The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

[Terry Duncan]

It forms the foundation of a "Schlieffen Plan" as narrowly defined by Zuber, whose argument you rely very heavily on.

I am not relying on Zuber that much, have a look at many of the history books detailing the opening of WWI (Tuchman's The Guns of August for one discussed in this thread) and they almost all detail exactly the same thing - a Schlieffen Plan where German troops swing west of Paris and even 'bush the Channel coast, before turning east to defeat the French armies that have conveniently not noticed what is happening and have sat in place awaiting their fate. Even the famous West Point map shows exactly this scenario.

The only thing absurd about this is that you fail to recognize that the Liege operation was a sub-operation of the greater plan that was a technical improvement and served the greater operational construct without altering its overall concept (desired end state).

Schlieffen put his allocation of forces forwar in 1905, when the Liege operation wasnt even planned, therefore he has to assign troops according to the circumstances at that time, therefore including forces for The Netherlands. He also ignored war with Russia entirely as it is not covered in the 1905 Memo.

No...this is a diversion from the point that Moltke significantly and critically altered the proportion of forces from the Right Wing to the Left.

The proportion of forces was not stated as a sacred ratio, nor did it feature in Schlieffen's plans as a rigid concept that he stuck to. Curiously you still ignore the single front war issue, as well as Schlieffen's 1905 Memo deploying an army almost 50% larger than the one he commanded.

The 1905 memo was an operational concept meant to solve the issue with France

As there seems to be no statement for exactly what the 1905 Memo was produced for, your comments go well beyond what the author of the plan committed to paper. For example;

the added dimension of a two front war does not detract from its relevance (The troops were available on the Left Wing as previously stated).

It very obviously does alter the relevance of the 1905 Memo as it deals with entirely different circumstances. As for your curious notion that the troops are already available on the left wing to be moved to the east, are these some of the numerous ficticious units Schlieffen wrote in or the real ones that constitute a minor force to hold the French anyhow?

To state that the lack of the two front dimension to the 1905 memo invalidates it is playing to Zubers definition of the Schlieffen Plan that I do not subscribe to.

Good for you. You seem to have a rather broad interpretation of what 'the Schlieffen Plan' actually is, something vaguely involving defeating France and moving through Belgium seems to be sufficient for you.

His is NOT some sort of official definition of fact.

Neither is yours, so dont be too surprised when others dont agree with you either.

I'm qualifying?

Yes you were.

No he did not.

Groener stated that Moltke had deviated from the magical plan laid down by Schlieffen, and that the plan was one that would have ensured German victory.

"comprehensive schematic recipe style plan" -These by definition in German doctrine and plans production DO NOT exist.

These were your words, maybe you used the wrong words to suit your purpose?

To believe that they do is an asinine and ignorant assumption that will never allow anyone to understand German military operations as they existed from Fredrick the Great though 1945.

Your words, do you believe them?

A true example of someone who doesn't know what they don't know...

I wasnt going to be so rude as to say it, but this defines you input so far rather well.

This is part of MDMP and used in determining a course of action based upon a given situation, in this case July 1914. The Mission is?

The Schlieffen Memo of 1905 deals with a single front war against France and with no transfer of troops to the east at any point for the period it covers.

And what was Moltke attempting with the troops available?

To fight a two front war against two great Powers.

I criticize Moltke for his judgement errors and subsequent failure.

But not the Schlieffen Memo for deploying 50% more men that the German army contained at the time?

Seriously Terry? Do you perhaps recall the "battle of annihilation" principle we discussed?

Yes, but this doesnt require any specific ratio of forces between German left and right wings as you have noted Moltke changed, nor does it amount to anything more than a very basic outline of intent.

Moltke made grievous errors which invalidated Schlieffen's concept of the operation in case of war with France and Moltke had the requisite number of troops available.

Given Moltke had to deploy troops against Russia from the outset, Schlieffen's concept of what to do in a war against France alone is irrelevant. If you cannot see that a one front war and a two front war are very different then it is pointless discussing things further.

Why is my position so hard for you to grasp?

It is inconsistent when reconciled to the facts. There is little point continuing with this circular discussion.

[Mad Zeppelin]

Groener stated that Moltke had deviated from the magical plan laid down by Schlieffen, and that the plan was one that would have ensured German victory.

Not quite, Groener stated that Moltke had deviated from the 'magical' principle - and that not squandering two complete armies in Lorraine but introducing them on the right wing would have reaped victory. And that Moltke's main fault was that of not leading the operations at all, etc.

