Berlin behind Sarajevo? A strange claim...

[Terry Duncan]

It is an interesting point, of course , at which point in the German planning, the war as a possible option went over to war being the necessary solution, which only needs a final date. From the defence budget expenses it looks like it has been somewhere 1911/1912. How do you look at this, having in mind not the military expenses only but the political events as well?

Germany, like all the other powers, was firmly wedded to the outdated concept that the offensive was the ultimate method of waging war, and taking any other course was somewhat beneath the dignity of a great power. There is a thread here that I worked on with Baltasar collecting different aspects of German spending from soon after the Franco-Prussian war to 1914 that offers a good perspective on what other options had been available.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1593113

There is also a problem with the German financial system that I am not fully conversant with, but in a basic form the budget was locked into collecting a set figure from all the states comprising the German empire, and it would take some sort of renegotiation of the constitution to increase these contributions. This is why in 1912 the Germans could either increase their army or navy, but not both, and had to opt for ending the naval race with Britain for good. They had simply run out of money. The Prussian ruling class were rather against the idea of renegotiations with the other states as it was felt they may well demand a greater role at the expense of the Prussians, and in at least one account I have read it was suggested there was a feeling they may well demand that Wilhelm relinquished the position of Kaiser as there was so much dissatisfaction at how Wilhelm had backed away in several crisies, so the other states may had asked for a kaiser from amongst their ranks, or more likely in my opinion, forced Wilhelm to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince who was far more in favour of war and at the time perceived as the greatest threat to Britain, France, and Russia. At the outbreak of the war he was seen as the major villain by the British, and it was only later the Kaiser himself was demonised more.

Now, could Alexander II, if he was to live longer, really avert some very turbulent and painful events in the Russian history, or were the weights to be moved, as the 'Rubber history' theory could suggest, too much for a single person in a single lifetime? Well, that is not a question I am going to even try answering ..

I think Russia was always going to undergo some drastic form os dissruption at some point as the people were no longer willing to be treated as they were by their rulers, but the form this change would take could take many forms. Sadly the idiots in charge managed to expertly pick a way to rule that almost ensured the worst possible outcome for the Russian people. Even without Rasputin, the Tzar and Tzarina were a terrible mix given the circumstances, it was rather like putting two dysfunctional chimpanzees in charge of the moon landings.

[Attrition]

~~~~~Germany, like all the other powers, was firmly wedded to the outdated concept that the offensive was the ultimate method of waging war~~~~~

Are you sure? The way that the opening campaign of the war went for the Germans, looks to me like an attempt to "peg out claims well inland" as 'twere, for a long defensive campaign, punctuated by operational-level offensives, with the potential to exhaust a more powerful coalition. The opposition would have to make a disproportionate effort to get the occupied territories back, evening the odds (somewhat) with a structural constraint. (I remember a few years ago that there was a discussion on possible evidence for this in German stockpiling of strategic materials, in Strachan.)

[Terry Duncan]

~~~~~Germany, like all the other powers, was firmly wedded to the outdated concept that the offensive was the ultimate method of waging war~~~~~

Are you sure? The way that the opening campaign of the war went for the Germans, looks to me like an attempt to "peg out claims well inland" as 'twere, for a long defensive campaign, punctuated by operational-level offensives, with the potential to exhaust a more powerful coalition. The opposition would have to make a disproportionate effort to get the occupied territories back, evening the odds (somewhat) with a structural constraint. (I remember a few years ago that there was a discussion on possible evidence for this in German stockpiling of strategic materials, in Strachan.)

I should have said strategic offensive as such, certainly for the start of the war, the idea of fighting on home soil seems to have been rejected by all the major powers other than Russia who had moved her mobilisation depots into the interior where they would not be vulnerable to an initial strike by the Central Powers attempting to surround troops in the Galician Salient, but even then the intent was to take the war onto enemy territory unless the Germans attacked east rather than west.

