Berlin behind Sarajevo? A strange claim...

[Terry Duncan]

What you asked for, Terry; This is another paper from Batakovic, dealing with the Salonika process. On the pdf page 16, (book page 287 ) is what you asked for, once more. The whole document below. My translation more exact, btw

Thanks for the links, though I am sure they are going to be dismissed as being unreliable by at least one person due to what they say not being congenial to them. I do agree with the idea that if Apis did have anything to do with the plot, he did so as an act against Pasic, as his position was really tenuous after the failed officers coup in May. I am sure if people chack back far enough in the history here they will find I have also questioned many times why anyone would pick assassins with little or no experience with weapons if they wanted an attempt to succeed, and why there were no better candidates to be found inside a Serbia where large numbers of people had been involved in the two very recent Balkan Wars and would have excellent chances of being better candidates than Princip and Co. In politics you do not entrust junior personel or new recruits to leak sensitive information, or to give really important briefings, something Apis was likely to be aware of as well as the good reasons for not doing so, which would make his opting to select Princip as a would be assassin either idiotic or desperate.

As for the discussion on the short war/long war/winning/not losing, it seems the one person out of step to a degree with the thoughts coming out of the GGS was Schlieffen himself if the lionised version we see in popular history is to be accepted. The great general who had never commanded any significant formation in action, let alone an army or army group, is meant to have believed in a quick victory, the certainty in defeating France quickly, though we have little in the way of direct quotes or documents supporting such claims. What we do know is that Moltke the Elder prefered a long war scenario while relying on a political solution to end the war when he had exhausted his enemies; Waldersee changed over to an offensive strategy but planned little before being replaced by Schlieffen; Schlieffen believed in a short war; Moltke the Younger seems to have never believed in a short war, rejected the 'Schlieffen Plan' (or whatever it was really called) due to the problem of Paris having no solution, as well as the ability of the French to retreat into their interior to avoid an initial defeat until the Russians were in the field in full force; Falkenhayn was disliked by Schlieffen due to his belief in a frontal attack to shatter the French army as fast as possible (as was Tappen) by inflicting massive losses even at the expense of losses to his own forces, and when commanding the German army opted for a strategy of attrition similar in concept to that of Moltke the Elder. Did the real Schlieffen really believe something so different to all the other commanders? Even Zuber, who tends to opt for a most pro-German stance, feels Schlieffen intended a rather more limited objective than popular history would have it!

You asked the question 'who could say he has not lost, after such a war?' which is a good question. I would say, as Attrition has already, that the Germans hoped for a quick victory even if they felt one was unlikely, and such a victory was only possible if the French were stupid and allowed themselves to get an army or two surrounded again, but thought the long war the most likely outcome even if it was unwinnable. Sadly they also believed they had no chance of victory even in a single front war with Russia once The Great Program had completed in about 1917, so taking the last chance to get a possible victory was rather less unthinkable than it had been even in 1912/13. Paranoia and an inability to see beyond a military solution to the strategic issues Germany faced were probably the deciding factors, though other powers had very similar problems in their own decision making process too, hence in my mind Germany cannot be held solely to blame for the situation or events in 1914.

[glenn239]

Never mind. Germany acted as it did and is thus responsible in a very large share for the war, which of course is something most people other than yourself agree with, whilst you seem to always be trying to understate the German responsibility whilst finding ways to blame others.

To my mind, any poster taking the tack that the Russian mobilization in and of itself was leading to some place other than to war is engaging in fantasy.

And a General War if they couldnt have a local war entirely on their terms....

A local war - yes. "Entirely" on their terms - no. The local war was more important than an entirely free hand with Serbia.

Strange, Berchtold should have noticed you hiding in the waste basket when he stated his thoughts...

Berchtold's instructions to his minister were to break relations if the reply was not a blanket acceptance and remain in Belgrade if it was.

Strange Bethmann felt able to state that was his purpose behind his policy then...

If the Entente fell out over a localised Austro-Serbian war then Bethmann would have welcomed that. But the German policy was to seek a localised conflict first, then work with the diplomatic fallout second. In terms of the future of the alliance with France, this was Russia's decision, not Germany's.

Bethmann's first attempt at Halt in Belgrade, the one when Russia was obviously going to intervene, was to totally re-write the Kaisers original proposal to mean the Note had to be accepted in full, plus Belgrade be occupied, whilst it was only with the acceptance Britain was also going to intervene that he decided to moderate his policy. The first part of this action would have led to Britain and France to not support Russia in Bethmann's mind, thus being a continuation of his original policy. The latter moderation was only when he realised he had lost control of the situation and Berchtold was determined to cash the cheque Bethmann had been so stupid to have issued without conditions in the first place.

Bethmann's decision to support Halt in Belgrade came just after the British warning that they'd quickly enter the war.

Incidently, Halt in Belgrade was impossible from an Austrian point of view as they had no troops able to occupy Belgrade, they were all mustered on the western frontier instead due to the Austrian mobilisation plan!

Halt in Belgrade was discussed around July 29-31, while Austrian mobilization plan against Serbia positioned 5th and 6th armies for their advance around 14 August. The third Austrian army against Serbia would have been the 2nd Army, but for the war with Russia that sent it to Galicia. I suspect this would have been the one to take Belgrade had the plan gone ahead.

Which still doesn't explain why you thought my position as staff was of any importance at all to the discussion?

