haggling and preferred war rather than the endless bargaining over the course of the fall that British mediation under the Austrian terms entailed.

Hence, the exaggerations and hyperboles invariably evident when describing Russia's rash decision to mobilize, when a less aggressive and more rationally inclined Great Power would never have done so at that time for those reasons.

That's easily disproved by the part of the quote that stated that 'Austrian forces would first ‘settle accounts’ with Serbia before turning north against the major threat'. The use of the term 'settle accounts' makes it quite clear that the Austrians were not simply talking about a march through Belgrade but rather the removal of the Serbian 'threat' in its entirety

I'll look deeper when I get the chance. I think it means that the Serbian army would be subject to a defeat in the first campaign. It does not mean that this defeat would knock Serbia altogether out of the war.

Incidentally you keep talking about 'formidable mountain positions' but have yet to provide any information about them. Indeed the events of 1915 would suggest that they were not as formidable as you claim.

'
The fact that the Central Powers only overran Serbia after its army was ravaged by disease and a year's worth of casualties, was also practically out of artillery ammunition, and the CP relied heavily upon a Bulgarian attack from the rear - these all prove the opposite to your theory – that the Serbian position in 1914 was so formidable that no realistic Austrian offensive could have overrun the country that year. Hence, Sazonov’s mad decision to immerse the world in war was taken prematurely and against Russia’s own interests. In fact, had matters played out as a localised war, the course of events from 1914 suggests that Serbia would have embarrassed Austria deeply.

[glenn239]

In any case, Moltke did not receive copies of the poster until after Pourtales' telegram had arrived as Albertini makes clear:

He had not one personally in his hands, but on the morning of 1 August he did receive telephone confirmation from his agent that the officer himself had crossed into Poland, torn down a mobilization poster, and had carried it back across the border into Germany. Moltke was hardly required to wait for a courier to get the poster to Berlin to know that it was within the Germany army's ability to prove Russia had triggered Germany's longstanding doctrine.

As I have pointed out, the German haste in 1914 in issuing ultimata and declaring war within two days simply because an order had been issued is in marked contrast to their inactivity in 1912/13...

But as I have pointed out, Russia did not mobilize in 1912 or 1913 according to the doctrine that Moltke followed in defining mobilization. You cannot alter Moltke's principals. Mobiilization, according to the procedure Moltke followed, occurred only on 29/30 July. To defeat this theory, you are invited to name the military district and the date at which the mobilization posters went up prior to 29 July 1914 calling the Russian army to the Austro-German border. You must, however, decline this invitation because there was no such incident – you cannot cite something that never happened.

How many times over the years have you demanded that people provide evidence of cases where a Great Power has mobilized the whole of its armed forces against another Great Power and war has not followed?

But war did follow for Austria – against Serbia. The Austrian mobilization against Serbia made war with Serbia inevitable and the Russian mobilization at Austria made war against Austria inevitable. The Serbian mobilization, and the Austrian mobilization in Galicia, were reactive. It is the Power that first acts that defines the moment, not the Power that reacts.

No you have never qualified your claim, you have always stated that in your opinion general mobilization meant war. A quick check of this board for example find the following example from 2008 (I am sure that I could find plenty of other examples on this and other boards if you want):

You indicating thinking that,

I’ve stated that mobilization meant some form of war in 100% of the Great Power general mobilizations.

And,

No Great Power ever mobilized its entire army against another Great Power for the purpose of negotiation between 1815 and 1913. In all cases, when full mobilization occurred, it was war.

Are not consistent with one another.

Russia mobilized at Austria on 29 July and thereby made war with Austria inevitable. Austria mobilized at Serbia and thereby made war with Serbia inevitable. Where are you seeing any inconsistency? The historical fact is that Great Power general mobilizations always meant war.

The logical conclusion from this scenario is, as I suggested previously, that - to a certain extent - the Russian decision on 30 July was irrelevant as a cause of the war.

This is true only insofar as it was actually the Russian decision of 29 July that made world war inevitable.

the OTL news of the Russian decision allowed the Germans to use it as a pretext for their actions but, even though in this ATL there was no such pretext, the outcome (i.e. German general mobilization and war) would have been exactly the same.

Asssuming we are talking of the 29 July mobilization as well, no, you are not correct and the theory of automatic German action even in the case of Russian non-action is baseless. Had Russia not mobilized on 29/30 July, Moltke’s doctrine would not have been activated, the Germans would not have mobilized, and world war one would not have broken out.

[xristar]

This would be the 'formidable Serbian mountain positions' which in 1915 succumbed in just over a month to an attack by 4 Austrian, 10 German and 6 Bulgarian divisions (i.e. 20 in total).

Bulgarian divisions were double divisions were they not? So that’s 26 CP divisions, not 20, and with Bulgaria attacking from the rear we all understand the operational situation was markedly different than August 1914. Additionally, the Serbian army had been ravaged by disease by 1915, and because France and Russia were at war the supplies that would otherwise could have flowed to Serbia by the boatload were being absorbed on the Western and Eastern fronts.

BTW - the Austrian general staff had concluded a campaign would take at least 3 months, not the 1 month you quoted. And even that was predicated, I think, on the rather optimistic assumption of a forward Serbian defence.

