Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#91

Post by Terry Duncan » 30 May 2016, 23:57

glenn239 wrote:Anyways, I checked the night action. Jellicoe went to bed in the middle of the battle. According to Castles of Steel, 649, he literally was snoring logs on his cot while the HSF was approaching to under the guns of the Grand Fleet.
I dont believe Massie says Jellicoe was snoring away, but it would seem that he lay down on the cot (have a look at its locations, it actually part of the bridge on Iron Duke) and left instructions he was to be woken if anything developed. The 'snoring away' period would appear to have been a very minimal time too, maybe 2 hours, in order to get rest before the expected daylight action renewed the battle. If only the intel section had not failed this would have happened.
glenn239 wrote:The fact the HSF got away was his fault.
How so? Because nobody reported to him despite his orders that they should do so?
glenn239 wrote: At 2000 had it in the bag.
You mean he had restored the situation and come out on top after Beatty had done his best to throw the battle away before the GF sighted the HSF?
glenn239 wrote:All he had to do was not go to bed in the middle of the most important naval battle of the war. Maybe a dozen battleships had valid information about the HSF, had Jellicoe remained at his post, inquired of his units, and properly directed the fleet.
The 'maybe a dozen battleships' that had very limited information on the German position and course didnt actually report it to Iron Duke did they, so even had Jellicoe been awake he would still not have known much, other than the fighting he expected his destroyer screen to be involved in as it clashed with the Germans. Have a look and see what was seen from Iron Duke, or indeed most of the battleships, it was just the odd gunflash, and nothing to indicate the HSF's heavy units were involved.
glenn239 wrote:I also see I remembered correctly - Evan-Thomas compounded his bad performance that day by having identified German capital ships in his gunsights at point blank range, (6,000 yards) and didn't give the order to open fire.
No you didnt remember correctly. You named Seydlitz and Moltke, one of which was badly damaged, but these were not seen by Evan-Thomas, he sighted battleships, a rather different beast, and far from critically damaged. He didnt give the order to fire certainly, but the encounter wasnt very long at all. The biggest fault was in not reporting the incident.
glenn239 wrote:He should have been sacked for that before he even reached port. (Beatty later (1917?) came in and took over his flagship, which suggests his opinion of E-T's performance that day).
LOL. Please try to look things up, this comment makes you look silly. Beatty had been after the QE's as a status symbol since they joined the fleet, and as Queen Elizabeth was the ship fully fitted as a fleet flagship it was inevitable he would grab it as soon as he could (the moment he took over command in fact, as Iron Duke took Jellicoe to the mainland to take the train to London). What you failed to notice is that he kept Evan-Thomas as the admiral commanding 5th BS, and kept him on Queen Elizabeth too, right up until the war ended! Beatty obvioulsy had no problem with Evan-Thomas, he may even have learned something about signalling from him, or just found a fellow incompetent to stand on the bridge with?

Have a look who Jellicoe and the other senior admirals wished to take up the command, it wasnt Beatty, it was Madden!

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#92

Post by glenn239 » 31 May 2016, 18:45

Terry Duncan wrote:
I dont believe Massie says Jellicoe was snoring away, but it would seem that he lay down on the cot (have a look at its locations, it actually part of the bridge on Iron Duke) and left instructions he was to be woken if anything developed. The 'snoring away' period would appear to have been a very minimal time too, maybe 2 hours, in order to get rest before the expected daylight action renewed the battle. If only the intel section had not failed this would have happened.
To say the least, I was v. surprised to read Jellicoe went to bed. Now, no doubt he'd never have repeated that mistake again, but he never got the chance.
How so? Because nobody reported to him despite his orders that they should do so?
Beatty had delivered the HSF to destruction and Jellicoe should not have gone to bed in the middle of a fleet action, with the GF for the first (and last) time of the war positioned between the HSF and its base.
No you didnt remember correctly. You named Seydlitz and Moltke, one of which was badly damaged, but these were not seen by Evan-Thomas, he sighted battleships, a rather different beast, and far from critically damaged. He didnt give the order to fire certainly, but the encounter wasnt very long at all. The biggest fault was in not reporting the incident.
It was E-T's 5th BS that had identified heavy targets at close range and let them go.
! Beatty obvioulsy had no problem with Evan-Thomas, he may even have learned something about signalling from him, or just found a fellow incompetent to stand on the bridge with?
Interesting point!


