German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

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Michate
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#91

Post by Michate » 24 Aug 2010, 19:34

Very interesting data and discussion.
Interesting stuff Monk, i wonder if anyone has made a similar study of French divisions at Verdun or the Germanas at the Somme?
Indeed, the Reichsarchiv volumes provide such (long) lists of divisions attached, engaged, withdrawn and so on for many of the larger battles (e.g. Verdun, Somme, and probably Flanders as well, though unfortunately my local library lacks that particular volume).
The ability of the Germans to shift forces by rail from East to West,vice versa etc,was an apparent asset they held 1914-1918.It took an average of 10 days to move one division if pressed.
David Zabecki, in a very interesting section in his book on the German 1918 offensives, provides some more information and analysis to German divisional movements, as well as their implicit costs, in terms of divisions on the move being temporarily unavailable for combat.

I take the liberty to provide a scan of the particular pages (84-85) of the book. Unfortunately I had to decrease the figure's size, I hope, it can be read nevertheless:
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Zabecki_1918_offensives_p84_85.gif
Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives, p. 84-85.
Zabecki_1918_offensives_p84_85.gif (61.43 KiB) Viewed 516 times

Michate
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#92

Post by Michate » 24 Aug 2010, 19:51

My understanding is also that the Germans at Ypres used a quick in,quick out approach for their divisions in battle.I think the average time in the line was a week or so.Then divisions were "nursed" back to health.Divisions in the Somme battles in 1916 experienced a longer frontline time,10-14 days(?).
IIRC, Wynne mentions that divisions had to stay 6 days in the front line. As of the 9 infantry battalions in a division, one third was at the front line proper, another third in support a little bit behind, and the last third in divisional reserve mostly outside the areas of most dense enemy fire, but still nearer to the front line than the Eingreif divisions, and all battalions rotated between these positions, each infantry battalion had to spend 2 days in the proper front area.
The placement of Angriff(Counterattack) divisions should also be noted.Some didn't even get into the battleline at all,but "hovered" in the back areas in case needed.The robust Silesian 12th Division acted as one such formation in August at Ypres but only suffered losses through artillery in the back areas.It then moved off to Caporetto after a refit in Alsace.
What follows is a little speculative, but it seems at least to me the Germans were trying to conserve the more valuable Eingreif divisions. and not to expose them more than necessary (that being dictated by the specifics of the value of terrain, observation and so on). E.g. the counterattacks on 31 July 1917, which were stopped after the had thrown back the Allies to the second line or Steenbeek river. Some errors or misfortunes occurred as well in that, of course.

I have seen some comments as well that the front divisions were thought of as being more "expendable" and included a significant share of second rate divisions. Any comments on that?


monk2002uk
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#93

Post by monk2002uk » 25 Aug 2010, 12:26

Michate, your speculation is very good, IMHO. This is my impression too but I have not studied the details too closely. As time went by, however, the best German divisions began to appear immediately opposite the best British and Dominion forces. For example, in 1918 the New Zealand Division (in which my Grandfather fought) came up against the Alpenkorps.

The Zabecki material is very clear. His book is very good, though I don't agree with some of his conclusions, FWIIW. It is the best study of the German spring offensives in English, by far.

Robert

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#94

Post by monk2002uk » 25 Aug 2010, 12:51

Michate wrote:Indeed, the Reichsarchiv volumes provide such (long) lists of divisions attached, engaged, withdrawn and so on for many of the larger battles (e.g. Verdun, Somme, and probably Flanders as well, though unfortunately my local library lacks that particular volume).
Michate, the information about division transfers came from the relevant volume of the 'Der Weltkrieg' series. It is very rare. I have the Reichsarchiv volume 27 in the Schlachten des Weltkrieges series, 'Flandern 1917'. It gives an interesting overview but is not very detailed. It does mention the 12th Division in reserve as an Eingreifdivision (counter-attack division) behind the Stellungsdivisionen (frontline divisions) of die Gruppe Wijtschaete. The 12th Division was not heavily involved on July 31st because the British attack in this sector was a minor 'bite and hold' operation, designed to protect the southern flank of the main attack north of the Ypres-Comine Canal. Jack Sheldon mentions that the 12th Division was subsequently involved in the front line, after it relieved one of the divisions that was worn out.

The main effort of the British attack was along the Gheluvelt ridge. The German defence did extremely well here. Although the British forces broke through the first line very easily (as it was not heavily defended in keeping with the defensive tactics), the operations on the ridge broke down as a result of the unsuppressed newly-built concrete MG pillboxes in the wooded areas. The high ground was captured, including Stirling Castle, but the British did not achieve their second line of objectives. This exposed the attack around St Julien. Initially, the British attack was very successful here. The German defenders on the ridge, who had not been reached by the attack on the ridge, were able to enfilade the British attackers lower down. This made it much easier for the Gegenstoß (immediate counter-attack) to suceed in this sector. Further north, the British retained their objectives and beat off the counter-attacks.

