Why did America intervene in WW1?

[peterhof]

The German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare resulted in the April 2, 1917, American declaration of war upon Germany. Largely unknown is the fact that House, and therefore Wilson, decided to intervene in the 1st World War long before 1917.
On October 17, 1915, House wrote the following letter to Sir Edward Grey:

"In my opinion, it would be a world-wide calamity if the War should continue to a point where the Allies could not, with the aid of the United States, bring about a peace along the lines you and I have so often discussed. What I want you to know is that, whenever you consider the time is propitious for this intervention, I will propose it to the President. He may then desire me to go to Europe in order that a more intimate understanding may be had.
It is in my mind that, after conferring with your Government, I should proceed to Berlin and tell them that it was the President’s purpose to intervene and stop this destructive war, provided the weight of the United States, thrown on the side that accepted our proposal, could do it.
I would not let Berlin know, of course, of any understanding had with the Allies. This might induce Berlin to accept the proposal, but, if they did not do so, it would nevertheless be the purpose to intervene. If the Central Powers were still obdurate, it would be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue."

After receiving Wilson’s blessing for this astonishing proposal, made fully ten months before the election which returned Wilson to the White House with the slogan “He kept us out of war,” House embarks on a series of conversations with the French. On February 9, 1916, he reports to Wilson:

"It was finally understood that in the event the Allies had some notable victories during the spring and summer, you would not intervene; and in the event that the tide of war went against them or remained stationary, you would intervene. This conversation is to go no further than between Briand, Cambon and myself, and I promised that no one in America should know of it, excepting yourself and Lansing."

Thorough as always, House covers all contingencies and notes in his diary:

"The next point that came up was how the British Government could let us know the time they considered propitious to intervene, without first submitting the question to the Allies, and, if they did not submit it to the Allies, how to avoid the charge of double-dealing. The solution I suggested for this was that at regular intervals I would cable Sir Edward Grey, in our private code, offering intervention. He could ignore the messages until the time was propitious, and then he could bring it to the attention of the Allies as coming from us and not as coming from Great Britain."

The American ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, summarizes the House-Wilson conspiracy to enter the lists against Germany:

"First, his plan was that he and I and a group of the British Cabinet should at once work out a minimum programme of peace—the least that the Allies would accept, which, he assumed, would be unacceptable to the Germans (my italics); and that the President would take this programme and present it to both sides. The side that declined would be responsible for continuing the War. Then, to end the War, the President would help the other side—that is, the Allies."

Here was the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” which morally committed the United States to war whenever Britain thought the moment “propitious.” And this at a time when American sentiment overwhelmingly favored neutrality; a sentiment Wilson had solemnly and repeatedly promised to respect.
Just as with Britain’s 1906 “understanding” with France, there was nothing in writing. Nothing, in other words, to endanger the time-honored stratagem of “plausible deniability” in case of embarrassing questions.
The decision for war with Germany was firm. When House ventured the opinion that “If Germany had not renewed her submarine pledge at the worst possible psychological moment, it is doubtful if Congress would have sanctioned war. It is certain that Wilson would not have sought it”, he was refuted by Wilson himself.
At a Foreign Relations Committee hearing during the sixty-sixth Congress, Senator McCumber queried the President: “Do you think if Germany had committed no act of war, or no act of injustice against our citizens, that we would have gotten into this war?”
President Wilson: “I do think so.”
Senator McCumber: “You think we would have gotten in anyway?”
President Wilson: “I do.”

Thus Woodrow Wilson confirms that neither the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare nor the Zimmerman telegram provoked American intervention but merely served as convenient pretexts.

[glenn239]

I can't agree unrestricted U-boat warfare was a pretext. Everything about the US government's behaviour towards Britain and Germany from 1914 to 1917 screams out that the Administration took neutral rights deadly seriously.

OTOH, I do agree the Zimmerman telegram was a pretext.

[Terry Duncan]

When House ventured the opinion that “If Germany had not renewed her submarine pledge at the worst possible psychological moment, it is doubtful if Congress would have sanctioned war. It is certain that Wilson would not have sought it”, he was refuted by Wilson himself.

Wilson may or may not have sought a declaration of war, but there is little reason to suppose that without the USW campaign and the Zimmerman Telegram that Congress would have supported him over a declaration of war.

[peterhof]

I do agree that that the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare was a serious matter for the United States and Congress had every right to react as they did - just as the Germans had anticipated. I am merely making the point that the decision for intervention had been made in the Oval Office in 1915. I believe the reason for the decision was Wilson's long sojourn in England and his well-known admiration for the English Parliamentary system.

[ljadw]

I do agree that that the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare was a serious matter for the United States and Congress had every right to react as they did - just as the Germans had anticipated. I am merely making the point that the decision for intervention had been made in the Oval Office in 1915. I believe the reason for the decision was Wilson's long sojourn in England and his well-known admiration for the English Parliamentary system.

