glenn239 wrote:Your logic is that whoever writes the draft must be in charge, so Eyre Crowe must have been in charge.
No, my logic is that the head of the department responsible for writing declarations of war or mobilisation can ask whoever he wants within his department to draft the article, not that he is taken by surprise because the head of a totally different department has written it and has been caught getting the head of state to sign it behind the supposedly responsible persons back!!! At the actual meeting, Moltke and the Kaiser had already agreed on the document coming into force, Bethmann arrived, blew his top that he had not even been consulted and stated it was his right to sign the document, and then did exactly as the other two had already agreed. Remember, Bethmann could have been replaced instantly by the Kaiser, appointment and dismissal from the role of Chancellor was entirely at the whim of the Kaiser, and someone like Faleknhayn who was already Prussian Minister of War could have replaced him without even needing to leave the room, and he also wanted to go to war - "Even if we perish over this, at least it will have been fun." being his famous statement from 4th August 1914 as given in Mombauer, but also traslated as "If we go to a doom over this at least it was glorious" in a TV documentary, I dont have the original German quotation, but Mombauer takes it from Afflerbach's book on Falkenhayn, and to my knowledge both are native German speakers. Even then, I am perfectly happy to accept words in German can have different meanings dependent on a lot of things, but even the more charitable indicates what would have happened if he had been appointed to the role due to Bethmann being removed. Plessen and Tappen were also close at hand, as would have been Jagow. Find one who would have objected and insisten on maintaining peace?
glenn239 wrote:Because the Germans understood why the Austrians were asking them for backing in the first place.
Austria only needs support if she already accepts her action must mean war with Russia. Otherwise any Russian attack is covered by the Austro-German alliance. However, the Austrians seem to have accepted from the start that they were intending an aggressive war that would need specific support to be in place before they could act. I agree, Germany fully understood what was going on, as did Italy, hence the Germany attempts to get Austria to give assurances of compensation to Italy, also indicating they accepted Austria fully intended to annex Serbian territory - there seems little dispute they intended to annex the Sanjac of Novi Pazar as part of the 'minor border adjustments for security reasons, although all the security this offered was to cut off Serbian access to the sea through Montenegro, making her fully dependent on Austria for all imports and exports once again.
This rather blows apart the entire 'localisation' policy, as apparently Germany already accepted the worst case scenario (war with Britain) was likely even before they tried to impliment their localisation policy, and really shows Bethmann and Jagow's apparent shock at Grey's warning to Lichnowski on 29th to be entirely lying for effect rather than the collapse of something they ever really believed in anyhow.
glenn239 wrote:IIRC? What's the exact source in Mombaurer, keeping in mind this particular historian could not find a charitable explanation for the actions or opinions of Moltke were the Goddess of Charitable Excuses herself to run her over with a Mack truck full of alibis.
The following are sources cited by Mombauer in footnotes to pp192-193;
Schafer, Generalstab und Admiraistab. Des Zusammenwirken von Heer und Fotte im /Weltkrieg, Berlin 1931, p. 10.
Trumpener, ‘War Premeditated?’, p. 62.
BA-MA, W-10/50661, Tappen, Kriegserinnerungen’, p. 10.
Giess, July 1914, PP 60/61
Giess Julikrise, vol 1, doc, 33, pp 97-98: Muller, Diary, p. 32.
Giess Julikrise, vol 1, doc 32c, pp96-97
Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch und zum Versailler Schuldspruch, herausgegeben im Auftrage des Bayerischen Landtages, o D (1922), Schoen to Hertling, report no. 386, pp 4ff. Schoen pointed out that not even Italy had been confided in.
glenn239 wrote:You stated it was impossible for Russia to await developments. No, it wasn't impossible for them to have done that.
It was as impossible for Russia to await developments as it was for Austria to present what she promised and go to war on the date she wanted, 12th August. Curiously, someone thought this date far too late and kept asking for it to be brought forward! Who was that?
glenn239 wrote:All intelligence organisations have underhanded, weird connectivity. It's the nature of the job. Doesn't mean anything unless one has evidence or an agenda.
Well the agenda is pretty well enough known to not need pointing out every few pages of a thread, the famous 'better war now when we still have a chance than in two years time' added to the Austrians need to prevent their own state falling apart due to internal tensions over minorities wanting their own states or even just representation in the empire.
glenn239 wrote:The creepiest part of the reality that Sleepwalkers describes is to see it happening again with Russia right now. We're watching the world slither closer and closer to war with Russia, and no one seems to realise how dangerous it is.
Yeah, the naughty Russians, the danger of 'invasion from the east' etc that has been touted since Roman times, sometimes correctly, but more often than not, incorrectly. Can you name many wars where Russia has attacked the western nations of Europe?
Incidently, a lovelly little gem came to light in a second reading of Otte's July Crisis p 47;
Largely for that reason, the then war minister General Moritz Baron Auffenberg von Komarow argued, in December 1912, that 'one should fix the summer of 1914 as the moment of an attack (on Serbia).
The source is given as Memo Friedjung (on interview Auffenberg), Dec 1912 (after 12 Dec 1912), F Adlgasser (ed), Heinrich Friedjung; Geschichte in Gesprachen. Aufzeichmungen, 1898-1919 (2vols, Vienna 1997) II, 375.
So we now have an Austrian wanting war in the summer of 1914, at the same time the Germans were also opting for that time being optimal for a war too! I dont seem to remember any Russians being quoted as saying 1914 was a good time for a war, even their enemies didnt think they would be ready until 1917.
Good luck with all the German sources though, I do know one German personally who may have suffered tracking down one for me, not quite as many as above, they are rather busy at the moment and not that much into history anyhow but have been known to help out from time to time as a friend. You may think Mombauer less than charitable, but is there any actual reason for this that can be supported by evidence? I have seen many people criticise her, but when asked, very few ever offer a detailed refutation but rather say X says she is wrong. When it comes to writings on Moltke the Younger though we have few competing sources to compare even now, one reason her book commands such a high price on the second hand book market and Amazon.