The Straits- London-Berlin-St. Petersburg-Constantinople

[Terry Duncan]

Since I began this thread by suggesting that acquisition of the Straits played no part in Russia's war planning or decision making process in the July Crisis, I'm willing to make the leap that they expected their Entente partner, Great Britain to secure unfettered access to the Straits from Turkey for the Russian merchant fleet and hopefully her warships as well.

The Russian merchant ships could transit the Straits under the 1878 Treaty, it was the same treaty that closed it to Russian and other warships. Russia wanted this altered, but as Britain and France were the two nations who opposed her in this from 1878-1914 it was not something the Ottoman's really needed to be talked into.

Winston Churchill certainly can be cited as a statesman whose thinking and actions were heavily influenced by German activities in Turkey during the July Crisis.

Finding that Winston told everyone in his books in the 1920's that he considered things is a long way from him doing so at the time, and as far as I can recall the only question that arose was one that asked if the oil fuel needed for some of the RN was secure, to which the answer given was yes - and very few ships relied on oil for fuel entirely. He was even known to claim it was his idea to fuel the navy with oil, though ship designers and several staff officers had been suggesting it for some time, all Winston did was give it political approval. But then again we have the question did this fuel come from Abadan? The answer appears to be no, not entirely, though it was only access to this oil that had led the navy to agree to the Queen Elizabeth class being oil fired ships, as alternative supply sources were in place.

Grey and the entire Asquith cabinet must have had it in mind during their July deliberations, since the British concessions on the route were annouced in Parliament on the 28 of June.

The agreement had still to be signed and the track to be built even then, so why should it worry people during the July Crisis?

It is an oblique reference to be sure. But since it was a response to a heckler's questioning of how Germany could be 'our dear friend one day and our enemy the next', it clearly alluded to the generous concessions the Kaiser had given Britain on the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad exactly one month before.

So oblique as to make me, and no doubt many others, wonder why if this matter were really so key to the survival Britain or the empire it was not directly mentioned by any number of the more than six hundred people present? The comment looks somewhat more like one of the numerous comments from the time - the Kaiser really was Britain's friend and wouldnt invade Belgium, and if he did Britain still didnt have to go to war - that Britain should never have been making agreements with the Kaiser and how he and Germany were dangerous - how the Kaiser would never allow his military to really invade Belgium, it was all a ploy etc.

My professor of British history told me (and the rest of the class) "If you want to understand Britain's foreign and domestic policies for the 300 years prior to World War II, they must be viewed in relation to their benefit to the British Empire. Maintenance and promotion of the Empire was always first and everything else a distant second.

Hence the need for the Entente's (without them there was not the money or manpower to defend all of the Empire from all the varied threats), the need to prevent the most powerful continental neighbour with the second largest navy in the world establishing control over the Low Countries (the safety of Britain itself came before the empire and this issue had seen Britain at war, or at least in enmity, with every continental power to achieve this status for 300 years), the need to still keep Russian warships from the Med (this had been seen as late as 1909 when Britain and France both refused to support Russia in reopening this question, as it would allow Russia to pose a threat to Suez). Maybe after those you have the possible threat of Germany building a railway to Bahgdad, and given the time it had taken to get to Constantinople this was not a particularly immediate threat.

[glenn239]

The Anglo-French resistance in 1909 probably had more to do with the fact that Russia was acting in unison with a Central Power against the status quo than as a continuation of the older policy.

[glenn239]

But then again we have the question did this fuel come from Abadan? The answer appears to be no, not entirely

I thought the RN’s primary source for oil during the war was the United States?

[Terry Duncan]

The Anglo-French resistance in 1909 probably had more to do with the fact that Russia was acting in unison with a Central Power against the status quo than as a continuation of the older policy.

Can you think of a single reason the British or French would be any more willing to see Russian warships in the Med in 1909 than they were in 1878? I cannot.

I thought the RN’s primary source for oil during the war was the United States?

