The Straits- London-Berlin-St. Petersburg-Constantinople

[favedave]

It has been stated on another thread that gaining control of the Straits, the Bosphus and the Dardanelles, was Russia's actual motive for mobilizing its army on the 29th of July, 1914. Proof of this assertion is this quote of Sergi Sazonov made in early 1914.

“I must repeat that the question of the Straits can hardly be advanced a step except through European complications. To judge from present conditions, these complications would find us in alliance with France and possibly, but not quite certainly, with Great Britain, or at least with the latter as a benevolent neutral. In the event of European complications, we should be able to count in the Balkans on Serbia and perhaps also on Rumania.”

Certainly the quote is provocative. But to think a diplomat of Sazonov's stature would believe that Great Britain would be allied to Russia, or stand by as a benevolent neutral in a war with the Central Powers in which Russia would gain control of the straits between the Black Sea and the Meditterranean Sea is to ignore Britain's history in the region, particulary it's post Napoleonic history. In 1856, Britain allied with France to prevent Imperial Russia from doing exactly that. By 1888 Great Britain had usurped control of the Suez Canal and the lands on both sides of it via bribery and martial displays with the Convention of Constantinople. In 1914 Great Britain built two of the latest dreadnoughts for the Turkish Navy. Their purpose was to keep the Black Sea Fleet of Russian Navy at bay.

None of this was news to Sazonov. So "the question of the Straits" must have meant something else more palateable to Great Britain.

[Jon Clarke]

Certainly the quote is provocative. 

It is when it is taken out of context. I'm guessing that it originally comes from one of Peter's posts which in turn is taken from either Barnes or Stieve who both suppress the beginning of the first sentence. The full paragraph from Sazonov's report of 6 December 1913 was:

Renewing the wish expressed above for the prolongation as far as possible of the status quo, it is also necessary to repeat that the question of the Straits can hardly be advanced a step except through European complications...

Fay, another of Peter's sources, more accurately points out that Sazonov's report was not as incriminating as Barnes & Steive's versions tried to make out:

An impartial reading of his report, which is too long to quote in full, shows that he did not desire to bring about a European war.  On the contrary, he repeatedly stated that he wished to preserve the status quo as long as possible.  But the situation in the Balkans was very unstable.  Russia could never permit the Straits to pass into the hands of any other Power, as they had been in danger of doing when the Bulgarians advanced to the outposts of Constantinople in 1912.  Therefore he and the other Russian Ministers must concert plans of preparedness to seize the Straits, in case of European complications which he feared might occur at any moment.

The relevant chapter from Fay is available at:

http://www.yamaguchy.com/library/fay/origin_105s.html

The complete book can also be downloaded from the Internet Archive for free:

http://www.archive.org/details/TheOriginsOfTheWorldWar

[glenn239]

Therefore he and the other Russian Ministers must concert plans of preparedness to seize the Straits, in case of European complications which he feared might occur at any moment.

So Russia must be ready to make an unprovoked attack on Turkey at any moment because there might be a large war in Europe in which Turkey will otherwise remain neutral - at least until this attack Sazonov plans for occurs.

All this....disproves...Peter’s point?

Certainly the quote is provocative. But to think a diplomat of Sazonov's stature would believe that Great Britain would be allied to Russia, or stand by as a benevolent neutral in a war with the Central Powers in which Russia would gain control of the straits between the Black Sea and the Meditterranean Sea is to ignore Britain's history in the region,

British policy after 1901 threw all this out the window, and Britain signed Ententes with France and then Russia in which Britain’s policies, which beforehand were supportive towards Austria and Turkey against Russia, became friendly of France and Russia instead.
You cannot cite a policy Britain tore up and threw in the trash can after the death of Victoria as why Britain would not allow Russia the Straights. The Entente policy was a complete break with previous doctrine, which is one of the core reasons why I find all the excuses for Britain as specious - it was Britain, not Germany, that chose to reverse the traditional policies of support of Austria and Turkey against Russia, in favour of one where Britain supported Russia against Austria. Balance of power turned on its head - the support of the strong against the weak.