[Terry Duncan]

Have you seen the details of the Krafft vs Groener argument discussed briefly in Zuber's book, where in mentions that the actual operations in 1914 had not gone as well as in the 1909 study performed to Schlieffen's own ideas, where the failure was that the 6th and 7th Armies had not advanced as far as expected due to the supposed 'gap' at Troyee des Charmes not being a gap at all but an area filled with field fortifications? This seems to fit in entirely with the orders from Schlieffen to the Bavarian Army to prepare an attack by the left wing in 1905.

[glenn239]

The 1905 memo was an operational concept meant to solve the issue with France, the added dimension of a two front war does not detract from its relevance (

The addition of a Russian front simply meant that the number of paper divisions required to bring about Schlieffen’s plan would increase by 10. So now Schlieffen needs 106 divisions and had, what, about 70? Perhaps a magic elf will summon the missing 36 from Middle Earth?

Mission (what is your mission? Defeat France before the Russians mobilize) The 1905 memo anticipated the mission to be a long pursuit march to contact the French left. The 1914 plan assumed the mission to be an encounter battle in Belgium with an advancing French left.

Enemy (French Army, their dispositions) The 1905 memo anticipated the French left to be refused, hence encountered far into France. The 1914 plan anticipated the French left’s disposition to be offensive. That is, to be found on the march, advancing in strength through Belgium south of the Meuse and encountered near (or even at) the German border.

Terrain (what terrain are you going to be fighting on and how will it effect your operations) The 1905 memo anticipated fighting deep in France. The 1914 plan anticipated the decisive battle to be fought in the Ardennes in Belgium.

Troops (what troops do you have available) The 1905 memo anticipated forces that did not exist. The 1914 plan kept itself to reality that did not require a meth lab.

-Time (how much time before Russians mobilize) The 1905 memo anticipated Russian neutrality. The 1914 plan anticipated Russian beligerency.

Doctrine is principle guidance, let that sink in. Your misuse of the word doctrine above continues to reinforce the idea that you just don't understand what you're talking about.

The word ‘doctrine’ is a bit like Humpty Dumpty’s line, It means what I mean it to mean. or something to that effect.

Seriously Terry? Do you perhaps recall the "battle of annihilation" principle we discussed? Moltke made grievous errors which invalidated Schlieffen's concept of the operation in case of war with France and Moltke had the requisite number of troops available. Why is my position so hard for you to grasp?

My guess is that Terry’s answer will be, (1) Moltke did not have the requisite number of troops, as you must know. (2) Schlieffen’s concept of operations was not what you are thinking it was, as shown in countless exercises. (3) Moltke’s objective was not a “battle of annihilation”.

Now, let’s see what Terry says!

[favedave]

Terry

"The Schlieffen Memo of 1905 has no 8th Army at all and says nothing about reinforcements ever being sent to the east as it deals with war only with France whilst Russia remains at peace. Germany can act as she likes in France as there is no other demand for forces."

I'm not sure, having no copy available, but I don't think the 1905 memo listed any specific units. But from what I've read in countless books is that It was only strategy statement , "In the event of a two front war with Russia and France, France will be defeated first and Russia second." Tactical outline was that the French Fortress system would be avoided by invading France through the Benelux with a great right wing which would swing out to the coast and then south to Paris, enveloping the French Army. To be successful, this movement required so much manpower that troops would have to be taken from the forces guarding Alsace and Lorraine and the reinforcement of East Prussia would not be possible until the French were defeated. Only then could Russia would be dealt with."

Again, I believe the 1905 memo was created for and given to the military intelligence section(s) of Entente armies.

This could be possible, though as Moltke is criticized for not sticking to this misdirection it would be highly ironic if this were to be the case.

If the memo was a planted document, it is the supreme irony.

"If I am correct, von Moltke had two problems at that moment. First, Pritwitz had cabled him that the 8th was retiring west of the Vistula, out of the zone of Hoffmann's surefire plan. Second, the First and Second Armies were galloping towards France literally unopposed, a success which threatened to undue the plan for the bringing France to the climatic battle set in Lorraine around Metz and Sedan.

The part about what Pritwitz had cabled to Moltke is correct, though he did change his mind after sending the cable, the second part is somewhat more open to discussion as the location of the climatic battle seems to vary depending who you wish to believe."

