Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?

[Terry Duncan]

Robert,

I agree with what you say about capabilities and debates over exact roles, but my point is that IF the left wing is only supposed to await a French attack and then defend, then there is no need for long distance recon deep into French territory on a large scale, so no need for a formation on a similar scale to that of Sordet's etc, only a need to protect the German formations from the French cavalry observing them forming up etc.

[joerookery]

Goodness I love this discussion! I returned home last night so I am more than a little bit disorganized. Von Bernhardi Was influential and indeed his book was published widely however, he was sort of a fringe guy with all sorts of pan – German leanings. I don't think he had a lot of influence on the great general staff who had to plan the operation. Fascinating discussion. I don't have access to the regimental histories of HKK 3 and four. Do you Robert? This could be very telling.

[monk2002uk]

Thank you for the clarification, Terry. Apologies for not understanding your question before. The German war plan was not that rigid. What if the French army had shifted most of their forces to their left flank? Waiting on the defensive with a limited depth of screen would have significantly delayed uncovering this. It was important to discover the enemy's forces and intentions as soon as possible, with an much operational depth as could be achieved in order to exploit opportunities.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

Joe, I hope the cruise went well.

Von Bernhardi was definitely not a favourite with the German Great General Staff. The aspects of his writings that I am referring to, however, related to practical details rather than the planning as such. These were details that lay below the radar of the strategic planners.

I haven't discovered any primary sources that have details of HKK 3 and 4, though I have many regimental histories of units that served in them. With respect to the Bavarian cavalry, there is bound to be material in the archives. I just haven't had the chance or the time to look.

Robert

[joerookery]

I think you are right about the Bavarian archives. I fully understand the lack of time. It is however an interesting discussion!

[Sheldrake]

The screening role of cavalry was considered to be extremely important. The debacle at Nèry came about because the British cavalry unit failed to maintain adequate protective outposts during the night. The British cavalrymen and the gunners, as noted earlier in this thread, fought well but it was a case of shutting the door after the horse had bolted... This episode mirrors the issue on a much grander scale. The Germans needed cavalry all along the front in order to understand what the French were doing and in order to prevent the French from understanding what they were doing. The German cavalry in the Ardennes, for example, were able to screen the French from understanding the scale of what struck them during the Battle of the Frontiers on August 22nd.

As the German armies closed to contact, the German cavalry were systematically transferred to the right flank, reinforcing HKK 2 and then contributing significantly to the Race to the Sea.

Robert

It is interesting to return to this thread having been in Mons on the 23rd and Elouges on the 24th Aug Nery on 1st sep and the Aisne on the 19th sep. I indulged myself with the kindle version of the new English translation of the German Staff History.

The German Staff history criticised v Kluck and v Bulow for not making better use of the HKK to manoeuvre round the flank of the BEF. Though I am inclined to agree with the comments made earlier about the effectiveness of Allenbys men in protecting the Western flank of the BEF.

The British cavalry were in far better condition than the Germans - or French, having de-trained on the frontier. By contrast the Germans had ridden through Belgium and The French had made some nugatory moves. The British had trained for the mounted infantry role and knew from the Boer War that a few riflemen could stop a mounted move.

The action at Nery is one of several incidents in 1914 which undermine claims of professionalism by the BEF. By the accepted rules of war this should have been a walkover for the Germans. The British had been caught napping while deployed non tactically. The German opening shots were lethal and incapacitated the Battery commander and knocked out two of the guns. However two factors mitigated against the Germans at Nery.

Firstly, the ravine stopped the Germans from following up their barrage with a mounted attack, which might have worked on that misty morning. Secondly, the rules of war had changed. As the mist cleared the German batteries - horse artillery and Machine guns were deployed in the open, facing several hundred well trained soldiers in cover with magazine rifles and machine guns. The Germans learned the lessons of Colenso a decade later.

The Germans were in peril from the moment they opened fire. They might have been better served had they crossed lower down and made a mounted attack on the Western bank.

[favedave]

First, Terry thanks for reposting that map set.