Robert

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Attrition
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#95

Post by Attrition » 25 Aug 2010, 13:18

This made it much easier for the Gegenstoß (immediate counter-attack) to [partially] succeed in this sector.

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#96

Post by monk2002uk » 25 Aug 2010, 20:41

monk2002uk wrote:...the 12th Division in reserve as an Eingreifdivision (counter-attack division) behind the Stellungsdivisionen (frontline divisions) of die Gruppe Wijtschaete.
Here is a segment from a map in Der Weltkrieg that shows the location of 12th Division. It was opposite the British X Corps' sector.
12th Division.jpg
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The division was some distance from the opening battle, although the surrounding area was a major focus of British counter-battery fire.

Robert

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Peter H
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#97

Post by Peter H » 26 Aug 2010, 08:52

Thanks Robert.

German participation at Caporetto(Karfreit):

5. Infanterie-Division-from East
12. Infanterie-Division-from West
117. Infanterie-Division-from East
26. Infanterie-Division-from West
200. Infanterie-Division-from East
Alpenkorps-from East

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#98

Post by monk2002uk » 26 Aug 2010, 12:26

Thanks Peter. Just to flesh out the information a little further, for the two divisions from the West (12th and 26th):

- 12. ID (as we have discussed) was already in the Ypres sector when Third Ypres started. The division left for Armee-Abteilung B in the period August 21-31, and was then transferred to Italy in the period September 21-30.
- 26. ID transferred into the Ypres sector in the period August 11-20 and transferred out to Armee-Abteilung A in September 1-10, thence to Italy in the same period as 12. ID (Sept 21-30).

Robert

Michate
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#99

Post by Michate » 26 Aug 2010, 19:41

Michate, the information about division transfers came from the relevant volume of the 'Der Weltkrieg' series. It is very rare. I have the Reichsarchiv volume 27 in the Schlachten des Weltkrieges series, 'Flandern 1917'. It gives an interesting overview but is not very detailed. It does mention the 12th Division in reserve as an Eingreifdivision (counter-attack division) behind the Stellungsdivisionen (frontline divisions) of die Gruppe Wijtschaete. The 12th Division was not heavily involved on July 31st because the British attack in this sector was a minor 'bite and hold' operation, designed to protect the southern flank of the main attack north of the Ypres-Comine Canal. Jack Sheldon mentions that the 12th Division was subsequently involved in the front line, after it relieved one of the divisions that was worn out.
Very interesting, though I was thinking at the Volume 12 of the "Der Weltkrieg" series, not the "Schlachten des Weltkriegs" series, though both were created by or at least under the auspices of the Reichsarchiv. Buts as mentioned, I have no access to that volume, unfortunately (though some time ago I went to a similar list attached to one of the volumes on the Somme battle).
The main effort of the British attack was along the Gheluvelt ridge. The German defence did extremely well here. Although the British forces broke through the first line very easily (as it was not heavily defended in keeping with the defensive tactics), the operations on the ridge broke down as a result of the unsuppressed newly-built concrete MG pillboxes in the wooded areas. The high ground was captured, including Stirling Castle, but the British did not achieve their second line of objectives. This exposed the attack around St Julien. Initially, the British attack was very successful here. The German defenders on the ridge, who had not been reached by the attack on the ridge, were able to enfilade the British attackers lower down. This made it much easier for the Gegenstoß (immediate counter-attack) to suceed in this sector. Further north, the British retained their objectives and beat off the counter-attacks.
According to Wynne, German preparedness to risk counterthrusts and counterattacks was clearly based on value of terrain. This was seen as much more expendable in the northern and central sectors (front of group Passchendaele), while possession of ground was much more critical in the area of group Wytschaete. Actually most commanders had been prepared to retreat to the Flanders (I) line (approximately in the vicinity of Passchendaele) after the Messines calamity.
The decision to accept battle in the current lines then seems to have been taken by von Lossberg.
The Zabecki material is very clear. His book is very good, though I don't agree with some of his conclusions, FWIIW. It is the best study of the German spring offensives in English, by far.
It is one of the most interesting of the book, and IMHO the whole topic of logistics merits much, much more, serious study. German logistics, troop movements and railway operations in particular seem to be virtually unexplored (I think for the British, at least one or two good studies exist), though they were so crucial to the course of events (more so than the specifics of a handful of Sturmbattalione IMHO). So you are left to the bits and pieces intermingled to the official histories.