A new conspiracy theory
But,of course,you are "forgetting" that what the Oval Office decided was irrelevant,because,in those days,there was no imperial presidency,and decision lay with congress:a US DOW was only possible if there was a quasi unanimity in Congress=if the Republicans did agree .
Btw:about Wilson's long sejourn in England :when did this happen ?
Last point:you are -IMHO ,conveniently- forgetting to say that in 1919,House was fired by Wilson .

[ljadw]

I also did not know that it was the custom in the US senate to interrogate the sitting president,I thought there was a strict separation between the executive and the legislative .

[Jon Clarke]

I would not let Berlin know, of course, of any understanding had with the Allies. This might induce Berlin to accept the proposal, but, if they did not do so, it would nevertheless be the purpose to intervene. If the Central Powers were still obdurate, it would be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue."

As I pointed out on the other forum when Peter last used this post 18 months ago, the text of House's letter of 17 October 1917 has been edited an attempt to make it look as if House intended to trick the Germans into rejecting House's proposal. In fact the opposite was true as the full quote, according to Charles Seymour's The Intimate Papers Of Colonel House makes clear:

I would not let Berlin know, of course, of any understanding had with the Allies, but would rather lead them to think our proposal would be rejected by the Allies. This might induce Berlin to accept the proposal, but, if they did not do so, it would nevertheless be the purpose to intervene. if the Central Powers were still obdurate, it would probably be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue.

House was using a fairly common negotiating tactic, i.e. trying to convince one side to accept a proposal on the basis that they would be doing exactly the opposite to what their opponents were doing. The removal of the word 'probably' from the last sentence may not seem significant but it was in fact the one and only change Wilson made to House's draft and highlights Wilson's reluctance to make any firm commitment regarding the war.

[Jon Clarke]

Btw:about Wilson's long sejourn in England :when did this happen ?

Godfrey Hodgson in his book Woodrow Wilson's right hand: the life of Colonel Edward M. House tells us that:

[/i]In 1906 Wilson became partially blind in his left eye as a result of undiagnosed hypertension. On his doctor’s advice, although he had recently returned from a long holiday in England, he went to Bermuda.[/i]

Further information about the holiday can be found in J. W. Schulte Nordholt's Woodrow Wilson:

He spent two months traveling through his beloved England, mostly on a bicycle. He visited all the shrines of his romantic imagination. Most important, of course, were the landscapes that had inspired Wordsworth, the Lake District and the Wye valley with Tintern Abbey, but he also went to the graves of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke, the village where Walter Bagehot was born, and more such sites that had a sentimental value. It was a delightful trip that did him enormous good, for he lived by such poetic contemplation. He came back with his health greatly improved.

The strange thing is that Peter either did not know or neglected to mention that Wilson's mother was born in Carlisle in the North West of England although his ancestry was more Scottish/Irish than English. Whatever his connections, and even after Belgium, the u-boat campaign, the Lusitania, the Arabic, the German-inspired sabotage in the States etc. etc. Wilson was still remarkably reluctant to commit his country to war. Ross Gregory writes in The Origins Of American Intervention In The First World War that

He [Wilson]was not allowed that hope for long, for he learned on March 18 that submarines had sunk three American vessels. Whatever thoughts he previously might have entertained, there now was no reason for seeing anything other than a German intent to sink all American ships within range of submarines. Even then, Wilson was hesitant. There was no emergency session with Lansing or hasty summoning of the Cabinet. The president spent much of the time by himself, and when he did talk to officials, he gave evidence of uncertainty as to the proper course. When he finally met the Cabinet two days later, on March 20, he asked each man’s opinion of relations with Germany. Though all members said that the United States had no alternative to a declaration of war, Wilson closed the meeting without revealing his thoughts. Shortly afterward he called a special session of Congress for April 2 “to receive a communication concerning grave matters of national policy.” Everyone then knew that Wilson had decided on war with Germany.

[ljadw]

Thank you for these usefull informations

[South]

Good morning PeterHof,

The reason for US participation in the Great War had little to do with Wilson's admiration of the English Parliamentary system. The decision related to US interests in international relations, especially in re alliances and US business.

Recall the Russo-Japan War of 1904-05. The US had observers present - Gen Arthur MacArthur, father of Gen Douglas MacArthur,-. Recall the Balkans and how this related to the Mediterranian trade. Recall the recent conversion (1905?) of the RN and later, the USN, from coal to oil. The US had businesses pursuing the Middle East oil fields in tandem with British partners.

It's all about - interests - and less so, if at all, about legislative models.

As an aside, General Pershing, in 1916, chasing after Poncho Villa in Arizona environs and Mexico, had less to do with US border integrity and more so in practicing brigade-level maneuvers for purposes unrelated to Senor Villa.

Warm regards,

Bob

[favedave]

The decision to intervene on behalf of the Allies was not made in 1915, nor was it made by Wilson. The decision was made by J.P. Morgan in August 1914. Morgan directly owned 90% of the merchant hulls plying the Atlantic between the Americas and Europe and Africa. This included White Star and Cunard. Morgan's financial holdings included a controlling or highly influential interest in most of America's major manufacturing, mining, energy, telecommunications and transportation industries. Morgan's decision to not allow his companies to trade with Germany during the war was the reason the British blockade was so successful. Having to pursue only 10% (at most) of the merchant vessels which could aid Germany was easily within the Royal Navy's capability. Morgan made this decision around August 4, 1914 and duly informed the Wilson Whitehouse as well as 10 Downing Street.

