The Battle of the Marne

[peterhof]

The Battle of the Marne

I just though I would post Winston Churchill's analysis of the Battle of the Marne as he wrote it in The World Crisis, Vol. Five.

"So we come to the Marne. This will ever remain the Mystery Battle of all time. We can see more clearly across the mists of time how Hannibal conquered at Cannea, than why Joffre won at the Marne. No great acquisition of strength to either side - except that usually invaders outrun their supplies and defenders fall back upon their reserves - important, but not decisive. Not much real fighting, comparatively few casualties, no decisive episode in any part of the immense field; fifty explanations, all well documented, five hundred volumes of narrative and comment - but the mystery remains.
What was the cause which turned retreat into victory and gave the world time to come to the succor of France? Where vast issues are so nicely balanced, every single fact or factor may be called decisive. Some say it was the generous onslaught of Russia and the withdrawal by an inadequate German Staff decision of two Army Corps from their wheeling flank; some say Gallieni and his leopard-spring from Paris, or Joffre and his phlegm and steadfast spirit. We British naturally dwell on the part played by Sir John French and his five divisions; and there are several other important claims.

But if under all reserves I am to choose the agate point on which the balance turned, I select the visits of Colonel Hentsch of the German General Staff on the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th of September to the Army Headquarters of von Bulow and Kluck, either ordering by an excess of authority, or lending the sanction of supreme authority to, the retirement of these armies. There was no need of such a retreat. (my italics) Speaking broadly, the Germans could have dug themselves in where they stood, or even in places continued to advance. It was only a continued effort of will that was needed then and a readiness to risk all, where all had already been risked."

The visit of Colonel Hentsch continues to be shrouded in mystery. It is known that a number of German field commanders vehemently disputed Hentsch's assessment and believed the encircling right wing to be on the verge of victory. There are unsubstantiated stories of plots to shoot Colonel Hentsch, attribute his death to French snipers, and continue the advance with all possible speed. In this case Churchill was right. Moltke's nerve failed him just when he needed it most. The Battle of the Marne truly was the "mystery Battle of all time."

[monk2002uk]

Churchill's review, like his campaign at Gallipoli and the attempts to save Antwerp, is deeply flawed. He talks of the Germans digging in 'where they stood'. Presumably he is referring to the furthest extent of the advance. Let's examine this in the context of the German right wing, specifically the First and Second German Armies. There are two scenarios relating to 'where they stood'. The first is before Maunoury's (not Gallieni) Sixth Army's flanking attack went in. The First Army was echeloned ahead of von Bülow's Second Army. Although First Army's right flank was refused to a limited degree, it was wide open to the north-west. We know this because von Kluck's response to Maunoury's threat was to pivot his entire First Army around the extreme right flank unit. It was as if his army formed a door, which was initially aligned along a (broadly) west-east axis. The 'door' pivoted on the hinge at the western end and rotated to a (broadly) south-north alignment. Von Kluck's army could not possibly have dug in prior to the pivoting manoeuvre. The whole reason the pivot was necessary is that Maunoury was fast approaching the rear of von Kluck's forces.

First Army's pivot did exactly what you would expect an opening door to do. It opened up a gap. An enormous gap. The gap was so wide that the entire BEF, plus French units on either flank, were able to slip between the German First and Second Armies. Although the German cavalry units conducted an heroic set of rearguard actions, they were no match for the combined forces that poured into the otherwise open 'entrance'. If the Germans had dug in at this point, then First Army would have been completely cut off. And the right flank of the German Second Army was under severe threat. It was beginning to bend back under the weight of d'Espérey's Fifth Army.

The whole German right wing was under terrible threat of destruction. Digging in at this point was simply not an option.

In steps Colonel Hentsch. Although his role may seem mysterious in the English literature, there are numerous other sources that cast light on what he did and, more importantly, why. Including from Hentsch himself. A detailed enquiry was ordered by Ludendorff. Hentsch submitted a detailed review of the build up and process that he was involved in. I have not seen this published in English but it makes illuminating reading. Hentsch was not the key to this drama. He merely served to consolidate the information about the potential catastrophe that was unfolding. It was not a question of von Moltke's nerve failing. It was a matter of military necessity, forced upon the Germans by the French outflanking manoeuvre.

Robert

[Terry Duncan]

Churchill's review, like his campaign at Gallipoli and the attempts to save Antwerp, is deeply flawed.

Thats being polite, his views on what should have happened at Jutland after Scheer's turn away are positively inane. If being perfectly honest, Churchill's work can be best described as self serving historical novels that whilst having a lot of interesting detail delivered in wonderful language, have a great deal of inaccurate information in them that is unable to withstand any but the most casual examination.

