Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

[AJFFM]

Hi

As above, were there too few German cavalry units in August and especially in September during the battle of the Marne?

I read in Hew Strachan's book (I think, its a long time ago) that the Germans in 1912 and forward were thinking of increasing the number of their cavalry units, was this true?

[favedave]

"Get a Horse!" was the derisive shout stranded motorists heard most because horses were still the most reliable means of transportation on public roads in the years leading up to the war. Over rough terraine and muddy tracks horses and mules got most of the artillery and nearly all of wagons bearing ammunition, rations and letters from home to men residing in on the edges of No Man's Land. The heavy lorry was barely a decade old and like the aeroplane just about as reliable. In the summer of 1914 the idea for the armoured fighting vehicle was just that, an idea. It was the war itself and the challenges it presented which transformed these 'good ideas' into fully functioning war machines by 1918.

[Terry Duncan]

Hi,

I dont think there was so much a lack of cavalry in 1914 as a lack of it in the right place for what was needed. The German deployment gave each army its full allotment of cavalry, so those on the left wing had their full compliment of units as did those on the right wing.

If the conventional view was correct we should have seen all, or almost all of the German cavalry on the right wing. With the opening of the offensive through Belgium and into France the losses in horses increased, both in the cavalry and in the supply units too, many being lost due to eating unripe crops in the field. The further the advance went on the less able to make good on losses the army became.

I am not sure about the increases in cavalry you mention but will look for it some books I am going through at the moment.

EDIT: Post copied from The German Army Deployment In 1914 thread and edited to deal more exclusively with the cavalry question. For posts dealing with the German depolyment please follow the link below.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1782227

[AJFFM]

What was the basis of this allotment?

If the basis was Schlieffen then it makes no sense since you are through precious cavalry on fixed defences not to mention exposing your eastern front to the threat of larger Russian cavalry forces.

If the full allotment was based on logistical/doctrinal reasons then this means that indeed the German army lacked enough cavalry for breakthrough operations if they actually intended to use cavalry in an operational capacity.

I dug a little deeper and it seems that the Germans did indeed think that they lacked cavalry, in 1913 the German army, Prussian army actually, raised 7 mounted rifle regiments, 7th through 13th. That's roughly 5000 more troops (assuming each one had 4 Sq. at mobilisation). I have not even counted the reserve regiments.

[Sheldrake]

According to the translator of Achtung panzer! military historian Dr Christopher Duffy, Heinz Guderian was fascinated by the operations of the major cavalry formations in 1914. They had been a big part of the military history he taught in the 1920s and the subject of sevral articles he wrote in "Militaer Wochenblatt" in the 1920s.

Some Germans, probably cavalrymen probably did believe that there weren't enough cavalry. Guderian quotes the from the 1909 regulations "Moutned action is the predominant way that cavalry fights" He also quotes von Schlieffen in 1909 as writing the following about the modern battlefield "Not a horseman will be seen. The cavalry will have to accomplish its tasks outside the range of the infantry and artillery. Breech loading rifles and machine guns have banished the cavalryman quite mercilessly from the modern battlefield."

His conclusion is that the German high command over estimated the effectiveness of Cavalry as a recce asset and under estimated the effectiveness of aircraft.

[AJFFM]

Hi

Returning to the subject. In the other thread there was a distinction made between HKK and a cavalry corps. What is exactly the difference?

Also I was wondering about operational employment of cavalry. I mean HKKs were too big to be employed in a tactical capacity and the front was too wide and fluid to say that operational use in the early days of WWI was ineffective. Cavalry was highly effective in the East and the Middle East and there is simply no reason why they shouldn't be so in the west.

[Sheldrake]

Hi

Returning to the subject. In the other thread there was a distinction made between HKK and a cavalry corps. What is exactly the difference?

Also I was wondering about operational employment of cavalry. I mean HKKs were too big to be employed in a tactical capacity and the front was too wide and fluid to say that operational use in the early days of WWI was ineffective. Cavalry was highly effective in the East and the Middle East and there is simply no reason why they shouldn't be so in the west.

