The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

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Jon Clarke
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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#376

Post by Jon Clarke » 08 Jun 2012, 13:05

Then there's one more possible use. Deliberately leaking the 1905 document to the French GQG would induce all three of the Entente members to start thinking offensively. All of the French war plans between 1875 and 1912 were defensive.
You mentioned this on a number of occasions but you seem to have overlooked a significant issue, namely that the supposed 'leak' occurred in 1904, at least a year before Schlieffen finished the famous version of his plan. Samuel R Williamson writes in The Politics Of Grand Strategy that :

The story behind French acquisition of these German documents in the winter of 1903-1904 remains confused and uncertain. In 1932 Maurice Paléologue, who had been one of Delcassé’s assistants in 1904, asserted that a disillusioned German staff officer had betrayed the outlines of the Schlieffen Plan to French agents. Subsequent studies have cast grave doubts about Paléologue’s accuracy both on the alleged betrayal and in his summary of the new information. Certainly there was no question, as the French diplomat implied, of the Schlieffen Plan having been revealed, since the Plan did not go into effect until late 1905.

At this point in time, Schlieffen's planning did not involve the broad sweep through Belgium and the Netherlands but rather a more limited violation of Belgian neutrality which, according to Williamson, French Intelligence duly reported to the General Staff with some accuracy in August 1904:

Finally in August the General Staff drafted a memo embodying the new information and cautiously noting their uncertainties about it. This staff paper, comparable in many ways to the British war game, credited Germany with twenty-eight army corps. Of these, sixteen were expected to be deployed in Alsace-Lorraine, nine to be concentrated in the area around Aix-la-Chapelle, and three to serve as a link between the Lorraine and Aix-la-Chapelle deployments. The Staff thought the northern German corps would launch a flanking move through southern Belgium, south of the Meuse and Sambre, aimed at Chimay-MéziêresStenay; the German forces in Lorraine would, meanwhile, take the brunt of the French offensive. In this assessment French intelligence had in fact discerned the major features of the German plans then in force: Schlieffen did plan a limited enveloping move through southern Belgium while also advancing from Lorraine.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#377

Post by glenn239 » 08 Jun 2012, 19:02

It would appear no less likely that the numerous claims of 'reserves of reserves' or second wave of mobilization troops that are often put forward as an explanation given the formations are in use from the outset and not as reinforcements.
The difference being that under the right political circumstances Schlieffen could get 24 fully armed and trained Austro-Hungarian frontline divisions, but not paper German ones.
It would still appear strange that Schlieffen did not make any attempt to identify the extra troops as Austrian units though.
He makes no comment on the units at all. They are just there. And the fireman rushes in, from the pouring rain. Very strange.
Maybe if it was written purely as an illustration as to how Germany should go about war with France in 1905 as part of an alliance war then there might be more of a chance it is real.
Ironically, more of a chance its a real plan and less of a chance it had anything to do with the 1914 plan.
Whilst the use of Austrian troops would certainly explain the disparity in the nember of troops available to Schlieffen and those envisaged by the Plan, their use would suggest that Schlieffen discounted the possibility of a Russian intervention
.

True, the other possibility being a combination of Austrian and Italian troops.


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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#378

Post by peterhof » 09 Jun 2012, 04:46

Let me see if I have this straight:

-Germany was [at least partially] responsible for the War but she had no credible motive other than self-defense.

-Germany had no credible campaign plan except the half-*ssed denkschrift submitted by Herr von Schlieffen fourteen years earlier.

Sounds just like the Germans, doesn't it?
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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#379

Post by Terry Duncan » 09 Jun 2012, 05:55

Let me see if I have this straight:

-Germany was [at least partially] responsible for the War but she had no credible motive other than self-defense.
German responsibility stems from the actions she took leading to the war. The motives behind Germany's actions are a seperate issue unless people are claiming Germany deliberately started a world war, and to my knowledge nobody here has suggested such a thing. However, I am sure you are familiar with the 'War the sooner the better' sentiment expressed by several in the German leadership from 1911 onwards. A preventive war is not self defence.
-Germany had no credible campaign plan except the half-*ssed denkschrift submitted by Herr von Schlieffen fourteen years earlier.
You would seem to have not got this straight as nobody has suggested Germany was working to a plan submitted in 1900, which would be the case if it were submitted fourteen years beforehand. The German plan of campaign is part of the subject of this thread, as it is clear that the 1905 Memo is not the plan used in 1914, even if the general concept is similar.
Sounds just like the Germans, doesn't it?
Not really, it looks far more like you have not read much in this thread or even some of the books you claim to own like Strachan, Mombauer, or Zuber.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#380

