Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

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monk2002uk
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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#31

Post by monk2002uk » 14 Sep 2014, 20:07

Joe, I will do. Just making my way slowly through the book due to other commitments. Really enjoying what I have read so far! A fabulous effort.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#32

Post by steverodgers801 » 15 Sep 2014, 03:37

The problem was a lack of means to support such a fast advance as required by the plan. Units could break through but with a means to resupply and reinforce quickly any breakthrough could be quickly contained.


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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#33

Post by joerookery » 15 Sep 2014, 07:55

I agree but it is far worse. There was zero plan to feed the horses. I recommend you to chapters 15 and 17 of the Great War Dawning. The BEF was really brave but their German cavalry counterparts were totally messed up from a force distribution,c& c, and logistics perspective.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#34

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 Sep 2014, 13:33

Does the German problem stem from there being no actual 'German' army as a fully integrated entity, but rather an army formed from a collection of states where each of the major states had its own self-contained army? That could account for the initial spread of cavalry along the line rather than where they would be more useful? Was the lack of supply for the cavalry a throw back to the Napoleonic era where troops and especially cavalry were expected to live off the land when campaigning?

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#35

Post by joerookery » 15 Sep 2014, 21:17

Terry,
Great thought but nothing to do with states. The smaller state regiments were well integrated. Only the Bavarians had their own division and it was near their 6th army. Distribution and logistics was determined by the Great General Staff. There was a "live off the land" mentality BUT they also knew the saturation point. Is it possible they sub optimized deployment because they knew they couldn't feed them?? Then why did they move HKK 1 in a Herculean effort 2 days after the start of the general advance? Operationally this was a technically difficult maneuver yet history has not focused on it at all. Especially with the dysfunctional HKK organization.Perhaps there was wounded pride or lack of appreciation of what these hungry horsemen were asked to do. By the time they finished the maneuver it was too late anyway.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#36

Post by Terry Duncan » 16 Sep 2014, 02:06

Joe,

I always understood that the German right wing was about as strong as it could get due to the limits imposed by the road and rail network not being able to support more men, even if they had been available, Keegan in particular was always adamant about this being one of the main limiting factors. The movement of HKK 1 at such an early juncture would really only make sense if the initial deployment was always seen as a mistake but not corrected for some reason, or if the reason for its initial deployment had vanished and there was now no chance for its use in this locality. Maybe a lot depends on exactly what was the intended role for the left wing armies during the planning and how this altered once real war arrived?

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#37

Post by monk2002uk » 16 Sep 2014, 07:55

Just to reiterate, it was vitally important that all German armies had independent cavalry formations operating in advance of them. This is why the cavalry was spread along the line. The difficult weather conditions in the early weeks of the war limited the contributions of aerial observation. This applied to both shorter range aircraft and longer range Zeppelins and dirigibles. Understanding the enemy's intentions relied on cavalry reconnaissance. Remember that when the war started, there were several days of delays in forming up the various armies, French and German. The infantry formations were not lined up immediately opposite each other. There were vast swathes of terrain that were empty of infantry forces on the ground. This territory had to be denied the enemy's cavalry lest their cavalry screens enabled the following armies to get the jump.

All armies had small detachments of cavalry attached, often down to divisional level. These detachments took over from the independent cavalry formations once the armies had closed to within striking distance. Take the example of HKK 1. This was a 'corp' of cavalry divisions that carried out reconnaissance and screening missions on behalf of the German Fourth (and other) Army in the Ardennes. For several days, HKK 1 operated well in advance of Fourth Army. The German cavalry kept their opposites away from Fourth Army while the latter formed up and then began advancing as part of the wheeling movement. Likewise the French independent cavalry did the same, preventing HKK 1 from getting close to the French 4th Army. From 20th August onwards, the German Fourth Army had advanced sufficiently that there was no need for HKK1 in the area anymore. There simply wasn't the room left for HKK 1 to operate in front of Fourth Army so it was then moved to reinforce the German right flank operations.

As HKK 1 moved out of the way, the divisional level cavalry took over the reconnaissance and screening functions. The German 21st Infantry Division, for example, was heading west towards Bertrix on 20th August. Its forward elements were screened by the German 6th Uhlans. Squadrons from this regiment were several kilometres ahead of the 87th and 88th Infantry Regiments. One squadron ran into French cyclists in the town of Longlier, just east of Neufchâteau. The divisional command was alerted and infantry were sent forward to help. The uhlans tried to hold the French and outmanoeuvre them to the north. They had run into a French cavalry division, part of Abonneau's scratch force that had been created to screen the French 4th Army's move into the Ardennes. The uhlans, however, enabled the German infantry to close on the French cavalry division, which then backed off.

