Berlin behind Sarajevo? A strange claim...

[glenn239]

Regarding the Apis's role in the plot, there are no 'if's in the standing of the Serb historiography on that, and for a long time already. Together with Young Bosnians he is held responsible, and this is by no means based on the Salonika verdict, because a very thorough analysis of the Salonika machinations has been made, using good memoirs literature in many cases. And the same approach has been used to discover the Apis's role.

Memoirs are highly unreliable when treated as factual accounts of historical events. Memoirs become more reliable when treated as the expression of a historical player's personal agenda.

Reading it, i now feel the German stance even more contradictory. .

I would suggest that is because you're approaching the problem from a standpoint of Serbian interests rather than just looking at it for what it is. Bethmann's policy was a localised war, which required a certain strategy. Moltke's policy was that Bethmann's strategy was acceptable up until the moment it compromised his chances in a contintal clash. Moltke would go along with Bethmann before that moment, and would resist Bethmann violently afterwards. So, you're looking too hard at it. The contradiction is that Bethmann never squared his localised conflict with Moltke's requirements to be ready for a Franco-Russian war with Germany. All the documents in Germany after Russian mobilization commenced are consistent with Moltke's doctrine clashing head on with Bethmann's localised strategy the moment Russian mobilization measures drew Moltke to conclude the continental war was likely.

[Slobodan Cekic]

Regarding the Apis's role in the plot, there are no 'if's in the standing of the Serb historiography on that, and for a long time already. Together with Young Bosnians he is held responsible, and this is by no means based on the Salonika verdict, because a very thorough analysis of the Salonika machinations has been made, using good memoirs literature in many cases. And the same approach has been used to discover the Apis's role.

Memoirs are highly unreliable when treated as factual accounts of historical events. Memoirs become more reliable when treated as the expression of a historical player's personal agenda.

Reading it, i now feel the German stance even more contradictory. .

I would suggest that is because you're approaching the problem from a standpoint of Serbian interests rather than just looking at it for what it is. Bethmann's policy was a localised war, which required a certain strategy. Moltke's policy was that Bethmann's strategy was acceptable up until the moment it compromised his chances in a contintal clash. Moltke would go along with Bethmann before that moment, and would resist Bethmann violently afterwards. So, you're looking too hard at it. The contradiction is that Bethmann never squared his localised conflict with Moltke's requirements to be ready for a Franco-Russian war with Germany. All the documents in Germany after Russian mobilization commenced are consistent with Moltke's doctrine clashing head on with Bethmann's localised strategy the moment Russian mobilization measures drew Moltke to conclude the continental war was likely.

Repeating something many times may convince uninformed, just like the masters of propaganda always knew. You seem trying to imitate. But it cannot make an arbitrary statement true. If you think the people here are uninformed, please reconsider. If for no other reason, it won't make you popular.

To mention this only, why did Bethmann conceal from Kaiser the message from the ambassador in Berlin, if he found the continental war unacceptable? He needed simply to show it to the Kaiser if he wanted the brake pulled. And there is a ton of material to prove Bethmann's position.
So, please, no BS. And if someone looks from the point of view of one side only, that is clearly you. What's more, you are quite prepared to try deceiving us in that function besides doing that to yourself on a full-time basis.

There is a German saying - a phrase, actually, they have many good ones, - Ich habe ja nichts verloren hier mit dir zu debattieren; I am not going to translate, and I do not think google would help you either. A debate with people like you brings nothing.

[Terry Duncan]

You said days ago highlighted how 8 years later you are still upset at a poster using blue text to alter an original British Document.

Maybe you find it difficult to understand, but lets try again. Chronos20th tried to pass of the entire quote as having been said, with the blue part supposedly edited out by someone. It is available online in Hansard, I do not need to look at the Coloured Books to see what was said. I presume you wouldnt be happy to accept endless quotes from the French and Russian books blaming Austria and Germany entirely for the war?

Now you want to suggest the Austrian Red Book was also falsified in the particular document under discussion? I would like you to post the Austrian document in question as it was in its original form, before the Austrians altered it.