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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#93

Post by Terry Duncan » 31 May 2016, 20:07

glenn239 wrote:To say the least, I was v. surprised to read Jellicoe went to bed. Now, no doubt he'd never have repeated that mistake again, but he never got the chance.
Given there was no intention to fight a fleet action at night and Jellicoe had been awake for over 24 hours, it was sensible to rest in order to have a clear head if action was renewed at first light. If anything significant were to happen, the bridge staff were under instruction to wake him at once, but nobody signalled Iron Duke with information to suggest what was happening.
glenn239 wrote:Beatty had delivered the HSF to destruction and Jellicoe should not have gone to bed in the middle of a fleet action, with the GF for the first (and last) time of the war positioned between the HSF and its base.
It was hardly 'in the middle of a fleet action' as the two sides were quite a few miles distant, and there was a very large screen of light cruisers and destroyers between the capital ships of the GF and the HSF. All of these ships has a copy of the GFBO instructing them that sightings must be reported to the flagship, so there was a reasonable expectation that Jellicoe would be aware of anything that developed. Beatty, who you seem to find no fault with, was even further from the action and, like pretty much all the British admirals, took his own break from the bridge, as expecting them to command after c36 hours awake by 00.00 1st June - many had been awake since the signal from the admiralty had been recieved about midday on 30th May.
glenn239 wrote:It was E-T's 5th BS that had identified heavy targets at close range and let them go.
A fleeting glimpse in poor visibility, with the Germans ships vanishing, quite possibly before correct identification and guns laying on target was completed. All we have a record of is a brief sighting and no opening of fire. We do know the Germans pulled away each and every time a British capital ship was sighted, so the encounter wouldnt have been for any significant time.
glenn239 wrote:Interesting point!
Thank you. Have you read the lin supplied by The Ibis in the did Jutland Matter thread? It deals with how the British designed their fleet and how they meant to fight, given you like the N Squared Law application, it is quite interesting.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#94

Post by glenn239 » 01 Jun 2016, 19:35

Terry Duncan wrote:
Given there was no intention to fight a fleet action at night and Jellicoe had been awake for over 24 hours, it was sensible to rest in order to have a clear head if action was renewed at first light. If anything significant were to happen, the bridge staff were under instruction to wake him at once, but nobody signalled Iron Duke with information to suggest what was happening.
There was won shot in the whole war to eliminate the HSF. Unfortunately, the opportunity came at dusk instead of dawn.
It was hardly 'in the middle of a fleet action' as the two sides were quite a few miles distant,
Having written the second half of this excerpt, how was it that the first half was not then edited out?
A fleeting glimpse in poor visibility, with the Germans ships vanishing, quite possibly before correct identification and guns laying on target was completed. All we have a record of is a brief sighting and no opening of fire. We do know the Germans pulled away each and every time a British capital ship was sighted, so the encounter wouldnt have been for any significant time
I've only reviewed Castles of Steel so far, and it does not suggest there was confusion on the nature of the target, but that the captains and admirals were reluctant to open fire for some reason. This reason will be the top-heavy command style of the GF, (though, to be fair to Jellicoe, when Beatty requested a battleship division follow him around 830pm, the request was granted).
Thank you. Have you read the lin supplied by The Ibis in the did Jutland Matter thread? It deals with how the British designed their fleet and how
they meant to fight, given you like the N Squared Law application, it is quite interesting.
When you're right, your right - if Beatty didn't punish Evan-Thomas then Beatty couldn't be upset with his performance and must have thought he was a capable officer. Personally, I wonder if E-T would have gotten his whole squadron sunk on a flag signalling technicality.

Can you link? The N-squared law I find most interesting because it had so much influence on thinking with so little actual validation in battle of the basic concept.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#95