[favedave]

"You cannot cite a policy Britain tore up and threw in the trash can after the death of Victoria as why Britain would not allow Russia the Straights."

While Britain may have re-aligned with France and thereby Russia with the Entente, British actions in the region up to and throughout the war itself show that this change in alliances in no way affected British policy regarding the entire Middle East.

Quite simply, Russia was not allowed, or invited to participate in events affecting the major trade routes of Constantinople and the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf and the new oil fields, or the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. For example, would not an attack by Russian naval and ground forces against the Bosphorus in 1915 have helped save the Gallipoli Campaign from disaster?

Adding to the unlikely senario that Russian mobiliized to seize the Straits, from the moment the war began in Belgrade, Russia never made any attempt to seize the straits during the course of the war.

[Terry Duncan]

None of this was news to Sazonov. So "the question of the Straits" must have meant something else more palateable to Great Britain.

All people need to do is to look at recent Russian policy to see what was attempted with regards to solving the question of the Straits and indeed what it was.

British policy after 1901 threw all this out the window, and Britain signed Ententes with France and then Russia in which Britain’s policies, which beforehand were supportive towards Austria and Turkey against Russia, became friendly of France and Russia instead

.

Britain was still supportive of maintaining the status quo, and she notably did not support Russia when the question of the Straits did arise in 1908/09.

The Entente policy was a complete break with previous doctrine, which is one of the core reasons why I find all the excuses for Britain as specious

Maybe you need to consider what brought about this change of policy as you see it.

Britain, not Germany, that chose to reverse the traditional policies of support of Austria and Turkey against Russia, in favour of one where Britain supported Russia against Austria. Balance of power turned on its head - the support of the strong against the weak.

This from the man who claims the Central Powers, especially Austria had actually won their war by 1917 and that it was only the intervention of the US that saved the Entente from defeat! This doesnt fit at all well with the claim that Britain was supporting the strong does it!

So Russia must be ready to make an unprovoked attack on Turkey at any moment because there might be a large war in Europe in which Turkey will otherwise remain neutral - at least until this attack Sazonov plans for occurs.

All this....disproves...Peter’s point?

Because it requires people to construct a strawman misrepresenting Russian objectives in order to make such a claim.

In the Annexation Crisis, Russia was acting directly on the issue of the Straits, and what was it she wanted? Russia wanted the subject of passage through the Straits to be reconsidered, she objected to the prohibition on her warships passing through the Straits, and wanted a say in control over them, but Russia was not proposing war with the Ottoman Empire to achieve this. Of even more relevence to the claim being put forward is where the main opposition to Russia having control over the Straits from 1878 to 1914 same from Britain and France who both proved most unwilling to support Russia in altering the agreement closing the Straits to her.

Certainly Russia did not want any other power in control over the Straits, the actual question of the Straits Russia was trying to solve was not simply one where Russia would physically take the lad around the Straits, but was a question first and foremost one of Russia wanting free access for all her ships to pass through the Straits to be guarenteed by the other Great Powers. Russia would almost certainly act to prevent another state taking this land, but her policy towards the Straits could be solved by exactly the same sort of agreement she had sought with Arenthal in 1908, and that did not involve any sort of attack on the Ottomans to grab the Straits.

[chronos20th]

I'm sorry to have to return like the demon king through a trap door in a pantomime, but the reason increasingly Imperial Russia prepared for war from 1912-14 was to take control of the Straits (and territory either side of it), as this increasing figured in their thinking and statements.

Peter, whether you agree with him or not, quotes many of these statements.

It was not the only one - the Russian War Party or "Reactionary Party" as it was referred to, wanted a short victorious war to wipe out the disgrace and humiliation of the R-J War and gain territory, but also increasing the major motive was to gain physical contol of The Straits.

By the spring of 1914 they believed Britain would not be able to resist Russian control of the Straits at the conclusion of the war.