I will state it again as you seem to be suffering comprehension problems today, the quote you gave does not support what you said. You stated it says Giels will remain in Serbia and not break off relations, but did not quote any such segment. Please provide the part supporting what you claim the document says - not everyone has instant access to the books, and at present my copies of Albertini are somewhat burried.

If the minister was supposed to break relations even on a blanket positive response Berchtold would have had to have stated that specifically in his instructions.

Not if he had already covered such a situation in his face to face briefing, where we know he said that no matter what, no answer was acceptable, Giesl was to sever relations, and it must come to war. We have nothing to suggest the earlier instruction had been superseeded, all the later communication says is that the least Austria can accept is full compliance with the terms of the Note, not that they cannot be increased further if Serbia tries to accept them, by the later production of more evidence allowing Austria to say the case is even more serious than known at the time of the Note. We do know there was a suggestion of giving Italy the territory she wanted, only for a victorious Germany and Austria to then war with Italy and take it back later, so lets not pretend they were discussing things only in terms of good faith at this point - iirc this is covered in Clarke's Sleepwalkers.

So yes, the fact that Berchtold instructed him to break relations only in the case of a not-blanket acceptance means that if a blanket acceptance had come back, Giesl stays on in Belgrade past 25th July.

So you should have no problem in quoting the part where Berchtold tels Giesl that the verbal briefing no longer applies?

You' continue to aim ahead of the hare. (In order hit a constantly moving target you MUST do so!) Bethmann wanted a localised war so that after he might work to improve relations with Russia at France's expense. (He expected France to desert Russia, who must back down or fight alone. Either worked for Bethmann.) If the localised war went continental, then the better relations with Russia that Bethmann sought would be impossible due to the fact that Germany and Russia would be at war. (If France deserts Russia the war does not go 'continental')

My comments in blue styled similar to the Kaiser's marginalia in the hope you understand it better.

Let's forget Nuremburg.

Why? The comparison still serves its purpose. With evidence gained after at least one severe beating, is that evidence admissable or not? The IMT allowed Hoess to testify in court, and for his written statement to stand. Was the IMT a kangaroo court?

An appropriate comparison to the Apis 1917 trial is this,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agram_Trial

Once Forgach forged documents against the Serbian defendants, the whole trial was a farce and everything presented as evidence has to be thrown out. That's what I think the 1917 Apis trial was.

I presume you have some familiarity with the Forgach case? There was actually no evidence against the accused, that is why some was faked. There was plenty of Evidence Apis had at least conspired to bring down his own government once, a capital offence if it failed like in many other nations, so inventing things about charges for which he was not even on trial serve little purpose, other than added colour. That doesnt make everything there trustworthy or untrustworthy, we need to look at what other evidence suggests or supports. The problem with Apis has always been that he put so little in writing, and the various accounts of his actions come from people who may have been folowing personal agendas. We do know he was not adverse to regicide, or to sanctioning acts of terror in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For Lichnowsky and Grey's conversations, the British and German documents in the archives as written at the time is what we use. Once it goes to verbal recollections, matters get hazier.

Documents only take you so far. When examining motives we need to consult memoirs or diaries, some of which date from some time after the events took place. The documents seldom offer a reason, just a bald statement of intent.

That doesnt change that he may well have believed Franz-Ferdinand led the war party. Highly pro-Central Powers historians like McMeekin and Clarke seem to follow this line, and both say Apis was behind the plot too, with no actual evidence other than what we have often discussed here, and that you would now dismiss. This would seem to harm your side of the argument rather than mine!

Underlined - you see history as a football match then, with two side and the fans shouting at each other over the refs call, their opinions based solely on the team they are cheering for rather than the actual evidence?

Oh dear. Would you rather I had used the term 'belief' or 'stance'? I think the term side, as having two sides in a debate, is sufficiently in common usage for me not to have to explain it further, or for you to really quibble over its usage. Look on the bright side, at least it was polite!

