The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

Discussions on all aspects of the First World War not covered in the other sections. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Locked
peterhof
Member
Posts: 686
Joined: 05 Sep 2011, 01:18
Location: Laguna Woods, CA
Contact:

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#16

Post by peterhof » 25 Jan 2012, 01:40

Terry Duncan wrote: So, clearly Sazonov was talking about the Note and its terms. You can blame Sazonov for many things, but he clearly had the measure of Austria from the moment he saw the Note and its terms.
I stand corrected. Sasonov was indeed responding to Szapary's reading of the ultimatum on July 24. But in a later interview with Szapary, Sasonov admitted that Serbia should be "taught a lesson" and that Austria had a legitimate grievance and was entitled to a retaliatory response. Given this, along with Bethmann's severe warning telegrams to Vienna of which Sasonov was aware, there was not an excuse in the world for Russia to order general mobilization, except to inaugurate the European war.
We have met the enemy and he is us.

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#17

Post by Terry Duncan » 25 Jan 2012, 02:06

Sasonov admitted that Serbia should be "taught a lesson" and that Austria had a legitimate grievance and was entitled to a retaliatory response.
Most people would agree. That response did not need to be war. There was, and is, nothing moral about killing thousands of innocent people over the deaths of two people.
Given this, along with Bethmann's severe warning telegrams to Vienna of which Sasonov was aware, there was not an excuse in the world for Russia to order general mobilization, except to inaugurate the European war.
The problem is that Sazonov was clearly not aware of even the slightest discussions between Germany and Austria as nobody had bothered to keep him up to date on this. From the moment Bethmann said he would speak to Berchtold to get him to moderate to the moment Russia mobilized, Bethmann never told Sazonov about any progress or total lack of it, or of Berchtold stalling with the claim he had to wait for Tisza - he didnt have to he could simply have consulted Franz-Joseph to whom he was answerable.


Jon Clarke
Member
Posts: 254
Joined: 09 Apr 2009, 00:35
Location: Devon, UK

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#18

Post by Jon Clarke » 25 Jan 2012, 18:18

Bethmann never told Sazonov about any progress or total lack of it, or of Berchtold stalling with the claim he had to wait for Tisza - he didnt have to he could simply have consulted Franz-Joseph to whom he was answerable.
IIRC it wasn't actually Berchtold who told Tschirschky during the afternoon of 30 July that it would have to wait until Tisza's arrival the next morning but Forgach & Hoyos. Berchtold had left with Conrad to see the Emperor in order to obtain his agreement to Austrian general mobilization!

The fact that Austrian general mobilization was decided upon at virtually the same time as the Tsar finally agreed to Russia's general mobilization is a somewhat inconvenient fact for Peter. If general mobilization meant war then it demolishes his claims that Bethmann's pressure was working on the Austrians as they could hardly be about to cave in to German pressure whilst at the same time deciding upon war with Russia.

However nobody in 1914, apart from Germany, acted as if general mobilization actually did mean war. Immediately after the audience with the Emperor, Berchtold met with the Russian ambassador and told him of the decision to order (Austrian) general mobilization. Both Berchtold's and Shebeko's account of their meeting during the afternoon of 30 July show the meeting to have been reasonably friendly which seems unlikely if Peter's claim that general mobilization meant war is correct. Moreover Bunsen's report of what Shebeko told him immediately after the meeting states that:

On the whole Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to pack up his things on the strength of rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. Russian Ambassador now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria...

How could Bunsen possibly write that Shebeko 'now hopes' (i.e. after the meeting with Berchtold) that war could be prevented - surely according to Peter Austria had effectively just declared war on Russia!

peterhof
Member
Posts: 686
Joined: 05 Sep 2011, 01:18
Location: Laguna Woods, CA
Contact:

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#19

Post by peterhof » 25 Jan 2012, 21:09

Jon writes fancifully that "However nobody in 1914, apart from Germany, acted as if general mobilization actually did mean war." Oh really?


Czar: Think of the responsibility you are advising me to take! Think of the thousands upon thousands of men who will be sent to their death!

Sasonov: It only remains to do everything necessary to meet war fully armed and under the conditions most favorable to us. Therefore it is better without fear to call forth a war by our preparations for it, and to continue these preparations carefully, rather than out of fear to give an inducement for war and be taken unawares.”

