Operations in Albania - WWI.

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THE POGRADEC OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 1917.

The operations in Albania, called the "Pogradec Offensive, in September 1917, had as a setting a mass of mountains, somewhat hidden, situated between Lake Okrida and Lake Malik and the high valleys of the Kelizoni, Devoli, and the Selce.

This group of mountains consists of several chains of mountains ranging in height from 1,500 to 2,000 yards. The chaotic nature of the terrain, the abrupt cuts made by the valleys and walls of rock made all troop movements very difficult. The road system was rough and unimproved and consisted mostly of footpaths. It is very difficult in such irregular regions to hold and fight against large numbers or to put powerful artillery.

The defensive system of the enemy, on the Macedonian Front, ended southeast of Lake Malik, at Gradiste. From this point to the Adriatic, the Austro-Hungarians: due to the terrain, did not believe any offensive action on the part of the French possible and had organized only a system of advance posts supported by a few pieces of artillery. On the other hand, the enemy's defensive organization between Lake Malik and Lake Okrida, from the Gradiste, through Svirna, Gubrovica as far as San Maoun, faced to the east.

The result of these dispositions was that if a strong surprise attack could pierce the outpost line, there was the possibility of a deep advance without the necessity of flank movements or reinforcements from the rear. The Austro-Hungarians thought a surprise impossible due to the Albanian spy system and studies of the situation made by German officers which had been put at their disposal.

The objective for the attack was:

First the envelopment of the center, the enemy base at Pogradec, between Lake Okrida and Lake Malik; and

Second, the clearance of the immediate approaches to Pogradec on the north and east in the region of the lakes.

A provisional division divided into two groups made two attacks. The principal attack was from south of the Devoli River direct to Pogradec.

The other from Bratomir was to locate the advance enemy positions near Placa and fix them in position facing east. Then when the attack from the south had reached a position parallel to Svirna, the two groups would launch a coordinated attack on Veliterna, Grubovica, and the heights of the frontier which protected the route to Pogradec.

These two attacks, in order to reach Pogradec, had to secure, by hard fighting, a series of successive lines, strongly held in force and supported by artillery of all calibers. It was impossible to approach them without the enemy's knowledge.

The enemy counterattacked, and crossed the Devoli, a little to the north of its junction with the Kelizoni, to get a foothold on the heights between the Devoli and the Selce, since the line of the crest of Kamia dominated Pogradec to the northwest. This pushed the enemy's defensive system to the west, thereby preventing an outflanking movement, and a threat on its lines of communications.

A new attack must therefore be associated with that of the south group. To assure its success it was necessary to keep the enemy in complete ignorance up to H hour, so as to take advantage from the beginning of an absolute surprise and avoid any modifications in enemy dispositions and to let him believe that all French preparations in the Koritza area were aimed solely at the Gradiste and the positions of Grubovica.

Source: CAVALRY MOUNTAIN WARFARE By Captain R.B. McClure, Infantry. Review of Military Literature. June 1936

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THE POGRADEC OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 1917.

French headquarters had to find the way and means of putting the following group in position for an important maneuver without arousing enemy suspicions:

The Spahis cavalry regiment (five squadrons and one machine-gun company). (Note: In 1918 machine-gun units in a cavalry regiment were called companies.)
The 49th Battalion of Senegalese riflemen (3 companies and a machine-gun company).
A detachment of Albanian gendarmes (1 company).
1 battery of mountain guns (65-mm.).
1 detachment of T.S.F.
1 ambulance detachment.

The problem was even more delicate since, in addition to its spy' system which covered the region, the enemy had an observation post at Gradiste, which never allowed a day to pass without reporting all traffic on the road from Biklista to Koritza, whether it was a soldier, rider or vehicle, with the aid of his powerful "Zeiss Marine" glass.

Moreover, enemy aviation based on Okrida was numerous, active and superior to the French and had every means at its disposal to inform its headquarters of the French movements.