[Slobodan Cekic]

In judical praxis, it is not seldom that a verdict has to be passed on the basis of the witness testimonies exclusively. An honest judge is able to pass a perfectly valid verdict in such circumstances, using his rather impressive human capabilities to compare the testimonies, asses the truthfulness of the witnesses, their capability of recollection.. as long as he is is looking for the truth, of course.

A dishonest judge is going to pass a wrong verdict even with a wealth of material evidence available.

As I see it, this is not different in the case of a historian passing his verdict about a historical event or figure. The first prerequisite of a historian is a professional, intellectual and, dare I say, human honesty and with that available, all the rest is easier.

So, please, let us waste no words debating the capability of the historical science in general, or the Serb historiography in particular to come to the valid conclusions basing them on a real wealth of the memoirs literature available about certain events and persons from the past.

[Slobodan Cekic]

Btw, the amount of bigotry and outright racism in the statements from the top of Austria and Germany is remarkable, even for it's time. " The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, deceitful, and master hands at temporizing." are the Wilhelms words.

Serbia has often been called Servia by the Austrians and Germans with the probable reason that this associates with 'servus', a slave in Latin.

On the page 264 ( Serb edition Dedijer's book), Dedijer makes a quotation of Gooch in his "Before the War" (London, 1938), II, p. 424-425., where the author reports on the meetings in Vienna and Konopiste relying on the Austrian archives and Berchtold's memoirs:

( Berchtold explaining his Balkans policies first) "... At this place, Kaiser Wilhelm took the floor: Strength of the Slavs, especially the South Slavic Balkan states has grown to unseen proportions. A war between the East and the West is unavoidable, and in that case an attack from the Serbian side could bring catastrophic consequences. Slavs are born to serve, and not to govern. Only possible relation between Austria and Serbia is a relation similar to the one between the Sun and some planet. Serbia should be attracted with money, military instructors, and trade benefits. Serb troops have to be put to the Austrian disposal to avoid the danger to the Austrian southern frontiers.
As Berchtold remarked that Serb race fosters an indeletable hatred , Kaiser Wilhelm added that Serbia would be ready to defend itself in the case of an attack. If it refuses the demands, the force would have to be used."
( my re-translation from Dedijer's Serb translation)

Why should any nation be content with such a status, the Germans and Austrians have been assigning the Serbs and Slavic nations in general?

If Berchtold could feel the Russian mistrust during his diplomatic service in Russia, as he recounted later, how much of that has been a mirror reflection of his own negative feelings, or his country's long held xenophobic attitudes in it's policies towards Russia?

If Röhl says Willhelm was a racist who hated the Slavs and Jews and despised the French because of the democracy, I see no reason not to believe him. He knows his Wilhelm, obviously, quite well.

Would that be a part of the answer to the question, where did that much of mistrust to Russia come from, to make a very risky war was better, than waiting for Russia to arm itself?

[Slobodan Cekic]

in the Wiki article about the Agram Trial there is a sentence very far from truth: ' Austria-Hungary pursued Trialism' i.e. it pursued a policy aimed at giving the Croatia the same status as Austria and Hungary.
That may well had been dreamed of in Zagreb, but it was quite far from most Vienna minds, not even to speak of Budapest. It has never been pursued as a policy in AH. Archduke toyed with the idea for a time, as a ploy to undercut the Hungarians he disliked, but he distanced himself from the idea after 1912, probably seeing it's better not to test the Hungarian reaction to this.

[Terry Duncan]

Serbia has often been called Servia by the Austrians and Germans with the probable reason that this associates with 'servus', a slave in Latin.

To be fair, outside the British Foreign Office, the usage of Serbia and Servia were pretty much interchangable, especially in the papers of the day. I have even seen a piece from the time questioning which is the correct spelling, where it is pointed out that the pronunciation is similar, with the 'V' having a soft 'B' sound. The Foreign Office used Pasitch rather than Pasic, just to give another difference between then and now, though at least one author I have read recently used Pasitch still!

If Röhl says Willhelm was a racist who hated the Slavs and Jews and despised the French because of the democracy, I see no reason not to believe him. He knows his Wilhelm, obviously, quite well.

