Attrition wrote:It wasn't a foregone conclusion and they didn't have hindsight. the Tsarist regime collapsed and the French and Italian armies had nervous breakdowns in 1917. The attempt in 1918 to forestall the arrival in force of the US army made military sense even as it sacrificed the Eastern Front peace dividend.
Here is a quote from a nice paper of University of Toronto:
"II. WHY THE ALLIES WON
What did economic factors contribute to victory and defeat in World War I? Before
the event, so to speak, the answer should have been nothing; after the event, it turned
out to be nearly everything. From the standpoint of the German war plan for 1914,
economic factors were not expected to count. The German general staff hoped for
victory in the west within six weeks. The war was intended to be won by military, not
economic means, and was to be finished off long before economic factors could be
brought into play. It was only after this plan had failed, as the leaders on each side
contemplated the ensuing stalemate, that belts began to be tightened and sleeves
rolled up for the mobilisation of entire economies (Chickering and Förster, 2000).
Once plans were redrawn for a longer haul, a war of attrition developed in the
west where the opposing forces of Germany, France, and Britain, each backed by
large, rich, and successful economies, ground each other down with rising force levels
and rising losses. In battles that were intended to be won by the last man left standing,
resources counted for almost everything. Once the German military advantage had
failed to win an immediate victory in the west, it seems inevitable that the greater
Allied capacity for taking risks, absorbing the cost of mistakes, replacing losses, and
accumulating overwhelming quantitative superiority should eventually have turned
the balance against Germany.
The realization of this advantage took time,..."
Well, nothing is a foregone conclusion; but there are things one better avoids doing, cause of the odds against being too high. You are right to point out, as well, that it is easy for me to be smart today, knowing what happened. I do not know, however, how aware the German military had been of the economical aspects of the strategy. If not much, then another point in favor of "war being too serious a thing..". This saying contrasts the German practice during the WWI, though.
Just as you say, 1916 has seen Entente quite exhausted. The Russians themselves had grave misgivings about their chances from the very start. Italy was better not to think of. French soldiers have been mercilessly thrown to the winds at Verdun; officers fearing possible mutinies; the perspectives bleak to say at very least. Separate peace and armistice proposals discussed in secret, very earnestly. But, could it be that someone could retain an oversight of this rather confused picture?
Let us now take into account the international finance. As the war progressed much after the Christmas of 1914 has been forgotten, Britain and France were getting into an ever increasing debt in order to to finance their wartime trade deficits, and it has been the same with Germany. Up till 1916 Germany had no problem to get the loans on the international market, but from that year on, this started getting quite difficult. Why?
The bankers are normally glad to give loans to any side in a war, as long as that does not cross their other plans. Russia has been foundering already, and that could mean Britain and France defeated and defaulting on the enormous loans they received. So the high finance had to do a couple of things to offset the coming collapse of Russia, if they were to see their money back. I think that is why it became difficult for Germans to get that loans, and that had a lot of weight. Even more weight had the entrance of the US into the war which happened for the same very reason - due mostly to the financial circles pulling the strings, as well.
So, the 1917 brought the exit of the financially weakest link of Entente, and the entry of the richest one in it's place.
If anyone in Germany before the war had come to an idea of comparing themselves with their enemies and their likely supporters and joiners, according to the respective total economic and financial weights of the both sides, he would have seen a bleak picture if he could only understand the meaning of these numbers. Now, did their soldiers or politicians understand such economic aspects of strategy at that time, don't ask me, but they should have. And I feel, they could have, as well.
GDP ratio was 1.8 to 1 in favor of Entente in 1913, and it got to 2.5 to 1 in 1917, after US replaced Russia on the allied side. This one line should have been enough, actually.
