How could the Schlieffen plan have succedded?

[Terry Duncan]

But improbable is not impossible, so a rummage through the closet of possibilities suggests that if the Austro-Hungarians stand on the Carpathians and if the Italians go to war as an ally of Germany and if the proper planning had been completed, that maybe the Austrians and Italians send 24 divisions to France to get Schlieffen to his magic number?

That would mean that Germany and Austria had to talk to Italy during the July Crisis and somehow win her over to supporting an agressive war, and to then deal with the British and French in the Med - something Italy was known to want to avoid.

[Attrition]

Did't Falky say that Italy was more use to the Central Powers as a neutral because of the contraband that it could supply?

[Terry Duncan]

Several German officers felt that way about Holland and Denmark, so it would not be a surprise to find Italy also in the group for the same reason. It would at least allow Italy to not attack France and still not leave the Triple Alliance entirely.

[Attrition]

Considering Italy's dependence on British coal exports, it might have worked to the Entente's advantage if they had joined the Central Powers - the coal could easily have been diverted to France.

[glenn239]

If the Germans knock France out of the war it will not be to Britain's advantage.

[Attrition]

Obviously.

[glenn239]

That fact places an upper boundry on the alleged Entente advantage to Italy joining the CP.

Obviously.

[Attrition]

I recently finished Sewell Tyng's book on the Marne Campaign and found the description of events surprisingly familiar - I read 'To Arms' circa 2003 and Terraine's book in 2007 so there must be quite a lot of consistency in the narratives for me to have absorbed it without realising. I'd forgtten about this thread as well but I got the distinct feeling reading the book that the 'Schlieffen-Plan-as-blueprint-for-victory' view is a dead end. It seemed to me that the German army's moves after the battles on the frontiers had a logic which can be found in German military thought and practice from long before Schlieffen - the autonomy of army commands as leaders of a managerial elite, whose training obviated the need for a close supervision (that wasn't possible or desirable in such a big army operating over a wide area) seems to me to be enough to explain Moltke's apparent remoteness. The moves of the First and Second armies seemed to reflect the need to catch the French in order to finish the job begun so promisingly on the frontiers rather than deviations from a master-plan that Moltke should have squashed. Moltke's directive just before the Battle of the Marne that the First and Second armies should defend while the armies further east finished off the French seemed to me to demonstrate that he saw the possibilities and dangers at the Paris end of the battlefront and made a prompt and accurate decision (certainly while the dangers to the First and Second armies were still latent) which meant that these armies could still manoeuvre (albeit backwards) when the Third, Fourth and Fifth armies ran out of steam just before their opponents did. It gave me the impression that the Hentsch question was also a red herring - it seemed as though Moltke had pretty much decided what to do and the Hentsch mission was a coda just to make sure, before a change of plan big enough to need the army commanders promptly to be in the know was really neccesary. I was also left with the impression that the retreat to the Aisne wasn't the end of the attempt to defeat the French quickly but the beginning of a redeployment (similar to the one the French brought off to create the 6th Army) preparatory to another attempt to flank the French armies near Paris. I also found myself wondering if the increases to the German armies on the common border could be faulted for being insufficient, rather than a disastrous change of emphasis.

All in all it looked like a mirror of the Battles of the Frontiers, the side with a slim advantage (all things considered) made it count.

[Terry Duncan]

I'd forgtten about this thread as well but I got the distinct feeling reading the book that the 'Schlieffen-Plan-as-blueprint-for-victory' view is a dead end.

It only seems to work if the French do nothing once the threat becomes obvious.

The moves of the First and Second armies seemed to reflect the need to catch the French in order to finish the job begun so promisingly on the frontiers rather than deviations from a master-plan that Moltke should have squashed.

The moves make sense a such, its just a shame that Kluck would not really co-operate with Bulow or at least co-ordinate with him.

It gave me the impression that the Hentsch question was also a red herring - it seemed as though Moltke had pretty much decided what to do and the Hentsch mission was a coda just to make sure, before a change of plan big enough to need the army commanders promptly to be in the know was really neccesary.

Given the idea of retiring had been mooted at certain army headquarters before Hentsch arrived, and the strategic situation, blaming him or Moltke seems to be much in line with what Zuber has suggested. As both were dead by the time all the claims of a master plan surfaced, we can only judge by looking at events. The master plan is certainly very much against the idea that no planwill long survive contact with the enemy and it was that that led to the General Staff training to allow every commander to arrive at the same solution to a problem, as it is hardly neccessary if an entire campaign can be written out years in advance and then implimented and survive six weeks of combat.

I was also left with the impression that the retreat to the Aisne wasn't the end of the attempt to defeat the French quickly but the beginning of a redeployment (similar to the one the French brought off to create the 6th Army) preparatory to another attempt to flank the French armies near Paris.

The redeployment is the most likely, but as the east would now need a lot of the manpower, it was the end of the first phase where maybe the best chance to inflict a major defeat would happen?

I also found myself wondering if the increases to the German armies on the common border could be faulted for being insufficient, rather than a disastrous change of emphasis.