The famous article in the Manchester Guardian states this - " it is madness to go to war for Russia, as we would not be able to prevent the strenghtening of the Reactionary Party, Russian control of The Straits and threatening Britain's whole position in the Middle East".

Certainly the quote is provocative. But to think a diplomat of Sazonov's stature would believe that Great Britain would be allied to Russia, or stand by as a benevolent neutral in a war with the Central Powers in which Russia would gain control of the straits between the Black Sea and the Meditterranean Sea is to ignore Britain's history in the region, particulary it's post Napoleonic history. In 1856, Britain allied with France to prevent Imperial Russia from doing exactly that.

But that's exactly what he did believe.

As Palmerston said

"England has no permanent allies only eternal interests".

He believed it because Isvolsky had told him so and that the British had promised him this., and this had been repeated at the visit to Russia in 1908.

The reason is that is the basis on which the Anglo-Russain Entente of 1907 was accepted by Russia and without it Isvolsky would not has been able to get it accepted in Russia.

This is because Grey had to promise him this, admittedly in vague terms, to get him to agree to it.

This is how the "Annexation Crisis" occurred, as it was the formula which Grey had stated.

Whether Grey and British policy-makers would honour that pledge finally was another matter, but Russia had to be promised this and given the impression they would.

Sazanov and Russian policy-makers believed it.

However it is clear by 1914 they realised it would be vitually impossible to resist this by Britain at the end of the war.

British policy after 1901 threw all this out the window, and Britain signed Ententes with France and then Russia in which Britain’s policies, which beforehand were supportive towards Austria and Turkey against Russia, became friendly of France and Russia instead.

Britain, not Germany, that chose to reverse the traditional policies of support of Austria and Turkey against Russia, in favour of one where Britain supported Russia against Austria. Balance of power turned on its head - the support of the strong against the weak.

British policy did a U-Turn, to use the political phrase common in Britain, after 1901 and threw all previous policy out the window in order to obtain and build up the Ententes with France and Russia.

A very major reason for that was to prevent an alliance or at least Entente and rapprochement between Germany and Russia - remember the Rjoekoe treaty of 1905 which was not continued?

Clearly did not intend to cash the cheque on this when it was presented, but the question was how could he resist after a successful short victorious war, when Russia expected payment for its services?

Sazanov and other polcy-makers realised that.

[Terry Duncan]

A very major reason for that was to prevent an alliance or at least Entente and rapprochement between Germany and Russia - remember the Rjoekoe treaty of 1905 which was not continued?

No, and nor does history record a treaty of this name. There was the abortive Treaty of Bjorko, rarely called the Treaty of Koivisto, that was allowed to drop by both Russian and German governments who would both prefered to forget what their sovereigns had decided to agree to.

Clearly did not intend to cash the cheque on this when it was presented, but the question was how could he resist after a successful short victorious war, when Russia expected payment for its services?

Sazanov and other polcy-makers realised that.

Which ignores the very obvious fact that Austria, Britain, France, or Germany did not control the Straits, and that war with them would not hand Russia control of something held by the Ottomans. The Ottomans were not even allied to Germany until the secret treaty right at the start of WWI and were far from certain to enter it even then, and no matter what result Russia achieved in war against the other Great Powers, the Ottomans were not going to hand over their capital and nearby lands simply to please Russia without a war - the Greeks found this out in 1919-22. This all indicates the futility of claiming Russia needed war with Austria or Germany to gain the Straits, as at best all she could achieve by a war of that nature would be to obtain a re-opening of the question of access to the Straits.

[favedave]

Britain's whole approach to the Ottoman Empire was to manage the collapse of the "Sick Man of Europe" in Britain's interest.

