Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#61

Post by Terry Duncan » 28 Nov 2015, 21:35

AJFFM wrote:
JAG13 wrote:
Attrition wrote:This all seems like hindsights-taktik; the Germans knew what they were doing and did it well. So did the French but neither side could overcome terrain, friction and the fog of war. The Germans did very well to reach the Aisne and their punt to the Marne showed that they still had the power to continue. It went wrong but it didn't matter much, since the real thing was the position on the Aisne.
Well, its not really hindsight if the Germans had continually gamed such an scenario for years, what is odd is that after all that work and evidence Moltke, on the day, did something completely different with little in the way of explanation.
They gamed it assuming they had much more men than they actually had. These added troops would have closed the gap between 1st and 2nd and reinforced 1st Army against the French 6th and probably would have been enough to create a provisional field Army in that gap.

I wonder whether they gamed it after Marne or indeed after WWI ended. I know from what our colleague here (Terry Duncan I think) mentioned in a previous threat that Jellicoe re-fought Jutland on maps after the war and still every time his decision making process was proven to have been correct.
Certainly true of Jellicoe attending the Naval Staff College gaming of Jutland, nobody ever improved on his deployment, whilst worse solutions were very quickly dismissed, such as Sturdee's divide the fleet and try to get each half to opposite sides of the HSF. From what I know, Jellicoe was unusual in actually attending such events, Beatty was actively trying to make out he had done all the work himself still at this point, so few people knew the real story and alternatives were all fresh. With regards the Germans, I am not so sure they ever did much publically, Moltke was dead, as was Hentsch, so a lot of input from that side is memoirs only in public at least, all presenting the writer as a hero and others as the cause of the failure. With the main leader dead, and a lot of details being hidden, I am not too sure it would have been too easy to even establish quite what was intended at the time, yet alone improve on it. Maybe if they had a list of objectives we still are unaware of, but as we still know little now, my bet would be that it was just examined to see what had bean learnt rather than see if it could be improved upon, as the new toys like tanks and planes would be key to future plans.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#62

Post by AJFFM » 28 Nov 2015, 22:01

Even if the participants were dead their successors would definitely would like to investigate what happened in as close to real life as possible, that is in war games and staff rides.

Initial WWII plans for the Invasion of France were closely similar to what actually happened in the battle of the Frontiers and the March to the Marne during the first war. The change of course came after the Mechelen incident after which Manstein introduced his Aisne (1918) like Schwerpunkt at Sedan. This would mean that the Germans in their simulations and gaming found that what Schlieffen and others gamed and Moltke followed was the best possible path to victory.


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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#63

Post by Terry Duncan » 29 Nov 2015, 00:10

AJFFM wrote:Even if the participants were dead their successors would definitely would like to investigate what happened in as close to real life as possible, that is in war games and staff rides.

Initial WWII plans for the Invasion of France were closely similar to what actually happened in the battle of the Frontiers and the March to the Marne during the first war. The change of course came after the Mechelen incident after which Manstein introduced his Aisne (1918) like Schwerpunkt at Sedan. This would mean that the Germans in their simulations and gaming found that what Schlieffen and others gamed and Moltke followed was the best possible path to victory.
The initial WWII plan would have been an improvement over what had failed in 1914, with added new weapons which greatly alter the movement and projection of power. As such, it is a product of the General Staff's thoughts on what went wrong in 1914, not a repeat of the plan so much. They would not need to have gamed out the 1914 scenario to impliment alterations from obvious errors, though they may have gamed it out. The thing that runs against them gaming it out is the claim of this wonderful plan that ensured victory if only it was followed, as if it was gamed out and shown to be far from perfect by young staff officers, it would make the remnants of the GGS appear foolish and dishonest, not to mention responsible for going to war with a plan far less than they were telling everyone. I could have happened, I would just be surprised if they had made the results public.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#64

Post by JAG13 » 29 Nov 2015, 06:10

Attrition wrote:What were the French up to when the 5th Army attacked?
Marching into what they supposed was unoccupied country IIRC, they hand run into cavalry patrols and little else.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#65

Post by michael mills » 29 Nov 2015, 22:30

Maybe you need to read English as it is written and not with what you want to be implied as some hidden agenda behind it. I said quite clearly they had nothing to do with the start of the war and were of no more importance than the French comments abour retrieving Alsace-Lorraine. However, as you are so concerned, I am sure you would be only too happy to list the people involved in the discussions I said I believed Ferguson had mentioned, especially as they were apparently all so inconsequential their ideas were included in Bethmann's list of war aims only weeks into the war? Maybe you could also have a guess at how Bethmann managed to incorporate all their ideas into his little wish list so quickly if they really were so inconsequential?
Is there any evidence that the so-called "September Program" was ever officially accepted by the German Government as aims to be implemented in the case of a German victory?