Re the distinction made between HKK and a cavalry corps: I thought HKK "Higher Cavalry Command" is the German for "Army Cavalry Corps" too.

Re "Cavalry was highly effective in the East and the Middle East and there is simply no reason why they shouldn't be so in the west." Apart from the size of the theatres of operations and thus the troop densities, denying cavalry the space to manoeuvre effectively.

[joerookery]

In the other thread there was a distinction made between HKK and a cavalry corps. What is exactly the difference?

There is a huge difference. It is one of the major exposé of our forthcoming book. Actually I'm also giving a talk on this on Saturday at the Southwest branch of the World War I historical Association. The corps configuration is indeed what they became in 1915 after they were made more whole. In August 1914 the HKK was an unpracticed, cobbled together ad hoc organization with really little staff, absolutely zero logistical function and real problems doctrinally, culturally, and in leadership.

and the front was too wide and fluid to say that operational use in the early days of WWI was ineffective

I guess I don't know what you mean exactly. But it certainly sounds like I would disagree with this. Great subject

[AJFFM]

What I mean by the last statement is that the front was wide open in the period between Aug. and Oct. of 1914 especially on the German right. The Franco-British troops only began stabilising the front there around mid October and before that the Germans had the opportunity to breakthrough either at the junction between the BEF and the French 5th or West of Paris using massed cavalry closely followed on by infantry which already have settled in Northern France.

From the previous thread it seems that the idea of utilising cavalry in an operational capacity was beyond the thinking of the German general staff which is why cavalry was evenly distributed and troops of the 3rd, 4th and 5th German armies attacking probably the most fortified part of the front had full cavalry complement (HKKs). Cavalry that would have been decisive in a breakthrough further west.

[Sheldrake]

What I mean by the last statement is that the front was wide open in the period between Aug. and Oct. of 1914 especially on the German right. The Franco-British troops only began stabilising the front there around mid October and before that the Germans had the opportunity to breakthrough either at the junction between the BEF and the French 5th or West of Paris using massed cavalry closely followed on by infantry which already have settled in Northern France.

From the previous thread it seems that the idea of utilising cavalry in an operational capacity was beyond the thinking of the German general staff which is why cavalry was evenly distributed and troops of the 3rd, 4th and 5th German armies attacking probably the most fortified part of the front had full cavalry complement (HKKs). Cavalry that would have been decisive in a breakthrough further west.

I refer you to the posts I have made based the critique by Heinz Guderian on Cavalry operations in 1914. Von Schlieffen did not expect cavalry to operate mounted within rifle-shot or artillery range of an enemy and could only be effective in the reconnaissance role. The only serious opportunity for strategic action by cavalry in 1914 on the West front was on the German right wing where the Germans might not have anticipated any formed French resistance after defeating the "Plucky little Belgians".

Guderian, devotes a large slice of the 1st chapter of Achtung Panzer! to the battle of Haerlen. He raises the question of why von Marwitz didn't either slip around the Northern flank of the Belgians south of the river Deimer or alternatively having decided to attack the Belgians the attack wasn't carried out by the whole of the cavalry corps and at least initially with a dismounted assault. This leads me to believe that Guderian thought that von Marwitz's mission wasn't unreasonable.

With respect to German expectations of their cavalry's capability in operational reconnaissance he quotes the Reicharchiv's official history "in peacetime altogether excessive hopes had been placed on strategic reconnaissance by large bodies of cavalry. As a general rule the probing cavalry managed to identify the enemy outpost line, but they were never able to break through and ascertain what was going on in the enemy rear areas. (Reichsarchiv, 1 126) I think that explains what the Germans might have been trying to do with their HKK.

Page five on this thread. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&start=60

[joerookery]

I refer you to the posts I have made based the critique by Heinz Guderian on Cavalry operations in 1914. Von Schlieffen did not expect cavalry to operate mounted within rifle-shot or artillery range of an enemy and could only be effective in the reconnaissance role. The only serious opportunity for strategic action by cavalry in 1914 on the West front was on the German right wing where the Germans might not have anticipated any formed French resistance after defeating the "Plucky little Belgians".

