Berlin behind Sarajevo? A strange claim...

[Slobodan Cekic]

..Well, depends how you look at it. Their splitting the Entente - you actually mean helping ignite the revollution in Russia, I suppose. This has been a boomerang - they started an epidemic they have been in a very bad shape to resist in 1918 themselves. There have been others with same interests, helping the Russia to fall apart, but then they brought the US into the war at the same time, to replace Russia. After that, the ballance looked even worse for Germany.
After the war, they have been very adept at hiding their handwork and wiggling and shifting blame, true, but .. As you say, it could have been worse for them; so they tried that worse as well, later.

.. short of not going to war - well that was the only really good option for all concerned, especially Germany. They did the opposite.

[Slobodan Cekic]

"ready " as such is a meaningless notion : ready to do what ?

On its own, the Russian army was no danger for Germany ,Russia was strong defensively,but very weak offensively;the maps I have seen of the Russian railways do not indicate that Russia would be ready to start a big attack in 1917 : it has been argued with some (or a lot of ) justification that the French financial support to Russia was only a question of throwing good money to bad .;

Well, if one wonders about the efficiency of the Franch large investment into the Russian millitary, it may not have been the rosiest in te sense of the ratio of invested to what it returned. French invested into the Russian railways and industry as well, and the efficiency here has been rather high, as I understand.

But in the sense of what it meant to France, when the Russians, after mobillizing in 10 days instead of 6 weeks started advancing and forcing the Germans to send the troops east.. if we know how close it has been with the Schlieffen, one could even say, this French investment into the Russian military may have been the best one they ever made. May be it is easy to forget that.

[ljadw]

about the Russian railways : the French investments went mostly to non military sectors,and the importance of the strategic Russian railways is mostly mythical ,principal reason being the small forces that were available : only 20 % of Russian males had received a military instruction .The result was that in august 1914 Russia could mobilise some 70 ID (later in 1933 33 Reserve ID were mobilised,but most went to the front in 1915 only, Germany OTOH sent 26 reserve ID to the front in 1914 ).

The Military Districts were

Moscow 10 ID

St Petersburg 7

Vilna 8

Kiew 10

Warsaw 9

Odessa 4

Kazan 5

Caucasus 8

Siberia 10


At the mobilisation 9 AC (mostly consisting of 2 ID ) were concentrated on the German border, 16 on the border with AH,1 remained in the Caucasus, and 5 AC (9 +10 A) were still forming at the end of august (they contained divisions from Siberia ,...).


About the Western front : the impact of the Western Front on the Eastern Front and opposite was very small : Germany won at Tannenberg without the small forces that were transferred to the east , and would have lost at the Marne even if the units transferred to the East had been available .

Tannenberg was between 26 and 31 august: after 25 days of fighting the Russians had not advanced further than Tannenberg .

[glenn239]

From memory the pressure for the talks came from the French, who pointed out that the Russians felt they were treated as lesser partners than the French, as the French had a naval agreement whilst the Russians did not. The talks were scheduled long before any assassination, and there was really little serious thought given to them by the RN, other than that the government may agree to something that the RN had not the slightest intention of doing. The RN had no intention of making any agreement, the government were not inclined to do much in the way of overruling them when it came to where it was impractical to deploy a fleet too, so these secret talks posed no real threat to Germany at all. I am not sure how you feel there was a 'political danger' as Britain and Russia already had an Entente, so could reasonably be expected to co-operate in times of war, even if it were not possible for the two fleets to physically work together.

The timing was damaging and the military requirement non-existent.

I dont see France attacking Germany alone at all, so the only aggressive danger she posed to Germany was as part of an alliance. If Germany did not get into a fight with Russia, then it is most likely France would have done nothing, just as she had done since 1871.

I conclude the danger of potential aggression went both ways, not one way.

[glenn239]

For the very same reason, knowing that if they let their allies down, the Germans would finish them off and then turn back, the Russians and other Entente members have not accepted the separate peace offers even inthe dark hours of 1916, when the Entente victory was nowhere to be seen, .

That was Russia's choice. The Tzar chose a fight to the death, and he got what he wanted. Russia, like Germany, could scarcely complain at taking a decision to go all-out, then whine at the consequences of losing that roll of the dice; if Russia did not want Brest-Litovsk then Russia should not have ordered it from the menu.

[glenn239]

German army stayed dangerous to the very end in 1918, but nonetheless, this very end came as Germany had no more materiel and troops to hold all the fronts from unravelling. In a long war the opponent with more men and materiel wins almost always; the militarily better prepared opponent with smaller resources must win fast, or he is in trouble.