I would be interested in your points of disagreement with Zabecki and, though his study is impressive, I am myelf sceptic about one or two of his views, but that would be stuff for another thread.

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#100

Post by monk2002uk » 26 Aug 2010, 22:52

Michate, I believe it is volume 13 that covers Third Ypres. Volume 12 is Die Kriegsführung im Frühjahr 1917, dealing with the Battle of Arras and Nivelle's offensive along the Chemin des Dames.

You are quite right about the different emphases on terrain. The main defensive effort was along the Gheluvelt ridge. This was vitally important because if the British had captured the ridge quickly then a significant proportion of the German artillery would have become very vulnerable.

Von Loßberg did play a significant role in organising the defence against the British attacks. His book 'Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege' has quite a bit of detail. He is not too self-serving. Loßberg arrived on 13 June 1917, so he didn't have long to arrange things. There is no hint that the commanders were keen to withdraw. Rupprecht, in his diaries, makes it very clear that if the Germans had withdrawn then it would have been very hard to defend the coast. I will try and find the quote.

It would be very interesting to discuss Zabecki's work at some time. I am just waiting for one of Bruchmüller's books.

Robert

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Peter H
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#101

Post by Peter H » 27 Aug 2010, 05:33

Does Jack Sheldon give German divisions rotated in/out of the Ypres campaign in 1917?

My attempt here ( http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8&p=551544 ) --77 divisions?

Regarding the Somme in 1916 Sheldon gives a list of German divisions in the back of his Somme book but not totalled.I think Terraine gave a figure of 125 divisions (some multiple tours) that served on the Somme.I would suggest that the more confined,smaller setting for the Ypres battle accounts meant less divisions needed.It would also indicate that the impact of the Ypres fighting wasn't as fully felt on the German Army as the Somme was.

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#102

Post by Baltasar » 27 Aug 2010, 07:42

Robert, does the map you provided indeed only atribute one division (41st) to the British X. corps? Seems odd since it seems to be the only one in that spot of the front. May be it was sceduled to recieve one of II. corps divisions later on?

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#103

Post by monk2002uk » 27 Aug 2010, 09:19

Baltasar, well spotted. The map is correct though. X Corps had more divisions but only one was used on 31st July. The British Second Army had a very limited role. It was to push down the slope for a short distance, pretending to threaten a breakout towards Lille. X Corps role was bit more significant. It had to extend and protect the right flank of the Fifth Army, which was operating on the main line of the ridge. Despite using only one division, X Corps achieved all of its allotted objectives.

Robert

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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#104

Post by monk2002uk » 27 Aug 2010, 09:41

Peter H wrote:Regarding the Somme in 1916... I think Terraine gave a figure of 125 divisions (some multiple tours) that served on the Somme.I would suggest that the more confined,smaller setting for the Ypres battle accounts meant less divisions needed.It would also indicate that the impact of the Ypres fighting wasn't as fully felt on the German Army as the Somme was.
Jack doesn't list the divisions involved in Third Ypres. On 5 December 1917, Kronprinz Rupprecht (von Kuhl's boss) wrote the following:

"The major battle in Flanders appears to be over. In consequence the moment has arrived for me to express my thanks and recognition to all commanders and troops who participated in the Battle of Flanders. Eighty six divisions, twenty two of which carried out two tours of duty, the greater majority of all our army artillery formations and other arms and services took part in this, the most violent of all battles to date. The sons of all branches of the German race have, through their heroic courage and tough endurance, succeeded in wrecking the attempts at breakthrough by the British and French, which aimed at the conquest of Flanders and our U Boats."

This excerpt was quoted by Jack from 'The History of the Footguard Regiment'. The British Official History refers to this Special Order of the Day and notes a figure of 88 divisions. This is consistent with the information in the relevant volume of Der Weltkrieg. There is no question that the whole Somme front, French line included, was longer. Equally important was that the Battle of the Somme lasted a whole month longer. Looked at slightly differently, Third Ypres lasted approximately 3/4 of the duration of the Somme. Looked at in this way, and assuming that 125 divisions is correct for the Somme, we might expect Third Ypres to have involved 93 divisions. It wasn't far off that number, and across a much narrower front. There is no getting away from the impact of Third Ypres.

Robert

Michate
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Re: German losses at Messines & at 3rd Ypres.

#105

Post by Michate » 27 Aug 2010, 17:39

Michate, I believe it is volume 13 that covers Third Ypres. Volume 12 is Die Kriegsführung im Frühjahr 1917, dealing with the Battle of Arras and Nivelle's offensive along the Chemin des Dames.
You are of course correct, my mistake, I meant vol. 13.

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