Pritwitz did change his mind immediately after conferring with Hoffmann, but he did not let von Moltke know. When Ludendorff arrived and found the situation very much more favorable he did not let von Moltke know either. He did however half heartedly suggest in a cable to von Moltke that the troops being dispatched east were not needed at the moment. Von Moltke still did not stop the transfer. Since the troops were in Belgium, why didn't von Moltke keep them? Could it be that at that moment he didn't think he needed them either?

As for the location of the climatic battle in Germany's pre-war planning, I again go to who were the generals assigned to command? Wilhelm and Rupprecht.

Ludendorff went on holiday and tourist visits to Liege prior to the war for similar reasons to Foch and Wilson. From memory either Bulow or Hausen was at least fairly familiar with the area they were to advance over though I cannot remember which. The commanders on both sides were often stationed close to the borders at some point in their careers, so it is reasonable to suppose all had at least some idea of the land from personal experience. The exception to this seems to be the Russian generals who in many cases were not even sure where they would be deployed if a war started!

I would have thought that von Kluck, given the seemingly impossible task of his First Army travelling so many miles from Aachen to Calais to the west of Paris, would have spent more time in France between 1912 and August 1914 than he did in Germany. Certainly his memoires should been chock-full of references to having done so. Unless, of course he was not expecting to go to far beyond Louvain, Belgium before the war....
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Attrition]

This might help. http://ia600804.us.archive.org/23/items ... an2006.pdf & http://www.gwpda.org/memoir/Ritter/ritter1.pdf p. 48.

[favedave]

Thanks for the post, Attrition:

I didn't find the contents of the actual 1905 memo published by the author, only a discussion of what various people thought was in it. (Admittedly I skimmed a lot of it so I may have missed it). But I don't doubt that somebody, (Groener?) published it because so many reputatble historians in the last 90 years have discussed it with such remarkable consistency as to its contents. Of course they could be regurgitating what Groener said was in it, as their sole source.

Then we have the fact that Schlieffen apparently never gamed this plan or asked any of his subordinates to make plans which would conform to it. Nor do we have any indication that von Moltke's General Staff ever gamed it either. However Von Moltke's staff did appear to be working out the logistical and tactical details of its initial deployments between 1906 and August 1914. These arrangements for executing the Plan put forward in the 1905(6) memo would have been quite visable to anybody passing through Germany's eastern and western borders between 1906 and 1914. Say, wasn't 1906 the year the Anglo-French general staff rides began gallivanting around northeastern France, nipping just across the border for delightful repasts of Belgian Waffles? I do know it was the year that the Russian Army began its reforms, including reducing
deployment of its two northern armies from 2 months to 14 days in the event of a war with Germany.

Then we have a very aggressive general named von Kluck who apparently didn't reconnoiter, a verb meaning to inspect, observe, or survey (the enemy, the enemy's strength or position, a region, etc.) in order to gain information for military purposes, the huge tracts of land he was expected to conquer in six weeks.

This is what leads me to believe that the 1905 memo was a device to dupe the Entente General Staffs, which perversely played out as though it were the real plan rather than a clever hoax. What did Groener get out of perpetrating this as the real plan? Well it saved a perfectly good war plan for use in May of 1940...

[Mad Zeppelin]

Have you seen the details of the Krafft vs Groener argument discussed briefly in Zuber's book, where in mentions that the actual operations in 1914 had not gone as well as in the 1909 study performed to Schlieffen's own ideas, where the failure was that the 6th and 7th Armies had not advanced as far as expected due to the supposed 'gap' at Troyee des Charmes not being a gap at all but an area filled with field fortifications? This seems to fit in entirely with the orders from Schlieffen to the Bavarian Army to prepare an attack by the left wing in 1905.

Groener complained about two different things:
1. The Bavarian attack had been premature. Instead of luring the French into the trap, the Bavarians had attacked too early and repulsed them frontally. This critique is certainly correct, but is moot for two reasons
a) it's what happened all along the German front line, where everybody was pressing forward without regard to operational considerations.
b) the French advance was no offensive but a rather a reconnaissance in force conducted by two army corps (advancing very carefully and ready to retreat at any moment), so there never existed an opportunity to encircle and annihilate a major portion of the enemy's field force. In the event, one corps was handled roughly, while the second one (Foch's) got away almost unharmed.
2. The attack on the French fortress line was a pure waste. - Any attack here had only made sense if the French 1st and 2nd armies had before attacked into Elsaß-Lothringen in full force - and been beaten decisively, which was not the case. An attack against the fully manned French fortress line/field fortification could be expected to produce the results it actually did bring: costly stalemate. - Thus, it would have been preferrabe to transport 6th army to the right wing.