Dobrorolski: “The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its end in all its details. When the moment has been chosen, one only has to press the button, and the whole state begins to function automatically with the precision of a clock’s mechanism . . . The choice of the moment is influenced by a complex of varied political causes. But once the moment has been fixed, everything is settled; there is no going back. It determines mechanically the beginning of war."

Here we have general mobilization explicitly defined as meaning war by the Czar, the Russian Foreign Minister, AND the Russian Chief of the Mobilization Division of the General Staff.

Even S.B. Fay confirms (P. 479): “By ordering general mobilization about 6:00 P.M., on July 30, Russia had now taken the step which military men everywhere clearly understood almost certainly meant war. This was also clearly understood by Sasonov and the Tsar, as appears from Schilling’s account of their conversation at Peterhof (see above) and the Tsar’s long hesitation to assume the terrible responsibility."


And let's not forget, the Russian decision to order general mobilization was made long before July 30th. Sasonov's plan (July 25th) to order partial mobilization had been decisively rejected by Dobrorolski and Danilov who ridiculed the idea as being "out of the question" because it would complicate a subsequent order for general mobilization which would include Germany and would mean war as Buchanan had explicitly warned. This - general mobilization - was planned to be sent out over the wires at midnight, July 29. The Czar's last-minute change to partial mobilization does not change the fact.

About Austria's decision for general mobilization, Fay notes (Vol. 2 P. 514):

"In Vienna Berchtold and Conrad were dominated more by a determination to carry out a campaign against Serbia than by a fear of war with Russia. Hence the Austrian ultimatum, the partial mobilization exclusively against Serbia, with careful avoidance of provocative measures in Galicia, and the declaration of war upon Serbia . . . Even after moving against Serbia and bombarding Belgrade, Conrad had still assumed that Russia would not resort to armed intervention. He had therefore sent no troops to the Russian front. But upon Sasonov's announcement that Russia would mobilize in her southern districts if Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, Conrad began to realize that the Galician front was in danger. He regarded as grotesque Sasonov's assurance that Russian troops once mobilized would stand idle on the frontier with arms stacked."

Sasonov's announcement was transmitted by Szapary to Berchtold on July 29, 4:26 P.M., and received 10 P.M. (A.R.B., III, 18)

But no Austrian troops had crossed the Serbian frontier. So why did Sasonov want to order general mobilization at midnight, July 29th? Why did he send it again on the 30th? The fact is that Russia had made her decision by the time of Poincare's departure on July 23. This is confirmed by the implementation of the "Period Preparatory to War" on July 25th.

Of all the events of the July crisis, the Russian mobilization obviously stands head and shoulders above the rest. I have already said that it proves that the Triple Entente wanted a European war. The Ententinistas will deny it to the bitter end. But at least it now has a thread of its own.
Last edited by peterhof on 25 Jan 2012, 21:37, edited 2 times in total.
We have met the enemy and he is us.

peterhof
Member
Posts: 686
Joined: 05 Sep 2011, 01:18
Location: Laguna Woods, CA
Contact:

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#20

Post by peterhof » 25 Jan 2012, 21:33

Terry Duncan wrote:The problem is that Sazonov was clearly not aware of even the slightest discussions between Germany and Austria as nobody had bothered to keep him up to date on this. From the moment Bethmann said he would speak to Berchtold to get him to moderate to the moment Russia mobilized, Bethmann never told Sazonov about any progress or total lack of it, or of Berchtold stalling with the claim he had to wait for Tisza - he didnt have to he could simply have consulted Franz-Joseph to whom he was answerable.

From Fay (Vol. 2 P. 431):

As we have seen above, Bethmann sent off the 'pledge plan' to Vienna on the evening of July 28, with instructions to Tschirschky to express himself "emphatically" to Berchtold and to "wire reply." At the same time he had notified England and Russia that he was doing his best to persuade Vienna to come to a frank and friendly discussion with St. Petersburg, and that he wished to cooperate to maintain the general peace.

Of course Bethmann notified Sasonov! He was trying to moderate Vienna in order to avert a European war! Why would he possibly fail to inform Sasonov of the fact??
We have met the enemy and he is us.