As for the German strategy in the west, I do remember seeing an interesting comment in Keegans book 'Opening Moves' where he noted that the position the German armies took up on the Aisne were pretty much the line from which the 'killing blow' was supposed to have struck the killing blow from the Schlieffen Plan, as well as brief mentions in a couple of other books I have long since forgotten about mostly, where it noted that the position on the Aisne was in the process of being prepared from before the Battle of the Marne began, which would seem to indicate an existing intent to sit on the defensive rather than any belief in being able to defeat France in a six week campaign etc. My guess would be that people had noticed this position being mentioned briefly but maybe not noticed what was significant about it and that it isnt mentioned often because info is sketchy at best, similar to the interior position Zuber mentions that the French had prepared deeper in their interior from long before the war, one where they would retire to if the position on the Marne and Paris area were unable to be held - he notes this position is proof the Germans had little chance of defeating the French before the Russians could make the Germans deploy troops eastwards because the French could continue to retreat and had prepared to do so if it proved necessary. Another of those minor details that barely get a mention in most books, but which may give a far greater insight into what the armies really thought prior to the war and how they planned if the best case scenario didnt come true for them.

[Attrition]

It seems clear that everyone wanted to fight in someone else's country, apart from Serbia and Belgium, which didn't want to fight anywhere. I have the same impression gleaned from half-forgotten sources and vague impressions that the Aisne position was a logical objective of the German advance after the Battle of the Frontiers and that the advance to the Marne was a bit of a punt or perhaps the first sortie from a fortified position. I also remember thinking that the Battle of Guise was a rehearsal for the French defence and counter-offensive on the Marne. It doesn't surprise me that the French army had scouted positions south of the river for another go if the Germans succeeded at the Marne. I wouldn't be surprised if such logical military arrangements were effaced afterwards by both sides too.

PS Keegan's book will have to go on my list now, despite me having the monk on with him.

[The Ibis]

The Germans thought they had the superior force. They knew their chances in a long war were not as great as in a short war (however unlikely the latter might've been). It makes logical sense that they'd go for a knockout against France on the chance that they wouldn't have to fight a vastly superior coalition. Subsequent history bears it out. Its the same reasoning that Hindenburg/Ludendorff launched the Spring Offensives in 1918. Its part of the reason the Germans attacked Russia in 1941. And if you read the accounts of the German generals (always to be taken with a grain of salt), the Marne was on those generals minds' when pressing on to Moscow when maybe the safer play was to dig in.

[Attrition]

Did they though?

[The Ibis]

Hi,
I was going to ask you which assertion you were question, but since my answer would be yes in all events, I'll just go with that.

[Attrition]

Moltke the Elder said in the 1970s that his quick wars were a thing of the past, Moltke the Younger said in the 1900s that Russian rearmament would make a German victory in a great European war impossible if it matured.

[The Ibis]

I'm aware of those comments. Are you familiar with Mark Hewitson's research?

[Attrition]

Yes but I couldn't remember his surname when I replied.

[glenn239]

To mention this only, why did Bethmann conceal from Kaiser the message from the ambassador in Berlin, if he found the continental war unacceptable? He needed simply to show it to the Kaiser if he wanted the brake pulled. And there is a ton of material to prove Bethmann's position.

When the Kaiser returned Bethmann was still under the illusion he could manage the situation and resisted instructions to initiate HIB talks in Vienna. Within a short period of time the outlook had darkened and he turned to HIB in order to try and salvage the situation. The big unresolved issue with Moltke concerned the timing of the German response to Russian mobilization measures. This all came to a head around the 29th of July as Russia mobilized and Britain sent in a warning, causing Bethmann to alter course.

[glenn239]

I will state it again as you seem to be suffering comprehension problems today, the quote you gave does not support what you said. You stated it says Giels will remain in Serbia and not break off relations, but did not quote any such segment. Please provide the part supporting what you claim the document says - not everyone has instant access to the books, and at present my copies of Albertini are somewhat buried.

The reason why Berchtold did not instruction Giesl to stay in Belgrade on in case of a positive reply is because remaining in place was understood as automatic in that condition. It is the breaking of relations that was unusual and required precise instructions. Here's the British ultimatum to Germany from 4 August,

(35798) No. 594.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.
Tel (No. 270.)
D. 2 P.M.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram No. 266 of this morning(1) be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports and to say that His Majesty's Government felt bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a Treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

Published in BB No. 159.

This was communicated by Sir E. Goschen as an Aide Mémoire to Herr v. Jagow at 7 P.M. See DD No. 83.

Cf. also Nos.



