How could the Schlieffen plan have succedded?

[Baltasar]

Moltke knew that the German armies in the west weren't numerous enough to achieve Schlieffens goal of destroying the French forces and reach Paris. Sending elements of 9th army to aid 8th army in the east was already an improvisation. Not having these forces available in the west deprived those armies of neccessary reinforcements, which may be a critical reason why the Schlieffen Plan failed.

[Dave Bender]

It's not realistic to expect a quick win against France with the historical size German army of 1914. The best you can hope for is to cripple the French economy while beating up the French army.

[monk2002uk]

If a quick win against France needed French cooperation in presenting its army in such a way as to allow the Germans to defeat it, then surely it follows that if this doesn't happen the same logic applies to the French trying to eject a German occupation?

Absolutely correct. As an example, the British were very proud of their efforts in the retreat to the Seine. Once the Germans started falling back, there was the expectation that they could be driven from France. Few BEF commanders seemed to acknowledge that the Germans could achieve what the BEF did. Ultimately, this 'balance' was reproduced across the entire front. Any mistakes in command, such as Joffre's estimate that the German centre was weak, were unlikely to produce total collapse - the attackers had limited capabilities to exploit mistakes, particularly given the power of even minimal rear guards. This is the fundamental reason why the Schlieffen Plan was doomed to failure.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

It's not realistic to expect a quick win against France with the historical size German army of 1914. The best you can hope for is to cripple the French economy while beating up the French army.

It is equally unrealistic to believe that the French economy could have been crippled quickly. The blockade of Germany had a terrible effect, just as the blockade of the Southern ports did during the American Civil War. Both examples illustrated, however, that countries can cope for a significant period of time.

The French economy was seriously affected by the war, but she was bailed out by the British and American economies. Shutting down a few of her ports would not have destroyed the French.

Robert

[Baltasar]

Absolutely correct. As an example, the British were very proud of their efforts in the retreat to the Seine. Once the Germans started falling back, there was the expectation that they could be driven from France. Few BEF commanders seemed to acknowledge that the Germans could achieve what the BEF did. Ultimately, this 'balance' was reproduced across the entire front. Any mistakes in command, such as Joffre's estimate that the German centre was weak, were unlikely to produce total collapse - the attackers had limited capabilities to exploit mistakes, particularly given the power of even minimal rear guards. This is the fundamental reason why the Schlieffen Plan was doomed to failure.

Robert

Strangely enough, the Germans were very much on the right track and almost knocked out France quickly, although at a high cost in casulties, not to mention their successes in the Frontier Battles.

[Dave Bender]

It is equally unrealistic to believe that the French economy could have been crippled quickly.

The French economy WAS crippled by the loss of Lille. They had to import basic war materials like nitrates, steel and coal which Germany was able to produce herself. Seizing the channel ports north of Amiens would make it even tougher for France to continue the war effort.

[Attrition]

It is equally unrealistic to believe that the French economy could have been crippled quickly.

The French economy WAS crippled by the loss of Lille. They had to import basic war materials like nitrates, steel and coal which Germany was able to produce herself. Seizing the channel ports north of Amiens would make it even tougher for France to continue the war effort.

I think there is something in this but the passage of time would allow France to remedy the economic damage with substitute resources from Britain and the USA. Loss of the Channel ports would have hampered the British more than the French though, wouldn't it?

Do the aficionados see a time when German efforts turned from destroying the French army to capturing strategically valuable (economically speaking) ground while there was still an opportunity or did the 1914 fighting in the west have a purely military character?

[monk2002uk]

The French economy WAS crippled by the loss of Lille. They had to import basic war materials like nitrates, steel and coal which Germany was able to produce herself.

The French economy might have been crippled by the loss of Lille had it had not been for the support of the British and the USA. French production of iron and coal was severely affected by the capture of the regions around Lille, but that is not the same as saying that the economy was crippled.

The Germans could not import some very significant resources that were vital for the war effort. There were major problems sourcing copper and nickel for example, which were necessary for the production of driving bands on shells, amongst other things.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

To my knowledge, the German efforts in 1914 were directed at a purely military outcome. Von Schlieffen had modelled a situation in which Russia would react more quickly than expected. The attack into France was suspended and then resumed once the hypothetical 'crisis' in Russia was resolved. The goal remained the destruction of France's military capability.

Even in 1918, Ludendorff's offensives do not appear to have had an economic component to the rationale. Zabecki notes that not even the logistic centres of Amiens and Hazebrouck were major targets for the offensives.

Robert

[Dave Bender]

passage of time would allow France to remedy the economic damage

Imperial Russia paid for that time with their blood. If the 1915 German Schwerpunkt had hit France instead of Russia and Serbia things would have looked grim on the western front.

