The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#76

Post by glenn239 » 31 Jan 2012, 20:12

‘Gagarin, however, doubted that Belgrade was behind the plot, arguing that the conspirators would been better armed had the Serbs provided their weapons.’
Science fiction, double feature; the weapons were acquired in Belgrade. Meaning that either Gagarin lied or he didn’t look hard enough.
Now perhaps Peter can remind me, exactly what investigations did Germany carry out into the Austrian claims before effectively committing herself to war with Russia by issuing the 'blank cheque' in early July?
None – the German position was that it was to Austria to determine her policy. Because of this, a German investigation would be redundant. Austria completed an investigation in mid-July, and the results of it became the basis for the ultimatum.
This is something I recall from AJP Taylor, though modern authors dont cover it, and it would make sense given Germany had decided that they wished to form a Balkan League based around Serbia as a foreign policy goal in 1914. It also puts a different light on claims about the Serbs being little more than terrorists etc, as it appears this didnt matter too much to Germany at the time.
As intelligence chief of the Serbian army, Apis will presumably had official contact with other governments as a Serbian official. Whether he had much to do with Sarajevo is another question. You might find that in 1914 Apis was also the British primary intelligence contact in Serbia, for example - entirely innocent.

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#77

Post by glenn239 » 31 Jan 2012, 20:22

have already said that Russian mobilization was in full swing by July 25th
I don’t view the German pre-mobilization of 31 July as making war inevitable, so I can hardly believe the Russian equivalent gesture back on the 25/26th made it so either.
a certain degree there was a conflict of interest between the Russian Pan-Slavs and the French, who did not want to dismember the Habsburg Empire, seeing it as a possible future counterweight against Germany.
The French put up no barrier that I’m aware of to Russia doing as she saw fit with Austria. All France asked for in return was a free hand to re-write Germany in the west as France wished, and to this the Russians were agreeable.
Austria did not attack Serbia, Russia will do nothing.
Your supposition that she would not do so stems from circular thinking; you assume that Russia held no intent to eventually make war upon Austria, therefore, that Russia would not move should the situation turn advantegous. However, if the Russians DID intend to eventually make war upon Austria your position collapses. In that instance a favourable mobilization could overcome the incentive for delay, and Russia will attack into Galicia after arranging for some fighting to occur along the Danube between the mobilized Serbian and Austrian armies - to provide herself a pretext.
If your purpose is to quibble wordings, would you prefer 'wage a highly one-sided war as was percieved by all at the time' is better?
You appear to be mistaking two clearly definable contexts; the defeat of the Serbian army in battle vs. the destruction of the Serbian state. Sazonov's hyperbole to the latter was propaganda; he intended to make war in any circumstance of Austro-Serbian conflict, so Austria's actual intentions towards the Serbian state were irrelevant to Sazonov.
Given the trouble supporting any claim that Russia was going to do anything in 1914 unless provoked, there would appear even less hope of showing prior intent by Russia to attack anyone in years to come.
The idea that Austria could avoid a war with Russia at some point seems a pretty thin one.
Does this apply only to Austria and Germany or were you applying it to Russia too?
Russia spurned peace offers in her determination to commit suicide. Austria nor Germany were given tangible proposals to spurn.
Sazonov made the last proposals for compromise. He may not have liked Austria, but he did not seem to desire war. as the preferred outcome of his policy, unlike Berchtold.
The intensity by which Sazonov despised Austria is a factor to his irrational, self-destructive policy. Once aggressive contempt enters the picture, the player loses the ability to act entirely rational. This problem with Sazonov, and Russian policy in general in 1914 is apparent.


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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#78

Post by Terry Duncan » 31 Jan 2012, 20:37

Your supposition that she would not do so stems from circular thinking; you assume that Russia held no intent to eventually make war upon Austria, therefore, that Russia would not move should the situation turn advantegous.
No. My position is that there is no evidence to suggest Russia was planning war with Austria. Anything is possible, but you cannot supply anything to support that Russia was planning to attack Austria.
You appear to be mistaking two clearly definable contexts; the defeat of the Serbian army in battle vs. the destruction of the Serbian state.
No. The second follows the first, as Berchtold had shown by trying to bribe other nations with chunks of Serbia in return for supporting Austria.
The idea that Austria could avoid a war with Russia at some point seems a pretty thin one.
Really? When had the two last gone to war with each other? Austria fought Germany in 1866, which by your reasoning here surely means Austria was also likely to fight Germany 'at some point'?
Russia spurned peace offers in her determination to commit suicide. Austria nor Germany were given tangible proposals to spurn.
Russia stuck by her alliance, and that alliance won the war.
The intensity by which Sazonov despised Austria is a factor to his irrational, self-destructive policy. Once aggressive contempt enters the picture, the player loses the ability to act entirely rational. This problem with Sazonov, and Russian policy in general in 1914 is apparent.
Unless you can show Sazonov's thoughts on Austria played a part in the July Crisis that others in Russia did not support, saying that he didnt like Austria is silly. What next? Tirpitz didnt like Britain? The Kaiser, Bethmann and Moltke didnt like Russia and the Slavs? Berchtold didnt like Russia or Serbia? Conrad didnt like Italy, Serbia, and Russia?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#79