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#21

Post by Terry Duncan » 25 Jan 2012, 22:21

Jon writes fancifully that "However nobody in 1914, apart from Germany, acted as if general mobilization actually did mean war." Oh really?
It is certain that almost all of the diplomats mentioned mobilization, yet none mentioned the notion that mobilization must mean war until after the first mobilizations had already taken place. It is a matter of record that Grey suggested all could mobilize and then continue to negotiate. This statement was not contested at the time, indicating that even though mobilization was seen as a serious escalation, it was still short of war and a peaceful settlement was possible.
But no Austrian troops had crossed the Serbian frontier. So why did Sasonov want to order general mobilization at midnight, July 29th?
Austria had declared war on Serbia and attacked her. Austria followed the suggestion of Germany on this matter, in order to prevent a peaceful settlement being forced through. This has been covered more than once on this site, and any number of times on other sites. There is little point feigning ignorance of such well known details.

One final thing, the quotes from the Tsar, Sazonov, and Dobrorolsky do not need to be repeated endlessly. So far they have surfaced about once every five weeks lately, and now you have posted them in this thread, there will be no need to do so again. People reading the thread are perfectly capable of digesting these statements without them being endlessly repeated.

Lets us briefly examine the quote from Sazonov, as it explains why Russia acted as she did;
Therefore it is better without fear to call forth a war by our preparations for it, and to continue these preparations carefully, rather than out of fear to give an inducement for war and be taken unawares.
It is perfectly clear that Sazonov is saying that Russia must prepare for possible war because of the events taking place, rather than do nothing and have war forced upon her. This was seen as likely given the inflexible attitude taken by Austria towards Serbia, and one that had all of Europe convinced that Austria would not have adopted unless Germany stood behind her - correctly as it turned out!

As to the Dobrorolski quote, it has also been pointed out many times that he was a minor official who was responsible for planning mobilization, and to issue the order for mobilization once he was ordered to do so by his superiors, notably Danilov and Sazonov. He had no power to make a decision on the meaning of mobilization, no ability to order it or to give orders once mobilization had taken place. Danilov notably did not agree there was an automated process that meant Russia must go to war, and more importantly neither did Sazonov imagine he was relinquishing control of events by ordering mobilization.

The German attitude is also indicative that you are incorrect, as they sent Russia an ultimatum and not a declaration of war as a result of Russian mobilization. This ultimatum does not mention war are the inescapable outcome of the Russian action if she fails to do as Germany demands. As Jon has said, the only nation that decided mobilization meant war was Germany, though she appears to have only really decided this herself after Russia mobilized.
Of course Bethmann notified Sasonov! He was trying to moderate Vienna in order to avert a European war! Why would he possibly fail to inform Sasonov of the fact??
Please read my post;
From the moment Bethmann said he would speak to Berchtold to get him to moderate to the moment Russia mobilized, Bethmann never told Sazonov about any progress or total lack of it
As you appear to have not bothered to read it, I will repeat it once again here. Bethmann told Sazonov he would speak to Berchtold, on a matter that was urgent, on 28th July. From that point onwards, Bethmann made no attempt to keep Sazonov appraised of his total lack of success with Berchtold, or the spurious claim that Berchtold couldnt say anything until he spoke to Tisza.

Let me rephrase your own question back to you;

Why would Bethmann possibly fail to inform Sasonov of his progress with Berchtold, or notify him of a time he could be in a position to give an answer??

peterhof
Member
Posts: 686
Joined: 05 Sep 2011, 01:18
Location: Laguna Woods, CA
Contact:

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#22

Post by peterhof » 25 Jan 2012, 23:35

Terry Duncan wrote:One final thing, the quotes from the Tsar, Sazonov, and Dobrorolsky do not need to be repeated endlessly. So far they have surfaced about once every five weeks lately, and now you have posted them in this thread, there will be no need to do so again. People reading the thread are perfectly capable of digesting these statements without them being endlessly repeated.
Just as you have "endlessly" and wrongly repeated that mobilization did not mean war?
Terry Duncan wrote:Lets us briefly examine the quote from Sazonov, as it explains why Russia acted as she did;

"Therefore it is better without fear to call forth a war by our preparations for it, and to continue these preparations carefully, rather than out of fear to give an inducement for war and be taken unawares."