Post by Terry Duncan » 04 Jun 2016, 18:10

glenn239 wrote:There was won shot in the whole war to eliminate the HSF. Unfortunately, the opportunity came at dusk instead of dawn.
I fully agree, but that is all that saved the HSF at Jutland.
glenn239 wrote:Having written the second half of this excerpt, how was it that the first half was not then edited out?
Because there was no expectation of fighting a fleet action at night (by either side) due to the massive confusion it would create. At the point Jellicoe went to rest, there was no report of enemy action, and none came in from the ships supposed to report on contacts. To criticise Jellicoe for getting a couple of hours sleep when no action was reported would be like criticising Napoleon for sleeping at night at Leipzig, Lee or meade at Gettysburg, or most recently, for complaining any of the French, British, or German generals sleeping during the German advance to the Marne or retreat to the Aisne. Commanders that have been awake for 48 hours tend to make mistakes, and Jellicoe could not accept that risk.
glenn239 wrote:I've only reviewed Castles of Steel so far, and it does not suggest there was confusion on the nature of the target, but that the captains and admirals were reluctant to open fire for some reason. This reason will be the top-heavy command style of the GF, (though, to be fair to Jellicoe, when Beatty requested a battleship division follow him around 830pm, the request was granted).
The GFBO made it clear a commander on the spot was the best man to make the decision, and that contact with the enemy should be reported to the CinC. You are trying to blame Jellicoe for a problem that had existed in the RN for hundreds of years, illustrated nicely when Camperdown rammed Victoria (with Jellicoe onboard) in 1893, where about half the Med fleet ended up within 100 yeards of the rammed ship due to near misses, and the 1875 collision between Iron Duke and Vanguard, where the latter sank after the former rammed her in thick fog, the speed of the collision being worse because despite thick fog, Iron Duke had not slowed because she had not been told to, and the other two ships of the squadron made port without even knowing the collision had taken place! The Victorian navy took the lessons of Nelson, Howe, and Rodney, to be that captains should have no initiative other than in painting the ships nicely, and that all commands should come from flag officers, upon whom the spirit of Nelson descended upon promotion so no further instruction was needed. Try and get hold of Vol I From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow to see what a mess the navy was at the time of Fisher, Scott and Jellicoe taking over, and how they transformed it.
glenn239 wrote:Can you link? The N-squared law I find most interesting because it had so much influence on thinking with so little actual validation in battle of the basic concept.
Sorry, I thought I had linked it, but here you are;

http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/99759/1/ ... Review.pdf

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#96

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Jun 2016, 18:30

Hi Glenn239,

Indeed, as you say, "There was won shot in the whole war to eliminate the HSF." However, desirable as this might be, it was not an absolute requirement because the British blockade was slowly strangling Germany anyway.

On the other hand, there was also just one shot in the whole war to eliminate the GF, which was the linchpin of that blockade. The difference is that in 1916 this was as near as any single thing to an absolute requirement if Germany were to win the war. When Britain finally came under threat it was a result of submarine warfare sensibly resorted to the following year precisely because the HSF had proved incapable of doing so.

It was named the High Seas Fleet for a reason, but failed totally to live up to its billing. It proved to be more of an occasional coastal flotilla than a high seas fleet. Jutland kept it that way.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#97

Post by glenn239 » 06 Jun 2016, 18:58

Terry Duncan wrote:
Because there was no expectation of fighting a fleet action at night (by either side) due to the massive confusion it would create.
True, Jellicoe did not wish to initiate a night action. It does not follow at all a similar intention of Scheer's. In fact, his own reasoning leads to the conclusion that Scheer would seek a night action at all costs if the choice was that or a battle the next day. And given that the battle lines were not that far apart, an all-out engagement could spark literally, at any moment during the night.
At the point Jellicoe went to rest, there was no report of enemy action, and none came in from the ships supposed to report on contacts. To criticise Jellicoe for getting a couple of hours sleep when no action was reported would be like criticising Napoleon for sleeping at night at Leipzig, Lee or meade at Gettysburg
There was one night during the entire war that the commander of the Grand Fleet had to stay up all night and still perform the next day. This was at Jutland. If Jellicoe was not capable of doing that he was not physically qualified to command the Grand Fleet.
You are trying to blame Jellicoe for a problem that had existed in the RN for hundreds of years
Beatty is responsible for the failures of officers in his command as well; it's always the commanding officer who bears final responsibility for errors and failures.
Thanks, I'll take a look.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#98