Or was it only ever a list of items for discussion, put together from suggestions made by various interest groups?

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#66

Post by Terry Duncan » 29 Nov 2015, 22:42

michael mills wrote:
Maybe you need to read English as it is written and not with what you want to be implied as some hidden agenda behind it. I said quite clearly they had nothing to do with the start of the war and were of no more importance than the French comments abour retrieving Alsace-Lorraine. However, as you are so concerned, I am sure you would be only too happy to list the people involved in the discussions I said I believed Ferguson had mentioned, especially as they were apparently all so inconsequential their ideas were included in Bethmann's list of war aims only weeks into the war? Maybe you could also have a guess at how Bethmann managed to incorporate all their ideas into his little wish list so quickly if they really were so inconsequential?
Is there any evidence that the so-called "September Program" was ever officially accepted by the German Government as aims to be implemented in the case of a German victory?

Or was it only ever a list of items for discussion, put together from suggestions made by various interest groups?
Like all the powers war aims, it was contingent on winning, but given its date the Reichstag would not have seen it as they adjourned for three months as soon as they voted through the first war credits. As the final arbiter was the Kaiser, with Bethmann and Moltke answering only to him on such matters, it is about as official as it can get in the circumstances. My point is that these 'suggestions' from various groups, made over the previous fifteen years or so, match fairly closely the aims stated by Moltke the Elder in 1878, and by the military later in WWI, so to suggest as Ferguson does that they are of no importance and unfairly referenced by people, is at best denying that all did become the official wish list, and may well have been for quite a long time - powers tended not to publish such a list of likely demands in peacetime because it would upset the neighbours to do so, and some of the places the items had been discussed previously were the so called 'semi-official' 'government' newspapers that usually reflected the governments official line of thought. Maybe of more significance is that they contradict the 'official' claims that Germany was only fighting to defend itself, when by Sept 1914 it was clearly wanting far more.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#67

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2015, 03:21

AJFFM wrote:
JAG13 wrote:
Attrition wrote:This all seems like hindsights-taktik; the Germans knew what they were doing and did it well. So did the French but neither side could overcome terrain, friction and the fog of war. The Germans did very well to reach the Aisne and their punt to the Marne showed that they still had the power to continue. It went wrong but it didn't matter much, since the real thing was the position on the Aisne.
Well, its not really hindsight if the Germans had continually gamed such an scenario for years, what is odd is that after all that work and evidence Moltke, on the day, did something completely different with little in the way of explanation.
They gamed it assuming they had much more men than they actually had. These added troops would have closed the gap between 1st and 2nd and reinforced 1st Army against the French 6th and probably would have been enough to create a provisional field Army in that gap.

I wonder whether they gamed it after Marne or indeed after WWI ended. I know from what our colleague here (Terry Duncan I think) mentioned in a previous threat that Jellicoe re-fought Jutland on maps after the war and still every time his decision making process was proven to have been correct.
I was talking about the Schlieffen's 1905 Generalstabreise, not the memo, he also used fictitious formations there and the German officers playing the French always attacked the German center leaving the right hook in the air, aimed at nothing, fighting nothing, doing nothing while the war was decided elsewhere. Nothing about the Marne.

In fact, and retaking the "what was Moltke thinking" point, Zuber details his 1906 Generalstabreise, where the French attack in Lorraine with 14 corps, what did the German commander do?

...invade Belgium with 15 corps...

Funny thing, Moltke actually disagreed with that solution advocating for a counterattack through Metz! He went as far as to say that the purpose of the right wing was to force the French to abandon their forts and fight in the open, and that if the French attacked in Lorraine with the bulk of their army then decisive battle would be there and the Germans must march there with the right wing.

In this exercise the French also attacked the German center leaving the right hook in the air, aimed at nothing, fighting nothing, doing nothing while the war was decided elsewhere.