It is perfectly clear that Sazonov is saying that Russia must prepare for possible war because of the events taking place, rather than do nothing and have war forced upon her. This was seen as likely given the inflexible attitude taken by Austria towards Serbia, and one that had all of Europe convinced that Austria would not have adopted unless Germany stood behind her - correctly as it turned out!
Talk about parsing! What Sasonov is saying is that it is better to "call forth a war" by mobilizing, rather than to be "caught unawares." Let me repeat it: "call forth a war by our preparations for it . . . " "caught unawares" is nonsense as Russia was in no danger of attack from Austria or Germany.
Terry Duncan wrote:As to the Dobrorolski quote, it has also been pointed out many times that he was a minor official who was responsible for planning mobilization, and to issue the order for mobilization once he was ordered to do so by his superiors, notably Danilov and Sazonov. He had no power to make a decision on the meaning of mobilization, no ability to order it or to give orders once mobilization had taken place. Danilov notably did not agree there was an automated process that meant Russia must go to war, and more importantly neither did Sazonov imagine he was relinquishing control of events by ordering mobilization.
It has also been pointed out an equal number of times that Dobrorolski's official title was "Chief of the Mobilization Division of the General Staff." As such, he was responsible for every detail of the mobilization process and maintained agents throughout Russia to keep him informed of strengths and weaknesses of the mobilization so these could be addressed later. Your insistence on referring to him as a "minor official" or to suggest, absurdly, that he did not grasp the meaning of mobilization is part and parcel of the push to minimize, deny, diminish, disparage, the fatal Russian mobilization.
Terry Duncan wrote:The German attitude is also indicative that you are incorrect, as they sent Russia an ultimatum and not a declaration of war as a result of Russian mobilization. This ultimatum does not mention war are the inescapable outcome of the Russian action if she fails to do as Germany demands.
Germany responded with a twelve-hour ultimatum to suspend. Diplomacy demands that diplomats express themselves diplomatically. But Russia had earlier been informed of the consequences of general mobilization any number of times.

To name just one example, On July 29, at 12:50 P.M., Bethmann telegraphed Pourtales:

"Kindly call M. Sasonov's serious attention to the fact that further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to mobilize, and in that case a European war could scarcely be prevented."

Just as unambiguous was Sasonov's statement to Paleologue and Buchanan on July 30th that

"if Austria rejects this proposal [to eliminate points 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note] preparations for a general mobilization will be proceeded with, and European war will be inevitable."

Sounds pretty straightforward to me. I note that you did not mention the Czar's unambiguous definition of mobilization.
We have met the enemy and he is us.

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#23

Post by Terry Duncan » 26 Jan 2012, 00:08

Just as you have "endlessly" and wrongly repeated that mobilization did not mean war?
You are claiming that it did. Support the claim with some evidence? I have quoted Strachan and Keegan on the subject, you dislike their thoughts on the subject, though as the former is generally regarded as the foremost expert on WWI by his peers, and the latter was the senior lecturer in military studies at Sandhurst it might be difficult for you?

Cite where any other nation had previously made such a claim, or where any nation had given notice it would regard mobilization as meaning war.
Talk about parsing! What Sasonov is saying is that it is better to "call forth a war" by mobilizing than to be "caught unawares." Let me repeat it: "call forth a war by our preparations for it . . . " "caught unawares" is nonsense as Russia was in no danger of attack from Austria or Germany.
Russia at the time did consider Germany was looking for war against her, and was playing the crisis to strip away support from France - they got that correct too - so irrespective of what we know now of the criminal irresponsibility of the German staff to have no plans for war only against Russia, it is something that was not known in Russia in 1914.

If you wish to claim Sazonov was deliberately lying when he said he thought Russia risked being caught unaware, please show it. If not there is no reason to suppose Sazonov would have felt the slightest need to lie to the Tsar, and none at all if your rather strange idea that Russia was seeking war has the slightest validity.
It has also been pointed out an equal number of times that Dobrorolski's official title was "Chief of the Mobilization Division of the General Staff."
This does not alter his responsibilities and lack of ability to do anything but follow orders from Danilov, who was after all the author of Plan 19 and General-Quartermaster, considerably outranking Dobrorolski in all areas.
Your insistence on referring to him as a "minor official"
He was. Would you accept that Tappen or Stumm had control of Germany policy in 1914? These people were not in a position to define national policy, nor were they able to influence it. Your reliance on one minor official shows the desperate nature of your claims, when quote mining can produce nothing better.

Germany responded with a twelve-hour ultimatum to suspend. Diplomacy demands that diplomats express themselves diplomatically.
There is no such requirement when threatening a nation with war. That you are being deliberately dishonest here is shown by the simple fact that the Germans supplied 'copies' of the ultimatum to Russia to Paris and London that specifically mentioned the threat of war. The one nation not advised of the threat of war was Russia, the only nation that it needed to be mentioned to.

