It forms the foundation of a "Schlieffen Plan" as narrowly defined by Zuber, whose argument you rely very heavily on.
I am not relying on Zuber that much, have a look at many of the history books detailing the opening of WWI (Tuchman's The Guns of August for one discussed in this thread) and they almost all detail exactly the same thing - a Schlieffen Plan where German troops swing west of Paris and even 'bush the Channel coast, before turning east to defeat the French armies that have conveniently not noticed what is happening and have sat in place awaiting their fate. Even the famous West Point map shows exactly this scenario.
The only thing absurd about this is that you fail to recognize that the Liege operation was a sub-operation of the greater plan that was a technical improvement and served the greater operational construct without altering its overall concept (desired end state).
Schlieffen put his allocation of forces forwar in 1905, when the Liege operation wasnt even planned, therefore he has to assign troops according to the circumstances at that time, therefore including forces for The Netherlands. He also ignored war with Russia entirely as it is not covered in the 1905 Memo.
No...this is a diversion from the point that Moltke significantly and critically altered the proportion of forces from the Right Wing to the Left.
The proportion of forces was not stated as a sacred ratio, nor did it feature in Schlieffen's plans as a rigid concept that he stuck to. Curiously you still ignore the single front war issue, as well as Schlieffen's 1905 Memo deploying an army almost 50% larger than the one he commanded.
The 1905 memo was an operational concept meant to solve the issue with France
As there seems to be no statement for exactly what the 1905 Memo was produced for, your comments go well beyond what the author of the plan committed to paper. For example;
the added dimension of a two front war does not detract from its relevance (The troops were available on the Left Wing as previously stated).
It very obviously does alter the relevance of the 1905 Memo as it deals with entirely different circumstances. As for your curious notion that the troops are already available on the left wing to be moved to the east, are these some of the numerous ficticious units Schlieffen wrote in or the real ones that constitute a minor force to hold the French anyhow?
To state that the lack of the two front dimension to the 1905 memo invalidates it is playing to Zubers definition of the Schlieffen Plan that I do not subscribe to.
Good for you. You seem to have a rather broad interpretation of what 'the Schlieffen Plan' actually is, something vaguely involving defeating France and moving through Belgium seems to be sufficient for you.
His is NOT some sort of official definition of fact.
Neither is yours, so dont be too surprised when others dont agree with you either.
Yes you were.
No he did not.
Groener stated that Moltke had deviated from the magical plan laid down by Schlieffen, and that the plan was one that would have ensured German victory.
"comprehensive schematic recipe style plan" -These by definition in German doctrine and plans production DO NOT exist.
These were your words, maybe you used the wrong words to suit your purpose?
To believe that they do is an asinine and ignorant assumption that will never allow anyone to understand German military operations as they existed from Fredrick the Great though 1945.
Your words, do you believe them?
A true example of someone who doesn't know what they don't know...
I wasnt going to be so rude as to say it, but this defines you input so far rather well.
This is part of MDMP and used in determining a course of action based upon a given situation, in this case July 1914. The Mission is?
The Schlieffen Memo of 1905 deals with a single front war against France and with no transfer of troops to the east at any point for the period it covers.
And what was Moltke attempting with the troops available?
To fight a two front war against two great Powers.
I criticize Moltke for his judgement errors and subsequent failure.
But not the Schlieffen Memo for deploying 50% more men that the German army contained at the time?
Seriously Terry? Do you perhaps recall the "battle of annihilation" principle we discussed?
Yes, but this doesnt require any specific ratio of forces between German left and right wings as you have noted Moltke changed, nor does it amount to anything more than a very basic outline of intent.
Moltke made grievous errors which invalidated Schlieffen's concept of the operation in case of war with France and Moltke had the requisite number of troops available.
Given Moltke had to deploy troops against Russia from the outset, Schlieffen's concept of what to do in a war against France alone is irrelevant. If you cannot see that a one front war and a two front war are very different then it is pointless discussing things further.
Why is my position so hard for you to grasp?
It is inconsistent when reconciled to the facts. There is little point continuing with this circular discussion.