Wilhelm certainly didnt like the groups you name, though he did have some Jews in his inner circle of friends, it would seem his major dislike was more directed to the eastern (Russian) Jews. He also disliked France for being considered the cultural capital of Europe, and because Nice had been taken from Italy without any lingering resentment, unlike with Alsace-Lorraine.

Would that be a part of the answer to the question, where did that much of mistrust to Russia come from, to make a very risky war was better, than waiting for Russia to arm itself?

[/quote]

A lot came from the 'Lithuanian Crusades' of the Teutonic knights and the drive east from then to 'convert them to Christianity' where the Russians were seen as very different, then the Seven Years War where Russia was origninally amongst the Prussian enemies, and finally from the Napoleonic Wars where the Russian army moved through Germany, when whilst the regular army behaved well, the cossacks behaved quite badly in some places. This led to a lingering folk memory that was still very raw in 1914 and 1945.

[Slobodan Cekic]

Serbia has often been called Servia by the Austrians and Germans with the probable reason that this associates with 'servus', a slave in Latin.

To be fair, outside the British Foreign Office, the usage of Serbia and Servia were pretty much interchangable, especially in the papers of the day. I have even seen a piece from the time questioning which is the correct spelling, where it is pointed out that the pronunciation is similar, with the 'V' having a soft 'B' sound. The Foreign Office used Pasitch rather than Pasic, just to give another difference between then and now, though at least one author I have read recently used Pasitch still!

If Röhl says Willhelm was a racist who hated the Slavs and Jews and despised the French because of the democracy, I see no reason not to believe him. He knows his Wilhelm, obviously, quite well.

Wilhelm certainly didnt like the groups you name, though he did have some Jews in his inner circle of friends, it would seem his major dislike was more directed to the eastern (Russian) Jews. He also disliked France for being considered the cultural capital of Europe, and because Nice had been taken from Italy without any lingering resentment, unlike with Alsace-Lorraine.

Would that be a part of the answer to the question, where did that much of mistrust to Russia come from, to make a very risky war was better, than waiting for Russia to arm itself?

A lot came from the 'Lithuanian Crusades' of the Teutonic knights and the drive east from then to 'convert them to Christianity' where the Russians were seen as very different, then the Seven Years War where Russia was origninally amongst the Prussian enemies, and finally from the Napoleonic Wars where the Russian army moved through Germany, when whilst the regular army behaved well, the cossacks behaved quite badly in some places. This led to a lingering folk memory that was still very raw in 1914 and 1945.

Servia would be a Greek way of pronouncing the word. If used in Berlin, where the Kaiser himself thought the Slavs born to be the German servants only - let it be am seeing things, but I 'll tend to think this no pure chance.
There was an arrogant type appearing here several times who insistently used 'Servia' while throwing some other Latin sparks around and trying quite much to insult .

Some nation being seen as very different makes it a natural target of xenophobia. While this mistrust of foreigners is universal, the Western Europe, a place quite crowded together, seems to me to have had at least a fair share of it, with Germany there being among the main 'beneficiaries' of it in the mentality, speaking historicaly. Such 'emotional shadow' sides of the mentalities are in slow, halting, but constant retreat everywhere, and especially in Germany, due to the civilizational advance, as I see it.

Let's take the Durnovo's letter as an example. The former Russian interior minister urged the Tzar at the beginning of 1914 to avoid the war with Germany. Russia can only loose, and this would lead to an revolution and destruction of the country. Not only correct but prophetic, up to this point.

Now, Durnovo recommends an alliance with Germany, seeing no ideological or territorial conflicts of interest between the two monarchies.
Well, Russia had really no territorial pretensions in German direction- they really had enough territory, but Durnovo has been wrong in projecting this attitude to Germany as well.

Russsian foreign office knew quite well what giving Germany the free hand with France would lead to. Russians were rather slow and unwilling in parting from its long alliance with Germany, but I would bet the attitudes of Wilhelm and others in Berlin, like this one to Slavs, have not been unknown in St. Petersburg.