Grey instructions Goshen to ask for his passports if no satisfactory reply were given by midnight. No instruction is given on what happens if a satisfactory reply is made, because it was understood that in that case Goshen would not ask for his passports.

We do know there was a suggestion of giving Italy the territory she wanted, only for a victorious Germany and Austria to then war with Italy and take it back later, so lets not pretend they were discussing things only in terms of good faith at this point - iirc this is covered in Clarke's Sleepwalkers.

The conditions of the ultimatum were clear - Serbia must blanket accept or it would be war. If Serbia had accepted the note, it's quite possible a war would still have followed, but Giesl would not have broken relations at that time.

So you should have no problem in quoting the part where Berchtold tels Giesl that the verbal briefing no longer applies?

Giesl's account was that he followed his instructions and went over the reply to ensure it was not full acceptance. When he saw the answer to no.6, he broke relations. So Giesl was following the instructions laid down in the telegram I mentioned.

My comments in blue styled similar to the Kaiser's marginalia in the hope you understand it better.

As stated, Bethmann's July policy was to arrange a localised conflict. He did not want a two-front war, but would fight one rather than pressure Austria to back down.

That doesnt make everything there trustworthy or untrustworthy, we need to look at what other evidence suggests or supports. The problem with Apis has always been that he put so little in writing, and the various accounts of his actions come from people who may have been folowing personal agendas. We do know he was not adverse to regicide, or to sanctioning acts of terror in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Correct, the problem is that with Apis the lack of actual evidence leaves interpretation wide open, with no way to verify what is right and what is not right. Apis may well have been deeply involved, but the 1917 trial was under circumstances that cause me to discount it as a kangaroo court.

Documents only take you so far.

Right, but anything past the documents is speculation.

[Terry Duncan]

Grey instructions Goshen to ask for his passports if no satisfactory reply were given by midnight. No instruction is given on what happens if a satisfactory reply is made, because it was understood that in that case Goshen would not ask for his passports.

But there is no record of Grey personally briefing Goshen that no matter what it must come to war or that no answer would be acceptable, which we do know Berchtold did with Giesl. That does make it rather different doesnt it.

The conditions of the ultimatum were clear - Serbia must blanket accept or it would be war. If Serbia had accepted the note, it's quite possible a war would still have followed, but Giesl would not have broken relations at that time.

So why did Berchtold bother to tell Giesl that no matter what the Serbs replied he must break off relations etc? It would seem pointless to arrange a face to face briefing if Giesl were to act according to normal circumstances ie: Serbia accepting all the terms meant he would stay on and accept the Serb reply.

Giesl's account was that he followed his instructions and went over the reply to ensure it was not full acceptance. When he saw the answer to no.6, he broke relations. So Giesl was following the instructions laid down in the telegram I mentioned.

He was also following the instructions given to him face to face yes? Was Giesl stupid? Berchtold needed to brief him once face to face and once by telegram to convey that he was to act in the standard manner of acceptance or lack of it?

As stated, Bethmann's July policy was to arrange a localised conflict. He did not want a two-front war, but would fight one rather than pressure Austria to back down.

His preference was to detach Russia from Britain and France too was it not?

That doesnt make everything there trustworthy or untrustworthy, we need to look at what other evidence suggests or supports. The problem with Apis has always been that he put so little in writing, and the various accounts of his actions come from people who may have been folowing personal agendas. We do know he was not adverse to regicide, or to sanctioning acts of terror in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Correct, the problem is that with Apis the lack of actual evidence leaves interpretation wide open, with no way to verify what is right and what is not right. Apis may well have been deeply involved, but the 1917 trial was under circumstances that cause me to discount it as a kangaroo court.

Right, but anything past the documents is speculation.

Given at least on nation went to great lengths to destroy its archives we can speculate they did not do so because the documents destroyed or removed made them look innocent!

[Slobodan Cekic]

To mention this only, why did Bethmann conceal from Kaiser the message from the ambassador in Berlin, if he found the continental war unacceptable? He needed simply to show it to the Kaiser if he wanted the brake pulled. And there is a ton of material to prove Bethmann's position.