"Kindly call M. Sasonov's serious attention to the fact that further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to mobilize, and in that case a European war could scarcely be prevented."
As you are having a particularly dense day I have highlighted the important words. War could still be prevented, as even 'scarcely prevented' means something very different from 'mobilization means war,' which is something that Pourtales could have said if he had felt this to be the case without any doubt.

Heinrich George
Member
Posts: 117
Joined: 25 Oct 2003, 17:49
Location: Falls Church, Virginia

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#24

Post by Heinrich George » 26 Jan 2012, 00:14

Suggest all engaged in the debate here check out "The Russian Origins of the First World War", published last November:

http://www.amazon.com/Russian-Origins-F ... d_vtp_b_44

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#25

Post by Terry Duncan » 26 Jan 2012, 00:53

McMeekin and his book are moderately well known. His blaming the Armenians for the Ottoman acts of genocide against them speak volumes. The book is little better than a rehash of the notions laid out by Steive in the book Peterhof is so fond of.

Here is a review of the book that might be of interest;

http://www.tnr.com/book/review/the-road ... r?page=0,1

Jon Clarke
Member
Posts: 254
Joined: 09 Apr 2009, 00:35
Location: Devon, UK

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#26

Post by Jon Clarke » 26 Jan 2012, 15:28

It is interesting although, not altogether surprising, that Peter cannot see the clear contradiction between his arguments that:

Please note that these statements confirm that for Russia – as for everyone else – mobilization meant war...

and

..."caught unawares" is nonsense as Russia was in no danger of attack from Austria or Germany.

If mobilization meant war then, during the afternoon of 30 July, Austria formally decided to go to war with Russia when the Emperor agreed to general mobilization. Russia must have therefore been in danger of attack by Austria as a consequence. Of course a more realistic interpretation would be that general mobilization did actually not mean war and the Austrian decision was simply a sensible precaution in the light of the earlier Russian (partial) mobilization. This is certainly the view taken by Conrad at the audience as the following extract from Conrad's memoirs (courtesy of Albertini) make clear:

I replied that if the Russians do not touch us, we need not touch them either. The position is not a desperate one if our mobilization is ordered in good time. Then at the beginning there would be 27 of our infantry divisions against about 33 Russian.

I should think it irresponsible in view of the already indisputable Russian mobilization to fold our arms and not carry out our own mobilization. The consequence of such an omission might be an invasion of the Monarchy - the road to Budapest and Vienna would lie open to the Russians


The last paragraph is reminiscent of Sazonov's comment about continuing 'these preparations carefully, rather than out of fear to give an inducement for war and be taken unawares.' although somehow I strongly suspect that Peter will continue to claim that there is no similarity.

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#27

Post by Terry Duncan » 26 Jan 2012, 21:00

I should think it irresponsible in view of the already indisputable Russian mobilization to fold our arms and not carry out our own mobilization.


Conrad was known for his many demands for war, and finding justification for war in almost anything (Italy and Serbia having certain borders with Austria were seemingly enough in some cases), so that he only suggests mobilization as a response to Russian actions is telling. Nothing about war, or how it will force Austria to war either. In many ways it mirrors the Kaiser's well known marginalia 'This means I must mobilize too!' upon learning of Russian mobilization. Again, nothing about war. (There is even the comment of the Kaiser's about how war could have been cancelled if only the Russians had not taken his declation of war as final and attacked East Prussia. Sadly I sourced this for Peter on the original THC site and cannot recall if it was in Albertini, Herwig or any one of half a dozen other authors that have been dismissed as 'Germanophobic' or 'wrongheaded' for recording details inconvenient to a pet theory)
The last paragraph is reminiscent of Sazonov's comment about continuing 'these preparations carefully, rather than out of fear to give an inducement for war and be taken unawares.' although somehow I strongly suspect that Peter will continue to claim that there is no similarity.
The rather obvious truth is that the diplomats all talked about mobilization, and none said it meant war. All felt it was a serious step but also that war could still be averted even after mobilization.

