Terry Duncan wrote:
Yet both did their best to increase the tensions as the crisis went on, neither was willing to back down, and neither was forced to do anything by another power, they took their own decisions.
Austria had an unprecedented level of support from Germany and intended to use it to its fullest. Whether Russia had the same blank cheque from France, (Poincare in St. Petersburg 20th-23rd July) we'll never know, but the Russian policy seems to assume that support was there.
ljadw wrote: The lack of an instant DOW could simply be that France knew it would not be ready to act for some days and therefore saw no point in acting in such a way, the mobilisation order indicates a willingness to move the troops to the German border to force Germany to fight on two fronts, exactly as the alliance asks for.
The French had no incentive to be sending their DOW's prematurely. So long as they mobilized and could keep to the military accords, the Russians wouldn't care if they delayed matters.
Britain tried to prevent a war yes, but mostly because the balance of power was threatened by any war, so British interests were best served by peace. Britain still went to war when it could have simply refused to do so.
Grey would have preferred no war, but if war there was to be, Britain must be in it. The great question, the one I've never decided upon, is how far Grey would have been willing to go in the Austria vs. Serbia solo department. I suspect the answer is further than might be guessed.
Nothing forced Austria to declare war, Germany pressured for the declaration of war to be moved forward from 12th August to 27th-28th July, but sending a couple of 'hurry up and get on with it' telegrams are hardly 'forcing' anything. Berchtold proved to be perfectly able to be intransigent when it suited him to do so, as he was with all the peace suggestions.
Austria need not declare war - they had their leverage for an extended diplomatic showdown. Berchtold, unfortunately, overrated his hand - he placed more value than warranted on his perception he was acting in the right.
ljadw wrote:It declared war on Russia while there was no reason for it
You may not agree with the decision but there was a reason. The Russian mobilisation threatened to make the German war plan impossible if it was allowed to move forward too much of German measures, then coupled with The Netherlands and Belgium mobilising too, making the Liege coup-de-main also more risky, then with the Austrians needing to know what Germany would do by 1st August so as to avoid sending Army B to the Balkans too, the Germans were running out of time. I believe they acted too fast, in that they could still have waited two or maybe three more days before declaring war, though they did likely have to mobilise in response to Russian and French actions when they did. This distinction of being able to mobilise without declaring war seems to have been overlooked for no reason better than it was specified in the plan that actions took place at set times.
I believe that Moltke's urgency for the coup de main on Liege was a bit of a soap bubble, that he exaggerated the military value of the gamble so that he could pressure the civilians to stop negotiating. (Moltke's real fear was not so much Liege, IMO, as it was the capacity for the Entente to paralyse German mobilization through endless diplomatic proposals, all of which that would end with the Franco-Russians advancing into Germany).
I think the amount of time Germany had before action was necessary was about 8-10 days, the timeframe to get the heavy siege cannons to the front at Aachen. Even then, rather than sending summary notes, they just should have advanced into the Ardennes.