Post by peterhof » 31 Jan 2012, 21:42

Terry Duncan wrote:No. My position is that there is no evidence to suggest Russia was planning war with Austria. Anything is possible, but you cannot supply anything to support that Russia was planning to attack Austria.
I have just cited a list of Russian leaders - including Sasonov - all of whom confirm that, indeed, "Russia was planning a war with Austria." Russian control of the Straits was a declared goal of Russian foreign policy. This was made official by the father of Nicholas II, Czar Alexander III. Russian control of the Straits required - among other things - the military defeat of Austria.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#80

Post by Terry Duncan » 31 Jan 2012, 21:47

I have just cited a list of Russian leaders - including Sasonov - all of whom confirm that, indeed, "Russia was planning a war with Austria."
I can only suggest you re-read them, or maybe read them for the first time, as none of the quote say anything of the sort.

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#81

Post by peterhof » 31 Jan 2012, 22:02

Terry Duncan wrote:
peterhof wrote: I have just cited a list of Russian leaders - including Sasonov - all of whom confirm that, indeed, "Russia was planning a war with Austria."

Terry Duncan responded: I can only suggest you re-read them, or maybe read them for the first time, as none of the quote say anything of the sort.
Okay, I've re-read them. Here they are again:

Sasonov: "The realization of the high ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan Peninsula, which are so close to Russia’s heart, is only possible after a fortunate issue of the struggle of Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary."


Gutchov: "When our military preparations are absolutely complete, then we shall have an explanation with Austria-Hungary. Do not start war now, for it would be suicidal. Say nothing about your intentions and be prepared. The days of your rejoicing will come."


In a letter dated May 6, 1913, Sasonov writes the Russian ambassador at Belgrade that

“Serbia has passed only through the first stage of her historical career. To reach her goal she must endure another frightful struggle, in which her very existence will be staked . . . Serbia’s Promised Land lies in the territory of the present Austria-Hungary.”

Just days later, the Serbian ambassador in St. Petersburg reports to his government that

“Sasonov told me again that we must work for the future, as we shall get a great deal of territory from Austria-Hungary.”


Early in 1914, Sasonov writes:

“I must repeat that the question of the Straits can hardly be advanced a step except through European complications. To judge from present conditions, these complications would find us in alliance with France and possibly, but not quite certainly, with Great Britain, or at least with the latter as a benevolent neutral. In the event of European complications, we should be able to count in the Balkans on Serbia and perhaps also on Rumania.”
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#82

Post by peterhof » 31 Jan 2012, 22:35

Jon Clarke wrote:Now perhaps Peter can remind me, exactly what investigations did Germany carry out into the Austrian claims before effectively committing herself to war with Russia by issuing the 'blank cheque' in early July? I believe that the answer is none but then they would have been slightly handicapped given that, according to AJP Taylor, their main source in Belgrade was Apis!
Germany was obliged to support Austria because they had a formal alliance. There was no alliance between Russia and Serbia. Therefore Russia needed some other basis upon which to support Serbia and this could only be obtained by discovering the rightness - if any - of Serbia's cause.

Furthermore, Germany was not "committing herself to war with Russia" as Germany's aim was to keep Russia out. This is confirmed by Bethmann's 180 degree reversal of German policy beginning on July 28th when Russia threatened intervention.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#83

Post by Terry Duncan » 31 Jan 2012, 22:52

Peter,

Please refrain from repeat posting, next time I will remove them without further warning.

The quotes still say nothing about Russia attacking Austria, the first four are refering to Serbia, and the last only notes complications. This could be many things as Russia only needed the treaty holding the straits closed to them to be revised - exactly the same thing Isvolsky attampted in 1908/9 when Arenthal deceived him.
Germany was obliged to support Austria because they had a formal alliance.
The terms of the Austro-German treaty do not cover acts of murder or support for judicial process, so Germany was not obliged to support Austria unless the two states were planning war from the outset - something you deny.
Therefore Russia needed some other basis upon which to support Serbia
The Serbian Crown Prince made a direct appeal to the Russian government on 23rd July.

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#84

Post by peterhof » 01 Feb 2012, 04:10

Terry Duncan wrote:The quotes still say nothing about Russia attacking Austria, the first four are refering to Serbia, and the last only notes complications. This could be many things as Russia only needed the treaty holding the straits closed to them to be revised - exactly the same thing Isvolsky attampted in 1908/9 when Arenthal deceived him.
The quotes reveal the Russian attitude. A blind man could see it.