The entire region of the Middle East, which Ottoman Empire controlled throughout the 19th century, has been the most hotly fought over bit of real estate in the entire world since Jericho became a collection of mud huts. The reason is location, location, location. All trade between the continents of Europe, Asia (and the sub-continent India) and Africa passes through it. Add petroleum to the immeasurable wealth which drove Alexander the Great, Rome, and the Crusades.... Britain's national interest made no allowences for incursions by the Russians, Germans, Austrians or the French. Britain's biggest concern in the region was the projected impact of the Berlin to Baghdad rail road. In fact a strong case can be made that the completion of the overland rail link so threatened the prosperity of the British Empire that this was the real reason Britain joined forces with France and Russia, and drew the line in the sand in Belgium in 1914.

[Terry Duncan]

In fact a strong case can be made that the completion of the overland rail link so threatened the prosperity of the British Empire that this was the real reason Britain joined forces with France and Russia, and drew the line in the sand in Belgium in 1914.

It could be tried but it fails against what actually happened. Fay recorded the following in New Light on the Origins of the World War. I. Berlin and Vienna, to July 29th;

Accordingly, the draft treaty in regard to the Portuguese colonies and the Bagdad Railway was drawn up. Grey was ready to meet Lichnowsky more than half-way. But the signature to the treaty was held up at the last minute, probably through the influence of the militarists at Berlin, and perhaps as a result of Berlin’s suspicions in regard to the Anglo-Russian naval convention, mentioned above.

The last two Anglo-German agreements were at the end of the July Crisis, the agreement over the Portuguese colonies had been passed over to Lichnowsky only days before. There were disagreements over interests, but very little to support that the Berlin to Bahgdad Railway was responsible for the Entente's. The reasons for them, the inability of Britain to fight both Russia and France at a dozen places around the world simultaneosly and the need to end British isolation in Europe would still have been there even if not a single sleeper had been laid on this rail line. Of course, we can see which nation made the need to end British isolation so keenly felt, and it was not felt because of trade.

[favedave]

I'm not familiar with the treaty or the connection to the Portuguese colonies and the Berlin to Baghdad railway. The rail link was not meant to end with an express passenger train to Berlin similar to the Orient Express. It was in fact the foundation of a multi-track shipping line which would carry cargos far from the Royal Navy's ability to disrupt the service. I do recall that the Kaiser's consessions to Britain on the rail line were announced in Parliament to thunderous applause almost simultaneouslly with the assassinations in Sarajevo. However the Crown, under every government since 1888, had done its utmost to delay construction of the rail system in Turkey. So how Parliament reacted and what the Asquith government thought of Germany's newest creation could be diametrically oppossed.

[Terry Duncan]

I'm not familiar with the treaty or the connection to the Portuguese colonies and the Berlin to Baghdad railway.

The agreement over the Portuguese colonies was one concerning what would happen when Portugal failed to be able to hold them, a sort of defining of who would get what agreement, but notably one where Britain was agreeing to what Germany had asked for and for which the paperwork was handed over in the last days of peace. The railroad agreement was really a long drawn out affair for both governments, Germany could have built such a railroad without even asking Britain and done it several times over in the time span 1888-1914. It was an area that had an impact on British trade, but this would have been minimal. Trade from India could have been relied upon to use British shipping, as would be the case for all the many areas not even close to Bahgdad, and ships carry far more freight than trains usually.

It might have been something to argue over, but it didnt even get a mention during the July Crisis as a cause for war. German dominance of Europe, Belgian neutrality, alliance solidarity, and the German fleet were all far greater concerns.

[favedave]

The July Crisis from our perspective was the main diplomatic, economic and military issue in the summer of 1914. Unfortunately, for most of the month of July it was not the foremost issue for Britain, France, or even Germany.

Britain was dealing with massive troubles in Ireland which would ultimately lead to the Easter Uprising in 1916 and the revolution in 1921, widespread labor unrest which was manifest in the 1,400 strikes which had occurred since January, an economic downturn which was caused in large part by the ending of the pre-war dreadnought building race, and the "good news" of the generous trade concessions the Kaiser had granted Great Britain on the soon to be opened Berlin to Baghdad rail route.