I believe the 'Germany did Sarajevo' theory, like the 'Poincare as warmonger' theory, belong in the What If section of the site.

Your efforts to divert here do nothing to distract from the fact that Princip and Co all stated to the Austrians that they had believed Franz-Ferdinand to be leading the war party when they came up with their plot in the first place, and that this matches the belief of Apis, who they never met.

IMO, there is no credible evidence Apis believed Ferdinand was the head of a war party in Vienna. What the kids believed is also not particularily relevant - they were primed to kill just about any high-level Austrian official they could put in their sights.

As to tin foil hat theories, how about the one where Berchtold and Bethmann didnt know what they meant to achieve or what diplomatic results were unacceptable to them? Someone here seems to give that 'theory' rather a lot of time!

Berchtold's and Bethmann's intentions are often discussed here.

[glenn239]

Of course it doesnt, Hansard doesnt mention the blue text either (it was a statement in the Commons after all), Chronos20th made it up and tried to pass it off as 'inside information' like he did with so many of his inventions, and then vanished for a while when asked to support his claims with sources!

The blue text did not belong in the quote. You can subtract stuff from a quote (provided the context of your point is not altered and you "..." to show it), but you can't add text to a document.

[glenn239]

What you asked for, Terry; This is another paper from Batakovic, dealing with the Salonika process. On the pdf page 16, (book page 287 ) is what you asked for, once more. The whole document below. My translation more exact, btw

"After having been tortured in the jail, Rade Malobabic, the alleged perpetrator of the failed attempt of assassination, admitted that he was only following the orders of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic Apis, while Mehmedbasic, the alleged accomplice, courageously denied ail charges. After being "friendly" advised by Colonel Petar Zivkovic, his former friend and the informai head of the White Hand, Colonel Apis, accepted to submit a written statement on their previous cooperation. By this far-reaching statement Colonel Apis was hoping not only ta protect his long-time loyal followers, but also to provoke a withdrawal of the main charges against him at the Salonica trial.
"Feeling that Austria was planning a war with us, I thought that the disappearance of the Austrian Heir Apparent would weaken the power of military clique he headed, and thus the danger of war would be removed or postponed for a while. I engaged Malobabic to organize the assassination on the occasion of the announced arrivaI of Franz Ferdinand ta Sarajevo. 1 made up my mind about this only when Artamanov [The Russian Military Attaché in Serbia] assured me that Russia would not leave us without protection if we were attacked by Austria. On this occasion I did not mention my intention for the assassination, and my motive for asking his opinion about Russia's attitude was the possibility that Austria might become aware of our activities, and use this as a pretext to attack us."

The_Salonica_Trial_1917._Black_Hand_vs..pdf

I am not posting these documents because I think I know exactly to what conclusion they may lead, regarding the subject; because I don't. You can take a look at them and think them over a bit if you wish. Am certain things 'll occur to you that would not have occurred to me.
I suspect Apis has not been telling the full truth to anyone, and that he was closest to it with his closest friends, like Antonije Antic. His way of thinking beats me, as well. I suppose the mentalities changed more than I thought in a full century since, and anyway, Apis was enigmatic even to his contemporaries.

As I stated yesterday, Apis was arrested on false charges of a plot to murder the king of Serbia. These nonsense charges were to the intention of a kangaroo court in which the purpose was to murder him. As such, nothing from this trial is credible evidence, as is the case with all kangaroo courts. The term means,

A kangaroo court is a judicial tribunal or assembly that blatantly disregards recognized standards of law or justice, and often carries little or no official standing in the territory within which it resides.

[Terry Duncan]

Berchtold's instructions to his minister were to break relations if the reply was not a blanket acceptance and remain in Belgrade if it was.

Any particular source for what you say Giesl should do in the case of acceptance? We do of course have sources for 'no reply is acceptable, it must come to war' sentiments expressed by Berchtold, not that this was what we were talking about anyhow. Curiously you edited my comment right at the point the actual matter under discussion was mentioned;

he seemed to specify the solution to the recent Balkan Wars was his objection as Austria did not approve of the peace settlement terms as Serbia came off well from them.

As you can see, the problems Berchtold had with a diplomatic solution were down to his dislike of the settlement of the Balkan Wars in the London Conference, and had nothing to do with the 1909 Annexation Crisis settlement that was very favourable to Austria, which is what you had been claiming until this recent diversion about what Giesl may have been told, as shown here;

A diplomatic 'victory' of the 1909 sort was what Berchtold was referring to as useless, so the diplomatic conditions he set out for Serbia in the note were much stiffer than those of 1909.

If the Entente fell out over a localised Austro-Serbian war then Bethmann would have welcomed that. But the German policy was to seek a localised conflict first, then work with the diplomatic fallout second. In terms of the future of the alliance with France, this was Russia's decision, not Germany's.

Given Bethmann stated his ultimate aim to Reizler was to use the crisis to detach Russia from Britain and France, I am not too sure why I or anyone else should give your thoughts anything but the brief time it takes to dismiss them as unsupported nonsense.

Bethmann's decision to support Halt in Belgrade came just after the British warning that they'd quickly enter the war.

So you concede that Bethmann did not support Halt in Belgrade when told to promote it by his monarch, went out of his way (along with Jagow) to sabotage it until it was too late to prevent war, and then halfheartedly told Austria to come to some agreement on this basis, whilst still telling them he would uphold the alliance even if they did nothing of the sort and caused a general war?