The problem was solved in the following manner: The area of Moskopole was selected as the assembly zone of Colonel Forton's group. The 49th Senegalese battalion, the Albanian gendarmes and the artillery were already almost in their assigned positions. These units participated in the covering of Koritza along the Kelizoni and on the heights of Gynomas.

The Spahis cavalry was in rest camp to the northwest of Florina, near Buf, about 63 miles from Moskopole.

The Spahis left Buf on 31 August at 12:00 midnight and on 6 September were in concealed bivouacs, in dense pine woods where tents and horses were completely hidden from hostile aerial observation. The regiment was at hand for the attack fixed for daybreak on 8 September. Reconnaissances were made during daylight on the 7th.

During its approach march, the regiment of Spahis cavalry had been observed by hostile aviation on 3 and 4 September, in the vicinity of Biklista, where it halted for a day.

But from 5 September the enemy observers did not know what had become of them as they marched to Moskopole under cover of darkness into concealed bivouacs.

During the night of 7-8 September the camps at Moskopole were broken and the squadrons took up their positions for their departure.

Thus by a rapid displacement of more than 63 miles, where marching on foot and with horses were combined to cross the rough terrain, where the speed of infantry marches under the best conditions was only 1 or 2 miles an hour, 5 squadrons and one company of machine guns had been put in attack positions in five days without the enemy learning of their movements.

Source: CAVALRY MOUNTAIN WARFARE By Captain R.B. McClure, Infantry. Review of Military Literature. June 1936

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THE POGRADEC OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 1917.

This group of cavalry constituted the bulk of an attack group charged with the mission of seizing a line of enemy posts about 1,500 yards high behind the Devoli.

Due to its mobility the cavalry was at its line of departure in time for the attack, a fresh body of troops holding the trump card of surprise in their hands.

On the morning of 8 September, the attack started. The attacking troops crossed the Devoli between Kuckaka and Tresova and gained a foothold on the summits of Kraniski and Mukani.

The suddenness produced a complete surprise in the enemy lines, thus assuring success.

On 8 September, the Spahis cavalry which had forced a crossing of the Devoli, found Albanians and Austro-Hungarians on the right bank, on the dominating heights of the river entrenched in defensive works and protected by perpendicular cliffs of 1200 yards in height and bands of fire placed in front of the towns of Kranisti and Mukani. From daybreak until noon the Spahis seized the outposts, scaled the cliffs, took the towns by assault, and cleared the crests which separate the Devoli from the Selce. In the evening of 8 September, the cavalry spent the night with a march outpost a little north of Deswica and Mukani.

On 9 September, the enemy unsuccessfully tried to retake the line along Dordosa-Osnad. He made a stubborn defense withdrawing from trench to trench and launched several counterattacks.Toward the end of 9 September, after marching echeloned in half-regiments and when the first half-regiment had swept over Osnad and the heights of the Dent, the Spahis camped to the northwest of Bragodja.

On 10 September the Spahis threw themselves against the defenses of Pogradec. The enemy, supported strongly by artillery, defended step by step. Its resistance was outflanked and trenches occupied one after another. The Spahis arrived at the outskirts of Pogradec and one squadron penetrated the village. On the night of 10 September they were near Berdova, at the doors of Pogradec, and were masters of that city on 11 September.

In the morning of 11 September the heights dominating Pogradec to the northeast were taken. One squadron which had maintained its position in Pogradec during the night in spite of a violent grenade counterattack by the Saxons, assaulted at once a sugar loaf mountain which dominated the town on the north and closed the road to Lin.

Three days was sufficient time for the attack, which had penetrated to a depth of from 15 to 24 miles.

Three days of effort to advance rapidly in mountainous terrain with steep and difficult climbing, without taking into account the special fatigue of combat or the difficulties of re-supply.

Such progress was possible due to the mobility of the horses. The led horses which at first seemed so much dead weight and a handicap to the cavalry in mountain warfare, rendered a priceless service. They made the Spahis regiment more mobile and permitted the solving of the supply problem.