By the end of 1916 both alliances were nearing exhaustion, not just Germany's. The fatal mistake was at Pless in 1917. Bethmann, and the Austrians, did not want unrestricted submarine warfare. They wanted to draw the US in as a neutral mediator, a role in which the Entente could not resist given their bankruptcy and dependence on US supplies. The German army - repeating its doctrine of escalation - chose a military solution instead, assuring the US entry on the Entente side and cutting off the last substantial opportunity for a compromise peace, based on exhausted stalemate.

Moltke's tears in mid-September 1914 after the Marne tell us about his state of mind then, as well, but as he said -'Your Majesty, we have lost the war' - he has been reasoning in the terms of grand strategy.

The response to this was appropriate - he was immediately sacked as mentally unsuitable for his position, both in terms of his unstable emotions as well as his military failures on the battlefield.

[glenn239]

.

.. short of not going to war - well that was the only really good option for all concerned, especially Germany. They did the opposite.

Germany emerged from WW1 in a stronger position geopolitically than in 1914. Bethmann accomplished his goal of breaking the Entente and cowing France. The loss of her Austrian ally was actually an opportunity for Germany, and the other Entente allies Italy and Japan were drifting away, like the US. Germany then threw it all away with the Nazi rise in the 1930's - these taking advantages of Germany's improved geopolitical prospects from the WW1 outcome to launch a second war, this time one of aggression.

[Terry Duncan]

The timing was damaging and the military requirement non-existent.

Other than the pressure of the alliance system making it a rquirement to at least talk to each other about needs in case of war, and it was clear the Russians were on a lesser standing to Britain than France was, so the talks were hard to avoid forever, I think you will find it had been a Russian wish for quite some time before the talks finally began, and they never got to finish anyhow.

I conclude the danger of potential aggression went both ways, not one way.

It depends how much you allow for 'potential' on a purely theoretical scale, as it was theoretically a threat that Belgium may mobilise all her dog cart machine gun units and move into Germany to desecrate/annex extra lamposts, not having enough lampost space of her own. Wasnt in Clemenceau who said that the only problem with the German was that there were 20 million too many of them? France was never going to attack Germany in a one on one war, we should all really be able to agree on that, I dont think there is anyone from the time who even considered such a thing possible.

[Terry Duncan]

Germany emerged from WW1 in a stronger position geopolitically than in 1914. Bethmann accomplished his goal of breaking the Entente and cowing France. The loss of her Austrian ally was actually an opportunity for Germany, and the other Entente allies Italy and Japan were drifting away, like the US. Germany then threw it all away with the Nazi rise in the 1930's - these taking advantages of Germany's improved geopolitical prospects from the WW1 outcome to launch a second war, this time one of aggression.

The position was stronger, but with the terms of Versailles limiting the German army, there was no opportunity for her to take advantage of it. If Versailles had been enforced, as it was at first, then there would have been no WWII anyhow, as Hitler could have been removed the moment he violated the terms openly. France was hardly cowed post-WWI as her occupation of the Ruhr as soon as Germany defaulted on reparations. What failed was the political will, as people started believing the lie from Wilson that WWI was fought as a war to end all wars, something it was never fought for, but made a good sop to public opinion when explaining a lot of deaths in a way that made the politicians who ordered them look good.

[glenn239]

Other than the pressure of the alliance system making it a rquirement to at least talk to each other about needs in case of war, and it was clear the Russians were on a lesser standing to Britain than France was, so the talks were hard to avoid forever, I think you will find it had been a Russian wish for quite some time before the talks finally began, and they never got to finish anyhow.

You've welcomed theories presented without credible evidence, as exhibited by the "Germany did it" theory for Sarajevo. With the Anglo-Russian naval talks, as Grey's motives are open to speculation, Grey may have been looking to encourage Russian tensions with Germany, in a format of plausible deniability, handily suggested by the French, (whose suggestions Grey would also not hesitate to brush aside).

It depends how much you allow for 'potential' on a purely theoretical scale, as it was theoretically a threat that Belgium may mobilise all her dog cart machine gun units and move into Germany to desecrate/annex extra lamposts, not having enough lampost space of her own. Wasnt in Clemenceau who said that the only problem with the German was that there were 20 million too many of them? France was never going to attack Germany in a one on one war, we should all really be able to agree on that, I dont think there is anyone from the time who even considered such a thing possible.

I've concluded that Germany perceived a level of threat, from France on par with the level of threat France perceived from Germany. If you can accept that conclusion in principle we can move on.

[glenn239]

The position was stronger, but with the terms of Versailles limiting the German army, there was no opportunity for her to take advantage of it. If Versailles had been enforced, as it was at first, then there would have been no WWII anyhow, as Hitler could have been removed the moment he violated the terms openly. France was hardly cowed post-WWI as her occupation of the Ruhr as soon as Germany defaulted on reparations. What failed was the political will, as people started believing the lie from Wilson that WWI was fought as a war to end all wars, something it was never fought for, but made a good sop to public opinion when explaining a lot of deaths in a way that made the politicians who ordered them look good.