Halt in Belgrade was discussed around July 29-31,

The Kaiser first offically told Bethmann and Jagow to forward the proposal on 28th July, as per Albertini Vol II p468-469;

The Kaiser formulated his conclusions in the following letter, sent at once to Jagow, bearing the date 10 a.m., 28 July, and written with underlinings which are here reproduced in italics:

On reading through the Serbian reply which I received this morning I am persuaded that on the whole the wishes of the Danubian Monarchy are met. The few reservations made by Serbia on single points can in my opinion well be cleared up by negotiation. But capitulation of the most humble type
is there proclaimed urbi et orbi and thereby all reason for war falls to the ground.

Nevertheless this scrap of paper together with what it contains can only be regarded as of limited value as long as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, deceitful, and master hands at temporizing. In order that these fine promises may become truth and fact, the exercise of gentIe (douce) violence will be necessary. This will best be done by Austria’s occupying Belgrade as security for the enforcement and execution of the promises and remaining there until the demands are actually carried out. This is also necessary in order to give an outward satisfaction d’honneur to the army which has for a third time been mobilized to no purpose, an appearance of success in the eyes of the rest of the world and enable it to have at least the consciousness of having stood on foreign soil. Without this the calling off of the campaign might give rise to an ill feeling towards the dynasty which might be extremely hazardous. Should Your Excellency share this opinion of mine, I should propose to say to Austria: the retreat of Serbia in a very humiliating form has been attained and we congratulate her on this. Thereby of course a reason for war no longer exists, but what is necessary is a guarantee that the promises would be put into execution. This would doubtless be attainable by the (temporary) military occupation of a part of Serbia. Just as we in 1871 left troops posted in France until the milliards were paid up. On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace in Austria. Contrary proposals or protests from other states I would firmly reject, especially as they all more or less openly appeal to me to help to preserve the peace. This I will do in my own way and thus in a manner sparing of Austrian national sentiment and the military honour of her army. The latter has already been appealed to by the supreme war lord and is about to respond to the appeal. It must therefore unquestionably have a visible satisfaction d’honneur; that is a prerequisite of my mediation. Will Your Excellency therefore submit to me a proposal in the sense here outlined which shall be communicated to Vienna. I have ordered Plessen who entirely shares my views to write in the above sense to the Chief of the General Staff.’

Of course even this ignores the fact the idea was also put forward by Averna on 27th July. So much for it only being discussed on 29th-31st July. I presume you picked those dates to obscure the origin of the proposal and the fact Jagow and Bethmann delayed it fatally even after re-writing it.

I suspect this would have been the one to take Belgrade had the plan gone ahead.

Maybe, but hardly compatible with the proposal being put in place quick enough to avert war.

I believe the 'Germany did Sarajevo' theory, like the 'Poincare as warmonger' theory, belong in the What If section of the site.

Are you requesting I transfer the thread or start a new one on that board?

IMO, there is no credible evidence Apis believed Ferdinand was the head of a war party in Vienna.

You have been provided with direct quotes and documents discussing the Balkan situation that support the conclusion Apis thought as stated, you offer little reason to dismiss it, especially as people like Clarke and mcMeekin seem to follow such a line too.

What the kids believed is also not particularily relevant - they were primed to kill just about any high-level Austrian official they could put in their sights.

It shows the belief of Apis was not exclusive to him, and others had reached the same opinion before coming into contact with his circle of agents.

Berchtold's and Bethmann's intentions are often discussed here.

That is no reason to disregard their own statements about their own objectives during the crisis.

[Terry Duncan]

As I stated yesterday, Apis was arrested on false charges of a plot to murder the king of Serbia. These nonsense charges were to the intention of a kangaroo court in which the purpose was to murder him. As such, nothing from this trial is credible evidence, as is the case with all kangaroo courts. The term means,

A kangaroo court is a judicial tribunal or assembly that blatantly disregards recognized standards of law or justice, and often carries little or no official standing in the territory within which it resides.

This does not mean all evidence from the proceedings is fake, or in any way incorrect. By the standards of many people then and now, the IMT at Nuremburg was also a kangaroo court as it certainly didnt operate under German justice rules but those imposed by the victors, and had at least one verdict than runs counter to what is seen as proper justice, as in the 'no collective guilt' standard being incompatible with the declaration that the SS was a criminal organisation and all in it were also criminals. I am not saying this is my view, but many do think this way. Either way that does not make all the evidence presented at the trial unreliable, especially where no contreary evidence is presented. The same applies to the trial of Apis.

[glenn239]

Any particular source for what you say Giesl should do in the case of acceptance? We do of course have sources for 'no reply is acceptable...<snip>

Yes, the Austrian Red book no. 28, Berchtold to Giesl, 20th July that states,

"The demands are the very least we can ask..."

and,

“We cannot enter into negotiations with Servia with regards to our demands, and cannot be satisified with anything less than unconditional acceptance…”

So, if the answer is full acceptance, he stays, if not, or no answer, he breaks relations.

Given Bethmann stated his ultimate aim to Reizler was to use the crisis to detach Russia from Britain and France...

The military aim of the July policy was to achieve a localised war between Austria and Serbia, not Germany and Russia.

So you concede that Bethmann did not support Halt in Belgrade when told to promote it by his monarch, went out of his way (along with Jagow) to sabotage it until it was too late to prevent war, and then halfheartedly told Austria to come to some agreement on this basis, whilst still telling them he would uphold the alliance even if they did nothing of the sort and caused a general war?