As Septemberprogramm shows it, Germany had pretensions indeed, and enormous ones at that. As an Interior minister, Durnovo was very sucessful, leading the country's office of the interior through a very difficult period of revolution of 1905 but he obviously had no foreign ministry experience.

There was no symmetry in the attitudes of the two countries to each other, as he had imagined.
Looking historically, the invasion directions between Western Europe and Russia have almost always been West to East, with rather few exceptions, I beleive, which made Durnovo's optimism apropos Germany even less justified. As this condensed saying has it, ' A pessimist is a well informed optimist".

As for the Cossacks, I can beleive it, it had always been an unruly crowd.

[Terry Duncan]

Let's take the Durnovo's letter as an example. The former Russian interior minister urged the Tzar at the beginning of 1914 to avoid the war with Germany. Russia can only loose, and this would lead to an revolution and destruction of the country. Not only correct but prophetic, up to this point.

Now, Durnovo recommends an alliance with Germany, seeing no ideological or territorial conflicts of interest between the two monarchies.
Well, Russia had really no territorial pretensions in German direction- they really had enough territory, but Durnovo has been wrong in projecting this attitude to Germany as well.

Durnovo was correct in part, the Germans had just increased the tariff on Russian grain imports, which had increased tensions as it badly effected Russia coming as it did in the same period the Ottomans shut the Straits to shipping. The German Junkers were apparently quite concerned about the ability of Russia to export large quantities of grain that would ruin them, and from memory this has been cited amongst the 'domestic causes' of the war or rather the tensions that created the situation leading to war.

A few posts back you commented about the Great Program in Russia. This would have left Russia having a standing army larger than the entire German army, and almost as large iirc as Germany and Austria combined. Coupled with the proposed increases in artillery and oficer training, it was a formidable program. Oddly even though the legislation dated from 1912/13, it went through the usual Russian slow process of being enacted, only getting the final go-ahead in June 1914, a few weeks before war began. (I will try to find the correct date for you, but from memory it is 3rd June that keeps coming to mind for some reason)

[Slobodan Cekic]

Let's take the Durnovo's letter as an example. The former Russian interior minister urged the Tzar at the beginning of 1914 to avoid the war with Germany. Russia can only loose, and this would lead to an revolution and destruction of the country. Not only correct but prophetic, up to this point.

Now, Durnovo recommends an alliance with Germany, seeing no ideological or territorial conflicts of interest between the two monarchies.
Well, Russia had really no territorial pretensions in German direction- they really had enough territory, but Durnovo has been wrong in projecting this attitude to Germany as well.

Durnovo was correct in part, the Germans had just increased the tariff on Russian grain imports, which had increased tensions as it badly effected Russia coming as it did in the same period the Ottomans shut the Straits to shipping. The German Junkers were apparently quite concerned about the ability of Russia to export large quantities of grain that would ruin them, and from memory this has been cited amongst the 'domestic causes' of the war or rather the tensions that created the situation leading to war.

A few posts back you commented about the Great Program in Russia. This would have left Russia having a standing army larger than the entire German army, and almost as large iirc as Germany and Austria combined. Coupled with the proposed increases in artillery and oficer training, it was a formidable program. Oddly even though the legislation dated from 1912/13, it went through the usual Russian slow process of being enacted, only getting the final go-ahead in June 1914, a few weeks before war began. (I will try to find the correct date for you, but from memory it is 3rd June that keeps coming to mind for some reason)

Yes, but would the completing of the Program automaticaly mean a Russian, or Entente attack on the central Powers?

[Slobodan Cekic]

Let's take the Durnovo's letter as an example. The former Russian interior minister urged the Tzar at the beginning of 1914 to avoid the war with Germany. Russia can only loose, and this would lead to an revolution and destruction of the country. Not only correct but prophetic, up to this point.

Now, Durnovo recommends an alliance with Germany, seeing no ideological or territorial conflicts of interest between the two monarchies.
Well, Russia had really no territorial pretensions in German direction- they really had enough territory, but Durnovo has been wrong in projecting this attitude to Germany as well.

