Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

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Re: Surrounding the BEF & other tricks.

#16

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Jun 2013, 13:47

It has been decades since I read on the battles of 1914. What I do remember is the German cavalry division being light on fire power. The tactical doctrine of the cavalry left the German divisions less able to use the fire power they did posses.
Sheldrake wrote: Terrence Zuber extolls the virtues of the German Cavalry Divisions, but despite his claims for Le Cateau as a great victory, the German cavalry were unable to turn the "Retreat from Mons" into a rout. The weakness and fragility of the German cavalry was shown up at Nery when my old battery L Bty RHA (and a few friends) battered the German 4th Cavalry Division.
It may be possible to accomplish something clever on the game board, but it is unlikely those rules applied in the reality of the 1914 battlefield.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#17

Post by joerookery » 09 Jun 2013, 18:30

He poo-poohed the possibility by insisting that there was no way for cavalry to have outflanked/enveloped the fast-moving BEF, even allowing for more divisions allocated.
That is an interesting theory. The fleet footed BEF was far too fast for the cavalry??! Here and I thought that the issue was HKK2 could not find the BEF. When they did there were not enough assets on the right flank. I guess I hadn't thought that it really was the speed of the BEF.


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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#18

Post by favedave » 09 Jun 2013, 19:21

Isn't Cavalry's ability to deal effectively with infantry really dependent on the foot soldiers being initially stationary in some sort of line of battle? Charging through one or two battle lines, then wheeling about and going again while the infantry was suffering shock, panic and beginning to 'run for the rear' seems to be about the extent of it. When the cavalry is riding as many as thirty miles a day just to maintain a sembalance of contact, which von Kluck's did, calvary would be unable to form any kind of coordinated attack before the enemy had marched up the road and disappeared.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#19

Post by Terry Duncan » 09 Jun 2013, 19:52

He poo-poohed the possibility by insisting that there was no way for cavalry to have outflanked/enveloped the fast-moving BEF, even allowing for more divisions allocated.
It may not have been easy but it would certainly have been possible even with the cavalry at hand if it had performed its function properly, but at Mons and Le Cateau the Germans lot the BEF entirely and had little idea of the line of retreat for some time. Then again that would have meant admitting something German failed.
That is an interesting theory. The fleet footed BEF was far too fast for the cavalry??! Here and I thought that the issue was HKK2 could not find the BEF. When they did there were not enough assets on the right flank. I guess I hadn't thought that it really was the speed of the BEF.
Well it does make a nice soundbite doesnt it.
Isn't Cavalry's ability to deal effectively with infantry really dependent on the foot soldiers being initially stationary in some sort of line of battle? Charging through one or two battle lines, then wheeling about and going again while the infantry was suffering shock, panic and beginning to 'run for the rear' seems to be about the extent of it. When the cavalry is riding as many as thirty miles a day just to maintain a sembalance of contact, which von Kluck's did, calvary would be unable to form any kind of coordinated attack before the enemy had marched up the road and disappeared.
Cavalry can also act to pin a target just be its proximity and ability to catch units on the march before they can deploy, and thus forces them to either remain in place or move more slowly and allow supporting friendly infantry to catch up. It didnt have to actually engage to have an effect, and it could try to make the infantry move away from its desired route of march. If it caught unformed and unprepared infantry then it could destroy a formation in very short time, though catching infantry in such a way was far from easy with rifles ranging out to over a thousand yards.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#20

Post by Sheldrake » 09 Jun 2013, 22:55

Terry Duncan wrote: Cavalry can also act to pin a target just be its proximity and ability to catch units on the march before they can deploy, and thus forces them to either remain in place or move more slowly and allow supporting friendly infantry to catch up. It didnt have to actually engage to have an effect, and it could try to make the infantry move away from its desired route of march. If it caught unformed and unprepared infantry then it could destroy a formation in very short time, though catching infantry in such a way was far from easy with rifles ranging out to over a thousand yards.
Where and when in WW1 did this happen on any significant scale?