Bethmann undermined the Kaiser's instructions until he realised that war was on his doorstep, then after the British warning backed Halt in Belgrade as a way out. He abandoned the efforts on 31 July.

Of course even this ignores the fact the idea was also put forward by Averna on 27th July. So much for it only being discussed on 29th-31st July. I presume you picked those dates to obscure the origin of the proposal and the fact Jagow and Bethmann delayed it fatally even after re-writing it.

29th-31st was regards to when Bethmann pursued the idea, not in reference to when it was initially proposed.

Maybe, but hardly compatible with the proposal being put in place quick enough to avert war.

If Russia and Austria had agreed to Halt in Belgrade and Russia had not mobilized because of it, then sometime around 14th August Austrian 2nd army would have been in position to advance on Belgrade across the Danube.

Are you requesting I transfer the thread or start a new one on that board?

I think the original topic of this thread (Germany orchestrated Sarajevo) is so unlikely it belongs more on the 'what if' forum then here, but that's up to you not me.

You have been provided with direct quotes and documents discussing the Balkan situation that support the conclusion Apis thought as stated, you offer little reason to dismiss it, especially as people like Clarke and mcMeekin seem to follow such a line too.

I don't believe that Apis believed Franz Ferdinand was the head of a war party in Vienna. The 'evidence' you mention is of the hearsay variety.

It shows the belief of Apis was not exclusive to him, and others had reached the same opinion before coming into contact with his circle of agents.

There's no link between what Apis thought of Ferdinand and what the kids thought - they never met.

That is no reason to disregard their own statements about their own objectives during the crisis.

The military objective was a war with Serbia while Europe 'held the ring'.

[glenn239]

This does not mean all evidence from the proceedings is fake, or in any way incorrect. By the standards of many people then and now, the IMT at Nuremburg was also a kangaroo court as it certainly didnt operate under German justice rules but those imposed by the victors, and had at least one verdict than runs counter to what is seen as proper justice, as in the 'no collective guilt' standard being incompatible with the declaration that the SS was a criminal organisation and all in it were also criminals. I am not saying this is my view, but many do think this way. Either way that does not make all the evidence presented at the trial unreliable, especially where no contreary evidence is presented. The same applies to the trial of Apis.

Apis was arrested on false charges, a plot to murder the king. This rapidly proved to be a frame-up job with the apparent intention to murder him after extracting a confession for the Sarajevo plot. As such, nothing in the trial is reliable as evidence, because the motive of the prosecution was a kangaroo court. My take from this is that Apis probably had less to do with Sarajevo than commonly assumed, but that's just my personal opinion.

[Slobodan Cekic]

Here is an excerpt from the MacKenzie's book:

That spring Apis became preoccupied with preparations to "greet" Archduke Franz Ferdinand appropriately in Sarajevo. Agreeing Serbia
required peace, Apis and Pasic differed how best to achieve it. Pasic, the politician, favored cautious and conciliatory policies. Apis, the national
revolutionary, viewing the Archduke as the chief obstacle to peace, concluded he should be removed forcibly. A pis regarded the Archduke as a
dynamic leader preparing a preemptive strike to crush Serbia and end its leadership of the South Slav national movement. To Apis Franz Ferdinand
was the Austrian "war party's" irreplacable chief, the only Austrian leader able to regenerate a disintegrating Dual Monarchy. By uniting South Slavs of the Monarchy under a uniform, coordinated administration, the Archduke might halt erosion of Austrian power and envelop Serbia. Vigorous Franz Ferdinand as emperor instead of eighty-four year old Franz Josef migllt delay Serbian unification indefmitely. Apis saw the Archduke's inlrninent visit to Sarajevo, coinciding with Austrian maneuvers in eastern Bosnia, as heralding an invasion of Serbia and southward advance to Salonika. If the Archduke were eliminated, concluded Apis, peace would be guaranteed indefinitely. Serbia could recover fully and prepare for a showdown with its traditional foe. By then Serbia's great ally, Russia, would be ready to join with her in war. 8

8 - 1941: Zivan Zivanovic: "From the life of Colonel D. Dimitrijevic-Apis." Zivan Zivanovic was Apis's brother in law; a prominent politician, he has been a member of parliament, a government minister several times and a senate (State Council) member.

As said, it was not only in his Salonika confession that Apis expressed his belief Ferdinand was 'War Party'. It feels laughable to see the suspicions about the truthfulness of other people's references and quotes from people who deserve the least credibillity in that sense - but such is the power of projection.

[Terry Duncan]

Yes, the Austrian Red book no. 28, Berchtold to Giesl, 20th July that states,

"The demands are the very least we can ask..."

and,

“We cannot enter into negotiations with Servia with regards to our demands, and cannot be satisified with anything less than unconditional acceptance…”

So, if the answer is full acceptance, he stays, if not, or no answer, he breaks relations.

Personally I wouldnt really trust much in any of the coloured books, but even this doesnt say Giesl stays on, only what the minimum Austria is willing to accept is. That is not incompatible with Giesl breaking of relations and leaving Serbia, leaving policy to be conducted through a third party negotiator or the army.

The military aim of the July policy was to achieve a localised war between Austria and Serbia, not Germany and Russia.