Post by Attrition » 09 Jun 2012, 09:23

Has anyone considered the possibility that the German strategy went roughly according to expectation, if not to plan? Perhaps the German army ended up further into France, had trouble on the Prussian border sooner than desired and the Austro-Hungarian army turned out to be more fallible than hoped but many of the economic constraints on a long (or longish) war had been reduced?

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#381

Post by Mad Zeppelin » 09 Jun 2012, 10:23

Terry Duncan wrote: However, I am sure you are familiar with the 'War the sooner the better' sentiment expressed by several in the German leadership from 1911 onwards. A preventive war is not self defence.
The proponents of 'war the sooner the better' were always present, already in Bismarck's time and in the 1890ies. This was no new development. - The new development was the ever increasing encirclement, as it was perceived not only by the German leadership, which lent more weight to the words of the prophets of 'war the sooner the better'.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#382

Post by favedave » 09 Jun 2012, 16:33

Samuel R Williamson writes in The Politics Of Grand Strategy that :

The story behind French acquisition of these German documents in the winter of 1903-1904 remains confused and uncertain. In 1932 Maurice Paléologue, who had been one of Delcassé’s assistants in 1904, asserted that a disillusioned German staff officer had betrayed the outlines of the Schlieffen Plan to French agents. Subsequent studies have cast grave doubts about Paléologue’s accuracy both on the alleged betrayal and in his summary of the new information. Certainly there was no question, as the French diplomat implied, of the Schlieffen Plan having been revealed, since the Plan did not go into effect until late 1905.

At this point in time, Schlieffen's planning did not involve the broad sweep through Belgium and the Netherlands but rather a more limited violation of Belgian neutrality which, according to Williamson, French Intelligence duly reported to the General Staff with some accuracy in August 1904:
John, I am a bit confused. Williamson discounts the validity of Pale'ologue's 1903, 1904 story, the plan itself does not seem as though it ever "went into effect" except by the ironies of war in 1914, and the violation of the Netherlands has been routinely reported by historians as the first thing scrapped by Moltke from the 1905 memo regarding the great Right Wing Sweep to the Channel.

These factors would however explain the initial troop deployments of Plan XVII. The 5th and 4th French Armies were too far south and east to get in front of the 1st and 2nd German Armies in time to keep Kluck and Bulow in Belgium.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#383

Post by Terry Duncan » 10 Jun 2012, 05:12

The proponents of 'war the sooner the better' were always present, already in Bismarck's time and in the 1890ies. This was no new development.
I agree, but early on they were outnumbered by people who favoured peace.
The new development was the ever increasing encirclement, as it was perceived not only by the German leadership, which lent more weight to the words of the prophets of 'war the sooner the better'.
That does not make the perception correct though, I for one do not believe there was no alternative to a general war overall until quite late in the period, though as time went on developments made avoiding one harder. Just because one nation may have a greater military force than another does not mean that it must attack, after all between 1815 and 1914 the balance of power in Europe had altered a few times without wanton attacks happening. If the July Crisis had not ended in war there is no obvious cause for war between the powers in the foreseeable future.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#384

Post by peterhof » 10 Jun 2012, 06:57

Terry Duncan wrote: If the July Crisis had not ended in war there is no obvious cause for war between the powers in the foreseeable future.
The "obvious cause for war between the powers" was:

-After 1871, revanche and the conquest of Alsace/Lorraine.

-After 1894, the conquest of Constantinople and the Straits.

-After 1904, the defeat of Germany for reasons outlined in the 1907 Crowe Memorandum.

