The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

[peterhof]

So you concede that the words are simply Tuchman's invention and not derived from any writing left by Moltke or anyone he confided such thinking to.

Obviously, my point was that thoughts cannot be sourced. Given Schlieffen's obsession with the right wing, and given Moltke's alarm that "the enemy has evaded" the right wing, and given Moltke's letters to his wife (cited by Mombauer), it was perfectly proper for Tuchman to ascribe such thoughts to Moltke. Even the best historians indulge in such artistic license. Without it, history is reduced to little more than a dry recitation of documents.

We all understand the requirement to source quotations. But let's be careful not to abuse such a requirement for the purpose of stifling reasonable debate.

Maybe you can now return to the actual topic of German planning itself?

By all means.

[Terry Duncan]

and given Moltke's letters to his wife (cited by Mombauer), it was perfectly proper for Tuchman to ascribe such thoughts to Moltke.

Mombauer wrote in the last ten years, Tuchman fifty years ago, so it would appear highly unlikely that Tuchman read Mombauer for her knowledge, and iirc did not access Moltke's letters either - otherwise you would have been able to cite her crediting them for what she decided she wanted Moltke to be thinking.

it was perfectly proper for Tuchman to ascribe such thoughts to Moltke.

No it is not proper for her to say 'Moltke thought X' if her objective is to accurately record events, if she is simply putting into the narrative her own ideas she should say something like ''perhaps Moltke thought' or 'it is possible Moltke thought' rather than to give the impression she has direct knowledge of Moltke's thinking. That is of course why historians are so careful to provide notes on sources when making such claims. The main point though is that it is not proper for you to cite Tuchman's thoughts as factual evidence for what Moltke was thinking!

[favedave]

This particular character assassination of von Moltke was the reason I cautioned that we should begin to examine how he rose to be the German Chief of Staff, and not just chaulk it up to favoritism. What others who wanted his job said about him after the Marne and after the war is probably the least reliable source.

[peterhof]

The main point though is that it is not proper for you to cite Tuchman's thoughts as factual evidence for what Moltke was thinking!

The rules allow me to cite Tuchman or anyone else - especially in a thread about the Schlieffen Plan.

Mombauer wrote in the last ten years, Tuchman fifty years ago, so it would appear highly unlikely that Tuchman read Mombauer for her knowledge, and iirc did not access Moltke's letters either - otherwise you would have been able to cite her crediting them for what she decided she wanted Moltke to be thinking.

Pleas note the following from Mombauer's book,Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, p. 7:

"The edited letters and memoirs published in 1922 by Moltke's widow under the title Errinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, offer an insight into Moltke's personality, particularly in private letters to his wife."

[Terry Duncan]

"The edited letters and memoirs published in 1922 by Moltke's widow under the title Errinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, offer an insight into Moltke's personality, particularly in private letters to his wife."

And does Tuchman quote this source for the passage you quoted? My copy certainly has no such link. Given you do not agree with almost anything Mombaur writes it is strange you look to her for support over what Tuchman wrote?

The rules allow me to cite Tuchman or anyone else - especially in a thread about the Schlieffen Plan.

The rules do not allow you to misrepresent things, and citing a passage where Tuchman clearly expresses her own opinons in order to claim this is what Moltke thought is certainly heading down that path. Please be more careful when citing sources and now please return to the subject of the thread.

[Terry Duncan]

This particular character assassination of von Moltke was the reason I cautioned that we should begin to examine how he rose to be the German Chief of Staff, and not just chaulk it up to favoritism. What others who wanted his job said about him after the Marne and after the war is probably the least reliable source.

Falkenhayn certainly wanted the job, and it is likely there were others too. Ludendorff was notably ambitious but he was one of the less critical in many ways, maybe because he was so closely associated with the war plan used in 1914.

Of course, the other people with most reason to blame Moltke (and Hentsch) were those who would be blamed for things going wrong in 1914 unless a scapegoat could be found.

[Terry Duncan]

An off-topic post from Peterhof was removed by this moderator.

Terry Duncan

Peterhof,

Please return to the topic of this thread. If you wish to discuss off-topic matters with me please do so via the PM service provided by this site.

[peterhof]

Of course, the other people with most reason to blame Moltke (and Hentsch) were those who would be blamed for things going wrong in 1914 unless a scapegoat could be found.

Moltke was no "scapegoat." He was indeed to blame for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan just as General Groener said. Had Moltke heeded Schlieffen and done everything possible to keep the right wing strong and the left wing on the defensive, there is every chance that Schlieffen's plan would have given Germany the victory.

[Attrition]

Pardon me for being naive but wasn't the German strategy to fight the war beyond German borders? Isn't this why they kept the left wing strong? If the withdrawal of a modest number of troops from the western armies was intended in advance, isn't this classic warfare on interior lines? If so isn't the pursuit of the French the point where the strategy went wrong, rather than the Marne where it went into reverse? What's wrong with seeing the plunge into the interior of France as an attempt to press home an advantage after the French refused to fight it out, rather than the sine qua non of "ze plan!"