Post by glenn239 » 06 Jun 2016, 19:09

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Glenn239,

Indeed, as you say, "There was won shot in the whole war to eliminate the HSF." However, desirable as this might be, it was not an absolute requirement because the British blockade was slowly strangling Germany anyway.
If an opportunity exists to kill the enemy fleet, it is desirable to do it because then the threat is eliminated for all time. (For example, at Pearl Harbor, Nagumo let the Enterprise go, and later Enterprise repaid that decision by sinking two of his carriers at Midway).
On the other hand, there was also just one shot in the whole war to eliminate the GF, which was the linchpin of that blockade.
The key to the blockade was the lack of German bases in the Atlantic, the plentiful number of Entente bases, and the circuitous route HSF warships needed to take to even get into the arena where the blockade functioned. Geography and logistics were the key to the blockade. In terms of the threat the HSF posed to the GF, every time the HSF sortied it could threaten the GF. Only if the HSF was sunk or the GF moved to the Irish Sea was there no capacity for the HSF to threaten the GF.
It was named the High Seas Fleet for a reason, but failed totally to live up to its billing. It proved to be more of an occasional coastal flotilla than a high seas fleet. Jutland kept it that way.
Jutland had nothing to do with that though; before Jutland the HSF was a glorified coastal raiding force, after Jutland it remained a glorified coastal raiding force. The strategic posture of the HSF never changed, and it reverted to a lesser role in 1917, not because of Jutland, but because Germany lacked the resources to pursue the 1916 surface strategy and USW at the same time.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#99

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Jun 2016, 20:00

Hi Glenn,

You write, "If an opportunity exists to kill the enemy fleet, it is desirable to do it because then the threat is eliminated for all time." Absolutely!

At Jutland the Grand Fleet successfully contrived such an opportunity, but failed to clinch it. The High Seas Fleet created no such war winning opportunity to fluff in the first place.

You write, "The key to the blockade was the lack of German bases in the Atlantic, the plentiful number of Entente bases, and the circuitous route HSF warships needed to take to even get into the arena where the blockade functioned. Geography and logistics were the key to the blockade." Again, absolutely! That was why Jutland was a success for the Grand Fleet, despite its higher losses, and a defeat for the High Seas Fleet, because this advantageous status quo for the Allies remained as solid after the battle as before.

You write, "In terms of the threat the HSF posed to the GF, every time the HSF sortied it could threaten the GF. Only if the HSF was sunk or the GF moved to the Irish Sea was there no capacity for the HSF to threaten the GF." Yet again, I agree. However, although the British had to remain alert 24/7 for over four years to counter this threat, they successfully did so. Except briefly at Jutland, the threat never really materialized and in the end the High Seas Fleet surrendered virtually intact. Job done for the Grand Fleet, I would suggest, if without the satisfaction of anything approaching the hoped for annihilatory fleet action.

You write, ".......before Jutland the HSF was a glorified coastal raiding force, after Jutland it remained a glorified coastal raiding force." That would be fine if it had been designed and built as a coastal raiding force, but it wasn't. As its name implies, the German High Seas Fleet was designed to challenge British domination of the high seas, not bombard the occasional east coast holiday resort.

Don't get me wrong, the German High Seas Fleet was arguably at least as good qualitatively as its British opposite number, and in some demonstrable ways superior. However, this was not enough at Jutland and it knew it. It therefore never risked a similar confrontation again.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#100

Post by Terry Duncan » 06 Jun 2016, 23:11

glenn239 wrote:True, Jellicoe did not wish to initiate a night action. It does not follow at all a similar intention of Scheer's. In fact, his own reasoning leads to the conclusion that Scheer would seek a night action at all costs if the choice was that or a battle the next day. And given that the battle lines were not that far apart, an all-out engagement could spark literally, at any moment during the night.
Have a look at the information, whilst the Germans had proper searchlight screens and larger searchlights too, as well as a more complex recognition signal system for night fighting, they had no intention of a night battle and had never practiced for one. Individual ships had practiced night gunnery, but control of a large fleet was impossible at night, so that was as far as it went, even maneuvers at night had proven difficult. Scheer's decision to try and break through the GF at night was an on the spot decision brought about by the desprate situation he found himself in, and even then he had no clue where many of his ships were until well into the next day. He had been willing to risk the loss of much of his fleet to avoid the certain loss of all of it the next day, hence his choice that night. Look at the well known 'Battle of May Island' for a good illustration of night maneuvers and the resulting chaos, when Beatty had been CinC for well over a year, indeed longer than the period between the issueing of the GFBO and Jutland taking place.
glenn239 wrote:There was one night during the entire war that the commander of the Grand Fleet had to stay up all night and still perform the next day. This was at Jutland. If Jellicoe was not capable of doing that he was not physically qualified to command the Grand Fleet.
Jellicoe had been awake since the fleet got the signal that the Germans were leaving port on 30th May. His decision made perfect sense as there was still an admiral on the bridge of Iron Duke (Madden) and he told people to wake him if any reports of contact with enemy capital units came in. He would have been awakened if reports came in, but they did not. This was hardly his fault, as the GFBO laid out it was of the utmost importance for captains to report sightings to the CinC. Captains had this information for well over a year by Jutland and had supposedly read it, so it is hardly the fault of Jellicoe if they did not act as he asked. Note: The admiralty appointed captains and admirals, not Jellicoe. It seems strange that you have read many of the same books I have, yet you look to blame the man who took the fleet out of the Victorian era for things beyond his control, but hold up Beatty as a shining example of a good admiral (I can think of at least six who would have been far better in the post).
glenn239 wrote:Beatty is responsible for the failures of officers in his command as well; it's always the commanding officer who bears final responsibility for errors and failures.
Beatty is responsible for the failures he was the cause of, or where he appointed someone who proved a failure, kept someone in place that was inept, or failed in ensuring proper practice drills it was his duty to ensure took place. For example, Beatty can be blamed for insisting Seymour remain in place and had done nothing wrong with the signals, when signal errors took place every time Lion was in action. The problem was either Beatty failing to give proper instructions, or Seymour repeatedly not executing the orders properly, which is hard to believe as he would hardly have got his post if he was that inept. Beatty had a well documented habit of standing on the bridge/compass platform when in action, and concentrating on the action iteself, he was a political appointment by Churchill despite never commading a squadron previously, so it is far more likely that the signalling problems stemmed from Beatty himself than an officer who had to pass exams to hold his position. Beatty's strange 360 degree turn at Jutland (the one he insisted Harper call 'two consecutive 180 degree turns' in order to disguise he had steamed in a circle in the middle of a battle) is a damned good indicator to just how capable and attentive to details Beatty was.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#101