I would argue that we are looking at it from two different directions. The Reichs archive and Guderian were looking at it from hindsight. I don't believe I know of a section where Schlieffen said reconnaissance only. Here's a look from before to the dawn of the war.

The 1909 cavalry drill regulation still stated that the primary mode of fighting for the cavalry was mount-ed, albeit in conjunction with machine guns and horse artillery. Dismounted fighting was to take place with the support of the same machine guns and artillery. There was an increase in the manual in the num-ber of paragraphs that covered dismounted operations. It soared from 11 paragraphs in the 1895 manual to 46 in the new 1909 manual. There was to be reliance upon subordinate initiative –Auftragstaktik – and a sense that success on the battlefield would be accompanied by large losses. The future of the formerly primary regiments was not so bright.

Now I understand what you meant and I agree with you.

From the previous thread it seems that the idea of utilising cavalry in an operational capacity was beyond the thinking of the German general staff which is why cavalry was evenly distributed and troops of the 3rd, 4th and 5th German armies attacking probably the most fortified part of the front had full cavalry complement (HKKs). Cavalry that would have been decisive in a breakthrough further west.

I don't think it was beyond their thinking at all. But I cannot put my finger on exactly why it was as it was. Clearly, cavalry was an afterthought. If you examine the staff officer's "red donkey" you will even see how cavalry was left out. They certainly just waved off logistics.

[Terry Duncan]

I don't think it was beyond their thinking at all. But I cannot put my finger on exactly why it was as it was. Clearly, cavalry was an afterthought. If you examine the staff officer's "red donkey" you will even see how cavalry was left out. They certainly just waved off logistics.

It would be unusual if the Germans had forgotten how to use cavalry decisively as the Kaiser had needed to be prevented from leading battle winning charges of cavalry in wargame maneuvers under Schlieffen (apparently Moltke put a stop to it) and it was always seen as the weapon of choice in pursuit, a particular speciality of Uhlans. It is possible the Germans did not feel cavalry would be the decisive arm as so many officers of other nations thought, and so placed little reliance on it alone.

The logistics for cavalry units is indeed formidable, and the ability to keep it supplied was a drain even when more static warfare was taking place. Quite how to supply it over the huge distance of the advance into France is one problem John Keegan used to point out - along with all the artillery horses and those of the supply units themselves. Living off the land as Napoleon had allowed for was not going to be possible for any length of time with the numbers involved in 1914.

[Sheldrake]

I don't think it was beyond their thinking at all. But I cannot put my finger on exactly why it was as it was. Clearly, cavalry was an afterthought. If you examine the staff officer's "red donkey" you will even see how cavalry was left out. They certainly just waved off logistics.

Joe,

This isn't the first time I have heard ideas about clever use of cavalry on the west front. Is this an idea floated in the US taking the lessons on using cavalry from the US Civil War?

I think some Americans may not appreciate exactly how small scale Western Europe is by US standards. The battle of the Frontiers takes place between Belfort and Maastricht, about 300 miles, roughly the distance from Harrisburg Pa to Five Forks Va, the space over which the Eastern Civil War campaign was fought. I know some Americans who might consider driving that distance for an evening out! This area was some of the most densely populated and industrialised regions in the world at the time, including the Sambre and Meuse Valley, and dotted with fortified towns.

The combined strength of the armies of the Potomac and North Virginia was around 200k. .
In 1914 on the west front 1.4m Germans faced 1m French, 100k Belgians and 100k British, about 2.6 million men under arms. i.e. thirteen times as many troops for the same area.

The great cavalry raids of the US Civil war just wouldn't fit into the Western Front:-
Grierson's Raid of 600 miles would have been from the Dutch Border to Switzerland and back again.
Price's Missouri raid would be Maastricht to Belfort and back - twice!
Stuart could never have ridden around the army of Potomac if it had been over a million men strong.