And yet he failed to follow his own advice in 1914 and lost the chance to win the war.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#68

Post by Attrition » 30 Nov 2015, 10:31

As with oh so many historians, Zuber's descriptions are far more convincing than his explanations. While I don't think Moltke was spoilt for choice in 1914, his decisions seem to me to be realistic, particularly when I compare them with the "if only he'd...." school of thought since their choices seem more a matter of reacting to hindsights-taktik. I think the German armies in 1914 achieved about as much as they could so wishing them to have done some things different, only leads to roughly the same result via a different route. I don't see 1914 as the beginning of the end for Germany because of Moltke's "mistakes", I think that came in mid-late 1916, when Germany lost the initiative. In that respect, Moltke, Joffre, French, Haig etc were irrelevant, it was economics, demographics and economics that decided the war.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#69

Post by glenn239 » 30 Nov 2015, 19:18

JAG13 wrote: As Zuber points out the counterattack was premature, the French were advancing happily and the Germans (or Bavarians) could have fallen further back thus handing the French enough rope to hang themselves... THEN counterattack from Metz in order to separate them from their frontier forts in order to bag the two armies and the war.
I understand. But I'm pessimistic on the prospects of success, Zuber or no.
Are you advocating an east deployment? Because otherwise the Germans would have very good reasons to expect the French to just wait for a German attack,


No, make the historical western deployment but with no German violation of Belgium, instead the right wing ready to fall on the French left as this passes through Belgium. If, as you suggest, France did not violate Belgium then the Germans would be free to cash in on such madness by turning east with major forces, the Russians having no doubt set themselves up in Prussia for a spectacular defeat in the meantime. If, more likely, the French did violate Belgium in order not to be spectators to the war in the east, then Germany executes the Schlieffen Plan after the French left passes south through the Ardennes.
And if they dont bite or the numerically inferior Germans fail to win a decisive victory then its the long war in a far less favorable position and under British blockade since the GGS believed rightly that the British would resort to any action or pretext to join the war.
There was no prospect of a "decisive victory" with the violation of Belgium. At best Moltke could take Amiens, secure Pas de Calais for the war in the Channel, and destroy the British Expeditionary Force. Valuable operational objectives to be sure, but worth the long term political odium of taking on the mantel of aggressor against Belgium? (The Germans underestimated the value of political factors throughout the war, then whined when this doctrine came back to haunt them at Versailles).

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#70

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2015, 20:02

michael mills wrote:
Maybe you need to read English as it is written and not with what you want to be implied as some hidden agenda behind it. I said quite clearly they had nothing to do with the start of the war and were of no more importance than the French comments abour retrieving Alsace-Lorraine. However, as you are so concerned, I am sure you would be only too happy to list the people involved in the discussions I said I believed Ferguson had mentioned, especially as they were apparently all so inconsequential their ideas were included in Bethmann's list of war aims only weeks into the war? Maybe you could also have a guess at how Bethmann managed to incorporate all their ideas into his little wish list so quickly if they really were so inconsequential?
Is there any evidence that the so-called "September Program" was ever officially accepted by the German Government as aims to be implemented in the case of a German victory?

Or was it only ever a list of items for discussion, put together from suggestions made by various interest groups?
No there is none, it was a mere collection of "what could we ask for if we win" made by one official, it was so relevant that the Germans were quite willing to settle for far less at any point during the war, they were not committed to it in any way and its sole use was for propaganda by people with a clear and determined agenda...

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#71

Post by AJFFM » 30 Nov 2015, 20:21

glenn239 wrote:

I understand. But I'm pessimistic on the prospects of success, Zuber or no.
The victory is not that the Germans would penetrate the Fort line, they knew that won't happen with the level of troops they had, the true victory is to deny Joffre the ability to move the 5-6 Corps from East to West and prop up the 9th and 5th Armies. It was these reserves that prevented 3rd German Army from penetrating Foch's army in depth which would have resulted splitting the whole front wide open and gave the 4th German army the opportunity to outflank the Fort line from the west.

The staff rides and Kriegsspiels, especially the 1900 one discussed by Zuber, counted on the French investing too many troops guarding the Fort line while the Germans move enough troops through Belgium (as fast as possible) to render any French remedy impossible because it would mean a compromise, reduce the Fort Line troop levels to counter the German approach on the French left (where the minor forward forts would have fallen by then) therefore exposing some of the vulnerable major forts, especially Verdun, to an attack that would probably break the entire Fort Line altogether (which was the result reached by one of the Staff rides during Schlieffen't time).

By joining battle early the German 5th and 6th Armies lost a great chance for a great victory which would have both reduced the number of French corps available to transfer in early September and caused lots of mayhem if not opened a door for an unexpected victory through a vigorously sought after exploitation.
glenn239 wrote:

No, make the historical western deployment but with no German violation of Belgium, instead the right wing ready to fall on the French left as this passes through Belgium. If, as you suggest, France did not violate Belgium then the Germans would be free to cash in on such madness by turning east with major forces, the Russians having no doubt set themselves up in Prussia for a spectacular defeat in the meantime. If, more likely, the French did violate Belgium in order not to be spectators to the war in the east, then Germany executes the Schlieffen Plan after the French left passes south through the Ardennes.


