Armistice in 1916?

[glenn239]

Versailles was rather unfair given what Wilson had promised, but it was less harsh than Brest-Litovsk,

I doubt you'd get very many Finns, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians or Slovenes to agree to this statement. Russian arrogance hung herself with her minorities, pure and simple.

And I say blame not in the sense of responsibility for the war, but instead in the sense of a responsibility to the German people for not getting them into a war on unfavorable terms.

Won't get any argument from this corner on that score. I've not ever seen a traditional strategy that I deemed likely to succeed to go along with the sentiment, though.

As for the war against Russia being a better bet for Germany, yes, but only if it can be quickly won. Theres a lot of space to trade for time, and this was one of the reasons an eastern war was not the favoured option.

Placing Russia on the defensive might have been a disaster for Germany. Most of the major powers were broken on the attack, not on the defense. This list includes Germany.

Isn't that exactly what they did?

The German High Command was feuding, which I would assume is what prevented H/L (easterners) from getting their way vs. Falkenhayn (westerner).

I disagree with Tjohn largely on the basis that I think Germany's best bet was to hit the Entente where they were weakest, not on the Eastern Front. The "proper" order was Serbia first, then Rumania, Greece and Italy in no particular order. The important thing was to win when attacking, and against Russia on the defensive this proposition was at best dicey. Let the Russians bleed themselves white in the east and then kick the door down when they fell apart.

[tjohn]

JonS,

I always had the impression that the Germans hit Russia hard enough to take the pressure of of A-H and then made an enormous commitment to Verdun. So, I don't think there was ever a clear continuous focus on Russia.

Glenn,

I think our disagreement is somewhat negotiable at this point. In any case, a Russia on the defensive yielding up the Baltic, Belarus and Ukraine would have done wonders for Germany's food supply problem.

[Terry Duncan]

I'm not saying Lenin and Trotsky didnt bungle the Brest-Litovsk treaty, but it was certainly far harsher than Versailles, even the Germans said so! As to the Finns etc, they were not really in favour of being German satelite states either, rather wanting complete and true independance from all outsiders.

As to attacking Serbia, Roumania, Italy and Greece first, none were in the Entente and only one was involved in 1914 so a political disaster like Belgium would be likely, and Italy was still allied to Germany and Austria, so a real bad move to attack her, no matter how much Conrad ould have enjoyed being able to do so!

Fully agree with you over the problems of attacking Russia and the problems of winning on the offensive though, but still rather hard to see a solution to this problem, even with hindsight.

Terry

[JonS]

I always had the impression that the Germans hit Russia hard enough to take the pressure of of A-H and then made an enormous commitment to Verdun. So, I don't think there was ever a clear continuous focus on Russia.

Ah, thanks. It was the 'continuous' that I overlooked.

[Mad Zeppelin]

The "Russia First" theory overlooks one important fact: As soon as the motherland was endangered, the Russians would gather around the czar to defend it. Even a criminal like Stalin was able to rally the Russian nation in defense of the motherland.
A German advance into Russia proper in 1914/15 would have triggered the same effect.

As to the treaty of Brest-Litowsk: Just the dismantlement of the Russian colonial empire (western part), natural process, would happen again in 1991. - The problem was the meddling of the military (Ludendorff in special) in eastern affairs even after the treaty (although the civil gouvernment had warned against it), which created the impression in Germany that Germany was de facto out to conquer these areas, thus erroding the common understanding of a war of self defense. This had serious repercussions especially with the socialists and the labour unions.

[tjohn]

When I say Russia first, what I had in mind was the dismantlement of the Russian colonial empire (western part) without invading Russia proper. This would have:

1. Solved Germany's food supply problems.
2. Discouraged Romania from joining the Allies
3. Positioned the Central Powers to threaten Persia (as Churchill himself noted).

Also, at such a time when Russia tried to regain the Ukraine, the German Army with Ukrainian allies would be able to defeat them in maneuver warfare. The German Army almost always outperformed the Russians in mobile warfare.

[glenn239]

As to attacking Serbia, Roumania, Italy and Greece first, none were in the Entente and only one was involved in 1914 so a political disaster like Belgium would be likely, and Italy was still allied to Germany and Austria, so a real bad move to attack her, no matter how much Conrad ould have enjoyed being able to do so!

There was no need to pre-emptively attack any of them. But it was imperative that they each be given a royal welcome to the war once they'd decided to take the plunge, so that the next one thinking of testing the waters would see their brutalized corpse and draw back from the brink. Serbia could have been eliminated prior to Italy's entry into the war. Italy might have remained neutral if the prospect of an immediate Austro-German attack upon her was in the cards. In any event, a German offensive in Italy was going to make more hay then anywhere else, so it was triply beneficial to put the boots to Rome; it would boost CP morale, deter potential Entente clients from joining, and force the Entente to divert a great deal of strength to prop up their Latin millstone.

The premise is that the determined offensive in WW1 was a false siren - it was more likely to destroy the attacking army than the defending one. The Russian army was broken on the attack in 1914/1915, revitalized itself on the defensive in 1915/1916, and then again impaled its morale in 1916 on the attack. Since this was so, the CP was best advised to let their enemies bleed themselves into oblivion while picking off the smaller Entente powers that could be defeated with one sharp backhand.