This is a good point, and I have often thought there is a good chance some sort of attack was intended here. The cavalry units of these armies would have been better placed on the mobile right wing if the left were not to attack at all, as it requires very little scouting to sit in place! Zuber shows one of his last instructions was to the Bavarian army and to tell it to prepare plans for an offensive, and they always were on the left of the line. There is also a lot of talk by senior German officers, about reaching a decision at the 'Catalaunian Fields' which is not anywhere near the right wings position. However, if the French weakened their own right to oppose the German attack through Belgium, then a German offensive by their left wing might achieve success.

Zuber is probably correct in noting that Moltke was looking for a decisive victory anywhere he could gain it, and the right wing moving around the French border defences would allow that by forcing the French away from their fortress lines. I am not sure any modern historian really accepts the 'plan that ensured victory' idea without question now, but the debate still continues.

[Attrition]

~~~~~Zuber is probably correct in noting that Moltke was looking for a decisive victory anywhere he could gain it, and the right wing moving around the French border defences would allow that by forcing the French away from their fortress lines.~~~~~

I haven't read Zuber except in comments on here so I'm curious as to how close my recent reading is to his.

The big flank manoeuvre by the German right through Belgium seems to me to need to be kept in context - the pressure exerted by the German centre and south were just as important to the result. I notice that the Germans moved troops from the VI and VIIth armies after the French had done the same. Why didn't they keep attacking and try to force the French to return the troops they'd moved or keep them pinned down in the first place? It seems to me that the Germans must have seen better prospects in the area where frontal attacks could be complemented by flanking moves (and greater danger from the French doing it back to them). Obviously flank moves are elementary military manoeuvres but I got the impression that both sides became ever more sensitive to the threat they represented, understandably since both sides had come unstuck over them. Seen like this, trench warfare was inherent in the manoeuvres of 1914 rather than an aberration which emerged later.

The removal of troops to the eastern front seemed to me to be another example of consistency, rather than falling between two stools. Strengthening the German forces on the common border with the extra troops furnished by the prewar increase of the army, rather than taking a risk that a French offensive could penetrate German territory very far and reinforcing the Eastern army when the underestimation of the Russians became known struck me as conforming to a putative prewar decision to keep a war outside Germany. Perhaps this is a combination of strategic overstretch and a desire to deny the enemy a territorial bargaining counter in a negotiated settlement. Another (admittedly vague) suggestion that some Germans had put some thought into the possibility of an indecisive war and equally indecisive peace?

[Attrition]

~~~~~The master plan is certainly very much against the idea that no planwill long survive contact with the enemy and it was that that led to the General Staff training to allow every commander to arrive at the same solution to a problem, as it is hardly neccessary if an entire campaign can be written out years in advance and then implimented and survive six weeks of combat.~~~~~

I remember that in Foley that German army commanders (particularly Hindenburg and Ludendorff) sniffed at Falkenhayn's prescriptive command (and the centralisation of things like the heavy artillery at Verdun), which lends weight to the view that German high command in 1914 operated as it was intended to.

Is there anything in English which concentrates on events in the west after the Battle of the Marne when Falkenhayn had taken over (apart from his monograph)?

[Terry Duncan]

I haven't read Zuber except in comments on here so I'm curious as to how close my recent reading is to his.

It doesnt seem too far away, but I will have a quick skim over it at the weeked as its some time since I looked at it in detail. It is a theory of his that the entire strategy relied upon the use of interior lines to defeat multiple threats and to allow the more flexible Germany army to be superior where it desired. Nothing too unusual in that, where he breaks with orthodox thought is that he thinks Moltke was trying to force the French away from the fortress line by any means possible before having to face the Russians, but that the victory being sought may have been a crippling blow to France rather than the often quoted 'war over in six weeks' idea. A lot of the military ideas make sense - as an ex-military planner it should do if he was any good at his main career - but where he wanders off to form his own conclusions on other areas he is far from sound, often devoting a paragraph to something a chapter would have been far better suited to - the claimed French intent to attack through Belgium even if Germany did not do so.

Is there anything in English which concentrates on events in the west after the Battle of the Marne when Falkenhayn had taken over (apart from his monograph)?

A good question, and I am damned if I know an answer! There is 'The Old Contemptibles: The British Expeditionary Force 1914 by Robin Neillands that deals with the original BEF up to Ypres at the end of the year, and iirc there is something by John Terraine that runs after his Mons book. Other than those, to my knowledge its not the best covered period, and anything dealing with a German perspective I really dont know.

There is nothing I have ever read that suggests a rigid central command structure was planned by the Germans, and a lot that suggests each army commander was allowed a very large degree of autonomy, which is one reason Kluck resented being made subordinate to Bulow. With the huge armies involved, and the long distances, it was impossible to exert any real control anyhow, so claims Moltke should have been forward with the armies ignores that his central position made a lot of sense. Koblenz allowed left and right to contact him with equal ease, and having a set position has obvios benefits over a CinC that has moved around and is difficult to contact at an important moment.

[murx]

Didn't it work in WWII?

[Terry Duncan]

Didn't it work in WWII?

Not really. The original plan had been similar, but was switched to a more central breakthrough as favoured by Falkenhayn and Tappen prior to WWI. They also had the benefit of motorized transport, and air support.

[Attrition]

I remembered Mombauer's book after I asked - you can get the PhD for free off Ethos. The quotations in it are in German but the text is English.