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#21

Post by Terry Duncan » 09 Jun 2013, 23:31

I wouldnt have a clue, if I had to look anywhere it would be on the eastern front, but that does not alter the fact that such employment was a traditional role for the cavalry. We could ask for successful charges of cuirassiers or uhlans in the traditional sense and see that they didnt happen much either, but it doesnt alter the fact that such charges were still hoped for and considered possible. Cavalry had also been armed with carbines or rifles though, so a large body of cavalry was perfectly capable of obstructing a line of march if anyone had the presence of mind to order it to do so.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#22

Post by favedave » 09 Jun 2013, 23:53

In August, 1914 the Allies retreated so fast, the Belgians into Antwerp and the BEF and French 5th towards Paris, the cavalry of the German 1st and 2nd only had contact with the rear guards after the 20th. At no time could they have blocked the route of march for the fleeing Allies or given the German Infantry time to catch up. I'm certain von Moltke's surprise at this turn of events was as great as Joffre's.

No one expected Liege to fall the second day of the German's invasion. Nobody expected the fortress system there to become instantly pointless, and itself be utterly destroyed by the 14th. The 1st and 2nd Armies were able to by-pass Liege with no danger beginning on the 6th and commenced walking through Belgium as if they were on holiday by the 10th. The poor Belgians could not get even verbal support from the French GQG who were solely concerned with launching Plan XVII and decided their best recourse was to retire to Antwerp. And certainly nobody expected when the French 5th and BEF finally came in contact with the German 1st and 2nd, that the two Allied commanders would direct their troops into a foot race to see who could get to Paris first.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#23

Post by Sheldrake » 10 Jun 2013, 09:16

favedave wrote:In August, 1914 the Allies retreated so fast, the Belgians into Antwerp and the BEF and French 5th towards Paris, the cavalry of the German 1st and 2nd only had contact with the rear guards after the 20th. At no time could they have blocked the route of march for the fleeing Allies or given the German Infantry time to catch up. I'm certain von Moltke's surprise at this turn of events was as great as Joffre's.

No one expected Liege to fall the second day of the German's invasion. Nobody expected the fortress system there to become instantly pointless, and itself be utterly destroyed by the 14th. The 1st and 2nd Armies were able to by-pass Liege with no danger beginning on the 6th and commenced walking through Belgium as if they were on holiday by the 10th. The poor Belgians could not get even verbal support from the French GQG who were solely concerned with launching Plan XVII and decided their best recourse was to retire to Antwerp. And certainly nobody expected when the French 5th and BEF finally came in contact with the German 1st and 2nd, that the two Allied commanders would direct their troops into a foot race to see who could get to Paris first.
fave dave,

This sounds like hindsight.

Who were you referring to when you wrote "no one expected...."

The Germans? Which Germans?

The ghost of von Schliffen hadn't expected the Belgians to delay the Germans for the best part of a month. The distance between Aaachen- Brussels- Mons is just over 100 miles. This took the Germans 18 days, at a rate of advance of 7-8 miles a day and hardly speed marching.

von Schlieffen presumably expected Liege to fall quickly as his plan was predicated on minimum resistance from the Belgians. That was why they borrowed the heavy siege guns from the Austrians


von Schlieffen might have been pleasantly surprised that it only took two corps to mask the fortress of Antwerp. He had expected to use five corps.

The French certainly hadn't expected the German Schlieffen plan - hence the strategic surprise and dogged determination to implement plan 17. So I doubt they had any expectations about Belgian performance at all.

After Mons and the French realisation of the extent of their mal deployment a rapid withdrawal of the Allied Left wing was common sense and a manouvre which enabled Joiffre to recover which other French commanders in 1870 and 1940 were unable to do.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#24

Post by favedave » 10 Jun 2013, 17:16

The "nobody" I was referring to were the command staffs of both the German and French Armies. Liege and its fortress system were in the summer of 1914 held to be the strongest defensive works in Europe. It was reckoned it could hold out on its own without reinforcement or resupply for 30 days by French and Belgian Military engineers. Its existence is the reason Schlieffen's original plan included Holland. But the German General Staff reckoned correctly that it could be taken with heavier artillery and therefore ordered up the guns from Skoda to do the job. (They didn't 'borrow' them, they special ordered them.) The Germans also correctly thought that the position itself could be neutralized by taking out the city from the northeast, leaving an open corridor between Liege and the Dutch border, reducing their potential opposition by not invading Holland. Taking Liege out was Ludendorff's planning job. Fate enabled him to assume command in the field to ensure it was done according to his plan. The Belgians also left the back door into Liege open and undefended just as Ludendorff rode up to it.