I find it inconceivable that there was no logistical support, or plans for it for these German cavalry units from the moment they left their starting lines. If the plan was really for the right wing to run from Aachen to Paris and crush the French in a gigantic pincer movement while the left wing stood pat and ultimately provided the anvil for the hammer of the right wing, the entire GGQ must have been smoking opium for 35 years.

The first phase of the 1914 Battle plan was scheduled down to the minute and provided for to the last set of rations. But the day that Liege falls (the 5th of August) the GGQ and the Army's field commanders seem to be at odds with each other. Von Kluck complained bitterly in his memoirs that his 1st Army was held for three days just west of Liege before von Moltke finally released it to start west. Von Moltke and the GGQ fully expected the French to rush into Belgium, perhaps even before the Germans invaded. Hence all the 'reports of French violations of Belgian neutrality and aerial bombing of train stations in Germany." before Joffre finally started following Plan XVII.

[joerookery]

I find it inconceivable that there was no logistical support, or plans for it for these German cavalry units from the moment they left their starting lines. If the plan was really for the right wing to run from Aachen to Paris and crush the French in a gigantic pincer movement while the left wing stood pat and ultimately provided the anvil for the hammer of the right wing, the entire GGQ must have been smoking opium for 35 years.

Dave,
You might consider it inconceivable but that is the way it was. If you have not read chapter 15 and seventeen of The Great War Dawning you might want to take a peek at it. Failing that you might want to consider the older work "Supplying War" by van Creveld. Used older copies should be pretty cheap. While not as detailed it should give you a general idea.

This concept of living off the land had been around for quite a long time. They were actually aware of the saturation point for troops living off the land. This was heavily over-saturated. I am not sure why they did not address it adequately but there had been an explosion of horses since the Franco-Prussian war. Reports of horses starving actually begin in the concentration centers early in mobilization. As we said it is uncanny how a staff that planned down to the number of cups of coffee at train stops did not even have a concept of HKK in their "red donkeys".

Relative to Liège I have tried to stay away from that but will probably be sucked in when Zuber's book comes out in November. The all-important lines of communication were not open on the fifth and sixth of August. Regardless of the statements of Von Kluck or anyone about operational zeal there was always this problem with logistics. It did not only apply to cavalry but the construction of the Etappe through the narrow defile at Liège was problematic. I would suggest a more well-rounded view was the 1929 book made by the US command and Gen. staff College entitled "Movements and Supply of the German First Army during August and September 1914". This is an in-depth interview with Kuhl and one other general. I believe it is eye-opening and available in English! There is some pretty harsh criticism in that book. I think it is more evenhanded than some of the postwar German blame game texts.

[monk2002uk]

There are too many attempts to 'undermine claims of professionalism' IMHO. The problem at Nèry was a fundamental failure in overnight security but it occurred in the context of the retreat and following the continual rear guard actions of the cavalry. That said, the British were fortunate that the ravine lay between them and the German cavalry division. The ravine is very deep but, as the attached photo shows, it is almost invisible from ground level. The photo is taken from the Nèry side of the ravine, just south of the village itself. The trees in the middle distance mark the edge of the ravine. Had the ravine not been there then the German cavalry would have been on their British counterparts most likely.

View towards the ravine

Nery.jpg (77.46 KiB) Viewed 519 times

Robert

[monk2002uk]

I would suggest a more well-rounded view was the 1929 book made by the US command and Gen. staff College entitled "Movements and Supply of the German First Army during August and September 1914". This is an in-depth interview with Kuhl and one other general. I believe it is eye-opening and available in English! There is some pretty harsh criticism in that book. I think it is more evenhanded than some of the postwar German blame game texts.

The monograph is available online here. The other general was von Bergmann, who was von Kuhl's head of logistics in the German First Army. It makes for very interesting reading and shows how quickly the First Army restored railway and other networks in the first weeks of the war.

Robert

[Sheldrake]

There are too many attempts to 'undermine claims of professionalism' IMHO. The problem at Nèry was a fundamental failure in overnight security but it occurred in the context of the retreat and following the continual rear guard actions of the cavalry. That said, the British were fortunate that the ravine lay between them and the German cavalry division. The ravine is very deep but, as the attached photo shows, it is almost invisible from ground level. The photo is taken from the Nèry side of the ravine, just south of the village itself. The trees in the middle distance mark the edge of the ravine. Had the ravine not been there then the German cavalry would have been on their British counterparts most likely.