France spent most of the month focusing on the scandalous murder trial of Madame Caillioux, wife of Joseph Caillioux, the Third Republic's notoriously pro German Finance Minister in the first decade of the new century and Prime Minister during the Agadir Crisis of 1911. The editor of Le Figaro, Gaston Calmette in his crusade against Caillioux, threatened to publish letters written by Madame Cailloux to Joseph when she was his mistress. She responded by going to Calmette's office and shooting him dead. On July 28, 1914, Madame Caillaux was acquitted. Having committed a "crime of passion" she was ajudged by the jury as not responsible for her premeditated actions of buying the gun, going to Calmette's office at LeFigaro and pumping multiple rounds into Gaston. How could the news that Vienna was shelling Belgrade compete with that on the front page of every newspaper in France?

In Germany, after the Kaiser had settled the details of his number #1 pet project, the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad he went on vacation aboard the royal yacht in the fjordes of Norway. The details he settled before departure consisted of two. First was the dispensing of trade concessions to Britain, France, and every other nation in Europe which could throw a diplomatic wrench (spanner?) into the works. Second, he gained Austria-Hungary's assurance that if Germany could keep the Russians from meddling, they would bring law and order to the Balkans by crushing Serbia. While not mentioned in his discussions with the Dual Monarchy, pacification of the Balkan Peninsula was critical if his beloved train line was to be completed on its revised schedule. It had been delayed by nearly a full year by the Balkan Wars of 1912 &13.

Though Britain was none too successful in interferring with the construction of the line from Baghdad to Constantinople, she was successful in getting the Porte to not build rail lines to the oil fields and thence to the Persian Gulf or due south to the Suez Canal. However, the constant concern of the Foreign Office was that in the event of a falling out between Britain and Turkey that these rail lines could be quickly built and in full operation. Turkey's increasingly close relationship with Germany did not bode well for Britain. With a German built rail system giving the Turks the ability to place large numbers of German trained and equipped troops in the oil fields of Iraq and on the Suez, the lynch pin of the Empire was extremely vulnerable. Even worse, oil and cargos coming from the Near and Far East not carried in British merchant hulls could be more quickly shipped and distributed to European markets, at a lower cost over land than by sea. The more lines added to the route the higher the volume of traffic and the lower the costs. So though Germany's Berlin to Baghdad railroad is unlisted among the issues of the July Crisis, its existence seems to have had considerable influence on course of events.
Even poor Gaston Calmette was a victim. Among Joseph Caillioux's pro-German activities he was exposing in the pages of Le Figaro was that he had used public funds to finance newspapers editorially supporting Germany's economic activities in Turkey, most noteable of course was the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad.

[Terry Duncan]

With a German built rail system giving the Turks the ability to place large numbers of German trained and equipped troops in the oil fields of Iraq and on the Suez, the lynch pin of the Empire was extremely vulnerable. Even worse, oil and cargos coming from the Near and Far East not carried in British merchant hulls could be more quickly shipped and distributed to European markets, at a lower cost over land than by sea.

Most British oil was imported from the America's in 1914, the Middle East was not known to contain such vast deposits of oil until after WWI. Oil is still shipped today mostly by sea, the cost is far less than rail and it is far easier to transport in bulk, the only overland alternative is that of pipelines.

So though Germany's Berlin to Baghdad railroad is unlisted among the issues of the July Crisis, its existence seems to have had considerable influence on course of events.

So show a single statesman in any nation siting the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad as an influence on their decisions during the July Crisis?

This is still getting not closer to the question of how Russia had been seeking to have the 'question of the Straits' addressed by the Great Powers prior to WWI.