Slobodan's post in my opinion misrepresents the actual situation of 1919. Germany had been beaten on the battlefield, but geopolitically (which has a longer view), Germany had won the war. The Entente was smashed, Germany's position in Europe stronger than ever, all of France allies had drifted away and France was traumatized beyond recovery to a 1914 level of confidence and aggressive inclination. Only Versailles, which would erode over the course of decades, stood in the way of Germany's eventual ascendance, her completion of Bethmann's economic and political aims. Hitler threw this all away with his programme of preparation, and then execution, of aggressive war.

[Terry Duncan]

By the end of 1916 both alliances were nearing exhaustion, not just Germany's. The fatal mistake was at Pless in 1917. Bethmann, and the Austrians, did not want unrestricted submarine warfare. They wanted to draw the US in as a neutral mediator, a role in which the Entente could not resist given their bankruptcy and dependence on US supplies. The German army - repeating its doctrine of escalation - chose a military solution instead, assuring the US entry on the Entente side and cutting off the last substantial opportunity for a compromise peace, based on exhausted stalemate.

The problem is that the US terms are going to be almost identical to those of the British, to withdraw from all occupied territories, something the Germans at this point were not willing to do. Bethmann may have got the army out of Belgium and France, but they had little intention of giving up the land in the east too. Even then, I would say getting the military out of Belgium wasnt overly likely, as the German government had to explain why it was giving up all this territory after so many casualties, just to return to the pre-war borders.

[glenn239]

The problem is that the US terms are going to be almost identical to those of the British, to withdraw from all occupied territories, something the Germans at this point were not willing to do. Bethmann may have got the army out of Belgium and France, but they had little intention of giving up the land in the east too. Even then, I would say getting the military out of Belgium wasnt overly likely, as the German government had to explain why it was giving up all this territory after so many casualties, just to return to the pre-war borders.

But Germany did not require territory to win the war outright. It only required peace on the basis of German territorial status quo ante with the German armed forces remaining intact. The dissolution of the Austrian Empire, if Wilson demanded, would service Germany's prospects, not hinder it.

[Terry Duncan]

You've welcomed theories presented without credible evidence, as exhibited by the "Germany did it" theory for Sarajevo.

I feel fairly sure I posted my own thoughts on the subject right at the start of the thread, but that is no reason to limit speculation only to 'The Entente did it' ideas as had previously been the case. I dont mind speculation, as some of it is based on known facts in this case at least, what I discourage is thread after thread based on the same speculation and little evidence.

With the Anglo-Russian naval talks, as Grey's motives are open to speculation, Grey may have been looking to encourage Russian tensions with Germany, in a format of plausible deniability, handily suggested by the French, (whose suggestions Grey would also not hesitate to brush aside).

Other than to pander to your whimsical desire to always see Grey in a bad light, I can see little reason to doubt the stated reasons for holding the talks, or that pressure was coming from Russia and France to hold them. The concept that talks that were intended to be secret were somehow intended to encourage tensions with a nation not party to them taking place is quite absurd unless you wish to claim the British knew a spy was getting the information. It is possible, though not very likely. There is also no motive for Grey to be acting in such a manner, other than you clearly dislike him.

I've concluded that Germany perceived a level of threat, from France on par with the level of threat France perceived from Germany. If you can accept that conclusion in principle we can move on.

As all French war planning prior to 1911 was defensive, and only in 1914 did a plan with offensive options come about, and Germany also clearly placed the most emphasis on attacking France even in a two front war, I would say that the scale of potential threat is skewed heavily to that of Germany being the nation that would have any initiative. In a one on one war with France, Germany had no plans at all to defend, even in Moltke the Elder's day. France only became a threat to Germany because of the Russian alliance, until then she was little more than a nuisance to be crushed if she ever dared to upset Germany.

[Terry Duncan]

The problem is that the US terms are going to be almost identical to those of the British, to withdraw from all occupied territories, something the Germans at this point were not willing to do. Bethmann may have got the army out of Belgium and France, but they had little intention of giving up the land in the east too. Even then, I would say getting the military out of Belgium wasnt overly likely, as the German government had to explain why it was giving up all this territory after so many casualties, just to return to the pre-war borders.

But Germany did not require territory to win the war outright. It only required peace on the basis of German territorial status quo ante with the German armed forces remaining intact. The dissolution of the Austrian Empire, if Wilson demanded, would service Germany's prospects, not hinder it.

A Germany going to war to help protect its only reliable ally is hardly going to find the dissolution of that ally an acceptable outcome, neither is the ally! Germany didnt need war at all, opting for it was one of the greatest mistakes ever made. But anyone in charge has a huge butchers bill to explain away by 1916, so the public will not want 'it was all for nothing' given what they have been told from 1914-16. A government could do it, but it would be electoral suicide if they did.