All armies, including the BEF, operated cavalry in the same way except the Belgians. This was only because the Belgians operated a different strategy at the outset of the war, dictated by the initial all-around defensive posture and then the requirement to contain the rapid German advance with limited forces. Thus the Belgian cavalry that defeated their German counterparts at Haelen had to be part of a hastily formed defensive line along the Gette river, rather than operating in advance of their infantry colleagues.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#38

Post by joerookery » 16 Sep 2014, 17:28

I love this topic! We rejected the " fair share" force distribution as it violated the basic planning method of applying available troops to the tasks that had to be accomplished. (Modern wording troops to task.). However, "fair share" is exactly what they did. 3 divisions on the right, 3 divisions on the left and 4 divisions in the middle. Why? Was there another task for the left wing as Terry pondered?

The task before armies 4,5, and 6 revolved around moving to contact. A task form fitted to a German reconnaissance squadron. As this might take more than 3 days 2-3 different squadrons would be needed for rotation on an army corps front and then surely the French would be found and the task accomplished. Just to make sure of this twice as much of the needed cavalry was already present in their normal corps structure and such a task was well within their expectations. All of this without touching a single HKK.

Then there was the single most important task of the entire operation - finding the allied left wing. Rather than assign massive cavalry with redundancy to this task HKK 2 got the mission. They were "assisted" by a chain of command that included variously 1st, 2nd armies OHL, and the Army of the Meuse. 3 divisions or 9 brigades having seen two of those brigades get mauled at Halen. The two cavalry divisions of HKK 1 were only moved from 3rd army control to 2nd army on the 20th in a maneuver that took 8 days. HKK 2 got to do this all with no logistic function, no real staff, and no radio. Meanwhile HKK 3 and HKK 4 did little with 5 divisions.

Unfortunately I am on a cruise off Scotland and have to pause.
Joe

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#39

Post by monk2002uk » 17 Sep 2014, 07:31

Joe, how tough - a cruise off Scotland... I hope it goes really well.

The issue under discussion now is not whether protective cavalry screens should have been in place but how big those screens should have been. You are correct in saying that the 'task before [German] armies 4, 5 and 6 revolved around moving to contact'. It was not their first task, however. The first task was to mobilise and to form up in order to be ready to undertake the task you described. German cavalry formations were mobilised very quickly and some were despatched to begin their screening and reconnaissance roles almost immediately. The distances between the French and German infantry forces were too great to support reconnaissance at the level you suggest. More cavalry was needed in order to project a sufficiently wide screen and to ensure that appropriate levels of rotation took place. One of the major tasks of the independent cavalry formations was to seek out and destroy their enemy counterparts. Given that these were known to be division or corps strength formations, this was another consideration in determining the need for larger cavalry forces to be involved in the centre and on the German left flank. It was only once the army formations were well into their second task of advancing to contact that much smaller regiment-size cavalry formations could fulfil the reconnaissance role.

It is interesting to speculate that the German commanders thought they knew where the French left wing was. This comes through very clearly in von Kluck's writings and in the behaviour of his army. HKK 2's primary role after the fall of Brussels was to find the British coming from the east, allegedly, and to screen the exposed open flank of First Army. Infantry corps were echeloned back as a second line of protection. It was First Army's role to get around the flank of the French 5th Army, not HKK 2's role. All of this changed once contact was made with the BEF, though von Kluck continued to operate as if he knew where the flank of the French armies lay.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#40

Post by joerookery » 20 Sep 2014, 09:04

Robert,

I agree. The size of the screen is the key discussion. I have always assumed that the divisional cavalry was adequate but maybe not. I think your characterization of the mobilization screening task is more accurate. Now to check the unit histories of HKK 3, and HKK 4. Did they have to get involved in that early task? If so was there a different approach to that task?

I return home at the end of the month and away from this wretched mobile device!

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#41

Post by AJFFM » 23 Sep 2014, 21:14

Can anyone provide me any info on Sordet's 1st cavalry corps operations in Belgium between 6th and 18th of August? It seems that he was able to go very deep into Belgium without being detected by the Germans.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#42

Post by Terry Duncan » 26 Sep 2014, 15:37

joerookery wrote:Robert,

I agree. The size of the screen is the key discussion. I have always assumed that the divisional cavalry was adequate, but maybe not. I think your characterization of the mobilization screening task is more accurate. Now to check the unit histories of HKK 3, and HKK 4. Did they have to get involved in that early task? If so, was there a different approach to that task?