It was not possible to live off the country, for the few poor Albanian villages of the region, pillaged, ransacked, and exploited by Albanian bands and Austro-Hungarian regulars, had nothing to give.

Source: CAVALRY MOUNTAIN WARFARE By Captain R.B. McClure, Infantry. Review of Military Literature. June 1936

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THE POGRADEC OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 1917.

The horses were loaded with five days ration for men and animals. These were the supplies upon which the squadrons subsisted until 12 September.

The groups of led horses consisted of from 6 to 8 horses, which were tied to rods, one in rear of the other, and thus marched in rear of the regiment; and in spite of some unavoidable incidents, they assured the supplementary mission of re-supply and mobility.

During the operations on Pogradec the regiment was called upon to fight only dismounted. It was engaged each day against infantry occupying naturally strong positions, covered by defensive works. The Albanian irregulars were well officered, disciplined, excellent shots, well-trained in mountain guerrilla warfare, fighting in liaison with Austro-Hungarian infantry which was perfectly equipped and well supplied with machine guns.

The Spahis had to maneuver from the time resistance was first encountered. Automatic arms entered into play and made a curtain of fire which sheltered the maneuvering mass. This maneuver consisted in discovering the defiles which led to weak points in the enemy lines and infiltration to take hold of the heights where the enemy flanks and rear were menaced or taken in reverse.

The machine gunners played a large part. In direct attacks they took under fire the perceptible points of the hostile position and neutralized hostile machine guns. In outflanking movements they accompanied reconnaissance patrols and when the elements of maneuver had gone beyond the enemy flank, they fired against the enemy from flank or rear.

The rifle grenadiers crawling or climbing would hide in defiladed, areas and bombard the defenders hidden behind bands of fire in their trenches.
Finally the offensive hand grenades served to seize the trenches and stop hostile counterattacks.

The tactical use of the machine-gun company consisted of never using it in mass, but by isolated sections and most generally by platoons. Mountain warfare demands this method of machine gun use.

Machine-gun sections should be echeloned in depth and a unit should be kept in reserve ready for firing. Thus other machine-gun sections can place the guns and equipment on pack animals and displace forward or to unpack an go into position farther to the rear, without loss of fire-support from the machine guns to the fighting line.

Source: CAVALRY MOUNTAIN WARFARE By Captain R.B. McClure, Infantry. Review of Military Literature. June 1936

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THE 22d CAVALRY AT FJERI, 7 JULY 1918

On 7 July 1918 the Italians attacked to envelop the Austro-Hungarian front behind the Voyusa (Albania). While an Italian Infantry brigade captured the weakly occupied sector: Poiani-Levani and overthrew an Austrian battalion sent to counterattack, the 22d Cavalry (Cavallegieri di Catania) had ridden on Fjeri.

It overran an aviation field, took the Semeni bridge at Brustar, and drove out the staff of the 97th Infantry Brigade from Fjeri. Shortly thereafter counterattacks of 1 1/2 battalions and 1 squadron again drove the Italian cavalry out of Fjeri. Nevertheless the employment of the Italian Divisional Cavalry regiment decided the day.

Wild rumors of the capture of the brigade commander and of the loss of the only practicable route of withdrawal caused a withdrawal on the front which had been successfully held. When it was learned that the crossing of the Semerii at Brustar was in enemy hands, a general push toward the east began. Thirteen spiked guns fell into the hands of the Italians. These could not be removed on the only available mule track. The Italian cavalry, in spite of its undoubted tactical defeat, had attained everything which could reasonably have been expected of it: destruction of airport and communications, driving off of staffs, drawing out of reserves, and forcing the enemy withdrawal into unfavorable routes.

Source: ["Truppenkavallerie. Erfahrungen. Ansichten. Betrachtungen." By, Rittmelster Balck. Mlitar-Wochenblatt, 11 February, 4 March 1933] Translated by Major A. Vollmer. Review of Military Literature. June 1933.

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