Nery.jpg

Robert

Hi Robert,

I'll declare my interest in Nery as an ex Troop Commander of B "Dorrell" Troop of L (Nery) Battery. I agree, you need to walk to the Eastern edge of the field to see the extent of the ravine. But local terrain is what scouts were supposed to discover and report and why officers were trained inn field sketching.T

here is no doubt that unit for unit the British troops were very good. Their Regulars and regular reservists were gooid soldiers, trained marksmen and could use ground well. However, at formation level, there were far too many instances of idiosyncratic command decisions and sloppy staff work in 1914 for this to be merely an unfortunate incident.

There are questions to be asked about the co-ordination between the Corps at Mons. It is a little bizarre that the Germans manage to outflank II Corps on their Right flank on the boundary with I Corps. The deployment at Le Cateau appears to have shambolic. Had the year been 1914 and Haig served Stalin he might have been shot It is hard to justify the deployment of 5 Div's guns so far forward, on the initiative of the CRA 5 Div unquestioned by the GOC 5 Div or the Corps Commander CRA 5 Div.

The inter war papers from the British Army staff ride to the Marne comment on elementary staff errors such as neglecting to define movement orders in terms of a comon start point, and the failure to assign howitzer batteries high enough positions in the order of march in the broken country of the Petit Morin. There are too many incidents of friendly fire including one in which the Btritish artillery break up an attack by British troops flanking the Germans. There is extensive criticism of the use of the cavalry in the advance from the Marne, including the conflicting order to the 4th Cavalry brigade to screen AND to maintain contact with the French on their Right that hampered an effective pursuit.

The retreat is not an excuse. The British Army had extensive operational experience from continual operations on the North West Frontier and a decade earlier in South Africa, often under demanding physical conditions. Slack security would have been just as fatal against the Pathans or the Boers.

[monk2002uk]

I agree totally that the retreat was no excuse. Nèry was the proof, not that it should have been needed, that the failure to maintain appropriate security was potentially fatal. I understand the examples you provided of 'idiosyncratic command decisions and sloppy staff work in 1914'. There are more examples besides. But the same can found in the German and French armies. These examples reflect the pre-war difficulties of training for large scale manoeuvring of million-man armies right on down to the lower level formations, plus the fact that there is nothing like war itself, sadly, to reveal the weaknesses (and strengths) in the various command levels. The operational experience from the NW Frontier and South Africa were not enough to compensate for what evolved on the Western Front.

The Marne staff rides make for very interesting reading. It is also clear that the BEF, like their German and French counterparts, were asking the same questions of themselves at the time. I have reproduced the Marne battlefield in a modest way (see here). The photos and videos of the demonstration in Dormans' Memorial Chapel will be posted in the next few weeks.

Robert

[joerookery]

I have never been to Nery. Adding to Robert's picture is this picture of the sunken road at Halen. The mounted German cavalry could not see this from their starting point. It looks totally flat but is about 10 foot deep. Lots of horses stumbled in there. Interestingly, the charge was made by the same hapless German Fourth Cavalry Division.
betserbahn by joerookery, on Flickr

[favedave]

Monk, thanks for posting the monograph, "Movements and Supply of the German First Army during August and September 1914".

I've now got that in my file for reference. It does indeed make fascinating reading, as has this entire discussion.

One thing which has always struck me is the sheer logistical lunacy of the Schlieffen Plan as historically presented in the 1905 memo, and as it was executed in 1914. The variations which von Moltke introduced in preparing for it, and those which naturally occurred in combat from the first of August until the withdrawal to the line along the Aisne River, in no way ameliorated those logistical difficulties. In fact they increased them in everyway. Living (in part) off the Land is indeed calculated into any sizeable, or long term military operation. But the GGQ was not staffed by idiots. They knew full well they could not throw a million and a half men with their equipment and horses to pull everything on wheels and carry the cavalry into Belgium with any expectation that they would find enough forage for the horses once France was penetrated to take them to Paris. Munitions and rations don't move themselves.