Post by glenn239 » 11 Jun 2016, 16:55

Sid Guttridge wrote: At Jutland the Grand Fleet successfully contrived such an opportunity, but failed to clinch it. The High Seas Fleet created no such war winning opportunity to fluff in the first place.
The HSF certainly created no opportunity to sink the Grand Fleet. Tough to see how that happens unless Jellicoe parcels out his battle squadrons one nibble at a time. So in terms of 'war winning' HSF victories, there was none to be had under practically any circumstances. Jutland simply confirmed the inherent bankruptcy of the pre-existing German naval strategy rather than being a decision that changed a workable idea into an unworkable one.
Again, absolutely! That was why Jutland was a success for the Grand Fleet, despite its higher losses, and a defeat for the High Seas Fleet, because this advantageous status quo for the Allies remained as solid after the battle as before.
In fact the lack of German bases in the Atlantic demonstrates how Jutland didn't matter at all. Scheer could literally have destroyed the entire Grand Fleet for no losses and the material situation of the blockade would not have significantly changed. The competition between the battle fleets in the North Sea was divorced from the strategic reality of the global naval situation.
However, although the British had to remain alert 24/7 for over four years to counter this threat, they successfully did so.
In fact the HSF never tried to attack and defeat the RN while at anchor. On a related note, the defences of Pearl Harbor were also perfectly successful in all instances in which they were not tested.
You write, ".......before Jutland the HSF was a glorified coastal raiding force, after Jutland it remained a glorified coastal raiding force." That would be fine if it had been designed and built as a coastal raiding force, but it wasn't. As its name implies, the German High Seas Fleet was designed to challenge British domination of the high seas, not bombard the occasional east coast holiday resort.
It doesn't imply anything about the designed intention of the HSF, (in fact, the designer Tirpitz had no say on fighting strategy, so there was a pre-war disconnect between design and strategy). The observation is simply that Jutland had no impact whatever on the mission of the High Seas Fleet - beforehand it was a glorified North Sea raiding force, afterwards it was a glorified North Sea raiding force. The argument that the RN maintained the blockade at Jutland is just searching for reasons that the British won the battle, when they did not win the battle. Jutland was a meaningless tactical German success that could easily have turned into a major defeat for Scheer.
Don't get me wrong, the German High Seas Fleet was arguably at least as good qualitatively as its British opposite number, and in some demonstrable ways superior. However, this was not enough at Jutland and it knew it. It therefore never risked a similar confrontation again.
Again, this reads into the situation things that were not there. Scheer had no intention of fighting the Grand Fleet on the day before Jutland, and no intention of doing so the day after. Jutland changed nothing.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#102