Yes. The US and Venezuala I believe account for almost all of it. Obviously more is better in this case, but the Abadan supply was not critical. I am still looking for something that gives a specific figure for supply, though the following link proved useful when the subject of oil came up previously.

viewtopic.php?p=1101377#1101377

Obviously this chart is not purely British oil supplies, but it gives a good enough idea.

[favedave]

I fear some of my comments have been misconstrued. By stating what Russia desired Britain to do in regards to access to the straits, I did not mean that Britain was willing to do it. In fact, I think the opposite is true. In building two of the latest dreadnoughts in 1914 for the Turkish Navy, Britain was pointedly barring Russia's warship from entering the Bosphorus. The fact that Churchill immediately confiscated both ships for the Royal Navy at the outbreak of war, sending the Turkish crews who had come to Britain in July to take delivery home via commerical liner, indicates that he was very aware of Germany's presence in Turkey at the time. His making the deal with Anglo-Persian and gaining controlling interest for the Crown in 1913 would also indicate a complete familiarity with the region's potential, and the very real threat Germany posed. It would be unreasonable to assume that the refinery, no matter how large, which only went on stream in 1913, would be a major, or even minor source of fuel oil for a fleet which itself had just begun the conversion to oil from coal. Access to that oil also ended when Turkey formally joined the Central Powers and declared war in November of 1914.

"The agreement had still to be signed and the track to be built even then, so why should it worry people during the July Crisis?"

During the "July Crisis" they wouldn't and didn't. How long did the "July Crisis" last? Not counting the spillover into August, it was the last three (3) days of the month. However, the other 28 days of the month did involve Parliamentary discussions of the trade agreement regarding the Berlin To Baghdad Railroad. During the Crisis itself Grey was dealing with Germany's actions elsewhere.

"...if this matter were really so key to the survival Britain or the empire it was not directly mentioned by any number of the more than six hundred people present?"

Well...because it was the best deal the government could make at the time. Each succeding goverment from 1888 had tried to get the project killed and failed. With the route at last nearing completion Britain had been given access to the huge revenue stream the rail route was expected to generate. The first three quarters of July were all about the future. Only late in the last weekend of the month did the focus change to the present, with Austria Shelling Serbia, Russia mobilizing and Germany declaring war on everybody.

[Terry Duncan]

I fear some of my comments have been misconstrued. By stating what Russia desired Britain to do in regards to access to the straits, I did not mean that Britain was willing to do it. In fact, I think the opposite is true.

Maybe they have been misconstrued, though I a not disagreeing with your initial premise. The problem is that Russian (or German for that matter) wishes, were not something that would happen automatically or even quickly once they had been agreed. Russia wanted the Straits opened to her ships be they military or civilian, and from all the evidence we have it would appear that the favoured method for this was via some form of diplomatic maneuver. The 'complications' mentioned would need to be no more than diplomatic complications as happened in the Annexation Crisis, but this time with Russia hoping to have Britain and France onside and not refusing to support her. That does not mean Russia would not have attempted to gain them in a war, only that war was not the primeary objective that some people like to claim.

Access to that oil also ended when Turkey formally joined the Central Powers and declared war in November of 1914.

Not too sure what you mean here? Abadan remained in British hands and there was a quite impressive force protecting it too.

During the "July Crisis" they wouldn't and didn't. How long did the "July Crisis" last? Not counting the spillover into August, it was the last three (3) days of the month. However, the other 28 days of the month did involve Parliamentary discussions of the trade agreement regarding the Berlin To Baghdad Railroad.

But it was not being discussed as some form of massive threat to the empire, and it would hardly fail to have done so if the threat from it were really that great. All the railroad really threatened was a minor loss to British trade - the majority of British imports and exports were with the US and Germany at this time.

Well...because it was the best deal the government could make at the time. Each succeding goverment from 1888 had tried to get the project killed and failed. With the route at last nearing completion Britain had been given access to the huge revenue stream the rail route was expected to generate.

But it was also something that Britain could not really oppose, not actually having any direct interests in the areas other than at the Straits themselves. Britain opposing the potential loss of trade here is no different to the Germans complaining about French actions in Morocco, the Powers did this all the time in order to gain concessions in some form or other.