All staff rides and Kriegsspiels that investigated leaving Belgium alone ended up with the same disastrous result for the Germans, no victory in the west and at least 2 million Russians in the East with full supply from France and Britain within a few months. The Franco-Russia deal was an attack in M+15 but it did not specify where and while the French had the capability to muster their 2 million men against the German Fort lines the Germans did not have enough men to counter the French. Indeed all staff rides ended with the Germans losing not only Alsace-Lorraine but Saarland and parts of Wurtemburg.

Taking Belgium as I have always maintained was a matter of national survival for the Germans regardless of its legality or appropriateness.

glenn239 wrote:
There was no prospect of a "decisive victory" with the violation of Belgium. At best Moltke could take Amiens, secure Pas de Calais for the war in the Channel, and destroy the British Expeditionary Force. Valuable operational objectives to be sure, but worth the long term political odium of taking on the mantel of aggressor against Belgium? (The Germans underestimated the value of political factors throughout the war, then whined when this doctrine came back to haunt them at Versailles).
I disagree with you here and this is why I have been asking myself and others here, were the events up to the Marne and even to mid October ever played out later? The fact that a variant of Schlieffen line of thinking, I wouldn't call it a plan, was utilised by the Germans in WWII, albeit forcefully since penetrating the Maginot line was damn near impossible given the number of troops guarding it, shows that the line of thinking pursued by Schlieffen was the correct one.

I am in no way a military expert but from all what I read the impression I got was that during the critical days from September 1st until 15th many mistakes on both sides were committed and two things made the difference, the French were quick to identify any mistake and through as many troops at them as they could possibly can, hold the line at any cost was the French order of every day. And the second was that the Germans did not have enough troops at the front to close the gap between 1st and 2nd and re-enforce 3rd Armies in their tasks. They had at least 3 Corps at the rear mopping up forts and had several divisions in other Armies than have were in the reserve and were not needed or used.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#72

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2015, 21:08

glenn239 wrote:
JAG13 wrote: As Zuber points out the counterattack was premature, the French were advancing happily and the Germans (or Bavarians) could have fallen further back thus handing the French enough rope to hang themselves... THEN counterattack from Metz in order to separate them from their frontier forts in order to bag the two armies and the war.
I understand. But I'm pessimistic on the prospects of success, Zuber or no.
Fair enough.
Are you advocating an east deployment? Because otherwise the Germans would have very good reasons to expect the French to just wait for a German attack,


No, make the historical western deployment but with no German violation of Belgium, instead the right wing ready to fall on the French left as this passes through Belgium. If, as you suggest, France did not violate Belgium then the Germans would be free to cash in on such madness by turning east with major forces, the Russians having no doubt set themselves up in Prussia for a spectacular defeat in the meantime. If, more likely, the French did violate Belgium in order not to be spectators to the war in the east, then Germany executes the Schlieffen Plan after the French left passes south through the Ardennes.
The trouble with that is that the French expected the right hook and welcomed it as the setup for a new Austerlitz, if the Germans failed to attack then they have to reevaluate, treaty obligations notwithstanding, and if they are keeping the Germans deployed in the west they are setting the Russians up and the sensible thing would be to wait for the Russians to fully mobilize and deploy which would mean to wait a week. The Germans of course can try to redeploy east, but at least a significant part of the army would still be in the trains when the two fully deployed Entente armies move forward in a simultaneous attack.

What would have been interesting is a Belgium feint, attack Liege as done, send cavalry and a reduced 1st army (just 4 corps)... keep the 2nd back on their trains ready to setup the counterattack on the advancing French or move East, had they been willing to take risks and bluff a little that is.
And if they dont bite or the numerically inferior Germans fail to win a decisive victory then its the long war in a far less favorable position and under British blockade since the GGS believed rightly that the British would resort to any action or pretext to join the war.
There was no prospect of a "decisive victory" with the violation of Belgium. At best Moltke could take Amiens, secure Pas de Calais for the war in the Channel, and destroy the British Expeditionary Force. Valuable operational objectives to be sure, but worth the long term political odium of taking on the mantel of aggressor against Belgium? (The Germans underestimated the value of political factors throughout the war, then whined when this doctrine came back to haunt them at Versailles).
Well, the army did assumed and assumed right that the British (Grey) would do anything to enter the war no matter what, the civilians had a better understanding of the nuances of British government and thought it likely, but also believed there was a chance they wouldnt intervene if the circumstances were right, which is what almost came to happen if not for Moltke's tantrum...