[peterhof]

If the withdrawal of a modest number of troops from the western armies was intended in advance, isn't this classic warfare on interior lines?

The only things "intended in advance" were to keep the right wing as strong as possible and the left wing on the defensive. These were the twin supporting pillars of the Schlieffen Plan (with regard to France) and Moltke violated both.

[Terry Duncan]

The only things "intended in advance" were to keep the right wing as strong as possible and the left wing on the defensive.

Really? So far we have seen no convincing evidence to support this view, only assertions that a dead general said this some eight years earlier. If this is true, why were the left wing armies still retaining their full compliment of cavalry and heavy artillery when these units would have been so much more valuable on the right wing? Why did Schlieffen instruct the Bavarian Army to prepare for an offensive from their position on the left wing during his last year in office? At the very least the information we have is contradictory.

If the withdrawal of a modest number of troops from the western armies was intended in advance, isn't this classic warfare on interior lines? If so isn't the pursuit of the French the point where the strategy went wrong, rather than the Marne where it went into reverse?

This is the latest conclusion reached by Terrence Zuber, who notes that the French could have retired to their internal lines even if they did not stand at the Marne and this would lead the Germans off on a wild goose chase where their supply lines were increasingly fragile. He believes Schlieffen intended to shuttle troops east rather than pursue to the Marne, to fight on interior lines as you say, and that it was by following Moltke the Elder's practice of improvising and launching into a pursuit of the French that Moltke the Younger made his mistakes.

[peterhof]

In her Pulitzer prize winning book, The Guns of Augustt, author Barbara Tuchman quotes Alfred von Schlieffen as follows:

-"In a two-front-war, the whole of Germany must throw itself upon one enemy, the strongest, most powerful, most dangerous enemy, and that can only be France."

-"Belgian neutrality must be broken by one side or the other. Whoever gets there first and occupies Brussels and imposes a war levy of some 1,000 francs has the upper hand."

"But the principles of strategy remain unchanged. The enemy's front is not the objective. The essential thing is to crush the enemy's flanks . . . and complete the extermination by attack upon his rear."

Actual German Army dispositions in the first week of September, 1914 reflect the accuracy of the above.



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[Terry Duncan]

-"Belgian neutrality must be broken by one side or the other. Whoever gets there first and occupies Brussels and imposes a war levy of some 1,000 francs has the upper hand."

A crippling indemnity indeed! Dr Evil of Austin Powers fame would no doubt approve!

"But the principles of strategy remain unchanged. The enemy's front is not the objective. The essential thing is to crush the enemy's flanks . . . and complete the extermination by attack upon his rear."

Flanks, as in plural? So if Schlieffen wanted to envelope the enemy 'flanks' this would of course mean some offensive action by the left wing too, rather like several commanders seemed to expect in 1914 when they were talking about a gigantic Cannae on the Catalaunian Plains.

Actual German Army dispositions in the first week of September, 1914 reflect the accuracy of the above.

Presumably therefore you consider Moltke's actions and dispositions to be the same as Schlieffen intended at the same period of the war. In which case it would seem rather strange to blame Moltke for doing as he did up until the first week of September 1914 at the least.

[favedave]

Peter,

There is certainly nothing contradictory in the quotes you posted with the idea that the Right Wing was intended to draw half the French Army into Belgium, away from their logigistical support, while the Left Wing drew of the rest of the French Army into German held Alsace and Lorraine with a strategic retreat, where they could be taken in detail in a series of Cannaes, and then Fortress System on the Left wing taken from the rear while it was being attacked from the front. War won. It does fit the reality of the circumstances in August 1914 and had a much greater chance of success, as illustrated by Germany's victory in the Battle for France in May of 1940.

The 1905 Schlieffen Plan, as you have so often noted, is a wild imprudent gamble with little or no chance of success. I just can't believe that the German General Staff would press the Kaiser to go to war as they did in 1914 with almost no hope of victory.

[peterhof]

Peter,

The 1905 Schlieffen Plan, as you have so often noted, is a wild imprudent gamble with little or no chance of success. I just can't believe that the German General Staff would press the Kaiser to go to war as they did in 1914 with almost no hope of victory.

What you "just can't believe" is that the Triple Entente were intent upon war. Some posters are fond of quoting Moltke's ". . . The sooner the better for us," but they always forget "We do not want it." How could Germany embark voluntarily upon "a wild imprudent gamble with little or no chance of success?" How could Germany possibly "want" to confront a combination as formidable as the Triple Entente? Moltke was sick with worry about the Russian re-armament program slated for completion in 1917 (see Mombauer's book on Moltke for details). This would reduce German chances of victory to practically nil. He and others therefore insisted that if war could not be avoided, it should happen "the sooner the better."
Please note that von Schlieffen went to great lengths to ascertain world reaction to the planned violation of Dutch and Belgian neutrality. See Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (Arden Bucholz, Berg Publishers, 1991) for details. Please note also that the Kaiser was unwilling to use the July crisis to precipitate the war, but after Russia started the war on July 30th (by their own admission), the Kaiser had no choice but to proceed with Schlieffen's "wild improbable gamble with little or no chance of success."