[Mad Zeppelin]

The Bavarian side (Krafft and Rupprecht) contended that according to the deployment orders the army group in Elsaß-Lothringen (6th Bavarian with subordinated 7th army) had the primary task of tying down enemy forces and prevent them from being shifted to another theatre. Only when and if the French attacked in force were they to counter-attack and annihilate the invader (there had been some pre-war discussions about this, as a major French offensive in this area couldn't be ruled out as a possibility - and Moltke obviously was of the opinion that in this case the Schlieffen operation became redundant).

The Bavarians were mainly criticised for attacking prematurely and frontally on August 20th - and for the stalemate in front of the fortress line. These critiques were mouthed first by Georg Wetzell, then by Groener - and finally by Merz von Quirnheim (who had been serving on 6th army staff under Krafft and therefore had insider knowledge).

While even Rupprecht finally conceded that the August 20th attack had been premature, the issue of the attack on the fortress line remained contentious (although everybody agreed that it had been unsuccessful and costly), the Bavarians claiming that they had been receiving contradictory directives from OHL (as each visitor from OHL had to tell something different and all were not in accordance with what Krafft was told when visiting OHL).

[Terry Duncan]

MZ,

The Bavarian side (Krafft and Rupprecht) contended that according to the deployment orders the army group in Elsaß-Lothringen (6th Bavarian with subordinated 7th army) had the primary task of tying down enemy forces and prevent them from being shifted to another theatre.

This makes sense, though the idea they were to do so by remaining passive and violated some plan by attacking the French does not. If the French ceased to attack the 6th and 7th Armies had to undertake operations to pin them in place to prevent the French transfering troops to the French left.

The Bavarians were mainly criticised for attacking prematurely and frontally on August 20th - and for the stalemate in front of the fortress line.

Prematurely is harder to judge at the time than it is with hindsight, and it appears that the stalemate in front of the fortress line was not entirely expected by the Bavarians. Joffre conceded that the French troops came back out of Germany in conditions resembling rout, German accounts seem to suggest he was not exaggerating too much if at all, so an attack may have appeared to be not only the only option to keep the French engaged but also a good chance that would be lost if the French regrouped - Rennenkampf has always been criticized for not following up the victory at Gumbinnen under exactly the same circumstances.

While even Rupprecht finally conceded that the August 20th attack had been premature, the issue of the attack on the fortress line remained contentious (although everybody agreed that it had been unsuccessful and costly), the Bavarians claiming that they had been receiving contradictory directives from OHL (as each visitor from OHL had to tell something different and all were not in accordance with what Krafft was told when visiting OHL).

Is there any reason to suggest the Bavarians were inventing these details?

Dave,

Terry

...

I'm not sure, having no copy available, but I don't think the 1905 memo listed any specific units. But from what I've read in countless books is that It was only strategy statement , "In the event of a two front war with Russia and France, France will be defeated first and Russia second."

The 1905 memo did not go into great detail, and it could well have been a strategy statement, but it does only show a war against France and does not advocate that Germany should deploy no troops at all to the east in a simultaneous war against France and Russia. The problems begin when people start to claim Moltke violated Schlieffen's plan from the outset by altering the deployment. Given the need to deploy troops to the east, and the fact that by 1914 there were still not as many units in the German army as Schlieffen had proposed to deploy in 1905, he rather obviously had to deviate from the deployment in the memo.

Tactical outline was that the French Fortress system would be avoided by invading France through the Benelux with a great right wing which would swing out to the coast and then south to Paris, enveloping the French Army.

...

To be successful, this movement required so much manpower that troops would have to be taken from the forces guarding Alsace and Lorraine and the reinforcement of East Prussia would not be possible until the French were defeated. Only then could Russia would be dealt with."

This was never possible given the manpower restrictions the German army had compared to the numbers involved needed to make such a move possible in the face of the French army even by delpoying the entire German army of 1914 in the west. With no troops at all in the east under the 1905 memo's deployment it might take more than reinforcements to evict the Russians from Berlin if they were unopposed. If troops are taken from the west to create the 8th Army in the east, the plan laid out in the memo of 1905 - that Schlieffen conceded was already not strong enough to perform the task - would be even less suited to undertake it. This could well be the reason Schlieffen noted that the Germans would find the task that they were not strong enough for the task they had chosen to undertake.