Post by glenn239 » 11 Jun 2016, 17:15

Terry Duncan wrote: Have a look at the information, whilst the Germans had proper searchlight screens and larger searchlights too, as well as a more complex recognition signal system for night fighting, they had no intention of a night battle and had never practiced for one. Individual ships had practiced night gunnery, but control of a large fleet was impossible at night, so that was as far as it went, even maneuvers at night had proven difficult. Scheer's decision to try and break through the GF at night was an on the spot decision brought about by the desprate situation he found himself in, and even then he had no clue where many of his ships were until well into the next day. He had been willing to risk the loss of much of his fleet to avoid the certain loss of all of it the next day, hence his choice that night. Look at the well known 'Battle of May Island' for a good illustration of night maneuvers and the resulting chaos, when Beatty had been CinC for well over a year, indeed longer than the period between the issueing of the GFBO and Jutland taking place.
Having reached the conclusion night combat favored the German fleet, it was reasonable to assume Scheer would seek a night battle.

Jellicoe had been awake since the fleet got the signal that the Germans were leaving port on 30th May. His decision made perfect sense as there was still an admiral on the bridge of Iron Duke (Madden) and he told people to wake him if any reports of contact with enemy capital units came in
No, this was inefficient because it introduced two more points of failure that could have been avoided. First, no subordinate knows Jellicoe's mind and could guess wrong on how he would process information. Second, any new information would be weighed against the downside of waking Jellicoe up. If Jellicoe doesn't go to bed then this doesn't happen and all information is evaluated.
He would have been awakened if reports came in, but they did not. This was hardly his fault, as the GFBO laid out it was of the utmost importance for captains to report sightings to the CinC
Jellicoe is responsible for the oversights in communication of his command, just like Moltke was responsible for failing to predict and take measures that his armies would not coordinate and communicate adequately. So yes, it was his responsibility. Secondly, Jellicoe's subordinates would assume that what they were seeing would be reported to Jellicoe by those aboard Iron Duke directly whenever they evaluated that the flagship could see or hear what they did. By taking a snooze Jellicoe threw another wrench into an already complicated situation. Jellicoe had the opportunity of a lifetime and he went to bed instead. The decision was so obviously on the face of it the wrong one, I really sort of wonder if Castles of Steel is wrong and he didn't retire.
It seems strange that you have read many of the same books I have, yet you look to blame the man who took the fleet out of the Victorian era for things beyond his control, but hold up Beatty as a shining example of a good admiral (I can think of at least six who would have been far better in the post).
It's a really simple but ancient principle - the commanding officer is ultimately responsible for his command because he is the commanding officer. To argue Beatty is responsible for his lousy signalling arrangements is perfectly true. Well, so was Jellicoe for his.
Beatty is responsible for the failures he was the cause of, or where he appointed someone who proved a failure, kept someone in place that was inept, or failed in ensuring proper practice drills it was his duty to ensure took place. For example, Beatty can be blamed for insisting Seymour remain in place and had done nothing wrong with the signals, when signal errors took place every time Lion was in action. The problem was either Beatty failing to give proper instructions, or Seymour repeatedly not executing the orders properly, which is hard to believe as he would hardly have got his post if he was that inept. Beatty had a well documented habit of standing on the bridge/compass platform when in action, and concentrating on the action iteself, he was a political appointment by Churchill despite never commading a squadron previously, so it is far more likely that the signalling problems stemmed from Beatty himself than an officer who had to pass exams to hold his position. Beatty's strange 360 degree turn at Jutland (the one he insisted Harper call 'two consecutive 180 degree turns' in order to disguise he had steamed in a circle in the middle of a battle) is a damned good indicator to just how capable and attentive to details Beatty was.
None of this changes the underlying principle, that both Beatty and Jellicoe were responsible for their command's signalling protocols, that these were defective, and that by going to bed Jellicoe introduced an avoidable complication into the situation at a time when the RN had a once-in-a-century opportunity, which hadn't been seen since Trafalgar. After the battle, a bunch of propaganda and spin about maintaining the blockade, but during the battle, the objective was to annihilate first Hipper, then when he showed up unexpectedly, Scheer. It's like Joe Fraser the day after Ali beats him arguing that in the ring he was looking to preserve his TV endorsements rather than knock out his opponent.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#103

Post by Sid Guttridge » 13 Jun 2016, 13:04

Hi Glenn,

You write, "......Jutland simply confirmed the inherent bankruptcy of the pre-existing German naval strategy....." This smells of British success to me.