It was a matter of military necessity, forced upon the Germans by the French outflanking manoeuvre.

This same topic was started on the History Channel website by Peter, and discussed with him for some time. He would never admit the French defeated the Germans - Guise didnt happen maybe - and insisted that only Germans defeated the Germans. He rejected Zuber's work because it did not say what he believes, even though it was written almost as a justification of the German military in 1914! This is not just my take on the discussion, Glenn, Jon, and possibly one or two others here saw it there.

The visit of Colonel Hentsch continues to be shrouded in mystery.

Not really, it is at least fairly well detailed in Zuber's Inventing the Schlieffen Plan that you claim to own. If you read it you will find much of the mystery vanishes.

It is known that a number of German field commanders vehemently disputed Hentsch's assessment and believed the encircling right wing to be on the verge of victory.

Kuhl and Kluck seem to the people you refer to, though your description of the German army being on the verge of victory is wrong for the reasons Monk has pointed out. There were the two officers who had thrown the German effort into chaos, and therefore had everything to gain from blaming two dead officers. Bulow had decided to withdraw when Hentsch arrived, because he was being flanked after 1st Army had failed to cover his flanks as he and others since have contended was their primary role.

There are unsubstantiated stories of plots to shoot Colonel Hentsch, attribute his death to French snipers, and continue the advance with all possible speed.

Please cite where these unsubstantiated stories can be found? I for one have never seen this claim other than when you previously aired it. Who is supposed to have plotted this, who has said such a plot was rumoured?

Moltke's nerve failed him just when he needed it most.

Only if your contention is that Kluck and Kuhl were Moltke's nerve? The German advance had got out of hand courtesy of these two, and there was no way to retrieve it without a retreat. The Germans had even acted in this expectation, starting to dig positions on the Aisne before the defeat at the Marne had taken place.

[peterhof]

I would agree that Churchill's military misadventures do not inspire confidence in his analysis of the Battle of the Marne. My own analysis is that von Kluck changed the direction of his advance (from west to south) too quickly and in violation of the strategic plan. This took his advance east - not west - of Paris thereby exposing his right flank to strong French forces. Kluck made this fateful decision because of supply problems which were increasing exponentially, and his calculation that the French army and the B.E.F. were already defeated.

Gallieni - not Joffre - was the man of the hour. He was the French equivalent of von Francois (in the Battle of Tannenberg) and von Kluck gave him full credit.

[Terry Duncan]

This took his advance east - not west - of Paris thereby exposing his right flank to strong French forces.

So you feel moving west of Paris and exposing his left flank to the same troops, as well as opening a fatal gap that could never have been closed between 1st and 2nd Army is in some way better? All your suggestion does is make a larger opening in the German line and isolate one army on the wrong side of the largest fortress city in the world, whilst allowing the entire German right wing still east of Paris to be rolled up in detail. This is worse than the errors Kluck and Kuhl enacted in reality.

Kluck made this fateful decision because of supply problems which were increasing exponentially, and his calculation that the French army and the B.E.F. were already defeated.

Do you have a source for the supply problems forcing Kluck to change his march? Please share it with us. 1st Army seems to have moved to what it thought was the open flank of the Entente forces in the hope of landing a decisive blow but then found this 'blow' hit nothing and exposed not only itself but also 2nd Army to flank attacks.

Any advance on my request;

There are unsubstantiated stories of plots to shoot Colonel Hentsch, attribute his death to French snipers, and continue the advance with all possible speed.

Please cite where these unsubstantiated stories can be found? I for one have never seen this claim other than when you previously aired it. Who is supposed to have plotted this, who has said such a plot was rumoured?

[monk2002uk]

My own analysis is that von Kluck changed the direction of his advance (from west to south) too quickly and in violation of the strategic plan. This took his advance east - not west - of Paris thereby exposing his right flank to strong French forces. Kluck made this fateful decision because of supply problems which were increasing exponentially, and his calculation that the French army and the B.E.F. were already defeated.

Von Kluck's mission was to get around the left flank of the Anglo-French forces. Paris was irrelevant. The notion of Paris being the pivot point comes from post-WW1 views of the so-called Schlieffen Plan, as illustrated in this map here. Von Kluck consistently misinterpreted what was happening on his right flank, even before nearing Paris. The build up of the French Sixth Army pre-dated Gallieni's contribution and was directly due to Joffre. The C-in-C manoeuvred men from his right and centre, using the French railway system. Gallieni's men helped but they were only part of the French left.