A very need diversion there, though of course the 'military aim' was not the only aim of the policy adopted by the Central Powers, Bethmann's was to detach Russia from Britain and France, Berchtold's were to set up a new Balkan League under Austrian leadership, dispose of a focus for internal dissent from Slavs, and prove Austria's worth as an ally.

Bethmann undermined the Kaiser's instructions until he realised that war was on his doorstep, then after the British warning backed Halt in Belgrade as a way out. He abandoned the efforts on 31 July.

He undermined them to get a war started, only changing his mind when he finally had to accept a war would be under the worst possible terms, though he had been perfectly happy to have a war between Austria with Germany against France with Russia and Serbia, so a general war was clearly an acceptable result to Bethmann, just not the widest possible general war.

29th-31st was regards to when Bethmann pursued the idea, not in reference to when it was initially proposed.

I wouldnt exactly say Bethmann did much in the way of supporting the proposal on 31st, or indeed the 29th given when it was communicated to him what Gray had said as too little time was left that day. To be fair, Laurel and Hardy could have done a far better job of conducting policy Germany intersests than Bethmann and Jagow managed at the end of the crisis.

I don't believe that Apis believed Franz Ferdinand was the head of a war party in Vienna. The 'evidence' you mention is of the hearsay variety.

At least one person was recounting his own conversations with Apis, so whilst not contemporary, it was not hearsay.

There's no link between what Apis thought of Ferdinand and what the kids thought - they never met.

The link is that both Apis and Princip had both come to the conclusion Franz-Ferdinand led the war party. This belief is recorded in several books as being 'widely held' in both Belgrade and Vienna at the time, so there must be something that made people think that way at the time, plus something that convinces modern historians this was something believed at the time. What we do not know is what evidence made them think that way, and given trawling the newspaper archives in Belgrade or Vienna is beyond most people here, it is something we are not likely to be able to track to a source either.

The military objective was a war with Serbia while Europe 'held the ring'.

Tin foil hat theories and ASBs* are not really a sound basis for committing a nations future to a war policy.


*****
Edit: * For reasons of clarity to readers ASBs = Alien Space Bats.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien_space_bats

[glenn239]

Personally I wouldnt really trust much in any of the coloured books, but even this doesnt say Giesl stays on, only what the minimum Austria is willing to accept is. That is not incompatible with Giesl breaking of relations and leaving Serbia, leaving policy to be conducted through a third party negotiator or the army.

I don't care whether you think the Austrian Red Book was faked. You asked where the information came from that said Berchtold wished Giesl to remain in Belgrade if the Serbians accepted the note, and I provided it from the document in the Austrian archives, (probably still sitting there). Berchtold's instruction said Giesl was to break relations if the answer returned was not full acceptance and he was instructed while delivering the note to say that the Austrian government would be 'satisfied' with blanket acceptance.

A very need diversion there, though of course the 'military aim' was not the only aim of the policy adopted by the Central Powers, Bethmann's was to detach Russia from Britain and France, Berchtold's were to set up a new Balkan League under Austrian leadership, dispose of a focus for internal dissent from Slavs, and prove Austria's worth as an ally.

You're aiming ahead of the hare. Bethmann's policy was a localised war in which Russia would remain neutral. If in the wake of the war Russia moved closer to Germany, that would be wonderful, but the last thing Bethmann would want if trying to get closer to Russia would be a war with Russia over Sarajevo. This would place Russia firmly in the camp of France for the duration - the opposite of what Bethmann wanted.

He undermined them to get a war started, only changing his mind when he finally had to accept a war would be under the worst possible terms, though he had been perfectly happy to have a war between Austria with Germany against France with Russia and Serbia, so a general war was clearly an acceptable result to Bethmann, just not the widest possible general war.

Yes, I've mentioned many times that if the policy of localisation failed Bethmann was content with a larger war in reaction to Russian mobilization. That was the effect of Moltke's "better now than later" councils. But the localised war was the preferred outcome. (You see the inherent contradiction, correct? You argue both that Bethmann told Reizler he wanted to split Russia from France diplomatically with a local war, and you argue that he wanted to tie Russia to France with a general war. Bethmann can't split Russia from France diplomatically and fight the Dual Alliance in a continental war at the same time, right?)

At least one person was recounting his own conversations with Apis, so whilst not contemporary, it was not hearsay.

What causes me to reject the entire line of Serbian government accusations against Apis is that they murdered him on false charges.

Hearsay is, information received from other people that one cannot adequately substantiate; rumor. Slobodan says Apis's friend recounts Apis said X. I say Apis's friend made it up, that Apis never said it. So how does Slobodan prove that Apis said X? By producing Apis's own documents and personal papers where it can be proven Apis said X, or the original minutes from a meeting where he said X.

The link is that both Apis and Princip had both come to the conclusion Franz-Ferdinand led the war party.

Your conclusion is noted, but mine is that the evidence for what Apis did and why is not sufficient to gain conclusions. The fact that he was murdered by the Serbian government on false charges in a kangaroo court in 1917 leads me to suspect that Apis's actual role in the Sarajevo attack was not as the Serbians claimed.

[Terry Duncan]

I don't care whether you think the Austrian Red Book was faked.

We know all the 'Coloured books' contain errors and omissions from the time that were intended to make each respective nation look innocent in the outbreak of the war.