Nobody's planning would have included this stroke of good or bad luck (depending on the side), hence "nobody" would have anticipated it falling to the Germans on the evening of the second day of their invasion. It is my belief the right wing thrust of the Schieffen Plan, because of the rapidity of the fall of Liege began about a week sooner than anticipated by von Moltke's staff, and even at that it could have begun three days earlier according to von Kluck's memoires. The effect was to not give the French and the BEF time to get into central Belgium and establish solid defensive positions in front of the German juggernaut.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#25

Post by Sheldrake » 11 Jun 2013, 08:55

favedave wrote:The "nobody" I was referring to were the command staffs of both the German and French Armies. Liege and its fortress system were in the summer of 1914 held to be the strongest defensive works in Europe. It was reckoned it could hold out on its own without reinforcement or resupply for 30 days by French and Belgian Military engineers. Its existence is the reason Schlieffen's original plan included Holland. But the German General Staff reckoned correctly that it could be taken with heavier artillery and therefore ordered up the guns from Skoda to do the job. (They didn't 'borrow' them, they special ordered them.) The Germans also correctly thought that the position itself could be neutralized by taking out the city from the northeast, leaving an open corridor between Liege and the Dutch border, reducing their potential opposition by not invading Holland. ................Nobody's planning would have included this stroke of good or bad luck (depending on the side), hence "nobody" would have anticipated it falling to the Germans on the evening of the second day of their invasion. It is my belief the right wing thrust of the Schieffen Plan, because of the rapidity of the fall of Liege began about a week sooner than anticipated by von Moltke's staff, and even at that it could have begun three days earlier according to von Kluck's memoires. The effect was to not give the French and the BEF time to get into central Belgium and establish solid defensive positions in front of the German juggernaut.
Favedave,

Perhaps it is just your use of terminology that I am questioning. If the Germans really thought the fortress would hold out for 30 days then you appear to be arguing that the German 1914 war plans were based on a massive gamble. However, if, as you said, they correctly thought that the fortress would fall with heavier artillery, then they must have thought the forts could be captured earlier!

What is your evidence that the French or British planed to get into central Belgium to frustrate the Germans plans? What do you think the French knew about the German plans and when did they realise that the main German Effort was through Belgium. The British accounts claim that the BEF was not aware until the eve of Mons.

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#26

Post by AJFFM » 23 Aug 2014, 20:35

Hello

Today is the 100th anniversary of Mons. Reviewing the battle it seems that there was no cohesive approach to using cavalry in support of offensive operations on either side. Could this be a reason why no one cared about a role for cavalry in exploitation operations after defensive lines were broken into open rear?

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#27

Post by monk2002uk » 14 Sep 2014, 09:13

Apologies for coming late to this topic. The clearest indication of the German General Staff's desire to increase the number of cavalry formations came in von Moltke's Memorandum of December 1912. It was addressed to the War Ministry. Part 1 set out 'Germany's Military Situation'. This summarised the various threats posed to Germany. Several scenarios were touched on but the basic message was that Germany had to be prepared to go it alone against the Entente. Von Moltke went on to request two types of increase that affected the cavalry: an increase of the establishment; and an increase in the strength of the armies.

With respect to establishment, von Moltke noted: "The covering troops on the frontier, a certain number of troops for special employment and the cavalry regiments, which mobilise six squadrons, must be increased to reach the following strengths:-

800 men per battalion
A minimum of 150 riding horses or remounts, 6 horse-drawn guns, 4 horsed ammunition wagons, and 1 observation wagon per battery.