Since the troops were in Belgium, why didn't von Moltke keep them? Could it be that at that moment he didn't think he needed them either?

With regards to the troops moved to the east, two corps came from the right, one from the left, but it appears certain that Moltke didnt think them critical at this time. The right wing generals were sending in reports of great victories all along the line and not objected when these troops were ordered east as they would have done if they felt them so critical. Kluck and Francois both proved willing to disobey orders, so simply questioning orders was not unthinkable in 1914.

Glenn;

My guess is that Terry’s answer will be, (1) Moltke did not have the requisite number of troops, as you must know. (2) Schlieffen’s concept of operations was not what you are thinking it was, as shown in countless exercises. (3) Moltke’s objective was not a “battle of annihilation”.

Now, let’s see what Terry says!

1. As we know, the 1905 memo deployed more units to the west than existed in 1914, when they were needed over two fronts too, therefore when this real war arose something had to change.

2. Schlieffen certainly seems far less dogmatic than military writers and historians presented for seventy years, and his exercises do not support claims he expected a quick six week victory over France.

3. Moltke may well have wanted to be able to gain such an annihilating victory over the French, but given what we know of his views it would appear he did not expect to gain one with any certainty. This is the point Zuber now says Moltke did depart from Schlieffen's ideas, plunging too deep into France in search of a stunning total victory that was beyond the German ability to achieve. Even if you discount Zuber, Moltke's known views do not support the idea he expected to beat France quickly or easily even when citing Mombauer, one of Zuber's more extreme critics.

The interesting document is Beseler's plan of 1900, which seems to have been similar to what Krafft refered to as the 1909 plan, and to what happened in 1914. What influence did this plan have, as it is certainly the only one we have details of that is likely to have led to 'the greatest Cannae the world has seen' or an envelopment of the French armies on the Catalaunian Fields that so many German officers talked of.

[Mad Zeppelin]

Is there any reason to suggest the Bavarians were inventing these details?

No, not at all. Invariably, there was some confusion and misunderstanding, but even when these had been ironed out, OHL didn't know what it wanted - that at least was the impression the Bavarians arrived at. So, at certains points in time Rupprecht and Krafft had to take decisions - only to have them criticised by the next envoy from OHL, and so on.
Because the 6th army files are preserved in the Bavarian State Archive and because of the Krafft/Wetzell-Groener-Merz argument the documentation about these events is rather good.

[Appleknocker27]

The addition of a Russian front simply meant that the number of paper divisions required to bring about Schlieffen’s plan would increase by 10. So now Schlieffen needs 106 divisions and had, what, about 70? Perhaps a magic elf will summon the missing 36 from Middle Earth?

Paper divisions to satisfy the recipe requirements in order to create Schlieffen stew? Any less ingredients and any other modifications and we cant call it Schlieffen stew anymore (Even though preperation is still the same, we cook everything the same and the original recipe was guide with some flexibility).

Mission (what is your mission? Defeat France before the Russians mobilize) The 1905 memo anticipated the mission to be a long pursuit march to contact the French left. The 1914 plan assumed the mission to be an encounter battle in Belgium with an advancing French left.

And that invalidates the doctrinal thought process how? The Mission is to destroy the French Army in the field through a battle of annihiliation. Where that happens is irrelevant to the Mission itself.

Enemy (French Army, their dispositions) The 1905 memo anticipated the French left to be refused, hence encountered far into France. The 1914 plan anticipated the French left’s disposition to be offensive. That is, to be found on the march, advancing in strength through Belgium south of the Meuse and encountered near (or even at) the German border.

Terrain (what terrain are you going to be fighting on and how will it effect your operations) The 1905 memo anticipated fighting deep in France. The 1914 plan anticipated the decisive battle to be fought in the Ardennes in Belgium

.

Point?

Troops (what troops do you have available) The 1905 memo anticipated forces that did not exist. The 1914 plan kept itself to reality that did not require a meth lab.

-Time (how much time before Russians mobilize) The 1905 memo anticipated Russian neutrality. The 1914 plan anticipated Russian beligerency.

The word ‘doctrine’ is a bit like Humpty Dumpty’s line, It means what I mean it to mean. or something to that effect.

