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MajorT wrote:Hi Glenn,
1) Nobody has claimed that the Austrian cabinet did order "the mobilization of the Russian and French armies".
2) It couldn't do so anyway.
What, exactly, is your source of misapprehension on this point?
But the world war was caused by Russia mobilizing its entire armed forces and thereby creating triggering the casus belli with Germany.
Therefore, you must think that Austria ordered the Russian mobilization. It did not, and did not wish it.
then this idea stands in defiance of all Great Power precedent between 1815 and 1913 - where such minor dust ups never once caused a world war
MajorT wrote:Hi Glenn,
What I actually wrote was:
"However, this need not prevent us from identifying who decided to risk turning yet another Balkan diplomatic crisis into a war that grew into WWI.
It was the Austro-Hungarian cabinet on 7 July, with German foreknowledge and support."
Perhaps you would care to give the date of delivery of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia and the date of the Russian mobilization?
MajorT, the world war occured because Russia mobilized at Germany.
The Austrian dispute with Serbia was no excuse for Russia to start a world war.
Between 1815 and 1914 not one Great Power used a minor war as a pretext to trigger a global conflict.
Or would you blame the third party that used the Boer war as an excuse, a pretext, for aggression?
Terry Duncan wrote:Far more key is the fact that Germany had decided to mobilize before she had any certain knowledge of Russian mobilization, so it cannot have been decided on because of that act.
You have made this statement before (on the HC board) and more than once. You were corrected each time
Where is your proof for this outlandish statement?
Moltke was aware that for Germany, if not for the other powers, mobilisation would mean war.
Strachan, Hew (2005-04-05). The First World War (Kindle Locations 490-495). Penguin. Kindle Edition.
The emphasis on speed of mobilization, the interaction of war plans, and Germany’s central geographical position meant that a chain reaction became possible. But the interlocking sequence of mobilizations can be exaggerated; Serbia decided to mobilize ahead of Austria-Hungary; Austria-Hungary settled for general mobilization before Russia’s position was known; Russia’s move to mobilization preceded Germany’s and yet Germany’s decision was made before it was aware of the Russian position; Britain responded to Germany before it had decided to honour any commitment to France. The imperative of the alliance system was not one of altruism. But of brutal self-interest: Germany needed Austria-Hungary; France’s military position was dependant on Russian support; British diplomacy was unsustainable if it allowed the Entente to shatter.
Strachan is plain wrong to state, as he does, that mobilization had been used before to buttress diplomacy.
But general mobilization by a Great Power was generally understood to mean that it had only resorted to this final step of putting the great military machine in motion, with the automatic movement of the troops to the frontier with the greatest despatch, when it had finally concluded that war could no longer be avoided."
The words of Sasonov and the Czar confirm this."
I know what it is. You mean to make war on Serbia. . . . You are setting fire to Europe. It is a great responsibility that you are assuming, you will see the impression that it will make here and in London and Paris and perhaps elsewhere. It will be regarded as an unjustifiable aggression. . . Why was Serbia given no chance to speak and why the form of an ultimatum? The monarchic idea has got nothing to do with it. . . . The fact is you mean war and you have burnt your bridges. . . . One sees how peace loving you are, seeing that you set fire to Europe.
Did you think, Terry, that you could make your threadbare canard [about this supposed German mobilization] come true by sheer force of repetition?
(BTW: Germany did not "negotiate" after the Russian mobilization.
Germany gave Russia twelve hours to suspend.
This is hardly "negotiation."
I see you have not forgotten your old trick of misquoting people.
Fay said: "Mobilization means war." He said this without qualifications of any sort.
This is so patently false that it calls into question the rest of Mr. Strachan's conclusions.
Show me a shred of evidence (other than Strachan's wrong-headed notion) that the German decision to mobilize came "before it was aware of the Russian position."
(BTW: The book to which your link points, is the same book I have on my Kindle-for-PC)
MajorT wrote:Hi Glenn,
Let's keep this clean.
"I ask you again - if the Boer War had caused a world war, do you really think it would be Britain and the Boers that were responsible? Or would you blame the third party that used the Boer war as an excuse, a pretext, for aggression?"
When did you ever ask me this before?
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