[Attrition]

passage of time would allow France to remedy the economic damage

Imperial Russia paid for that time with their blood. If the 1915 German Schwerpunkt had hit France instead of Russia and Serbia things would have looked grim on the western front.

According to Falky it wouldn't be grim enough which is why he created a status quo in the east similar to that in the west before attempting to sort out the westenders with the modest strategic reserve he was able to accumulate by early 1916.

[Terry Duncan]

Do the aficionados see a time when German efforts turned from destroying the French army to capturing strategically valuable (economically speaking) ground while there was still an opportunity or did the 1914 fighting in the west have a purely military character?

The switch in the campaign is at the time of the retreat to the Aisne, although this again was motivated by military factors and not economic ones. I would say that there was no particular desire to grab an area simply due to its ecomomic value, if such an area was protected by an area of easily defensible terrain it would be held, it it had not military advantage it was not held.

To my mind the question of could the plan have succeeded is answerable in the negative unless the French were very stupid and failed to respond at all to the German moves. I doubt it could have been made to succeed in the form it took, it involved too many enemies and supporting the advance was problematic the further the German armies advanced.

The question might well be if there was a better alternative available for an attack in the west in any form, either a limited offensive to try and grab nothing more than an easily defencible glacis and then hold this with fewer troops than a more aggressive offensive would need, or if it would be possible to break the center of the French line in a manner proposed by von Falkenheyn and Tappen IIRC prior to WWI - Schlieffen was apparently not fond of Falkenheyn's willingness to consider frontal attacks according to Zuber. This would have the benefit of not invading Belgium, but could obviously involve higher initial casualties.

[monk2002uk]

There wasn't an alternative that could achieve the German High Command's aspirations, ie the rapid destruction of the French Army. A major offensive with limited objectives was exactly what the war turned into, in essence. The rigors of being on the defensive for several years, coupled with the inexorable deterioration in German society due to the effects of Total War in a non-democratic political environment, was precisely what the 'Schlieffen Plan' was designed to avoid.

There is no doubt that a highly focused attack, with overwhelming superiority, would have punched a hole. But the history of the whole war as that such an event was not war-winning in and of itself. As with the Battle of the Marne, and later with the 1918 Spring offensives, any impact would have been negated by the movement of the reserves.

The two major advantages enjoyed by the Germans in 1870, ie the highly trained General Staff and the more aggressive behaviour of the High Command, had been negated in WW1. Even these advantages did not, however, prevent the Volkskrieg, as the Germans referred to the ongoing resistance by the French after the defeat of their main armies in the opening months.

Robert

[Attrition]

I think that the retreat to the Aisne represents a change too, from attacking the French wherever they may be found to adapting to the French concentration in the west. It looks like a stabilisation to create the conditions to try again further west (although at the same time the Third Army tried a frontal attack). Considering that Joffre's move of troops from the area between Switzerland and Germany had begun to undo the advantage the Germans had gained with their strong right wing, a counter-concentration made sense, even with the difficult communications behind the German front.

Are there any indications before the war of anyone in Germany contemplating the economic value of the areas overrun in the attempt to destroy the French army, considering the pessimism of some of the people concerned? I suppose Moltke's decision to leave Holland alone might count?

[Attrition]

There wasn't an alternative that could achieve the German High Command's aspirations, ie the rapid destruction of the French Army. A major offensive with limited objectives was exactly what the war turned into, in essence. The rigors of being on the defensive for several years, coupled with the inexorable deterioration in German society due to the effects of Total War in a non-democratic political environment, was precisely what the 'Schlieffen Plan' was designed to avoid.

There is no doubt that a highly focused attack, with overwhelming superiority, would have punched a hole. But the history of the whole war as that such an event was not war-winning in and of itself. As with the Battle of the Marne, and later with the 1918 Spring offensives, any impact would have been negated by the movement of the reserves.

The two major advantages enjoyed by the Germans in 1870, ie the highly trained General Staff and the more aggressive behaviour of the High Command, had been negated in WW1. Even these advantages did not, however, prevent the Volkskrieg, as the Germans referred to the ongoing resistance by the French after the defeat of their main armies in the opening months.

Robert

Presumably this is why Moltke altered some of Schlieffen's arrangements. Kier Lieber et al have shown that the prospect of failure in an attempt to defeat France quickly wasn't unusual or confined to the army. I wonder if this has something to do with the strategic fatalism which seems to have attended German calculations in both world wars, no way out (for the boss class) but to hope for the best and avoid placing too much emphasis on materialism?

I'm a little surprised that you mention democracy though - none of the contenders of 1914 - 1918 were democratic, not even New Zealand.