The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

[favedave]

How the Kaiser forced three countries on Germany's western boarder into war is not the topic. Did Fay or Albertini have much to say on the military planning & preparations which mandated this inappropriate response to the squabble over Serbia between the three absolutist monarchs?

[Attrition]

~~~~~Steiner, Herweg, Joll, Rohl, Fischer, Ritter etc contain the more recent information. Strachan's book The First World War. Vol I. To Arms, is probably the best summery but it is not an in depth study of the July Crisis alone.~~~~~

Steiner? I've seen the rest except for Rohl, which is a pleasant surprise, not being an aficionado.

[Terry Duncan]

Zara Steiner covered the British side of events in the book Britain and the Origins of the First World War;

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Britain-Origins ... 0333734661

There are numerous books on the subject of the July Crisis and the former East German archive material still may yield some new info.

Did Fay or Albertini have much to say on the military planning & preparations which mandated this inappropriate response to squabble over Serbia between the three absolutist monarchs?

Not really. As noted in the extract from Herweg that I posted, these documents were not made available to anyone during the 1920's or 1930's and much was destroyed in 1945. Maybe some of the documents handed back as 'private papers' may surface, but at this point in time that is not too likely.

[Attrition]

Oh that Steiner, I thought you meant Michael Caine....;O)

[Trackhead M2]

Oh that Steiner, I thought you meant Michael Caine....;O)

Dear Big A,
He could have meant James Coburn in Cross of Iron.
Strike Swiftly,
TH-M2

[Attrition]

http://archive.org/details/WilhelmGroen ... ieffenPlan

PhD by M Stoneman (2006)

[Attrition]

The only things "intended in advance" were to keep the right wing as strong as possible and the left wing on the defensive.

Really? So far we have seen no convincing evidence to support this view, only assertions that a dead general said this some eight years earlier. If this is true, why were the left wing armies still retaining their full compliment of cavalry and heavy artillery when these units would have been so much more valuable on the right wing? Why did Schlieffen instruct the Bavarian Army to prepare for an offensive from their position on the left wing during his last year in office? At the very least the information we have is contradictory.

If the withdrawal of a modest number of troops from the western armies was intended in advance, isn't this classic warfare on interior lines? If so isn't the pursuit of the French the point where the strategy went wrong, rather than the Marne where it went into reverse?

This is the latest conclusion reached by Terrence Zuber, who notes that the French could have retired to their internal lines even if they did not stand at the Marne and this would lead the Germans off on a wild goose chase where their supply lines were increasingly fragile. He believes Schlieffen intended to shuttle troops east rather than pursue to the Marne, to fight on interior lines as you say, and that it was by following Moltke the Elder's practice of improvising and launching into a pursuit of the French that Moltke the Younger made his mistakes.

If this be true, Falkenhayn's strategy 1915-1916 looks less like a change to ermattungsstrategie than a return to it, after the ill-fated attempt to snatch victory in France in failed September 1914.