The first three quarters of July were all about the future. Only late in the last weekend of the month did the focus change to the present, with Austria Shelling Serbia, Russia mobilizing and Germany declaring war on everybody.

My point is that if either the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad or Russian access to the Straits had played any role in the outbreak of war in any way, the politicians in Britain, France, or Russia would have been talking about them as a threat or a goal. The idea that it is ok to point to some area of contention or future gain and then say that this is why the war was fought or why it started is really a long way off the mark - though it was very much the method of the dishonest Barnes to do so.

[favedave]

Having not read Barnes (from the discussions here, it would hardly be worth while except as a curiosity) I was unaware that this was some part of the German revisionist theory. Abadan and the oil fields of "neutral" Persia were placed under the protective custody of the Indian Army almost immediately after the war began, to safeguard the Royal Navy's oil supplies...probably by the request of Churchill, again keeping his eyes turned on maintaining Britain's hedgemony in the Middle East. Those same troops went on the offensive against the Ottoman forces in Basra on November 6th in sync with Turkey's declaration of war. (I should have stated that Britain's access to the oil "could" have ended when Turkey joined the Central Powers, I am well aware of how rapidly Britain acted to prevent such an occurance. It also has a tendency to highlight how important to the Empire maintaining control of the region was when Britain declared war on Germany on the 4th of August.

I am not claiming that Britain went to war with Germany over Turkey rather than Belgium. However, Britain did declare war on Germany due to a series of conflicts which included the naval race and Germany's very real intrusion into what the British goverment had determined was part and parcel of its Empire, the Middle East. Belgium was indeed the line in the sand. But Britain moved first to eliminate the threat to the Empire posed by the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. And to the chagrin of French and Haig, devoted considerable manpower throughout the war to secure the Suez Canal, Take Constantinople and keep the new oil fields in tact.

Re: the Berlin to Baghdad rail route:
"But it was also something that Britain could not really oppose, not actually having any direct interests in the areas other than at the Straits themselves. Britain opposing the potential loss of trade here is no different to the Germans complaining about French actions in Morocco, the Powers did this all the time in order to gain concessions in some form or other."

Agreed. But the war gave Britain the opportunity be rid of it and not allow its rebuilding after the war.

[glenn239]

Can you think of a single reason the British or French would be any more willing to see Russian warships in the Med in 1909 than they were in 1878? I cannot.

The Anglo-French had no intention of permitting Russia to upset the status quo in conjunction with the Central Powers. Germany’s policy settled the matter where Austria got her half of the bargain and Russia did not. Perhaps Germany’s policy would have been better advised to have smashed the Ottoman Empire to pieces in coordination with Russia in 1909.

I am not claiming that Britain went to war with Germany over Turkey rather than Belgium. However, Britain did declare war on Germany due to a series of conflicts which included the naval race and Germany's very real intrusion into what the British goverment had determined was part and parcel of its Empire, the Middle East. Belgium was indeed the line in the sand. But Britain moved first to eliminate the threat to the Empire posed by the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire.

Just to be clear – the Ottomans offered Great Britain an alliance in 1913 and Great Britain flatly rejected it. So that means the British thought very little of the B to B railway and thought very much of their relations with Russia.

By stating what Russia desired Britain to do in regards to access to the straits, I did not mean that Britain was willing to do it.

That would come as a surprise first of all to Great Britain itself, which in 1915 not only did exactly what you suppose they wouldn’t do, but actually launched the invasion of Turkey that would hand Russia the Straights if successful.

Perhaps it might be better said that Britain was indifferent to Russia’s agenda in all cases where Russia’s agenda was not in conflict with Germany?

[Terry Duncan]

The Anglo-French had no intention of permitting Russia to upset the status quo in conjunction with the Central Powers. Germany’s policy settled the matter where Austria got her half of the bargain and Russia did not.

Curiously the matter of Russia accessing the Straits is one held up as anathema to the Central Powers, hence why Russia must want war with Germany and Austria in 1914. In 1909 the matter seemed to be one Arenthal was keen to thwart too, hence his reversal of policy after Austria's land grab.