Terry Duncan wrote:The terms of the Austro-German treaty do not cover acts of murder or support for judicial process, so Germany was not obliged to support Austria unless the two states were planning war from the outset - something you deny.
The terms of the Austro-German treaty cover acts of war and hostile mobilizations.

Terry Duncan wrote:The Serbian Crown Prince made a direct appeal to the Russian government on 23rd July.
Any legitimate appeal would have to made by the Head of State - that would have been Pasitch. Sasonov himself advised Serbia that in case of an Austrian attack, the Serbian government should withdraw from Belgrade to the interior and appeal to the Powers.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#85

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Feb 2012, 04:26

The quotes reveal the Russian attitude. A blind man could see it.
They apply to Serbia. Presumably you couldnt find any actual quotes saying Russia wished for war with Austria and hoped these specimens would go unnoticed.
The terms of the Austro-German treaty cover acts of war and hostile mobilizations.
Therefore not an assassination carried out by their own subjects, not for the judicial process against such criminals, and not for the process of investigating such a crime. From this we can conclude one of two things - 1. Germany had no obligation to support Austria in any way shape or form until the moment Austria declared war. 2. Germany and Austria decided that they wished to engage the article of alliance to wage war from the outset, and therefore there was an obligation upon Germany to support Austria because they were planning to create a situation where the clause for support could be cited.
Any legitimate appeal would have to made by the Head of State - that would have been Pasitch.
No it was not Pasic. The king had abdicated, and the parliament had dissolved for the general election, so the Crown Prince was at least as close to a head of state at that time as any other individual. Surely you were aware of the Serbian general election taking place at this time? It would be interesting to see you cite any Serbian minister who suggested the Crown Prince acted against his nations interests, though I doubt you will find one. Altogether a feeble and ill thought out objection.
Sasonov himself advised Serbia that in case of an Austrian attack, the Serbian government should withdraw from Belgrade to the interior and appeal to the Powers.
A curious statement. Other than Sazonov stating the rather obvious, is this supposed to mean something important?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#86

Post by peterhof » 01 Feb 2012, 23:45

Terry Duncan wrote:The king had abdicated, and the parliament had dissolved for the general election, so the Crown Prince was at least as close to a head of state at that time as any other individual. Surely you were aware of the Serbian general election taking place at this time? It would be interesting to see you cite any Serbian minister who suggested the Crown Prince acted against his nations interests, though I doubt you will find one. Altogether a feeble and ill thought out objection.
Pasitch was Premier/Prime Minister before and after the election. He was the head of state. The Prince could advise but could not act officially on behalf of Serbia despite the fact that the King had abdicated. Altogether a feeble and ill thought out point.

As far as the Russian general mobilization is concerned, its consequences were known by all and fully anticipated. Professor Fay gives us the following summary (The Origins of the World War, Vol 2, p392):

Russia and her French ally were insisting that Berlin exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, while Russia herself refused from the outset to accept any such influence, and was supported in this by France. In this respect Russia was pursuing an uncompromising attitude, threatening to the peace of Europe, exactly analogous to that of Germany from July 5 to 28, who had been insisting that France and England should exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg, while she herself refused to do likewise at Vienna. But there was soon a difference (my underline): by July 28 Germany had abandoned her hitherto uncompromising attitude . . . and really began to exercise an increasingly strong moderating influence at Vienna. But France and England continued to refrain from restraining Russia, and Russia proceeded to the general mobilization, which she had been warned would make a European war inevitable.”

Fay should have noted that Germany’s “uncompromising attitude” prior to July 28th was singularly aimed at keeping Russia out, whilst Russia's "uncompromising attitude" was aimed squarely at inaugurating a European war.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#87

Post by Terry Duncan » 02 Feb 2012, 02:21

Pasitch was Premier/Prime Minister before and after the election.
During the election is another matter, notoriously a grey area in some nations. Given he had to go through an election at this time, the Crown Prince was perfectly entitled to act from what I can see from the Serbian constitution. Maybe you would like to point out where the Serbian constitution prohibited him from asking for assistance in these circumstances? - This will be interesting as nobody has ever raised an objection about his acting before that I am aware of.
The Prince could advise but could not act officially on behalf of Serbia despite the fact that the King had abdicated.
So cite something to support this claim. From most nations where the monarch is the head of state - Pasic was the head of the government to be precise - they are abe to engage in limited diplomatic conversations at least, and in this case it would appear he acted entirely in accordance with the policies of the Serbian governments prior to the election and afterwards.