Supply problems were not a relevant consideration. Von Kuhl and von Bergmann made this clear in a very detailed report that was compiled for the American Army after the war. The report was entitled 'Movements and Supply of the GERMAN FIRST ARMY During August and September, 1914'.

Von Kluck took steps to screen Paris (which is why First Army was able to react to Maunoury's attack) but he did not realise that he hadn't outflanked the French left. There were three reasons for this. First, as noted above, von Kluck wanted to ignore signs of threat from his right. Second, the German cavalry screen had been badly compromised. Most of the cavalry had been forced to cover the gap between First and Second Armies. The one unit that was dedicated to reconnoitring on von Kluck's right had been badly affected by the affair at Nèry and its aftermath. Thirdly, the German intelligence services were unable to interpret fully what the French were up to (though they had detected the transfer of French forces away from other fronts) and were unable to communicate effectively with von Kluck.

Robert

[Baltasar]

The Germans tried to redo a 1870-71 battle, where they managed to isolate and destroy or trap large elements of the French armies. By marching east of Paris, they initially surprised the French, because Paris would be a natural target and the French lines were overstreched, trying to cover the whole front despite being outnumbered. That's why Joffre shortened the lines east of Paris, to release men to form west of Paris in case of German attacks there while the Germans tried to bag the French formations between Alsace-Lorraine and Paris with this maneuver.

[monk2002uk]

Baltasar, I agree with your review FWIIW. There is one point that might cause some confusion to readers who are not so familiar with the Franco-Prussian War. You mentioned trying to 'redo a 1870-71 battle'. Some readers might associate this comment with the seige of Paris, which was a major 'battle' in the FPW. I don't think this is what you mean. Rather it was the concept of Vernichtungsschlacht - destruction of the enemy's forces in open manoeuvre warfare.

In keeping with your point, here is what von Kluck in the first chapter of his book translated as 'The March on Paris':

As the right flank of the German Armies in the west, the First Army had a most important part to play in the execution of a wide movement, probably of an enormous wheel through Belgium and Artois and perhaps into Picardy. It was evident that large tracts of country would have to be traversed with heavy fighting, and that many obstacles would have to be overcome. Rapidity of movement would be the principle condition of success in attaining the ultimate objective, which was to disperse first the Belgian Army, then the British Expeditionary Force, and finally to fall on the French Armies.

Two things stand out. There is no mention of Paris, only the province of Picardy which is north of Paris. Falling on the French Armies is a reference to their destruction from the flank/rear. This did not require the outer wheel to encompass Paris, especially if the decisive action occurred away from Paris, as happened in 1870-71.

Robert

[chronos20th]

I am amazed British posters would disagree with Churchill.

But it is hilarious the German High Command were in full agreement with Winston Churchill.
I was amazed to discover Das Marnedrama, the official report of the inquiry which took place in 1915 and which concluded thta "the German army had retreated from its already won victory".

I was also surprised to recently read accounts which stated the principal reason for the German failure was to put two commanders ajacent to one another in the two key positions - von Kluck and von Bulow.

Neither could stand one another and were violently antagonistic to each other, both despising the other.

Von Kluck was a regarded as an "Aggressive" commander and regarded von Bulow as over-cautious and plodding. Von Bulow fom a traditional military family regarded von Kluck, who had originally been a middle class volunteer in 1866, as an amateur and a glory-hunter.

Worse, von Kluck had been put under the command of von Bulow, and in some accounts I have read it is stated von Bulow ordered von Kluck to make the nearly 90% turn towards him.

Also that von Bulow did not believe in the Schlieffen Plan anyway.

Neither Hentsch or von Bulow would take responsibility for giving the order to retreat, both claiming it was the other.

With 2nd army withdrawing. the other armies had to follow suit.

The are discussions to peoples' heart's content and articles at this link;-

http://uk.search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt= ... =yff50-sfp

[ljadw]

Maybe,if "one" would not start with looking for scape-goats to explain/excuse the German defeat at the Marne,but with examining if the Germans still had a chance to win at the Marne,or if the Schlieffen plan ever had any chance to succeed,we could have a serious discussion,otherwise, I fear that this one will undergo the same fate as the preceding ones :to be locked .

[monk2002uk]

I am amazed British posters would disagree with Churchill.

But it is hilarious the German High Command were in full agreement with Winston Churchill.
I was amazed to discover Das Marnedrama, the official report of the inquiry which took place in 1915 and which concluded thta "the German army had retreated from its already won victory".