You asked where the information came from that said Berchtold wished Giesl to remain in Belgrade if the Serbians accepted the note, and I provided it from the document in the Austrian archives, (probably still sitting there). Berchtold's instruction said Giesl was to break relations if the answer returned was not full acceptance and he was instructed while delivering the note to say that the Austrian government would be 'satisfied' with blanket acceptance.

The bolded area is what your quote did not say though. It just said Austria wanted unconditional acceptance, but nowhere mentioned Giesl was to remain in Serbia. Accepting a Serb reply and Giesl leaving Belgrade do not have to be mutually exclusive, Giesl leaving Belgrade was very much expressed to Giesl in person by Berchtold, and it always possible a written communication was a 'cover my arse' type comment that the face to face briefing had already discussed.

You're aiming ahead of the hare. Bethmann's policy was a localised war in which Russia would remain neutral. If in the wake of the war Russia moved closer to Germany, that would be wonderful, but the last thing Bethmann would want if trying to get closer to Russia would be a war with Russia over Sarajevo. This would place Russia firmly in the camp of France for the duration - the opposite of what Bethmann wanted.

You seem to be working under the misaprehension that only one goal applied to the policy. Bethmann believe Britain and France would not support Russia, who would be therefore unable to fight alone, or if she did, would be easily defeated by Austria and Germany. Either way the Russian threat is removed, be it by aligning with Germany or by being removed as a threat.

Yes, I've mentioned many times that if the policy of localisation failed Bethmann was content with a larger war in reaction to Russian mobilization. That was the effect of Moltke's "better now than later" councils. But the localised war was the preferred outcome. (You see the inherent contradiction, correct? You argue both that Bethmann told Reizler he wanted to split Russia from France diplomatically with a local war, and you argue that he wanted to tie Russia to France with a general war. Bethmann can't split Russia from France diplomatically and fight the Dual Alliance in a continental war at the same time, right?)

See the answer above. Both scenarios Bethmann proposed led to the same result.

At least one person was recounting his own conversations with Apis, so whilst not contemporary, it was not hearsay.

What causes me to reject the entire line of Serbian government accusations against Apis is that they murdered him on false charges.

That doesnt mean everything said or recorded at the time of the trial is false - if so we could also remove Hoess's testemony at Nuremburg for the same reasons.

Hearsay is, information received from other people that one cannot adequately substantiate; rumor. Slobodan says Apis's friend recounts Apis said X. I say Apis's friend made it up, that Apis never said it. So how does Slobodan prove that Apis said X? By producing Apis's own documents and personal papers where it can be proven Apis said X, or the original minutes from a meeting where he said X.

In which case almost everything said by Grey in the July Crisis is hearsay as it was face to face meetings that were recorded, even his explicit talk with Lichnowsky about British intentions on 29th July. Where do you draw the line at discounting evidence? I suggest going with the predominance of the evidence, not by throwing out evidence, unless experts on the subject consider a piece of evidence highly unreliable, in which case they usually say so and do not use it in books.

Your conclusion is noted, but mine is that the evidence for what Apis did and why is not sufficient to gain conclusions. The fact that he was murdered by the Serbian government on false charges in a kangaroo court in 1917 leads me to suspect that Apis's actual role in the Sarajevo attack was not as the Serbians claimed.

That doesnt change that he may well have believed Franz-Ferdinand led the war party. Highly pro-Central Powers historians like McMeekin and Clarke seem to follow this line, and both say Apis was behind the plot too, with no actual evidence other than what we have often discussed here, and that you would now dismiss. This would seem to harm your side of the argument rather than mine!

[Slobodan Cekic]

It is not a FRIEND who wrote the book "From the life of Colonel D. Dimitrijevic Apis", but a close relative, the husband of Apis's sister Jelena.
Apis lived in the same house together with his sister and brother in law - you can hardly be much closer to someone!
Furthermore, Zivan Zivanovic was a prominent politician and known as man of personal integrity. He wrote several books, and his son Milan, Apis's nephew, who received a touching Apis's farewell letter and the last will leving him all of the Apis's possesions in this world, wrote later a 800 page treatise 'Colonel Apis'. Appearing in 1955, this is still considered the standard work on colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic and his period of Serb history.

As likely in his position, Apis did not put much to writing. In such cases, history uses the memoirs, words and writings of other people who were in position to testify about what has been said or done. Without this, history would have enormous holes. Apis's brother in law, quite close to him felt a need to say what he knew and wrote a book.

Dedijer felt as well, that a broader belief, not in Serbia only, about Ferdinand being in the the war party needs to be examined in a whole chapter of his book (chapter 'Franz Ferdinand - a man of peace or war?' ). The position of Ferdinand in that sense is still unclear, and while he seemingly felt the war could bring down the remaining European monarchies, ( like it did), there are many indices he felt a war with Serbia and Italy unavoidable. To that purpose Dedijer gained access to Ferdinad's personal archive. In his secret 'Thronwechsel' documents, he finds a sentence: ' The foreign powers should stay convinced of our peaceful intentions... ...a war with Italy and possibly Serbia and Montenegro can be confidently expected.'

In the closing paragraph, Dedijer writes that as, how he puts it, Austria received full support from Germany, a carte blanche for the war against Serbia in October 1913, that became known in the secret nationalist and revolutionary societies in Serbia and Bosnia. First serious plots on Ferdinand's life started after that month, because Ferdinand has been thought to be the leader of the war-party in Vienna.
A very military figure, a good friend with Hötzendorff, his such role was very thinkable to many.