The second issue is that the Germans didn't have any particular reason to look at the "strategic " use of cavalry as a mobile mounted infantry. Long distance raids were not part of their recent highly successful military experience in the wars of liberation, 1866 or 1870. Nor did the Germans have a centralised cavalry arm whose leaders might look, like Stuart for something glorious and independent to do. Napoleon concentrated his cavalry in Reserve Cavalry for shock action and exploitation. The Prussians had a modest cavalry Corps in 1866 but it was under employed. German cavalry was distributed between corps in 1813-15 and 1870. Their recent traditions were of recce and tactical shock action such as von Bredow's charge at Mars le Tour. Their infantry armed with breach loading rifles stopped the Austrian cavalry at Sadowa and the French Currassiers at Sedan. While some German cavalry officers may have looked at the wars in America, South Africa and the Manchuria as offering an opportunity for their arm, it wasn't ingrained in the DNA. I have been reading pre 1914 military textbooks and commentary on recent wars for a course I am delivering on C19th Battles. None of the Commentaries on 1866 and 1870 point to the opportunity for a strategic action by a large mounted corps. The main points are how rotten the Austrians and French cavalry were at reconnaissance and the general vulnerability of cavalry on the battlefield.

Terrence Zuber extolls the virtues of the German Cavalry Divisions, but despite his claims for Le Cateau as a great victory, the German cavalry were unable to turn the "Retreat from Mons" into a rout. The weakness and fragility of the German cavalry was shown up at Nery when my old battery L Bty RHA (and a few friends) battered the German 4th Cavalry Division.

There was a time when the German cavalry could have been decisive. That was in 1918 when the germans created breaches in the Allied lines big enough to deploy cavalry and, according to some British troops cavalry could have made the difference and turned Ludendorff''s failure into success.

[joerookery]

Sheldrake,

Great discussion! I would love to compare some opportunities with the American Civil War. Unfortunately, the Imperial Germans themselves really degraded the ideas. There is all sorts of anti-American Civil War doctrinal writings much of it fostered by Freytag-Lothringen (sic). They really disdain the American experience really considering them to be amateurs not the professional cavalry existing in Imperial Germany. It's too bad. I have toyed with comparing the two not from a depth perspective but rather from a speed perspective. Warfare against the infrastructure. But alas – there is just no traction there from the Imperial Germans themselves.

Their recent traditions were of recce and tactical shock action such as von Bredow's charge at Mars le Tour. Their infantry armed with breach loading rifles stopped the Austrian cavalry at Sadowa and the French Currassiers at Sedan. While some German cavalry officers may have looked at the wars in America, South Africa and the Manchuria as offering an opportunity for their arm, it wasn't ingrained in the DNA. I have been reading pre 1914 military textbooks and commentary on recent wars for a course I am delivering on C19th Battles. None of the Commentaries on 1866 and 1870 point to the opportunity for a strategic action by a large mounted corps. The main points are how rotten the Austrians and French cavalry were at reconnaissance and the general vulnerability of cavalry on the battlefield.

I am sorely tempted to send you our draft chapter on the development of Calvary doctrine. You would probably find it interesting based on your course preparation. I agree with what you are saying here.

Terrence Zuber extolls the virtues of the German Cavalry Divisions, but despite his claims for Le Cateau as a great victory, the German cavalry were unable to turn the "Retreat from Mons" into a rout. The weakness and fragility of the German cavalry was shown up at Nery when my old battery L Bty RHA (and a few friends) battered the German 4th Cavalry Division.

In my opinion Zuber goes seriously off the tracks in his books on Mons and the Ardennes's. The Mons book was really a catalyst for our research. I think there were lots of opportunities for the use of cavalry including after Mons but I always go back to the envelopment concept. That was the leitmotif. Why was it not used?

[glenn239]

In my opinion Zuber goes seriously off the tracks in his books on Mons and the Ardennes's. The Mons book was really a catalyst for our research. I think there were lots of opportunities for the use of cavalry including after Mons but I always go back to the envelopment concept. That was the leitmotif. Why was it not used?

In the past I asked Zuber whether or not Moltke could have put more cavalry on his right, to the purpose of surrounding and eliminating the BEF. (ie, throwing the British off the continent such that maybe they might decide not to come back). He poo-poohed the possibility by insisting that there was no way for cavalry to have outflanked/enveloped the fast-moving BEF, even allowing for more divisions allocated.