Durnovo was correct in part, the Germans had just increased the tariff on Russian grain imports, which had increased tensions as it badly effected Russia coming as it did in the same period the Ottomans shut the Straits to shipping. The German Junkers were apparently quite concerned about the ability of Russia to export large quantities of grain that would ruin them, and from memory this has been cited amongst the 'domestic causes' of the war or rather the tensions that created the situation leading to war.

A few posts back you commented about the Great Program in Russia. This would have left Russia having a standing army larger than the entire German army, and almost as large iirc as Germany and Austria combined. Coupled with the proposed increases in artillery and oficer training, it was a formidable program. Oddly even though the legislation dated from 1912/13, it went through the usual Russian slow process of being enacted, only getting the final go-ahead in June 1914, a few weeks before war began. (I will try to find the correct date for you, but from memory it is 3rd June that keeps coming to mind for some reason)

Yes, but would the completing of the Program automaticaly mean a Russian, or Entente attack on the central Powers?

And, to add a remark, knowing the inefficiency the Russsian army showed in the war, would the sheer size be enough to asses it's combat abilities?
Army where two army commanders who do not like each other do not communicate with each other, smells of imperial decadence a bit.

I think Russia's last chance to 'catch the train' without falling from it while trying was the Alexander II, a great reformer, if a '5 minutes to twelve'-one. Sadly, he has been assasinated 1881.

[Terry Duncan]

Yes, but would the completing of the Program automaticaly mean a Russian, or Entente attack on the central Powers?

This is the interesting question. The Russians do not seem to have planned anything beyond the railway lines they had been funded for previously and the increase in the army, there seems little strategic thought of attacking anyone as such, though an attack on the Ottomans was always likely if the Ottomans shut the Straits to commercial traffic again due to how damaging this was to Russian agricultual exports. The Germans however did not seem to believe anyone else (France and Russia) would become superior in military strength without attacking them, because that is what they would have done if they were in the position of the other powers. It was the same as the 'France plans to attack through Belgium' line from the GGS, who only had their own planning staff's belief based on how they would act if they were France. It was inconcievable anyone else would pass up the chance to attack them, based on their own beliefs, not on actual enemy planning. To the German mind it seems that they viewed their own military preponderace as ensuring peace, but as soon as it vanished there would be war, hence the 'sooner the better' theory.

And, to add a remark, knowing the inefficiency the Russsian army showed in the war, would the sheer size be enough to asses it's combat abilities?
Army where two army commanders who do not like each other do not communicate with each other, smells of imperial decadence a bit.

The Russians would probably have struggled to finish all of the program to schedule, but they did complete the Black Sea dreadnoughts on schedule despite there being a war at the time! Really it is guesswork but I would say 1918/19 would have been more likely.

I think Russia's last chance to 'catch the train' without falling from it while trying was the Alexander II, a great reformer, if a '5 minutes to twelve'-one. Sadly, he has been assasinated 1881.

I am not so sure, Nicholas II was totally ineffective as a ruler as well as insensitive to public opinion from the coronation disaster where about 1200 people were crushed to death to his abdication, little was ever done quickly, efficiently or with much thought. If he had been a good autocrat like Alexander III then maybe he would have been strong enough to keep control, or if he had reformed like Alexander II maybe he could have averted a revolution, but he was neither.

[Slobodan Cekic]

Yes, but would the completing of the Program automaticaly mean a Russian, or Entente attack on the central Powers?

This is the interesting question. The Russians do not seem to have planned anything beyond the railway lines they had been funded for previously and the increase in the army, there seems little strategic thought of attacking anyone as such, though an attack on the Ottomans was always likely if the Ottomans shut the Straits to commercial traffic again due to how damaging this was to Russian agricultual exports. The Germans however did not seem to believe anyone else (France and Russia) would become superior in military strength without attacking them, because that is what they would have done if they were in the position of the other powers. It was the same as the 'France plans to attack through Belgium' line from the GGS, who only had their own planning staff's belief based on how they would act if they were France. It was inconcievable anyone else would pass up the chance to attack them, based on their own beliefs, not on actual enemy planning. To the German mind it seems that they viewed their own military preponderace as ensuring peace, but as soon as it vanished there would be war, hence the 'sooner the better' theory.