Apparently it is to some on this forum. Reminds me of definition 3 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.p ... n%20stupid

"It is a guide to action, not hard and fast rules. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military. It helps standardize operations, facilitating readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks.

Doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. Its objective is to foster initiative and creative thinking. Doctrine provides the military an authoritative body of statements on how military forces conduct operations and provides a common lexicon for use by military planners and leaders."

That is what doctrine is in general, and it is entirely possible to read German doctrine as it was written pre-war and see its application in 1914. Why that is so difficult for some???


"Seriously Terry? Do you perhaps recall the "battle of annihilation" principle we discussed? Moltke made grievous errors which invalidated Schlieffen's concept of the operation in case of war with France and Moltke had the requisite number of troops available. Why is my position so hard for you to grasp?"

My guess is that Terry’s answer will be, (1) Moltke did not have the requisite number of troops, as you must know

.
Ah... "the requisite number of troops" as deterimined by whom? The recipe?

-(2) Schlieffen’s concept of operations was not what you are thinking it was, as shown in countless exercises. (3) Moltke’s objective was not a “battle of annihilation”.

Countless exercises..... Exercises that are continually represented here as some sort of scientific experiments meant to determine the feasibility of a given operation. This is NOT what they were.
-German Field Service Reg (damn doctrine again...)

"War games, tactical problems, winter schemes, lectures and staff rides serve to develop tactical training and to cultivate intelligence. War games and tactical problems afford opportimities to form decisions on given premises, and to express these decisions rapidly in the form of orders. They also encourage officers to study the regulations and the
principles of tactics (LIKE SOME PEOPLE ON THIS FORUM???). Specially qualified individuals may be selected to set tactical problems and to direct war games, irrespective of their seniority.
The object of winter schemes is to encourage officers in the earnest and scientific study of their profession. The subjects chosen for an essay, which will be connected with military science or other professional matters, must be within the intellectual capacity of the writer. The subjects should not be of too general a nature, but should be such as to require the writer to form and to express an opinion upon certain definite points. Lectures delivered to officers, or to mihtary societies, serve both to instruct and to stimulate new ideas, whether they illustrate past campaigns or military
questions, or whether they arouse a deeper interest in the service text-books. They cultivate the power of clear and accurate expression, especially when they are delivered extempore. It is desirable tlaat each lecture should be followed by a discussion, in order to give as many officers as possible an opportunity of expressing their opinions.

Now, let’s see what Terry says!

[Terry Duncan]

Appleknocker,

Please refrain from trying to insult or provoke other members of the forum. If you feel unable to comply future posts can be removed entirely for breaching the rules.

A. Civility

The first rule of the forum is: "No insults are tolerated (that includes serious national and religious insults)." Personal remarks in posts are strongly discouraged, and personal insults are forbidden here.

[favedave]

Exercises that are continually represented here as some sort of scientific experiments meant to determine the feasibility of a given operation. This is NOT what they were.

I most certainly disagree with this assessment, nor does the following quote from the German Field Regulations support it.

"War games, tactical problems, winter schemes, lectures and staff rides serve to develop tactical training and to cultivate intelligence. War games and tactical problems afford opportimities to form decisions on given premises, and to express these decisions rapidly in the form of orders. They also encourage officers to study the regulations and the principles of tactics. Specially qualified individuals may be selected to set tactical problems and to direct war games, irrespective of their seniority."

The above is a generic statement applicable to all army officers regardless of rank. The key to understanding the purpose of war games and tactical exercises is the bold faced sentence above. Quite simply, when the friction of war is applied, will it work?

In the case of the 1905 Memo, apparently no one thought there was a need to test the premise. It was unworkable from the start. So what was the purpose of this memo? I vote for subterfuge to convince the French and Russians to attack into German held territory where traps were laid to defeat them both in battles of anihilation.

[Terry Duncan]

The above is a generic statement applicable to all army officers regardless of rank. The key to understanding the purpose of war games and tactical exercises is the bold faced sentence above. Quite simply, when the friction of war is applied, will it work?

In the case of the 1905 Memo, apparently no one thought there was a need to test the premise.

It could also be asked why Schlieffen's exercises all seem to have revolved around certain circumstances, apparently circumstance he never intended to have arise if some people are to be believed. Oddly enough when war did happen, the Germans acted far more like in Schlieffen's exercises, and especially the Beseler Denkschrift, than according to the 1905 Memorandum.