In repeating Moltke's oft-quoted "the sooner the better for us" we should include Moltke's "we do not want it" and keep in mind that German leaders would have very much preferred no war at all. This is strongly underscored by the sheer desperation of the so-called Schlieffen Plan.
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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#385

Post by Mad Zeppelin » 10 Jun 2012, 10:40

Terry Duncan wrote:Just because one nation may have a greater military force than another does not mean that it must attack, after all between 1815 and 1914 the balance of power in Europe had altered a few times without wanton attacks happening. If the July Crisis had not ended in war there is no obvious cause for war between the powers in the foreseeable future.
The July Crisis was the unique event of a Germany risking war for the first time (all crises before had seen a Germany perfectly unwilling to risk war, not to speak at all of waging war) meeting a Russia only too ready to go to war (not for Serbia, they didn't care a dime about the Serbs, it just served as their Belgium, but for Austrian Galicia, the Straights and what could be termed Greater Armenia - as Russian puppet - and perhaps a greater Poland under Russian domination, incorporating much of East Prussia, the Posen Province and Silesia).

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#386

Post by Jon Clarke » 10 Jun 2012, 15:46

John, I am a bit confused. Williamson discounts the validity of Paleologue's 1903, 1904 story, the plan itself does not seem as though it ever "went into effect" except by the ironies of war in 1914, and the violation of the Netherlands has been routinely reported by historians as the first thing scrapped by Moltke from the 1905 memo regarding the great Right Wing Sweep to the Channel.
I'm a bit confused about your confusion as I would have thought that it was pretty clear - the German plan the French obtained in 1904 was NOT the famous Schlieffen Plan of 1906 so the leaking of it is largely irrelevant to discussions about whether the 1906 plan was used by the Germans in 1914.
These factors would however explain the initial troop deployments of Plan XVII. The 5th and 4th French Armies were too far south and east to get in front of the 1st and 2nd German Armies in time to keep Kluck and Bulow in Belgium.
It is important to keep in mind that Plan XVII was not a 'strategic' plan like that of Schlieffen but rather a 'concentration plan'. Robert A Doughty writes in Pyrrhic Victory that:

While Plan XVII provided for the mobilization and concentration of the French army in the northeast and included alternatives for possible manoeuver, it was not a blueprint for strategy and operations in August 1914. In his memoirs Joffre explained that even though the plan established the broad outlines of possible manoeuvers, it was “impossible to fix a definitive manoeuver for execution a long time in advance.” According to Joffre a wide variety of information, “as much diplomatic and political as military” would arrive incrementally after mobilization and would require modification of any plan completed in peacetime;’ hence he chose to delay final decisions about strategy and operations until the military and political situation became clear in the opening days of the war.

The failure to guard against a more northerly advance by the Germans was the result of a French miscalculation rather than any reaction to the leaked plan. Joffre wrote in his memoirs that:

In fact, we admitted - and this was especially the sentiment of General de Castelnau - that the Germans would not place their reserve units in the first line. “If this he the case,” he said, “unless they extend their front dangerously, or make it too thin for any vigorous action, it would be impossible for them to march north of the line Liège-Namur.”

I confess that after a long reflection I came to the same opinion. However, I did not reject, a priori, the hypothesis of a wider German manoeuvre to the north of the Meuse. But in such a case I had a right to expect the co-operation of the Belgians and of the British.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#387

Post by Terry Duncan » 11 Jun 2012, 00:39

MZ,
The July Crisis was the unique event of a Germany risking war for the first time (all crises before had seen a Germany perfectly unwilling to risk war, not to speak at all of waging war)
Nothing forced Germany to risk war in 1914, Austria could have been told to follow a less conrontational policy than the one adopted and war avoided. If the July Crisis had been averted, there is no obvious cause for war that could not have been avoided if only the previously used methods had been employed.
a Russia only too ready to go to war (not for Serbia, they didn't care a dime about the Serbs, it just served as their Belgium, but for Austrian Galicia, the Straights and what could be termed Greater Armenia - as Russian puppet - and perhaps a greater Poland under Russian domination, incorporating much of East Prussia, the Posen Province and Silesia).
Russia was undoubtably willing to risk war to support her policies, but so were Austria and Germany, nothing forced any of them to act in this way. If the Crisis had been allowed to run over the time scale of the previous crisis and not being rushed into a war it is likely western powers would have not supported a Russian aggressive policy even if they did not agree to Austria going to war with Serbia. We could add a wish list of border changes, annexations, puppet governments installed and enemy powers reduced to minor power status for many of the Great Powers as a possible war aim, Russia is hardly unique there, but it is well outside the scope of this topic really.