Perhaps Germany’s policy would have been better advised to have smashed the Ottoman Empire to pieces in coordination with Russia in 1909.

This has been argued many times, and has been the subject of speculation by historians too at times. At first glance it looks a nice idea, but when examined closer it is less so. The differences between Germany and Russia were far greater than the few things they had in common - one of the reasons both governments were happy to see the abortive Bjorko Treaty forgotten as a misadventure of their two sovereigns - and this action would almost certainly see Austria looking to France, Britain (probably with Italy too as part of a alliance package), as Russian policy goals are almost all diametrically opposed to Austrian policies. That would of course leave Germany with the somewhat unreliable and meddlesome Russia as her only ally, something that is not likely to appeal to Germany.

Just to be clear – the Ottomans offered Great Britain an alliance in 1913 and Great Britain flatly rejected it. So that means the British thought very little of the B to B railway and thought very much of their relations with Russia.

Between 1912 and 1914 the Ottomans offered each of the Great Powers an alliance, and all refused, Germany only taking up the offer once war had started! You do not need a military alliance to either agree with or oppose a railway project.

That would come as a surprise first of all to Great Britain itself, which in 1915 not only did exactly what you suppose they wouldn’t do, but actually launched the invasion of Turkey that would hand Russia the Straights if successful.

Are you claiming that wartime actions represent pre-war policy? An equal application of such a principle would then make the 'grab for world domination' ideas of Fischer make all further debate on the origins of the war somewhat redundant. As to handing lands to Russia post war, that like so much else would depend on the final results of the war and the desire to fulfil promises made during it.

Perhaps it might be better said that Britain was indifferent to Russia’s agenda in all cases where Russia’s agenda was not in conflict with Germany?

Like the Annexation Crisis or the Russian desire for an Anglo-Russian naval agreement?

[glenn239]

Like the Annexation Crisis or the Russian desire for an Anglo-Russian naval agreement?

Annexation Crisis – yes. Britain was near to being much more Russian than the Russians in that one.

Anglo-Russian naval agreement – this was geo-politically irrelevant, politically dangerous, and militarily a joke, so of no use to Britain.

Are you claiming that wartime actions represent pre-war policy? An equal application of such a principle would then make the 'grab for world domination' ideas of Fischer make all further debate on the origins of the war somewhat redundant. As to handing lands to Russia post war, that like so much else would depend on the final results of the war and the desire to fulfil promises made during it.

As I just said, Britain granted Russia the Straights in 1915. So the Power most surprised by Dave’s assertion would no doubt be Britain itself, which not only did the exact thing he supposes it wouldn’t do, but actually invaded Turkey in order to bring it about!

In terms of pre-war and war policy towards a Russian annexation of the Straights, the two times were identical in policy for Great Britain only insofar as Britain would sacrifice the Straights to Russia before she would risk a break with Russia over the Straights. That principle was as true before the war as during it. This does not mean Britain wanted an alteration of the status quo in Turkey either before or during the war, but that Britain was prepared to 'go there' if that was the method by which Russia was kept in the camp of the Entente.

Between 1912 and 1914 the Ottomans offered each of the Great Powers an alliance...

Dave’s theory about Britain and the Ottomans doesn’t hold water because the British rejected an alliance with Turkey in 1913. Frankly, the idea that Britain could view a single-line railroad with the lift capacity of about 1% of the British merchant fleet as more important than its relations with Russia - this is impossible thinking. On the importance scale, if the BtoB was a '1', Russia might have been a '50'.

Curiously the matter of Russia accessing the Straits is one held up as anathema to the Central Powers, hence why Russia must want war with Germany and Austria in 1914.

AFAIK, neither Germany nor Austria gave a damn about whether Russian warships could transit the Straights - all they wanted was their 'cut' for the 'concession'. Germany wanted a strong Turkish army, and with Saunders in the capital, by 1916 or 1918, the Ottoman army would have been very strong indeed. That was highly antagonising to Russia, which sought to keep the Ottoman army in disarray so that if and when Russia acted against Turkey, the war would be quickly decided.