That is exactly what I think; it was one big German projection. They armed themselves in order to change the European political landscape thru war means. If our opponents succeed in reaching the military superiority, they are going to attack us, just like we would, they have felt. And as they have been the first to come to the idea, they possibly felt the revenge and punishment of the Entente would be a certain matter, I suppose.

Starting an arms race with an economically superior block, it was unavoidable that German initial advantage starts melting fast, once the opponents realize what's up. So what would be the point of an arms build-up which provokes a certain Entente response with some delay, when not using the optimal time window for an attack, before the Entente start closing it? As the Russians were going to start really using the enormous French loans from mid-1914, clearly from that point on, the window would start swinging ever faster direction it's frame.
As the German qualitative superiority against the numbers of the Entente has not been one of an absolute kind at all, they have had to see their chances as uncertain even without the Grand Program.

I think Russia's last chance to 'catch the train' without falling from it while trying was the Alexander II, a great reformer, if a '5 minutes to twelve'-one. Sadly, he has been assasinated 1881.

I am not so sure, Nicholas II was totally ineffective as a ruler as well as insensitive to public opinion from the coronation disaster where about 1200 people were crushed to death to his abdication, little was ever done quickly, efficiently or with much thought. If he had been a good autocrat like Alexander III then maybe he would have been strong enough to keep control, or if he had reformed like Alexander II maybe he could have averted a revolution, but he was neither.

[/quote]

To be honest, I am unimpressed by both of the Alexander II successors as well. Narrow minded and reactionary or undecided and absentminded, neither of the two could save Russia from what was ahead. Had Alexander II not been killed and finished his reforms , it would not be so crucial who came after. As it was, his death seems to have scared his successors into even more conservativism - who tries loosening the reins, gets killed, that was how they seemingly have read the message.

[Terry Duncan]

That is exactly what I think; it was one big German projection. They armed themselves in order to change the European political landscape thru war means. If our opponents succeed in reaching the military superiority, they are going to attack us, just like we would, they have felt. And as they have been the first to come to the idea, they possibly felt the revenge and punishment of the Entente would be a certain matter, I suppose.

Starting an arms race with an economically superior block, it was unavoidable that German initial advantage starts melting fast, once the opponents realize what's up. So what would be the point of an arms build-up which provokes a certain Entente response with some delay, when not using the optimal time window for an attack, before the Entente start closing it? As the Russians were going to start really using the enormous French loans from mid-1914, clearly from that point on, the window would start swinging ever faster direction it's frame.
As the German qualitative superiority against the numbers of the Entente has not been one of an absolute kind at all, they have had to see their chances as uncertain even without the Grand Program.

There is a persistant rumour that Schlieffen was dismissed for urging that Germany attack France in 1905 whilst Russia was busy with the fallout from the war with Japan. The 1905 Memo certainly is for a single front war of this type, but there is little to support that such urgings were seriously put forward if they even were real. How much it was a case of simply observing that this would be the ideal situation to take advantage of, or actively putting forward such an idea to the Kaiser or government is anyones guess, I have seen both sides argued in the past. The First Moroccan Crisis was at much the same time, and we know Bulow had no intention of going to war then even if he was willing to pretend he would consider it at first.

To be honest, I am unimpressed by both of the Alexander II successors as well. Narrow minded and reactionary or undecided and absentminded, neither of the two could save Russia from what was ahead. Had Alexander II not been killed and finished his reforms , it would not be so crucial who came after. As it was, his death seems to have scared his successors into even more conservativism - who tries loosening the reins, gets killed, that was how they seemingly have read the message.

I would tend to agree, but Alexander III was at least a decided autocrat, nobody ever described him as 'utterly without a will of his own' or 'not having the slightest grasp of international politics' so his leadership at least would have been decisive, whilst Nicholas was far too feeble to be an autocrat and too stupid to reform the government and lose some of his precious rights or power - see how he treated his own brother, Grand Duke Michael, just for daring to marry without his permission! Totally the wrong man to have been in charge of Russia at such a time.