This is one more bit of evidence that "The Great Haymaker", the right wing of the Schlieffen Plan covering 200 miles of French and Belgian Territory, was not the execution von Moltke and the GGQ actually had in mind. But as another German said, "Man plans, God laughs."

I believe that the German war plan had much more limited territorial objectives. While taking a course for my master's, I came upon a fact which makes the initial German deployment of cavalry much more sensible. Liege, Belgium happens to be Europe's second center for steel production. Abundant supplies of raw materials locally induced Britain's steel industry in the 1850s to invest heavily in complete production facilities in Liege, and build a rail hub which could move raw materials like coke and iron ore, and finished iron and steel any place they wished. The Belgian steel industry was in fact supplying a sizeable portion of Germany's imported raw materials before the war.

If we take the German General Staff's word, their only objective was to beat the French (and secondarily the Russians) so soundly they would never dare to threaten Germany again. With the war of 1870 as their benchmark, von Schlieffen and his successor, von Moltke the Younger had to take into account the changes in French Military doctrine and fortifications the Franco Prussian War caused. Attacking an army of equal size invested in formidable fortifications which had been designed to channelize their own troops into artillery killing zones did not seem prudent. The obvious answer was to go around them, through Belgium. This was the answer in the late 1870s which von Moltke the Elder and Bismarck quashed it. When the young officer corps of the 1870s took command of the German Army with the ascension of Wilhelm II to the throne, France was still the most formidable military power Germany faced, and Germany still had possession of Alsace and Lorraine, an area rich in natural resources both nations needed to feed their rapid industrial development.

When the war finally came both sides had been planning and preparing for decades. The borders between France and Germany and Belgium were not closed in the prewar years. The staffs of each of the field armies would surely reconnoiter every square inch of their assigned task as well as those of each army on their flank, noting terrain difficulties and places which afforded them every advantage when meeting the enemy. But I've never found any references to such 'normal' and expected activities. Nor did the German General Staff conduct such intelligence operations beyond the Franco-Belgian-German border.

If however, the German plan was to secure eastern Belgium to a point west of Liege, drawing half of the French Army as well as the BEF and the Belgian Army to that point, they could then count of their own logistical support from Aachen and Liege to be uninterrupted for all seven field armies on both wings, the right out of Aachen and the left out of Metz. This would cause the French to leave behind their logistical support bases and fight along exterior lines, while the Germans fought on contiguous interior lines with their logistical support immediately at hand. On the field in August, the German deployments also forced the French to separate their 4th and 5th Armies and the BEF and Belgians by several hundred miles from the French 3rd, 2nd and 1st Armies. The flaw in this approach was the fact that Joffre held back, waiting to see if the Germans were in fact executing the plan he expected them to. (The contents of the 1905 Schlieffen Memo was obviously in French hands as early as 1906) This delay in executing Plan XVII was responsible for the German 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies' nearly unopposed march through Belgium from the 10th to the 20th of August, and its march into territory which no one prepared to take. On the German left, the plan was to let the French move out of their fortress system into Alsace and Lorraine while the German 4th, 5th, 6th pulled back until they could close the bag the invaders and force their surrender. Then the 5th Army under the Command of Prince Wilhelm and the 6th Army under the command of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria would take down the Verdun-Toul fortress system with a combined attack on the front and rear. From there it would be a fast train ride for the two Royal Generals to the victory parade in Paris. Unfortunately the stunning success of the right wing caused the two Royals to complain to the Kaiser that they were being forced to retreat while everyone else was getting the glory. They went over to the attack before the French were fully enveloped and the French pulled back to their forts. This of course freed up sufficient troops to meet the gravely over extended German right wing and ended with the pull back to the Aisne.

[monk2002uk]

Just for interest, here is another view of the ravine. It has been created as a 3D view from an IGN terrain map. Nèry is on the left. The German 4th Cavalry Division attempted to charge from right to left. Ooops...

3D terrain map view of ravine

Robert