I return home at the end of the month and away from this wretched mobile device!
I would raise another question on the subject of screening forces, as although the use of cavalry in such a role was traditional, the use of an infantry screen with limited cavalry to cover a force deploying is possible, especially as the Germans had almost twenty years to plan for it. There were already border forces to secure the frontiers, so augmenting these in front of an army that was intended to play a purely static role would be far more sensible than using major cavalry forces desperately needed for use with the parts of the army expected to conduct an offensive. I would expect these sort of things to be considered fairly early in the planning process if the left was never expected to play an offensive role, although I do not believe that this was the case with the left wing in this case, as from memory there are also significant artillery deployments there that could have been used elsewhere to better effect.

Then again, the problem with a purely static left is that it cannot work if the French do not attack across the common border, as according to Zuber and others, the Germans thought the French would attack through Belgium even if they had not done so, in which case it would be perfectly possible a static German left might be facing a static French right, both being little more than spectators as the fighting took place to the north. Even if the French left does attack, there is nothing to prevent it transferring troops to the left as soon as it becomes obvious the German main effort is there, if the German left is not capable of offensive operations of its own. This would of course need cavalry and artillery deployed on the left, especially if a significant effort is expected in case of deadlock occurring in front of the right wing.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#43

Post by Terry Duncan » 26 Sep 2014, 15:41

AJFFM wrote:Can anyone provide me any info on Sordet's 1st cavalry corps operations in Belgium between 6th and 18th of August? It seems that he was able to go very deep into Belgium without being detected by the Germans.
You can track the movements of the units on a day by day from 1st August onwards on this site I posted about some time ago, as it provides sequential maps of the western front;

http://www.carto1418.fr/19140801.php

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=209601

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#44

Post by monk2002uk » 28 Sep 2014, 07:49

AJFFM wrote:Can anyone provide me any info on Sordet's 1st cavalry corps operations in Belgium between 6th and 18th of August? It seems that he was able to go very deep into Belgium without being detected by the Germans.
The corps comprised three cavalry divisions that formed up near Sedan. During this phase, Sordet had three armoured cars built. There were three major phases of 'exploration' that occurred between the 6th and 15th August, based on Boucherie's excellent book 'Historique du Corps de Cavalerie Sordet'. On 6th August, the corps travelled almost due north from Sedan. It almost reached Liège via Bouillon, Paliseul, Rochefort, and Ciney. By the 7th August, 3e division de cavalerie (3e DC) had reached Dinant and Rochefort, 1e DC La Roche and Houfalize, and 5e DC Martelange and Allert to the east. 4e DC had been detached and was operating near Arlon; it would later be combined with 6e DC under the temporary command of général Abonneau. The divisions reunited on the 8th August and proceeded as far north as Villiers le Temple, Fraiture and Offlet, before turning back to the area of the La Lesse river WNW of Rochefort.

On 9th August, 1e DC to Eneille, La Roche, and as far as the l'Ourthe river in the direction of Houfalize. 5e DC reconnoitred to Bastogne and 3e DC to Neufchâteau.

The corps engaged German cavalry at Neufchâteau and to the west at Libramont and Bertrix on 9th and 10th August. 45th Brigade continued to screen Rochefort and towards Marche. The corps formed up again and headed north again on 12th August to just south of the river Lesse before crossing it and then engaging German forces near Ciney, Buissonville, Rochefort and Han-sur-Lesse on 14th August.

The corps then pulled back below the Lesse river again and crossed the Meuse on the 15th before heading due north on the 16th and then crossing the Sambre on the 17th, just west of Namur. Contact was made with the Belgian Army near Wavres and Ottignies, whilst 5e DC and elements of 1 DC engaged with German cavalry near Orbais, Perwez and Eghésée north of Namur.

Sordet's Cavalry Corps continued to fight with German cavalry in this area then fell back to protect the French 5th Army's left flank.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#45

Post by monk2002uk » 28 Sep 2014, 08:09

Terry Duncan wrote:I would raise another question on the subject of screening forces, as although the use of cavalry in such a role was traditional, the use of an infantry screen with limited cavalry to cover a force deploying is possible, especially as the Germans had almost twenty years to plan for it.
There was an immense amount of debate and discussion around the appropriate use of cavalry, on all sides. It was clear, however, that independent cavalry was needed operationally. It was the only way to mobilise and to project significant screening and reconnaissance as deeply as needed. A cavalry corps was about as big as an infantry division so it took a shorter time to mobilise. It could project reconnaissance forces far more deeply into enemy territory, as the main cavalry divisions formed central points from which the brigades and then regiments could fan out in rotation. There is no way, for example, that an infantry formation could have achieved what Sordet's Cavalry Corps (and its German equivalents) did in those early weeks of the war. Von Bernhardi wrote the most detailed description of how and why the cavalry corps was most suited to these types of operations. His works were so significant that they were translated into English.

Robert

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