[Peter H]

Interesting that Ludendorff's right hand man Generalmajor Hoffmann had come to the conclusion by January 1918 that "victory was impossible" and that a "peace by compromise" was needed.On New Year's Day 1918 he was summoned to see the Kaiser about his view.He stated that all territorial claims should be withdrawn and Germany "should only keep a small strip of Polish territory in the Bendzin-Thorn area for defensive purposes".

Ludendorff was outraged when he heard about this.Although Hoffmann was not sacked he was out of the symbolic HLH(Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoffmann) relationship after that.

[Peter H]

The failure of German intelligence on the Russian situation has already been mentioned.The second intelligence failure of the French position after the Chemin des Dames attacks in April 1917 should also be mentioned.

I find this difficult to reconcile--Germany was in a position to force victory in 1917 but with the blunder of the unrestricted submarine warfare policy,and the entry of the US into the war,this advantage was cancelled.

Incompetent systems lead to incompetent decisions.

[Terry Duncan]

With the entire Chemin des Dames episode, intelligence seems to have failed on both sides, although quite how the Germans never guessed at quite how brittle the morale was in amny French units is hard to see now. Incompetent systems may make incompetent decisions, but by 1917, they had still not put the war out of Germanys reach to gain a better settlement.

Hoffmann seems to have had a better feel for the situation than many others, and was certainly very gifted, although from certain accounts his sense of humour may have worked against him in many cases. It would have been interesting to see how he would have acted as CinC, as some of he was often critical of others and their actions with hindsight.

Could he have been a good choice to work with the politicians to get a negotiated peace though? Cartainly a very hard call by 1918, as the odds were very badly stacked against Germany. If he had been in a position to offer a peace settlement directly after the Chemin des Dames, there may have been a greater impetus on France to open talks, although it is hard to see the Entente demands of leaving occupied soil first being easily overcome, especially with the US now also involved.

Terry

[tjohn]

If the Germans had managed to combine Chemin des Dames, success/revolution in Russia, keeping the U.S. neutral and acceptable terms for France (e.g. status quo ante), why wouldn't the French be sorely tempted to break with the England and pursue her own interests. As Dave said, it isn't as if the members of the Entente actually liked each other. They were held together by Germany.

[Terry Duncan]

The political will was not there to get such a settlement, as to leave the alliances was realised by all to be suicidal, and indeed unlikely to be accepted by the other side, as Austria found when she made peace overtures herself in 1916. France did not have a failure of political will even in 1917, and at no time did a situation exist where circumstances were bad enough as to make peace as appealing on both sides. When it suited one side, it was not suitable to the other.

Politicians are not renowed for common sense, humanity, or indeed anything other than self-preservation when backed into a corner. It may have been better than killing several million more men, but until you can force this onto them, politicians will not vote for suicide. If France risked such a settlement she would be broke, in debt and without any hope of any form of intervention if German goodwill suddenly changed. This was why the alliances proved so deadly once they were invoked.

As Moltke the Younger pointed out 'the next war will be fought until one alliance group is utterly exhausted and unable to continue the struggle.' This proved to be a highly accurate prediction, as was the length of time it would take to achieve this position, where he estimated 4-7 years.

Terry

[chronos20th]

She would.

This is why it was a constant anxiety to British policy-makers to keep her in the war ( and why the "recovery" of A-L was played up by British propagandists.

In Nov. 1917 the French government collapsed, Poincare had the choice of appointing Clemenceau - victory at any price - or Caillaux - negotiated peace. Had Poincaire not been president, as he had manoevred to be in 1912, then it would have been Caillaux.

[Terry Duncan]

So all the 'revenche' was really a British propaganda maneuver from 1871 onwards, and the french really didnt care at all about one of their most unswerving war aims? A-L seems to have always figured quite heavily in the French ideas of what they would demand from Germany in any war from 1871 onwards, so its a little hard to see how or why the British would ever need to try and play this issue up, as it concerned only France.

Where is this constant 'anxiety' of 'British policy makers' ever recorded, or indeed any propaganda over A-L to match the campaign the French launched themselves?

The problem for the entire 'it would have been Caillaux' idea is that there was an alternative, and that the French were perfectly happy to adopt a win at all costs policy rather than one of mediation, showing quite happily that they still did have the political will to fight, but not any real desire to surrender to a dictated peace. Caillaux may have prefered a negotiated peace, but he would have needed the French parliament to support him, and he was of far different charecter to Clemenceau and thus unlikely to ever try to rule alone, and even by the end of 1917, mutually acceptable terms were not to be found.

From 1916 onwards Austria had tried the 'negotiate for a seperate peace' line, and it got absolutely nowhere, only irritating the Germans over their allies attitude. You need to find a position that all will agree upon, and that never occured in the war at all, indeed it proved impossible to get just the US and Entente Powers to agree to a peace settlement after the war ended! Given it was so hard from that position, and Austrias failed overtures, what will appeal to both German, France, Britain, Russia, Austria and the US? The chances are that nobody had a definitive answer at the time, and that was why so many attempts to get the sides talking failed throughout.

Terry

[viriato]

Caillaux was put in jail and alternatively in house arrest after December 1917. Would it be possible that he could have surmounted the war party in France before that date especially with Ponicaré as President?