You write, "The competition between the battle fleets in the North Sea was divorced from the strategic reality of the global naval situation." There was no "global naval situation", precisely because no significant German warships could get past the British Blockade - a blockade whose linch pin was the Grand Fleet.

You write, "In fact the HSF never tried to attack and defeat the RN while at anchor." True, but then nobody claimed that it did. What I actually wrote was, "However, although the British had to remain alert 24/7 for over four years to counter this threat, they successfully did so."

You write, "Jutland was a meaningless tactical German success....." Nope, it was a tactical British success, which is why the Germans fled back to harbour. The HSF was lured onto the Grand Fleet and had it's "T" crossed twice. In the age of the battleship. crossing the "T" was the height of successful tactical deployment. The German High Seas Fleet's main tactical success was to get away without too much damage under the cover of dark while the tally of losses still favoured it.

You write, "Scheer had no intention of fighting the Grand Fleet on the day before Jutland......" Well he wasn't very successful. One up to the British, I would suggest.

You write, "Jutland..... could easily have turned into a major defeat for Scheer." Yup, and the Germans knew they had had a narrow escape, which helps explain why they never risked a similar clash again.

You write, "Scheer could literally have destroyed the entire Grand Fleet for no losses and the material situation of the blockade would not have significantly changed." Really? Mastery of the high seas would have conferred almost no advantage on Germany at all? I find it difficult to take this as a serious argument. It certainly doesn't sit comfortably with the oft quoted observation that "Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could have lost the war in an afternoon."

"The observation is simply that Jutland had no impact whatever on the mission of the High Seas Fleet". Yes, it was right back where it started, which was a status quo that massively favoured the British blockade. Another positive outcome in British favour.

And if the High Seas Fleet was really just designed as "a glorified North Sea raiding force", why wasn't it equipped as such? It was designed for one thing, to wrest control of the seas from the British and that is why it built so many of the sort of line-of-battle Dreadnoughts it did. However, it had failed to out-build the British before 1914 and so spent almost the entire war in port. It never really challenged British supremacy at sea, even at Jutland. It was far too heavy just for occasional North Sea raiding, and not big enough to face the Grand Fleet, as Jutland evidenced. As built, it proved a white elephant!

You write, "The argument that the RN maintained the blockade at Jutland is just searching for reasons that the British won the battle...." Yes, and finding a really good one!