Peter,

I will answer your points briefly, although it is rather of topic, as the points you raise deserve addressing;
The "obvious cause for war between the powers" was:

-After 1871, revanche and the conquest of Alsace/Lorraine.
No war had happened for 43 years over these territories, nor did the final crisis even come from this issue.
-After 1894, the conquest of Constantinople and the Straits.
Your dating is not really accurate. There had been no real change here since the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878, so a total of 36 years without war, and even your figure allows 20 years without war. Again the final crisis was not about this matter.
-After 1904, the defeat of Germany for reasons outlined in the 1907 Crowe Memorandum.
Even allowing for the Crowe Memo to have been a far different document than it was, there had been 7 years without a war, and three years without Britain and Germany clashing head on over an issue, they had worked well together in the 1912/1913 Balkan Crisis and if the will had been there in 1914 Berlin could have once again attempted a peaceful settlement via a conference. The Entente with France was signed 10 years before the war, and the clash that caused the war was not even in the west.

None of these issues had led to war so far, and there is no obvious cause in the forseeable future if the Great Powers continued to attempt to settle matters via talks as had been done for the past 100 years.

Hopefully this will answer your points and leave this thread able to remain about German planning up to 1914.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#388

Post by Mad Zeppelin » 11 Jun 2012, 10:40

Terry Duncan wrote:Russia was undoubtably willing to risk war to support her policies, but so were Austria and Germany, nothing forced any of them to act in this way.
The Austro-Hungarians were seeking a limited war with Serbia in order to 'punish' her and restore A-H's fragile status as a great power and her position in the Balkans, the Germans were encouraging them to do so for the same reason.
Russian full mobilisation could only result in one thing: all out war. The Russians were well aware that the Germans would hit in direction France first, so, French unconditional support was assured. Britain might not hurry to help Russia, but they surely would act when France was invaded (Germany violating Belgian neutrality would only be a bonus). Thus, Russia could play her game in full expectation of mobilising an overwhelming force against the Central Powers.

Isn't it strange that hardly anything is known about the conversations held between Poincaré's delegation and the Russian leadership? What did they do all these days? Talk about the weather? - Or was the revanchist Poincaré only too happy to be dragged into a war the Entente couldn't lose? And in which France would be the attacked innocent?

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#389

Post by glenn239 » 11 Jun 2012, 18:38

I'm a bit confused about your confusion as I would have thought that it was pretty clear
Your post was clear.
Austria could have been told to follow a less conrontational policy than the one adopted and war avoided.
Austria could have been ordered by Berlin to fly a kite on the Moon. Doesn’t mean Berchtold will obey, does it? That being said, your point that Germany should have taken a much more restrained position is true, and the fact that it did not is a sign that Berlin was willing to take a risk.
Russia was undoubtably willing to risk war to support her policies, but so were Austria and Germany, nothing forced any of them to act in this way.
Again, we’re dealing with humans, not robots. At some level every confrontation and struggle in human history has contained an element of irrational behaviour.
The Austro-Hungarians were seeking a limited war with Serbia in order to 'punish' her and restore A-H's fragile status as a great power and her position in the Balkans, the Germans were encouraging them to do so for the same reason. Russian full mobilisation could only result in one thing: all out war.
Yes, we know. The Russian mobilization sought a pretext to act, and did not come when it did as a genuine reaction to events as they were unfolding. This we know from the fact that Sazonov first declared Russia would not mobilize until Austria actually invaded Serbia, and then he switched himself upon discovering an opportunity to act much sooner than this, feigning indignity to a meagre bombardment of forts around Belgrade. A chance play-act with the Austrian ambassador, like Hitler became so fond of in the crises of the late 1930’s.

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Re: The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

#390

Post by peterhof » 11 Jun 2012, 19:04

glenn239 wrote:The Russian mobilization sought a pretext to act, and did not come when it did as a genuine reaction to events as they were unfolding. This we know from the fact that Sazonov first declared Russia would not mobilize until Austria actually invaded Serbia, and then he switched himself upon discovering an opportunity to act much sooner than this, feigning indignity to a meagre bombardment of forts around Belgrade.
Very true. Now how about recognizing and acknowledging the inescapable conclusion: the Russian general mobilization was the Triple Entente declaration of war.
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