As said, it was not only in his Salonika confession that Apis expressed his belief Ferdinand was 'War Party'. It feels laughable to see the suspicions about the truthfulness of other people's references and quotes coming from someone who deserves so little credibility in that sense.

The Salonika Trial has not been fair, in all probability. Apis had some crooked and unscrupulous people as enemies, as politicians tend to be, and he was a naive idealist. One of the reasons he has been arrested were demands of the French, regarding their secret negotiations with AH. These have promised no Yugoslavia, which seems to be glenn's nightmare, but to reinstate Serbia and Montenegro with a part of Albania to the Serbs; among Austrian conditions was a clean-up of the people responsible for the assassination. Paper Apis wrote was a certificate for the Pasic and Regent and everyone else that they are completely clean in that matter. Reason why they still wanted him dead after that they had to be afraid of his moves for quite a long time- he tried or threatened with a a coup d' etat more than once.

What Apis wrote about Ferdinand being the war party, his motives or anything else was of not much interest to Regent and Pasic, as long as he was to write clearly that he alone has done Sarajevo. He has done that, not mentioning even the role of 'Young Bosnia', which initiated the plot and refused his order to return, or anyone else except Malobabic, who betrayed him under pressure.
The French negotiations with AH came to nothing, probably because US joined the war, but that could not save Apis's life.

Apis was a great proponent of the raison d' etat, and organized murders abroad to his liking, but as no one in the government had any control or even insight of his activities, he obviously thought - l'état c'est lui. Doing such things as plots against foreign heads of state, without any government control over his activities, well, that makes my hairs stand. How that came to be is a longer story.

And now Alexander and Pasic decided that raison d' etat demanded his death. Served him right. I am not saying this in dislike of his person; it is actually especially Peter Zivkovic of White Hand and only slightly less Pasic that I dislike and I am not that delighted with Alexander, either. But confronted with what Apis was doing, they had no choice, and had to put him at least in prison. They had him shot because they simply feared him too much, I suppose. Coups, assassinations, and that Germanofile delusions midst in a war with Germany - they suffered him much too long; as long, I suppose, as the old King Peter was willing to protect him.

I have presented several articles from the leading living Serb historian of the period, on these events and circumstances, as well as the Apis's role in them. I think no one in a better position to know about these, then Serb historiography, and ignoring what a Serb Academy of Sciences member has to say on Apis is the usual arrogance and impertinence of some people here.

[Slobodan Cekic]

What you asked for, Terry; This is another paper from Batakovic, dealing with the Salonika process. On the pdf page 16, (book page 287 ) is what you asked for, once more. The whole document below. My translation more exact, btw

Thanks for the links, though I am sure they are going to be dismissed as being unreliable by at least one person due to what they say not being congenial to them. I do agree with the idea that if Apis did have anything to do with the plot, he did so as an act against Pasic, as his position was really tenuous after the failed officers coup in May. I am sure if people chack back far enough in the history here they will find I have also questioned many times why anyone would pick assassins with little or no experience with weapons if they wanted an attempt to succeed, and why there were no better candidates to be found inside a Serbia where large numbers of people had been involved in the two very recent Balkan Wars and would have excellent chances of being better candidates than Princip and Co. In politics you do not entrust junior personel or new recruits to leak sensitive information, or to give really important briefings, something Apis was likely to be aware of as well as the good reasons for not doing so, which would make his opting to select Princip as a would be assassin either idiotic or desperate.

As for the discussion on the short war/long war/winning/not losing, it seems the one person out of step to a degree with the thoughts coming out of the GGS was Schlieffen himself if the lionised version we see in popular history is to be accepted. The great general who had never commanded any significant formation in action, let alone an army or army group, is meant to have believed in a quick victory, the certainty in defeating France quickly, though we have little in the way of direct quotes or documents supporting such claims. What we do know is that Moltke the Elder prefered a long war scenario while relying on a political solution to end the war when he had exhausted his enemies; Waldersee changed over to an offensive strategy but planned little before being replaced by Schlieffen; Schlieffen believed in a short war; Moltke the Younger seems to have never believed in a short war, rejected the 'Schlieffen Plan' (or whatever it was really called) due to the problem of Paris having no solution, as well as the ability of the French to retreat into their interior to avoid an initial defeat until the Russians were in the field in full force; Falkenhayn was disliked by Schlieffen due to his belief in a frontal attack to shatter the French army as fast as possible (as was Tappen) by inflicting massive losses even at the expense of losses to his own forces, and when commanding the German army opted for a strategy of attrition similar in concept to that of Moltke the Elder. Did the real Schlieffen really believe something so different to all the other commanders? Even Zuber, who tends to opt for a most pro-German stance, feels Schlieffen intended a rather more limited objective than popular history would have it!

You asked the question 'who could say he has not lost, after such a war?' which is a good question. I would say, as Attrition has already, that the Germans hoped for a quick victory even if they felt one was unlikely, and such a victory was only possible if the French were stupid and allowed themselves to get an army or two surrounded again, but thought the long war the most likely outcome even if it was unwinnable. Sadly they also believed they had no chance of victory even in a single front war with Russia once The Great Program had completed in about 1917, so taking the last chance to get a possible victory was rather less unthinkable than it had been even in 1912/13. Paranoia and an inability to see beyond a military solution to the strategic issues Germany faced were probably the deciding factors, though other powers had very similar problems in their own decision making process too, hence in my mind Germany cannot be held solely to blame for the situation or events in 1914.