In 1909 the matter seemed to be one Arenthal was keen to thwart too, hence his reversal of policy after Austria's land grab.

The Austrians negotiated cleverly (far too cleverly for their own good, in fact) – they were in a position to grab their half of the deal while the Russians were not. If Isvolsky wasn't able to see this, then he should never have been promoted to the position of foriegn minister.

Treaty forgotten as a misadventure of their two sovereigns - and this action would almost certainly see Austria looking to France, Britain (probably with Italy too as part of a alliance package), as Russian policy goals are almost all diametrically opposed to Austrian policies.

Actually, the trouble for Germany would be getting Russia to press the matter and risk a break with France, rather than anything to do with Austria. (In fact, Austria would be in a position to gain from the partition of the Ottoman Empire, since in 1909 she was adjacent to Ottoman territory).

That would of course leave Germany with the somewhat unreliable and meddlesome Russia as her only ally, something that is not likely to appeal to Germany.

Assuming Russia actually was bold enough to go to the Straights with German backing, the British would not resist and the Ottoman Empire would be partitioned. British policy (presumably) would be to hold Germany and Austria out of the bargain as much as possible, while giving way to Russia.

[favedave]

As I just said, Britain granted Russia the Straights in 1915. So the Power most surprised by Dave’s assertion would no doubt be Britain itself, which not only did the exact thing he supposes it wouldn’t do, but actually invaded Turkey in order to bring it about!

Oh, so Britain granted Russia the Straits in 1915? Didn't the Turks have something to do with preventing the British from having access to the Straits in 1915?

Dave’s theory about Britain and the Ottomans doesn’t hold water because the British rejected an alliance with Turkey in 1913. Frankly, the idea that Britain could view a single-line railroad with the lift capacity of about 1% of the British merchant fleet as more important than its relations with Russia - this is impossible thinking. On the importance scale, if the BtoB was a '1', Russia might have been a '50'.

Everybody rejected an alliance with Turkey in 1913. Who wanted to be forced to commit their military resources to the biggest loser in the Balkan Wars?

Britain couldn't care less because they disrupted construction of the rail link. Germany would have had an easier time with Bulgaria if they'd won. The Turks would have been just as anxious to get it finished.

Now if you think Britain was seeing the Berlin to Baghdad rail line as ending with a single line with the lift capacity of 1% (personally I don't think it would have been that high in the early years) of the merchant fleet, think more in terms of New York to Chicago for load capacity. Also think of the ability to put hundreds of thousands of troops on the Suez or the Persian Gulf in a quarter the time it would have taken Britain to do so by sea.

[Terry Duncan]

Annexation Crisis – yes. Britain was near to being much more Russian than the Russians in that one.

Maybe you can point to the part Britain was championing the opening of the Straits to Russian warships in 1908/09?

Anglo-Russian naval agreement – this was geo-politically irrelevant, politically dangerous, and militarily a joke, so of no use to Britain.

But rather obviously not supporting Russia where it would clash with Germany otherwise this idea fits the bill perfectly.

As I just said, Britain granted Russia the Straights in 1915. So the Power most surprised by Dave’s assertion would no doubt be Britain itself, which not only did the exact thing he supposes it wouldn’t do, but actually invaded Turkey in order to bring it about!

An interesting idea. Can you provide any support for your claim Britain was launching the Gallipoli invasion in order to hand the land to Russia after the war? I have seen many writing on this matter and none indicate it was to aid Russia expand her territory after the war. To be honest, I imagine this would be the first wartime promise to go in any scenario where Russia is not firmly in control of Constantinople by her own efforts. What you promise in a war is not always what you intend to give at the end of it.

The Austrians negotiated cleverly (far too cleverly for their own good, in fact) – they were in a position to grab their half of the deal while the Russians were not. If Isvolsky wasn't able to see this, then he should never have been promoted to the position of foriegn minister.

Arenthal acted before the agreed date, maybe Isvolsky simply expected a deal to be exactly that and not simply a lie that would destroy what good relations Austria and Russia enjoyed? I really cannot see what you feel might have been clever about this for Austria? They upset the Russians badly, did similar to the Serbians, aquired some assassins along with some rather unprofitable land, stiffed their ally Italy out of all compensation destroying all hope of co-operation in 1914, and upset even Germany!

