So Col. Huguet "is known to be inaccurate" but Smith-Dorrien is gospel. Who knew?
The facts are obvious as the BEF did take its place in the line and in the advance to the Aisne too, something that Huguet's report suggests as impossible.
"On the same day the British chiefs were hurrying the BEF southward with such urgency that the soldiers were deprived of the rest they needed far more than they needed distance from the enemy. On that day, August 28, a day when von Kluck's columns gave them no trouble, Sir John French and Wilson were in such anxiety to hasten the retreat that they ordered transport wagons to 'throw overboard all ammunition and other impediments not absolutely required' and carry men instead.'
The need to get out of the precarious situation on the French left wing should be obvious, a force as small as the BEF in comparison to the forces of the enemy nearby has little option but to gain as much separation as possible and seek secure flanks with its more numerous allied armies. Sir John French did very much panic, though his mind was changed instantly after Kitchener met him, but he did turn the BEF and put it into the fight despite his earlier protestations it was not possible. This is all rather well documented, selective quotes from books will not alter reality though they do call into question the objectivity of the person presenting them.
If Smith-Dorrien's assessment was accurate, perhaps so was von Kluck's.
So why are you deliberately dodging the points I have raised? I will try to reword my points as you failed to respond to my request you answer, in the hope that you will reply now.
1. If the Entente forces were as beaten and incapable of resisting the German forces as reported by the generals of the German right wing, how did they turn and fight at the Marne?
2. If the Entente armies were not as badly defeated as the above mentioned reports suggested, why were such reports submitted, and why is it Moltke's fault for accepting his generals assessments of the situation?
3. If the Entente forces really were in such a poor condition as your recent selection of quotes suggest, and as the German generals had been telling Moltke, how is the transfer of three corps to the east in any way a poor decision?
4. The timing of Moltke ordering the three corps to the east matches that of Schlieffen in his exercises, do not forget Schlieffen sent between six and eleven corps east at this time, so this is clearly something the Germans expected to do at this time. At this point it could well be that Moltke was following Schlieffen too closely and not to the actual situation at hand, but why did the commanders at the front raise any objections to the transfer if they felt it critical at the time?
5. Your argument here at present seems to be one where you claim the Entente armies were incapable of resistance, but also one where Moltke shifting any troops from this victorious advance - the troops were not in the front line of the advance on the far right when withdrawn - somehow instantly reverses everything, but even then the Germans were victorious but decided to retreat by mistake. Moltke is to blame for his generals misjudging the situation, for them not objecting to the troop movement, and even for Kluck not following orders, but also gets no credit for coming so close to victory in a two front war, as close or closer than Schlieffen's exercises managed to achieve. Can you tell me if this is a correct understanding of what you are saying?
If you are unwilling to answer questions there would seem little point in your posting on a discussion forum, you would do better surely to just create your own blog somewhere and just post polemics there?