With these increases of establishment our active formations would have a superiority over France, if not in numbers, beyond all doubt in constitution and striking power, and France would no longer be able to catch us up in this respect."

With respect to increases in strength, von Moltke wrote; "At least three new army corps must be formed if we are to have the required strength for an offensive in the west while simultaneously affording sufficient protection to our eastern front. We must... put forward the following requirements:

b) The formation of several cavalry regiments in order to improve the organisation of the cavalry."

In other memoranda, von Moltke also alluded to strengthening the reconnaissance capabilities of the cavalry by adding air reconnaissance assets.

The information above is quoted from: 'The General Staff and Its Problems (Vol. 1): The History of the relations between the High Command and the German Imperial Government as revealed by Official Documents', written by General Ludendorff and published in 1920.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#28

Post by monk2002uk » 14 Sep 2014, 09:31

Zuber's comments about the BEF and the German cavalry are complete nonsense. I am about to publish an English translation of Die Schlacht bei Mons, which was the German General Staff's official account of the Battle of Mons. It shows very clearly that von Kluck was operating under the wrong assumptions about the BEF's location. He was expecting the BEF to come from the West, away to German First Army's exposed right flank. The independent cavalry HKK was dispatched in this direction, along with the air reconnaissance assets. The arrival of French territorial troops in Tournai added further confusion, these being interpreted as BEF forces in the first instance.

Once definite contact was made with the BEF by the main forward infantry corps of First Army, HKK 2 was diverted to try and manoeuvre round behind the BEF. The British anticipated such a move and had already transferred Allenby's cavalry to the BEF's exposed left flank. BEF cavalry brigades fought a series of successful delaying actions on that left flank, all the way from Mons to Le Cateau. This meant that when the lead units of HKK 2 turned in to envelop, they met the refused left flank of the British infantry at Le Cateau. Furthermore, Sordet's French Cavalry Corps reached the exposed BEF left flank. They took up position echeloned to the left rear of the British infantry line at Le Cateau. Sordet's force was not heavily involved at all, demonstrating how the German cavalry did not get far enough south to execute the enveloping manoeuvre that was so desired by von Kluck. Thanks to Sordet and to the French territorial forces that unloaded at Cambrai, the BEF's left flank was very secure against German cavalry.

After Le Cateau, von Kluck again misinterpreted the line of retreat of the BEF. First Army set off in a southeasterly direction, getting further away from the retreating BEF. German cavalry formed the bulk of the pursuit force (though this was not appreciated at the time) but again they were easily delayed by British cavalry rearguards. It should be noted that the Germans did exactly the same to the BEF during the German retreat to the Aisne in September 1914. Cavalry were extremely important and their role in this regard is grossly underestimated.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#29

Post by monk2002uk » 14 Sep 2014, 09:43

The screening role of cavalry was considered to be extremely important. The debacle at Nèry came about because the British cavalry unit failed to maintain adequate protective outposts during the night. The British cavalrymen and the gunners, as noted earlier in this thread, fought well but it was a case of shutting the door after the horse had bolted... This episode mirrors the issue on a much grander scale. The Germans needed cavalry all along the front in order to understand what the French were doing and in order to prevent the French from understanding what they were doing. The German cavalry in the Ardennes, for example, were able to screen the French from understanding the scale of what struck them during the Battle of the Frontiers on August 22nd.

As the German armies closed to contact, the German cavalry were systematically transferred to the right flank, reinforcing HKK 2 and then contributing significantly to the Race to the Sea.

Robert

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Re: Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

#30

Post by joerookery » 14 Sep 2014, 12:56

Robert,

Some times I think you and I see the cavalry issue while others ignore it. HKK 2 did not have the forces to accomplish the tasks expected of it. HKK 1 was moved far too late and in a most awkward method. I think the race to the sea was too late.

I just read in Murland's book how the BEF killed 200 horses at Nery. This was the same hapless 4th Cavalry Division that had already lost 1000 horses and basically 2 brigades at Halen. Yet Nery gets the press not Halen.

Someday you need to tell me what you think of the cavalry cracks in chapter 17 of The Great War Dawning.

Vr/
Joe

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