German divisions typically had 12 battalions (4 regiments of 3 battalions each), Austrian, Serbian and Russian divisions had 16 battalions (4 regiments of 4 battalions each) and Bulgarian divisions had 24 battalions (6 regiments of 4 battalions each). A Bulgarian division also had two field artillery regiments, a cavalry regiment and an engineer one. It's strength was typically over 40,000 men.

And I agree with Glenn239 that a campaign to destroy the Serbian army alltogether would require definitely at least 3 months.

[glenn239]

I found the reference - it's on Strachan A Call to Arms, page 336. Conrad concluded in 1909 that the defeat of Serbia would take 3 months. Then, on 338 he appears to have couched that estimate with a precaution that if the Serbians were not drawn into a battle for Belgrade that the campaign might be 'prolonged'.

So, IMO, the alternative Russian policy to world war in July 1914 was to advise the Serbs to draw up their armies south of Belgrade and fight a withdrawing action towards Nish. In conjunction with this Russia could choose to, or decline to, send a Russian military expedition to Nish via the Danube in order to give weight to their councils of moderation with Austria. Given the historical tendency of the Serbs to best the Austrians, the expected outcome to that would have been 24 Austrian divisions badly knocked about, the Serbs giving ground only gradually, and therefore a humiliation of Austria on the world stage. In fact, because neither Russia nor France would be at war, the Serbian position would have been much better because Entente armaments and supplies could have poured into Serbia, (whereas in the real war the actual indifference of the Entente Powers to Serbia was quickly exposed via their near complete lack of supply to their ally of vital war materials).

[Terry Duncan]

So, IMO, the alternative Russian policy to world war in July 1914

Russian policy was not for a world war in 1914, it was to prevent Austria going to war with Serbia and to make her deploy troops that would otherwise be used against Serbia in Galicia.

Given the historical tendency of the Serbs to best the Austrians, the expected outcome to that would have been 24 Austrian divisions badly knocked about

The Austrians were never able to deploy even half their forces against Serbia because they had to deploy the majority against Russia. Russia could only achieve this by mobilizing. Conrad's estimate over time to beat Serbia is for a single front deployment, it always became problematic in a two front war that was beyond Austria's means to fight without aid.

In conjunction with this Russia could choose to, or decline to, send a Russian military expedition to Nish via the Danube in order to give weight to their councils of moderation with Austria.

Oh dear, not again? This was never possible in 1914 for many reasons 1. Nobody ever thought of it 2. Russia did not have the shipping to send forces 3. The Danube was not open for military expedition traffic by treaty. This is far fetched rubbish. All the other powers telling Austria to cease the war and to talk failed to have any effect, so a dozen men in Russian uniforms are not going to do any differently.

In fact, because neither Russia nor France would be at war, the Serbian position would have been much better because Entente armaments and supplies could have poured into Serbia

How? Austria had been very careful to deny Serbia any access to the sea and Greece proved a most unreliable ally for Serbia, so at best she would get a trickle of supplies - unless for some strange reason Austria decides to open the main trade routes.

whereas in the real war the actual indifference of the Entente Powers to Serbia was quickly exposed via their near complete lack of supply to their ally of vital war materials).

Given they needed to supply their own armies first, and did not have this even vaguely solved before Serbia was knocked out of the war effectively, it was not indifference but inability that was the problem. The same inability that saw the indended Allied troops sent to aid Serbia sit in Greece on an extended disease ridden holiday.

[Jon Clarke]

An Austro-Serbian war in isolation was a strategic possibility – provided that Austria did not attempt annexations and responded to mediation.

So in effect it was never a strategic possibility given that Austria was definitely planning annexations (including Serbia's capital city!) and wasn't interested in the slightest about meaningful mediation until they had achieved their goal - the reduction of Serbia to a vassal state.

The Austrians gave the conditions by which they would accept British mediation between Austria and Serbia to the resolution of their dispute.

No they didn't. They attached conditions which they knew would be unacceptable but which they hoped would buy them time so that they could complete the subjugation of Serbia before Russia could intervene (as Bilinski pointed out during the meeting on 31 July).

I'll look deeper when I get the chance. I think it means that the Serbian army would be subject to a defeat in the first campaign. It does not mean that this defeat would knock Serbia altogether out of the war.

Of course you do because to think otherwise would be to actually admit that you are wrong - something you have proved yourself remarkably reluctant to do (I'm still waiting for you to withdraw those claims against Grey BTW). The term however used by Conrad was 'settle accounts with Serbia' which clearly envisages a much greater military consequence than simply subjecting Serbia to a defeat.

Hence, Sazonov’s mad decision to immerse the world in war was taken prematurely and against Russia’s own interests. In fact, had matters played out as a localised war, the course of events from 1914 suggests that Serbia would have embarrassed Austria deeply.

Nonsense. The lack of a Russian threat in Galicia would have enabled Conrad to deploy the additional troops of B-Staffel (i.e. 20 divisions, instead of 9) against Serbia, thereby creating a numerical advantage that even the doughty Serbian army would not have been to deal with. A single corps from B-Staffel had just begun to have an impact when they were withdrawn in readiness for re-deployment to Galicia. Without the Russian threat, all seven corps could have been used in the attack (without any concern over redeployment) , thereby resulting in almost certain defeat for Serbia.