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#104

Post by Terry Duncan » 13 Jun 2016, 18:42

glenn239 wrote:Having reached the conclusion night combat favored the German fleet,
Really? Who do you imagine reached such a conclusion prior to Jutland? The concensus across all navies at this time was that a night action was too risky as it was impossible to control the fleets, and friendly fire was too great a risk. Even the advantage the Germans had with their searchlights was unknown to both navies until the night action started.
glenn239 wrote:it was reasonable to assume Scheer would seek a night battle.
It was reasonable to assume Scheer would avoid a night action for the reasons above. Even then, the destroyer flotillas of the GF were left in a position to block any passage across the rear of the fleet just in case such an attempt was made.
glenn239 wrote:No, this was inefficient because it introduced two more points of failure that could have been avoided. First, no subordinate knows Jellicoe's mind and could guess wrong on how he would process information. Second, any new information would be weighed against the downside of waking Jellicoe up. If Jellicoe doesn't go to bed then this doesn't happen and all information is evaluated.
Jellicoe laid in his cot, the room was part of the bridge of Iron Duke, so Jellicoe was hardly removed from the bridge. However, you are ignoring that no signals were sent to Iron Duke anyhow, so it doesnt matter if you think subordinates would have been confused, though Madden was considered an excellent admiral, there was simply nothing to respond to in the first place!
glenn239 wrote:Jellicoe is responsible for the oversights in communication of his command, just like Moltke was responsible for failing to predict and take measures that his armies would not coordinate and communicate adequately. So yes, it was his responsibility.
Jellicoe laid out the need for captains to report all sightings in the GFBO, he could do no more than make the commanders aware of what he expected. He did not appoint admirals or even captains, so if idiots were appointed that is the fault of the Admiralty (or in Moltke's case, the Kaiser). You seem to be forgetting that at this time there were really no means of controlling forces over large distances that were secure.
glenn239 wrote:Secondly, Jellicoe's subordinates would assume that what they were seeing would be reported to Jellicoe by those aboard Iron Duke directly whenever they evaluated that the flagship could see or hear what they did. By taking a snooze Jellicoe threw another wrench into an already complicated situation. Jellicoe had the opportunity of a lifetime and he went to bed instead. The decision was so obviously on the face of it the wrong one, I really sort of wonder if Castles of Steel is wrong and he didn't retire.
At night the destroyers that made contact with the HSF were five miles or so distant from Iron Duke, so it was almost impossible Jellicoe would see what they were seeing, so the only way anyone on the bridge could report these sightings to Jellicoe would be if somebody bothered to report them to Iron Duke in the first place. I am perfectly happy with the idea Jellicoe retired to lay down (I do not believe it recorded if he slept or rested, the latter is more likely as there would likely be too much going on in his mind to relax too much), and such practices were common when lulls occurred in battles, such as overnight. For the decision to be the wrong one, you would need to show that Jellicoe expected a night action to occur.
glenn239 wrote:It's a really simple but ancient principle - the commanding officer is ultimately responsible for his command because he is the commanding officer. To argue Beatty is responsible for his lousy signalling arrangements is perfectly true. Well, so was Jellicoe for his.
Commanders are responsible for areas they have a direct input towards, like training, and for people immediately under their command where they are at hand to rectify errors. When an order has been given, with its intention clear, the commander cannot be responsible for people who fail to follow them, especially where they have not appointed such people themself. Jellicoe is responsible for distributing the GFBO and ordering commanders to read it, he is not responsible for them deciding not to do so. Beatty is responsible for his ships signalling errors because he was at hand when the errors were made, and insisted on keeping the person responsible as his signal officer on two occasions when the Admiralty wished to remove them. Beatty is also responsible for not insisting on proper gunnery practice (indeed almost trying to avoid it), but he is not responsible for his light cruiser commanders failing to give him sighting reports. He would be partly responsible for the mess at Dogger Bank as he was the officer flying pointless signals, especially where they identified another enemy ship, but he was not responsible for Moore deciding to not disobey orders and try to decide the battle, only Moore can be responsible for that decision.
glenn239 wrote:None of this changes the underlying principle, that both Beatty and Jellicoe were responsible for their command's signalling protocols, that these were defective, and that by going to bed Jellicoe introduced an avoidable complication into the situation at a time when the RN had a once-in-a-century opportunity, which hadn't been seen since Trafalgar.
As already noted, this would only apply if anyone had bothered to try and tell Iron duke what was going on. They didnt. Sleeping or awake made no difference, the reports just didnt happen.
glenn239 wrote:After the battle, a bunch of propaganda and spin about maintaining the blockade, but during the battle, the objective was to annihilate first Hipper, then when he showed up unexpectedly, Scheer. It's like Joe Fraser the day after Ali beats him arguing that in the ring he was looking to preserve his TV endorsements rather than knock out his opponent.
Actually, Jellicoe laid down his intentions in a letter to the Admiralty the moment he took command, he also laid out his battle tactics for them to see. Nobody found fault with the latter until after Jutland, when it was mostly Beatty and Churchill who did so, with some Monty Python-esque contributions from Sturdee, and Jellicoe had always maintained that the foremost duty was to preserve the superiority of the GF in order to maintain the blockade, and that the GF existed primarily to enforce the blockade, with all other considerations secondary.

After Jutland we see mostly the efforts of Beatty to rewrite events to make his role as important and heroic as he liked to tell people, avoiding all mention of having his ass handed to him by a force half the size of his own! Beatty was also part of the 'Beresford' school in the latters dispute with Fisher, whilst Jellicoe was closely associated with all the Fisher reforms, which really should tell you a lot about the man, a naval Luddite. If Beatty really had done so well, why did he try to get Harper to rewrite events, and why did he refuse to give a written order for that to happen?

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Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#105

Post by glenn239 » 13 Jun 2016, 18:52

Terry Duncan wrote:
Sorry, I thought I had linked it, but here you are;

http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/99759/1/ ... Review.pdf
Just read it. Meh. The article concludes the N^2 law is sound, but recognises that frictions kept popping up to prevent the superior side from crushing the inferior opponent like the theory says they must. The authors mention, but do not explain, how these frictions that prevented N^2 from happening were not inherent to naval combat at that time. (For example, poor visibility is practically an automatic condition if you have 200 coal fired warships steaming about at full speed). The conclusion, that Jellicoe's weight of numbers would decide the battle eventually, seems sound, but after things get more questionable. (For example, under the N^2 law Hipper's death ride really should have ended with the destruction of his entire force. But it did not. Why?)

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