[favedave]

Since I began this thread by suggesting that acquisition of the Straits played no part in Russia's war planning or decision making process in the July Crisis, I'm willing to make the leap that they expected their Entente partner, Great Britain to secure unfettered access to the Straits from Turkey for the Russian merchant fleet and hopefully her warships as well. Britain was still regarded as the major power in charge of the Ottoman Empire's imminent collapse in 1914. However, while Britain provided a small amount of economic life-support to the Sick Man of Europe, Germany in a diplomatic and economic initiative led by the Kaiser himself, offered a dizzaling new high-technology life as befitting a modern sovereign nation moving into the 20th century. The original "Young Turks" in the government, business and the military fully embraced the future the Kaiser personally offered. The Sultanate at Porte remained profitably allied to British interests like the Anglo Persian Oil Company, a property of the Crown which ultimately became today's British Petroleum.

It is not the least bit surprising that the majorty of the oil in Europe in 1914 came from the United States and specifically Standard Oil of Ohio, or ESSO. This was the case in World War II as well. But the oil discovery in 1908, reckoned by every driller worth his salt to be huge, was to be exclusively Britain's. In 1901 the future Anglo-Persian Oil Company had secured from the Shah of Persia exclusive rights to prospect for oil for 60 years in a vast territory which included most of Iran. In exchange the Shah received £20,000, an equal amount in shares of the company, and a promise of 16% of future profits.

Five years after bringing in their first well, in 1913 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company began volume production of Persian oil products at their new refinery built at Abadan. For its first 50 years it was the largest oil refinery in the world. In 1913, APOC managers had a new customer, Winston Churchill, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty. At Jackie Fisher's urging Churchill sought to modernize Britain's navy by abandoning the use of coal. Churchill also wanted to free Britain from reliance on Standard Oil and Royal Dutch-Shell. In exchange for secure oil supplies for its ships, the British government injected so much capital into the company it acquired a controlling interest in APOC. The contract that was set up between the British Government and APOC was to hold for 20 years. The British government also became a de facto hidden power behind the oil company. APOC also took a 50% share in a new Turkish Petroleum Company organized in 1912 by Calouste Gulbenkian to explore and develop oil resources throughout the Ottoman Empire. These lead to even bigger discoveries in modern day Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.

It is true most oil products in Europe in 1914 got there by ship. They still do. In America most oil in 1914 was transported by rail throughout North America. Oil for export was put in tank-cars and taken by rail to the ports and then put on ships bound for other continents. Pipelines were in the distant future. To protect its hugely enhanced trade interests in the Middle East after winning the First World War, Britain's first order of business was to destroy all vestiges of the Berlin to Baghdad rail system. The few remains are now insignificant roadside tourist stops in Turkey. The Orient Express, which was actually part of the Berlin to Baghdad system, remained in operation until the early 1970s before becoming a tourist attraction itself.

Winston Churchill certainly can be cited as a statesman whose thinking and actions were heavily influenced by German activities in Turkey during the July Crisis. Kaiser Wilhelm thought and spoke about the rail route frequently in June, beginning with his discussions with Franz Ferdinand two weeks before his death, and in early July. In late July events happened so rapidly there was no reason to discuss the rail line under construction with anybody but the Turkish government. Grey and the entire Asquith cabinet must have had it in mind during their July deliberations, since the British concessions on the route were annouced in Parliament on the 28 of June. Grey also had to deal directly with the issue when he delivered his address to Parliament on the third of August. It is an oblique reference to be sure. But since it was a response to a heckler's questioning of how Germany could be 'our dear friend one day and our enemy the next', it clearly alluded to the generous concessions the Kaiser had given Britain on the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad exactly one month before.

My professor of British history told me (and the rest of the class) "If you want to understand Britain's foreign and domestic policies for the 300 years prior to World War II, they must be viewed in relation to their benefit to the British Empire. Maintenance and promotion of the Empire was always first and everything else a distant second.

[South]

Good morning all,

A couple of references to flesh out the above presented material:

THE PRIZE-The Epic Quest For Oil, Money & Power
Daniel Yergin
ISBN: 0-671-75705-9
1991

A CENTURY OF WAR-Anglo-American Oil Politics And The New World Order
William Engdahl
ISBN: 0-7453-2309 X
1992


Warm regards,

Bob