[Slobodan Cekic]

There is a persistant rumour that Schlieffen was dismissed for urging that Germany attack France in 1905 whilst Russia was busy with the fallout from the war with Japan. The 1905 Memo certainly is for a single front war of this type, but there is little to support that such urgings were seriously put forward if they even were real. How much it was a case of simply observing that this would be the ideal situation to take advantage of, or actively putting forward such an idea to the Kaiser or government is anyones guess, I have seen both sides argued in the past. The First Moroccan Crisis was at much the same time, and we know Bulow had no intention of going to war then even if he was willing to pretend he would consider it at first.

That is an interesting point. As it looks to me, as he came to the throne, Willhelm, a militarist in outlook, feeling being pushed around a bit by the established powers, started his rule by doing diplomatic damage only. As he begun the fleet-buildup, though,1895-97, I cannot but think that he must have set himself a long-term target of reaching the world power status, by war means if necessary.

Fleet parity target showed itself a Fata Morgana as the British reacted with a naval arms program of a quality the German treasury could not really follow. Let us not forget - the Pound was the Dollar of that period. Having a very big army to arm as well, the Germans overreached themselves already as the series of international crises has begun poisoning the relations of the two alliances and German decade-long scaring of the others now came back to roost as their own fears of encirclement.

It is an interesting point, of course , at which point in the German planning, the war as a possible option went over to war being the necessary solution, which only needs a final date. From the defence budget expenses it looks like it has been somewhere 1911/1912. How do you look at this, having in mind not the military expenses only but the political events as well?

To be honest, I am unimpressed by both of the Alexander II successors as well. Narrow minded and reactionary or undecided and absentminded, neither of the two could save Russia from what was ahead. Had Alexander II not been killed and finished his reforms , it would not be so crucial who came after. As it was, his death seems to have scared his successors into even more conservativism - who tries loosening the reins, gets killed, that was how they seemingly have read the message.

I would tend to agree, but Alexander III was at least a decided autocrat, nobody ever described him as 'utterly without a will of his own' or 'not having the slightest grasp of international politics' so his leadership at least would have been decisive, whilst Nicholas was far too feeble to be an autocrat and too stupid to reform the government and lose some of his precious rights or power - see how he treated his own brother, Grand Duke Michael, just for daring to marry without his permission! Totally the wrong man to have been in charge of Russia at such a time.

You are right, Nicholas II was not up to the situation at all. My thinking was, had Alexander II lived another 10-15 years to make his monarchy a constitutional one, as he intended to, Russia would have been on the best way in the social and economic sense. Who can know it now, but maybe he would be able to stop the rot, in the society in general and in the armed forces as well, so that such things like Port Arthur or the revolution 1905 would have never happened. And then the Germans would, may be, think it over twice before.. etc. That way, you can come to WWI never happening, if you wish. That is this thinking of the kind, if my grandmother had the .. she would have been the town Mayor

As if I remember reading, once upon a time, how an imagined change of an outcome of a past event, even if the event was an important one, would not tend to change the general flow of history or evolution that much. History is like rubber, I think the the author has meant, wherever you would pull at it, it would tend to come back to her previous form. Well, that is one point that would be hard to prove, of course.

One important reason Russia stayed behind in her social and economic development was the enormity of the state, I think. This meant an enormous concentration of the wealth and power in the ruling circles, as well, and there could have been no effective pressure to make a change, from an internal or external direction. No new classes or ideas could threaten the exclusive power of the aristocracy in the country, and no one could threaten it from the outside, until the rot was already causing the edifice to start falling apart from itself. Very large countries, like ancient Rome, for example, tend to develop in a similar manner, I think.

Now, could Alexander II, if he was to live longer, really avert some very turbulent and painful events in the Russian history, or were the weights to be moved, as the 'Rubber history' theory could suggest, too much for a single person in a single lifetime? Well, that is not a question I am going to even try answering ..