(In fact, Austria would be in a position to gain from the partition of the Ottoman Empire, since in 1909 she was adjacent to Ottoman territory).

Austria could be counted on to oppose any venture in the Balkans that appealed to Russia, and this was the reason the Germans ditched the Reinsurance Treaty as they were fed up trying to balance the two bickering states interests. There were always the pan-Slav and pan-German agenda's to fall out over, as well as the clashes their client states got into.

British policy (presumably) would be to hold Germany and Austria out of the bargain as much as possible, while giving way to Russia.

Given British policy didnt act this way with Russia as an ally, it isnt going to with her in an opposing alliance. Britain could be relied upon here to enlist Austria, France, Italy, Greece, and the Ottomans in order to oppose such a plan as none will want Russia able to access the Med in much the same way they had opposed it from 1854-1914.

[waldzee]

The Anglo-French resistance in 1909 probably had more to do with the fact that Russia was acting in unison with a Central Power against the status quo than as a continuation of the older policy.

Can you think of a single reason the British or French would be any more willing to see Russian warships in the Med in 1909 than they were in 1878? I cannot.

I thought the RN’s primary source for oil during the war was the United States?

Yes. The US and Venezuala I believe account for almost all of it. Obviously more is better in this case, but the Abadan supply was not critical. I am still looking for something that gives a specific figure for supply, though the following link proved useful when the subject of oil came up previously.

viewtopic.php?p=1101377#1101377

Obviously this chart is not purely British oil supplies, but it gives a good enough idea.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
One minor correction- Oil in Venezuela was first commercially exploited on april 15, 1914. A drilling boom then erupted.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of ... l_industry.
by 1917 Britian & France were getting substantial amounts of oil from Venezuela.

[glenn239]

Oh, so Britain granted Russia the Straits in 1915?

Yes.

Didn't the Turks have something to do with preventing the British from having access to the Straits in 1915?

Did the Turks hurdle themselves through the window and knock the pen from the British hand as they were about to sign the treaty with Russia? No. Did the British expect to lose the Gallipoli Campaign when they signed the treaty with Russia granting her the Straights? No. They expected that the Ottomans would collapse and the deal would be done.

An interesting idea. Can you provide any support for your claim Britain was launching the Gallipoli invasion in order to hand the land to Russia after the war?

For anyone following along, Terry is essentially asking whether the British understood when invading Gallipoli on 25 April 1915, that success in their objective of knocking the Ottomans out of the war would mean that Russia would annex Constantinople as per the Anglo-Russian agreement of 12-18 March 1915.

[glenn239]

Given British policy didnt act this way with Russia as an ally, it isnt going to with her in an opposing alliance. Britain could be relied upon here to enlist Austria, France, Italy, Greece, and the Ottomans in order to oppose such a plan as none will want Russia able to access the Med in much the same way they had opposed it from 1854-1914.

What Britain would do in a situation that never happened isn’t a very promising topic. That being said, the principle of the British Franco-Russian Entente policy was, generally speaking, appeasement and understanding of France and Russia and resistance towards Germany and her allies. This principle, if applied to the Straights pre-war, would suggest that Britain would attempt to maintain the status quo, but if absolutely forced to choose either that or the reestablishment of Driekaiserbund, London would move to partition the Ottoman Empire, just like she did in March 1915. The logical objective would be to create difficulties between Germany and Russia, meaning that in negotiations Britain would want to create overlapping claims between Germany and Russia while at the same time having none between Russia and the Anglo-French.

But rather obviously not supporting Russia where it would clash with Germany otherwise this idea fits the bill perfectly

.

In fact, the Anglo-Russian naval treaty was so contrary to Britain’s interests I remain somewhat at a loss to this day to account for why Grey was willing to go forward with it. My model is that Grey was passively interested in maintaining the status quo, while any form of military treaty with Russia aimed at Germany lay outside of this.