This is a rather stupid objection from the outset 'You must not ask for help whilst I mug you' would about sum it up.

You appear not to read your own quotes more;
In this respect Russia was pursuing an uncompromising attitude, threatening to the peace of Europe, exactly analogous to that of Germany from July 5 to 28, who had been insisting that France and England should exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg, while she herself refused to do likewise at Vienna.
Fay notes that Germany has spent from July 5th to 28th threatening the peace of Europe - something you dispute - and refused all moderation in Vienna, and must therefore take all responsibility for her own actions in creating a war.
But there was soon a difference (my underline): by July 28 Germany had abandoned her hitherto uncompromising attitude
Fay is not being quite honest here, as 'by the 28th' is not true, it was only on the 28th, after war had been declared by Austria that Germany attempted anything that could be said to involve abandoning her uncompromising views.
...
What was in the place you used elipses?
and really began to exercise an increasingly strong moderating influence at Vienna.
Again Fay is not being very honest. Bethmann sent a few telegrams to Berchtold, but never even got a reply from Berchtold - simply being told by Berchtolds staff a series of excuses - and none had the slightest effect. By your own admission, Germany had to support Austria by this point no matter what Bethmann thought.
But France and England continued to refrain from restraining Russia, and Russia proceeded to the general mobilization, which she had been warned would make a European war inevitable.”
Austria was the problem causing Russian action. Austria was not responding to anyone, and before anyone could really achieve anything once Russian mobilization was known, Germany had threatened Russia and set impossible conditions whilst allowing Austria to continue her war.
Fay should have noted that Germany’s “uncompromising attitude” prior to July 28th was singularly aimed at keeping Russia out
It was aimed at starting a war and humiliating Russia in the Balkans.
Russia's "uncompromising attitude" was aimed squarely at inaugurating a European war.
It was aimed at supporting Serbia against Austria. You are aware this is an historical forum and not alternate history?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#88

Post by peterhof » 02 Feb 2012, 04:11

Terry Duncan wrote:
...
What was in the place you used elipses?
Here it is: "as we shall see later"

Happy you asked?
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#89

Post by Terry Duncan » 02 Feb 2012, 04:42

Happy you asked?
Yes. Now i know that Fay included nothing to substantiate the claim made for this 'strong moderating influence' that Berchtold completely ignored.

It is all very well to say something like this, but the actual events prove that Bethmann's efforts could best be summed up as 'a last minute change of heart, a few half-hearted and feeble attempts to contact Berchtold, whilst more concerned to make it appear Russia was in the wrong than save the peace of Europe that the Central Powers policy had done so much to endanger! Efforts so ineffective Berchtold could not even be bothered to reply to them personally, and when he finally did address the last pleas for moderation, dismissed them out of hand, insisting Austria must continue on her path irrespective of the fact it would draw Germany into a war she didnt want, and take all of Europe with her.'

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#90

Post by peterhof » 02 Feb 2012, 05:40

Terry Duncan wrote:Now i know that Fay included nothing to substantiate the claim made for this 'strong moderating influence' that Berchtold completely ignored.
Omigosh! You no doubt remember that Berchtold's advisers had promised on July 30 that Berchtold would place Bethmann's telegrams before Emperor Franz Josef, and that he [Berchtold] would reply the next day after conferring with Tisza. But doggone it, Russia ordered general mobilization later that same day - just hours after Bethmann told the Prussian Council of Ministers:

"The declaration of 'Threatening Danger of War' meant mobilization, and this, under our conditions - mobilization towards both sides - meant war." (p 524)

Fay poses the pertinent question - and answers it:

"What were the reasons for this fatal decision to order general mobilization? The Entente Powers, in their efforts to excuse and justify it, have often alleged various reasons - which are false." (p. 474)

Yeah, too bad. As Fay tells us:

"It was the hasty Russian general mobilization, assented to on July 29 and ordered on July 30, while Germany was still trying to bring Austria to accept mediation proposals, which finally rendered the European war inevitable." (p 554

In addition:

"Russia's responsibility lay also in the secret preparatory military measures which she was making at the same time that she was carrying on diplomatic negotiations These alarmed Germany and Austria."

Yes of course. You remember the Russian Military Protocol of November 8, 1912, don't you?

Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshaling of our troops without beginning hostilities, in order that our opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may still be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by clever, pretended diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days, they absolutely must be taken!”

Those clever Russians don't miss a trick, do they? But in the end, as Fay tells us:

"But it was primarily Russia's general mobilization, made when Germany was trying to bring Austria to a settlement, which precipitated the final catastrophe, causing Germany to mobilize and declare war." (p 555)

Apparently, Fay has not grasped your central point that the noble Russians were simply protecting the poor Serbs. This can only be understood by those who were equally noble in protecting the poor Belgians two days later.
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