Perhaps the key is that I am not British . I would urge great caution in interpreting the post-Marne reviews conducted by the 'High Command'. You should study the movements and actions of the various units involved. Basically Hentsch and/or von Bülow did not initiate a withdrawal when the German armies were winning. The decision to withdrawal was made because a catastrophe was looming on the right wing.

The relationship between von Kluck and von Bülow was strained. It should be noted that von Kluck was only under von Bülow's command for some of the period leading up to the withdrawal. Also, relationships were not exactly cordial between the other commanders either. But the problems between von Kluck and von Bülow did not cause the French Sixth Army to appear on von Kluck's right. And these problems did not cause the French Ninth Army to appear on von Bülow's left. Von Kluck had to respond to Maunoury. He and von Kuhl, First Army's Chief of Staff, believed that First Army was winning the battle with Maunoury's Sixth Army. Be that as it may, this did not account for the fact that the Anglo-French forces were pushing into the gap between First and Second Army. These forces caused the German cavalry rear guards to fall back. Von Bülow could tell what was happening because his right wing was giving way under this pressure.

Hopefully the following maps will help. They are taken from the 4th volume of Der Weltkrieg. The first map shows the situation on 5 September, with von Kluck's First Army echeloned further south than Second Army but covering Paris:

Robert

[monk2002uk]

This map is labelled "Das Bild der Lage bei der Obersten Heeresleitung vor der Entsendung des Oberstleutnants Hentsch am Morgen des 8. September 1914." This is the situation, as perceived by German High Command, before Hentsch was sent on his mission. Note how First Army has rotated to a south-north axis. The BEF and French cavalry (red arrows) are pushing up towards the German cavalry, particularly H.K.K. 1. Second Army's right flank is already beginning to bend back.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

And now the map for the 9th September. The gap is very obvious. Both First and Second Armies were at risk. It was the extraordinary rearguard actions of the German First and Second Cavalry Corps that prevented something much worse.

Robert

[Terry Duncan]

I am amazed British posters would disagree with Churchill.

Why? He wrote a lot of well worded rubbish at times. On MP noted that Churchill had written a book about himself and called it The World Crisis, a not entirely unfair comment as Churchill did like to paint himself as far more central than he was, especially pre-war.

I was amazed to discover Das Marnedrama, the official report of the inquiry which took place in 1915 and which concluded thta "the German army had retreated from its already won victory".

Hentsch requested, and was granted, an enquiry into the claims that he had ordered or caused to be ordered a retreat when this was not necessary. The enquiry cleared him entirely. Monk has posted some very good maps, and as they are from the German history I presume you will accept them and not dismiss them as being the product of court historians or propagandists?

I was also surprised to recently read accounts which stated the principal reason for the German failure was to put two commanders ajacent to one another in the two key positions - von Kluck and von Bulow.

Not entirely clearly worded, as it is normal military practice to have two commander adjecent to each other. If you mean to say it surprised you that Kluck and Bulow disliked each other, this is a well documented fact and certainly widespread since at least the time of Keegan's works on this time. As Monk has noted, many of the senior German commanders did not get on at all well, maybe Bulow and Kluck were the worst example in 1914, but far from the only example.

Worse, von Kluck had been put under the command of von Bulow, and in some accounts I have read it is stated von Bulow ordered von Kluck to make the nearly 90% turn towards him.

Kluck's famous turn was entirely the product of his own - along with his CoS Kuhl - nothing to do with Bulow, and ended all hope of a German success.

Also that von Bulow did not believe in the Schlieffen Plan anyway.

It would appear Kluck didnt believe in it either until after the war. Zuber has looked into this a good deal and it is only when people start playing the blame game after the war that Kluck and Kuhl start to mention some plan that would have ensured victory, though neither can describe it. Then again, the alternative is to conclude the Kluck and Kulh's disobedience and ill-judged turn were what ended up ensuring the entire right wing would retreat, and they were not likely to accept blame when there were people who were no longer able to answer back.

Monk,

Thank you for posting the maps, they are most useful.

ljadw,

I fear that this one will undergo the same fate as the preceding ones :to be locked .

I wont lock such a thread, it is a subject well worth looking at. As long as posters remain civil and honest there is no need for any action at all, and no staff member has told me that would wish to shut down any thread her as long as it is within the normal rules.

[peterhof]

The Battle of the Marne ended in stalemate and foreclosed any chance of a quick German victory. The storm of controversy in Germany as to who was responsible was as fierce as it was inevitable. In Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, Terence Zuber provides a lot of good information but makes clear that the controversy remains unresolved - even on this forum.