Regarding the Apis's role in the plot, there are no 'if's in the standing of the Serb historiography on that, and for a long time already. Together with Young Bosnians he is held responsible, and this is by no means based on the Salonika verdict, because a very thorough analysis of the Salonika machinations has been made, using good memoirs literature in many cases. And the same approach has been used to discover the Apis's role.
There is a 800 page book written by the Apis's nephew which everyone considers very good, if a bit too well-disposed to the famous uncle, and even this book purports nothing else regarding the role of Apis. Of course, the Serbs look at Apis and these events in the light of their role in the liberating and forming of their and the related South Slav nations.

Thank you for this deep and detailed insight into the German strategic thinking before the war. Reading it, i now feel the German stance even more contradictory. Moltke, a non-beleiver, still uses Schieffen, and (almost) to the hilt. Some say, though, his modifications killed the plan. He beleived the war would last, though. After Schlieffen failure, Falkenhayn's options have been narrowed down to an attrition strategy. Operatively, Germans did it brilliantly, nod budging an inch and causing terrible losses to the Entente till the very end. The quality of the leadership, while improving steadily on the side of the Entente, only began to reach the German levels in the closing stages of the war.
But an Insight in the effects or the role of economics in warfare would have told the German leadership not to begin a war under a presumption that it cannot be won fast. What they knew about it, I have no clue, but I am quite certain there were people in Germany, only too well informed on the workings and attitudes of international finance.

For example, Max Warburg, the brother of the one of the US Fed's grounder's and it's first Governor Paul Warburg was the head of a well known and internationally connected bank from Hamburg. (There are some who say that he was Wilhelm's secret Intelligence adviser, but this is uncertain). Germany was home of other great banking families.

An opponent with lesser resources can start his war preparations before the richer one, to get an equipment, training and other advantages in the beginning, but if he does not use his advantage fast, he is going to be ground down through the opponent's material supremacy; the time works for the latter. It is imaginable Japanese could have even won the war against US at the beginning, in 1941 with a bit more luck - but only then. And that would then possibly have been the first war in a series which would lead to the final defeat of Japan of that time.

Going into a war under such circumstances, with much smaller resources and with the continuing support of the international finance everything but sure - either they did not understand or underestimated these economical aspects, or they felt desperately endangered by the perspectives of the Entente. Myself, I do not see Entente starting a war in 1917 to partition Germany and Austria among themselves, but what Moltke, Bethmann, Conrad felt, I do not know.

Could you possibly throw some more light onto that 'no reverse gear' attitude of the German, especially military leadership?
After 1912, they could not stop the Great Program without a war, but would the Russian reaching of these goals have meant an instant death to the Germanic alliance and it's members, so that they had to try stopping it with a war - even one they are unlikely to win..?

[glenn239]

We know all the 'Coloured books' contain errors and omissions from the time that were intended to make each respective nation look innocent in the outbreak of the war.

You said days ago highlighted how 8 years later you are still upset at a poster using blue text to alter an original British Document. Now you want to suggest the Austrian Red Book was also falsified in the particular document under discussion? I would like you to post the Austrian document in question as it was in its original form, before the Austrians altered it.

It just said Austria wanted unconditional acceptance, but nowhere mentioned Giesl was to remain in Serbia. Accepting a Serb reply and Giesl leaving Belgrade do not have to be mutually exclusive.

If the minister was supposed to break relations even on a blanket positive response Berchtold would have had to have stated that specifically in his instructions. So yes, the fact that Berchtold instructed him to break relations only in the case of a not-blanket acceptance means that if a blanket acceptance had come back, Giesl stays on in Belgrade past 25th July.

You seem to be working under the misaprehension that only one goal applied to the policy. Bethmann believe Britain and France would not support Russia, who would be therefore unable to fight alone, or if she did, would be easily defeated by Austria and Germany. Either way the Russian threat is removed, be it by aligning with Germany or by being removed as a threat.

You' continue to aim ahead of the hare. Bethmann wanted a localised war so that after he might work to improve relations with Russia at France's expense. If the localised war went continental, then the better relations with Russia that Bethmann sought would be impossible due to the fact that Germany and Russia would be at war.

That doesnt mean everything said or recorded at the time of the trial is false - if so we could also remove Hoess's testemony at Nuremburg for the same reasons.

Let's forget Nuremburg. An appropriate comparison to the Apis 1917 trial is this,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agram_Trial

Once Forgach forged documents against the Serbian defendants, the whole trial was a farce and everything presented as evidence has to be thrown out. That's what I think the 1917 Apis trial was.

In which case almost everything said by Grey in the July Crisis is hearsay as it was face to face meetings that were recorded, even his explicit talk with Lichnowsky about British intentions on 29th July. Where do you draw the line at discounting evidence?

For Lichnowsky and Grey's conversations, the British and German documents in the archives as written at the time is what we use. Once it goes to verbal recollections, matters get hazier.

That doesnt change that he may well have believed Franz-Ferdinand led the war party. Highly pro-Central Powers historians like McMeekin and Clarke seem to follow this line, and both say Apis was behind the plot too, with no actual evidence other than what we have often discussed here, and that you would now dismiss. This would seem to harm your side of the argument rather than mine!

Underlined - you see history as a football match then, with two side and the fans shouting at each other over the refs call, their opinions based solely on the team they are cheering for rather than the actual evidence?