...hence the pandemonium in Berlin when it became known they were to invade Belgium and Luxemboutg RIGHT NOW, as the army barely started to mobilize! Moltke was adamant, had they known (as Moltke did) that the Belgians had already prepared to demolish the bridges and were ready for a German attack the civilians would have likely resigned over the matter as it no longer made any sense!

In the end, the attack on Liege that saved Grey happened because Moltke's pride was hurt, he was sick of being sidelined and ignored, he was weak, so he dug his heels in and insisted on an attack that had slim chances of success and a huge political downside...

But still, the Germans had to force a decision in the west somehow, otherwise they just cede the initiative in a war in which they are outnumbered and under blockade.
Last edited by JAG13 on 30 Nov 2015, 21:25, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#73

Post by JAG13 » 30 Nov 2015, 21:22

Attrition wrote:As with oh so many historians, Zuber's descriptions are far more convincing than his explanations. While I don't think Moltke was spoilt for choice in 1914, his decisions seem to me to be realistic, particularly when I compare them with the "if only he'd...." school of thought since their choices seem more a matter of reacting to hindsights-taktik. I think the German armies in 1914 achieved about as much as they could so wishing them to have done some things different, only leads to roughly the same result via a different route. I don't see 1914 as the beginning of the end for Germany because of Moltke's "mistakes", I think that came in mid-late 1916, when Germany lost the initiative. In that respect, Moltke, Joffre, French, Haig etc were irrelevant, it was economics, demographics and economics that decided the war.
Well. what lost them the war was a miscalculation when they were in the brink of turning the demographic balance around, they thought they could starve Britain before the Usians could come in, therefore nullifying the effect of Imperial Russia's demise shortly thereafter.

Had they delayed such a decision by a couple months they would have won.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#74

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Dec 2015, 01:02

JAG13 wrote:No there is none, it was a mere collection of "what could we ask for if we win" made by one official, it was so relevant that the Germans were quite willing to settle for far less at any point during the war, they were not committed to it in any way and its sole use was for propaganda by people with a clear and determined agenda...
It represents what the Germans would have been able to demand if they had maintained their positions of early Sept 1914, the point the memo was composed, the later demands were reduced due to their loss at The Marne and retreat to the Aisne, it being rather difficult to demand more than your military might can obtain. As to the notion it was only for propaganda is amusing, as if this had been the case it wouldnt have been hidden away and denied post war. As the 'one official' that produced it was the Chancellor and answered only to the Kaiser, it is a quite significant document, but I guess if you dismiss this, you also dismiss the idea France was after regaining Alsace-Lorraine until well after the war started as there was never an official policy by the French saying such a thing.

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Re: Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

#75

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Dec 2015, 01:08

JAG13 wrote:
Attrition wrote:As with oh so many historians, Zuber's descriptions are far more convincing than his explanations. While I don't think Moltke was spoilt for choice in 1914, his decisions seem to me to be realistic, particularly when I compare them with the "if only he'd...." school of thought since their choices seem more a matter of reacting to hindsights-taktik. I think the German armies in 1914 achieved about as much as they could so wishing them to have done some things different, only leads to roughly the same result via a different route. I don't see 1914 as the beginning of the end for Germany because of Moltke's "mistakes", I think that came in mid-late 1916, when Germany lost the initiative. In that respect, Moltke, Joffre, French, Haig etc were irrelevant, it was economics, demographics and economics that decided the war.
Well. what lost them the war was a miscalculation when they were in the brink of turning the demographic balance around, they thought they could starve Britain before the Usians could come in, therefore nullifying the effect of Imperial Russia's demise shortly thereafter.

Had they delayed such a decision by a couple months they would have won.
The miscalculation created the impression the Germans had a chance of winning, if they had used the correct figures, they would have run out of men and material long before the Entente, as even the supposed 'manpower shortage' the British had in 1918 was only becuase Lloyd-George had decided to keep 140,000 fit men in the UK to prevent the army 'wasting them', something that was impossible to maintain if the war was to be continued and no US army was in France. Germany just did not have the manpower or material resources to win, the Entente could, and did, deploy large numbers of men in theaters away from Europe at will, they could just as easily use them in Europe if there was a need.

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