When the Kaiser returned Bethmann was still under the illusion he could manage the situation and resisted instructions to initiate HIB talks in Vienna. Within a short period of time the outlook had darkened and he turned to HIB in order to try and salvage the situation. The big unresolved issue with Moltke concerned the timing of the German response to Russian mobilization measures. This all came to a head around the 29th of July as Russia mobilized and Britain sent in a warning, causing Bethmann to alter course.

If Bethmann did not want the war with Russia and France, as you say, he needed only show his Kaiser a telegram from London, saying Britain is joining, if the war starts. Wilhelm has backtracked from an European war on several previous occasions after if got clear that Britain would not stay neutral, and Bethman knew that only too well.

Bethmanns did not show the telegram to his Sovereign. He did the opposite, which removed the last obstacle to a war with France and Russia - and that would have been the Willhelm's probable backtracking.

Bethmann's hopes and tries of holding the British out, while letting the situation roll into the general war on the continent, are completely irrelevant to the question - did he want the continental war, i.e. one with Russia and France, or not.

These tries of his may only show that, while doing everything that the continental war finally starts, Bethmann did not actually want a war with Britain (eureka), but was willing to run a high risk of it. Even if Bethmann's later backtracking because of Britain could be shown, he already clearly demonstrated his intention of a continental war, as he denied the telegram to Willhelm.

So, no smokescreens, please. Radar exists 80 years already. What you are doing is called ' an exchange of thesis'. By showing Bethmann not wanting the war with Britain, you would like to persuade he wanted no continental war - and these two are quite different things. Now, my question to you, do you believe such considerations of yours, or should only we believe them?

[Slobodan Cekic]

...The Prussian ruling class were rather against the idea of renegotiations with the other states as it was felt they may well demand a greater role at the expense of the Prussians, and in at least one account I have read it was suggested there was a feeling they may well demand that Wilhelm relinquished the position of Kaiser as there was so much dissatisfaction at how Wilhelm had backed away in several crisies...

Quite interesting. Could you, perhaps, point to a link or book telling more about all these 'topplings over' of Kaiser's and possibly, the German internal reactions to them, please?

Now, could Alexander II, if he was to live longer, really avert some very turbulent and painful events in the Russian history, or were the weights to be moved, as the 'Rubber history' theory could suggest, too much for a single person in a single lifetime? Well, that is not a question I am going to even try answering ..

I think Russia was always going to undergo some drastic form os dissruption at some point as the people were no longer willing to be treated as they were by their rulers, but the form this change would take could take many forms. Sadly the idiots in charge managed to expertly pick a way to rule that almost ensured the worst possible outcome for the Russian people. Even without Rasputin, the Tzar and Tzarina were a terrible mix given the circumstances, it was rather like putting two dysfunctional chimpanzees in charge of the moon landings.

Well, Alexander II liberated the serfs, among other things. His proclamation of a legal reform which was a beginning of the road to the constitutional monarchy was just 48 hours ahead, as he has been killed. It is, of course , ironic, that revolutions or extremisms take place exactly then when the reins are loosened; as long as the terror rules, everything stays quiet. That was why the successor, Alexander III revoked the father's newest legal reform and returned to good old suppression.
That solved no problems, but made them pile up further into the Nicholas II's inheritance, and he was not that capable, that is clear. Nevertheless, a constitutional monarchy would have relieved Nicholas II of much of his load, shifting it to the government, and, as Bethmann nicely shows, the ministers and officials have their ways of circumventing their Sovereigns, if need be. So the state would have been less dependent on the quality of it's Royal figure.

I would agree with what you say about a disruptive way of change as one that was probable for Russia anyway. Of course, the people get fed up with their treatment at some time point, but so glorified as a revolution can get, it is very difficult for people of a country to take over through an armed uprising. A state has great resources and an army. Nevertheless, a society is an organism, and an organism developing too slow gets endangered by others of it's kind. Strong foreign help and influences have never been much advertised, of course, but for the most of the successful revolutions, sooner or later, one begins belatedly discovering them.
There has been no proof of foreign involvement in the Alexander II murder, but for the revolutions from 1905 and 1917 there are many such indications.
Wide range of events, from the English Civil War to the today's Colored Revolutions are nowadays said to have been financed and influenced from the outside. Having in mind that a country's people is no match for it's coercion apparatus, this should come as no surprise, but it still does, as such activities tend to stay hidden.