America's military intervention was not desired by the British or the French until after the battles of Verdun and the Somme ended in November, 1916. Of course, Germany had been secretly at war with the United States via its industrial sabotage activities for nearly two and a half years, the most infamous of which was the catastrophic explosions and destruction of Black Tom Island, a munitions storage and freighting facility located about 500 yards from the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor in July,1916. Three quarters of the American munitions sold to Britain and France passed through this facility.

America's neutrality was so heavily weighted in favor of the Allies, Wilson's Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryant had already resigned in protest at this point. Wilson's occassional feeble protests for "Freedom of the Seas" against the Royal Navy's blockade nearly took an embarrassing and election losing turn with the Black Tom explosion. The "merchant" Uboat Deutschland had been docked in Baltimore for nearly a month, with 'engine troubles.' After weeks of shore leave by the crew and engine tests in the Chesapeake, Deutschland was fully stuffed with cargo and ready to sail for home. Outside the Bay a flotilla of Royal Navy destroyers stood in wait to intercept the Germans. Wilson boarded the Presidential Yacht and in combination with U.S.Navy destroyers escorted the Deutschland out of the bay to keep the RN's sub hunters a 'safe distance' from the Uboat until it submerged and got away. The President was informed of Black Tom's destruction while still aboard the presidential yacht providing safe passage to the Deutschland into international waters.

Wilson was faced with a huge political delimma. His political opponents, Teddy Roosevelt, returned to the Republican fold after his 1912 Progressive party bid for the Presidency, and the Republican's potential candidates for the Presidency in the November election had already staked out the pro war position. Wilson had to run on the "He kept us out of war" platform. The British were expecting their just launched "Big Push" on the Somme to win the war and therefore absolutely did not want American military intervention to take place. But Federal investigators in New York City had already determined that Black Tom was caused by German saboteurs operating out of the German Embassy. Wilson therefore directed his investigators to declare unequivocally that Black Tom was an accident, and not the work of saboteurs. This was done less than 24 hours after the initial explosions in an article on the front page of the New York Times. At that moment, according to the Times, nobody had been able to get onto what was left of the island since the raging fires were still cooking off artillery shells and small arms ammunition.

Wilson went on to successfully campaign on the He kept Us Out of War slogan. The British and French realized that a sure victory required American manpower on the ground and the U.S. Navy to keep the sea lanes to Britain safe from Germany's increasingly successful Uboat blockade. Germany's declaration of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare and the Zimmerman Telegram, coming on top of Russia's backing out of the war, gave Wilson the perfect public reasons to go to war. Ironically, figuring out how to protect the secret that Room 40 had all of Germany's diplomatic and naval codes slowed down Wilson's call for a declaration of war.

[glenn239]

I am merely making the point that the decision for intervention had been made in the Oval Office in 1915.

House was, IMO, a political hustler. Frankly and IMO, I doubt S.E. Grey took much he said at face value.

As I pointed out on the other forum when Peter last used this post 18 months ago, the text of House's letter of 17 October 1917 has been edited an attempt to make it look as if House intended to trick the Germans into rejecting House's proposal.

It seems flat out impossible even House himself have been so dillusional to think that he could arrange a German acceptance of a proposal designed to be unacceptable to Germany - simply by his lying. As such, the altered quote does not significantly alter the meaning, or blunt the duplicitious nature to House's original intent.

[Terry Duncan]

As such, the altered quote does not significantly alter the meaning, or blunt the duplicitious nature to House's original intent.

Not significantly is still altered, regardless of how you think it impacts on House's intent. Of course in this particular instance the main question is of course why was it edited in the first place?

[glenn239]

Because the full version does not impact the overall conclusions to be drawn from the document is the first answer - the added material is functionally irrelevant - House is trying to soft-pedal his duplicity towards Germany because the exchange is in writing.

The second is that authors often parse a quote down, ejecting redundant passages, in order to deal with only the section that is important to the point they are making. Another individual may disagree that the edited material is not important, but in this instance it is bad form to suggest duplicity - it is possible for people to honestly think differently, and the idea that he who has different opinions is being dishonest smacks a tad of drawing and quartering the mouthier serfs in the Black Tower.

A third is that posters often pull quotes from books where the parse has already been made, and were not aware that the original quote was longer. Note that this bit has happened to me. Overall, I think it's a good habit both to parse extraneous bits and to keep anything that might be of interest to someone with an opposing view. Not always an easy thing to do, when internet discussions can tend towards reflexive hostility by some on all points they can find to dispute.

So overall, I think both Jon and Peter have defendable positions....

[Terry Duncan]

The second is that authors often parse a quote down,

Except we both have direct knowledge of one poster directly editing quotes frequently in order to make them say something different from long experience on other another site.