At least here we will not see the same four or five quotes endlessly repeated, as if in some way they trump all other evidence to the contrary, as I will simply remove posts that repeat evidence already introduced. Courts of law do not function in such a manner, nor do most discussions unless one participant is drunk or disruptive, so I will not allow such tactics to be practiced here. Hopefully this will not only allow the thread to move forwards, but also allow it to contain the relevant details without sapping the will to live of anybody reading it. The other bonus is of course now that there is a dedicated thread for Russian mobilization there will be no need to bring these details up in all other threads.

peterhof
Member
Posts: 686
Joined: 05 Sep 2011, 01:18
Location: Laguna Woods, CA
Contact:

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#28

Post by peterhof » 27 Jan 2012, 02:58

The new book by Sean McMeek The Russian Origins of the First World War, proves it yet again. "Objectivity" is perhaps applicable to scientific inquiry into physics or chemistry, but not to human history. The historian who reports history in accordance with our national and cultural prejudices is considered "objective," while the dissenting historian is "misinformed" or "biased."

But what do call it when this "Kindly call M. Sasonov's serious attention to the fact that further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to mobilize, and in that case a European war could scarcely be prevented" is interpreted as "As you are having a particularly dense day I have highlighted the important words. War could still be prevented, as even 'scarcely prevented' means something very different from 'mobilization means war,' which is something that Pourtales could have said if he had felt this to be the case without any doubt."

In other words, TerryDuncan thinks that Bethmann means: If you "force us to moblize," don't worry, we can still negotiate. Apparently, TerryDuncan thinks that Bethmann should have said: "further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to" declare war immediately and without delay.

This is way past "bias" and takes us to the attitude that gave us Article 231.

Jon's post about the Austrian decision to order general mobilization completely ignores the extensive Russian mobilization measures which had so alarmed Moltke that he demanded that Austria mobilize and demanded (together with Falkenhayn) that Chancellor Bethmann respond immediately and without further delay.


Fay wrote ( In The Origins of the World War, Vol. 2, P326):

"Then, on July 25, even before Austria had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia, Sasonov and the Tsar conceded to the Russian militarists the putting into effect of various military measures, including those of the 'Period Preparatory to War,' which roused anticipation of war among the Russian officers, and gave an impression, as Dobrorolski put it, that 'War was already a settled matter.'"

Finally . . .

**********************************************************************************************************************************************************
Repetitious quote removed as promised. I have requested you do not keep reposting the same quotes, so please take notice of this request. I will not repeat this warning, in future any post including such repetition will be removed entirely.

T. Duncan.
We have met the enemy and he is us.

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#29

Post by Terry Duncan » 27 Jan 2012, 03:37

"Objectivity" is perhaps applicable to scientific inquiry into physics or chemistry, but not to human history.
History without objectivity is usually flawed, often because the writer is recording what he wants to have happened and not what did.
Apparently, TerryDuncan thinks that Bethmann should have said: "further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to" declare war immediately and without delay.
You are the one insisting that if Russia mobilized, Germany MUST go to war. Why do you imagine it is somehow wrong for Bethmann to clearly state this to Russia?

Please make sure you answer this, simply ignoring the points others raise is rude.
This is way past "bias" and takes us to the attitude that gave us Article 231.
Article 231 arose from the US refusal to write of debts, and only then about a week from the final signing of the treaty. That is not the subject of this thread though, so please to not discuss that here.
Jon's post about the Austrian decision to order general mobilization completely ignores the extensive Russian mobilization measures
No it did not. Jon has raised points in his two posts that you are ignoring. Please address them. Austria and Germany had been conducting their own military 'precautions' such as cancelling leave and not releasing men after maneuvers, so the Russian measures prior to the mobilization orders have parallels in the Central Powers forces.

Your latest quote mined from Fay is somewhat pointless as Fay only notes that the Russian measures 'gave an impression' which is a long way from saying that Russia had already decided to go to war. You have been asked many times to provide anything that shows Russia would have attacked Austria or Germany if Austria had not declared war on Serbia and then attacked her.

peterhof
Member
Posts: 686
Joined: 05 Sep 2011, 01:18
Location: Laguna Woods, CA
Contact:

Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#30

Post by peterhof » 27 Jan 2012, 03:53

Repetitious quote removed as promised. I have requested you do not keep reposting the same quotes, so please take notice of this request. I will not repeat this warning, in future any post including such repetition will be removed entirely.

T. Duncan.

How do you reply to the Czar's definition of general mobilization??? To date, you have never done so. If you are not going to do so at all, please state it here so we can move on.

P. Hof
We have met the enemy and he is us.

Locked

Return to “First World War”