"Germany was the only responsible for WW1"

[JAG13]

Svebejev was lying, simple as that, Stevenson points out that German measures were negligible, and yet you try to back him jup in equating them to the disproportionate Russian measures.

Germany had taken measures, and Russia had detected them, the scale is unimportant. The idea that Germany was starting to move was enough. As to proof Sverbeev was lying, I am sure there is no need to take your word for it as you have no doubt read whatever reports were available to the Russians at the time and know for sure they had no reports saying anything like what Sverbeev reported. Then again, at the same time the Dutch and Belgians were noticing enough significant activity to lead them to mobilise too, and they had no borders with Russia.

Really? How do you know, detail the German moves as known by the Russians, Dutch and whatever.

Please detail all German military preparations known by the Russians July 29th.

Having no access to Russian diplomatic or military archives to check what reports, briefings, and intercepted signals, they had access to, I could not possibly do this, in much the same way you cannot possibly relate all that had taken place in Germany, because all you are relying on is the works of various historians you wish to believe and have not what is left of the German archives after much of them were destroyed.

Yes, I am relying on the work of historians, so what I claim has a far more solid base than Svernejev's empty claims that you try to pass as true... Nice bit on the archives, sadly the Germans pretty much did just as little on prior ocassions showing an MO.

Detail then the German measures so far taken, then we will compare them with the fact that Russia was actually mobilizing reserves on the German border.

As already pointed out several times, the scale is unimportant, it is the conclusion other powers drew from what they were detecting.

Lol, sure, people never lie in order to craft an excuse and do what they want. Lets see what Stevenson says about that:

Finally, what measures did leaders implement, and how can these be categorized? Surprisingly often, governments took no special military steps. In cases when they did, because of the notorious difficulty of categorizing such pre-paratory measures as intrinsically aggressive or defensive, I classify them according to the surviving evidence about the intentions of those who initiated them:

- D1: measures taken as defensive precautions against an attack considered a possible crisis outcome although not imminent;
- D2L: measures taken urgently against an attack seen as potentially imminent in a localized war;
- D2G: measures taken urgently against an attack seen as potentially imminent in a general war;
- O1: measures taken not as preparations for military operations but to sup-port diplomatic demands (i.e., "compellence," whereas D1 and D2 are varieties of deterrence. Categories Dl and 01 need not be mutually exclusive);
- O2L: measures taken as preparations for an offensive localized war;
- O2G: measures taken as preparations for an offensive general war.

...

"Even after Austria-Hungary's ultimatum Germany at first took only minor (D1) steps. None of these steps down to July 29 fell even into the "political tension" category, the second of the German armv's stases of alert, intermediate between winter troop increases and the two levels of Kriegsgefahrzustand or "condition of danger of war.

...

Nonetheless, it was above all Russia's measures that shifted the crisis from the Balkan level to new heights of militarization. The first point here must be to stress the significance of the "Period Preparatory to War" approved in principle by the St. Petersburg council of ministers on July 24 for implementation begin-ning July 26. The Preparatory Period regulations were applied in the military districts opposite Germany as well as opposite Austria-Hungary, and to the Baltic as well as the Black Sea fleet. According to the regulations, the relevant agencies were to check mobilization and concentration arrangements, purchase horses, food, and fodder, and ban their export. They were to guard bridges, dear frontier railways of rolling stock, and under the guise of maneuvers to move up extra forces to the border. They should distribute munitions and accelerate reservist training. The regulations were very extensive and had O2G as well as D1 elements, because not only could they speed a later mobilization but to some extent they were mobilization. From July 26 reservists and draught animals were being added to the standing army, even if the troops were supposedly being called up for exercises and the horses purchased rather than requisitioned. The GGS understood this, and quickly guessed that the Preparatory Period regulations (of which it had obtained a copy) were being implemented. By July 28-29 the GGS had evidence that Russian frontier garrisons were being reinforced, rolling stock was being assembled, and units were on the move.

Developments after July 26 suggest that the premobilization measures alone were enough to cause war between Germany and Russia, and that they started the events that led to the breach. On July 26 Bethmann informed his ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Friedrich von Pourtales, that "Russian preparatory measures that were in any way directed against us would compel us to take countermeasures, which must comprise the mobilization of the army. But mobilization would mean war . . . [against Russia and Prance]."° Furthermore, in a memorandum to the chancellor on July 28 Moltke alleged that St. Petersburg was cunningly preparing mobilization without declaring what it was doing. Russia might be able to wrongfoot the Central Powers by provoking them into mobilizing first, and then itself mobilize all the faster because of its preliminary steps. The situation, Moltke counseled, was worsening daily, and Germany must force its enemies to show their hand. As a result, on July 29 Pourtales conveyed a blunt warning from Bethmann to Foreign Minister Sazonov that, even if Russia did not proclaim mobilization, for it to carry on with the Preparatory Period would oblige Germany to mobilize and take the offensive.

Bethmann's warning on July 29, however, coupled with news on the same day that Austria-Hungary had followed up its declaration of war on Serbia by shelling Belgrade, hardened Sazonov in the conviction (which he was moving toward anyway) that continental war was inevitable. At its July 24 meeting Russia's council of ministers had proposed that if Serbia were invaded, Russia would carry out a partial (D1) mobilization against Austria-Hungary alone, thus seeking to pressure Vienna without a confrontation with Berlin. But without awaiting this eventuality Sazonov joined the Russian military after July 29 in urging Nicholas II to opt instead for O2G general mobilization against both Central Powers. Discarding the prudential arguments he had used in 1912, in a decisive meeting on July 30 Sazonov won the czar's authorization.

The Russian Preparatory Period measures and general mobilization were the most important proximate cause of Germany's decision to start a European war."

Stevenson

Jannen quotes Turner and indicates Sukhomlinov called the 3 year classes the PPW for European Russia allowed him, that would mean a LOT of troops. Yet, for you, scale is unimportant... there is no difference between buying grain and mobilizing reserves...

Yes, both on the 26th and again on the 29th Germany told Russia to quit mobilization measures on the German border, THEN on the 31st Germany gave them an ultimatum to cancel GM EVERYWHERE since GM means Russia mobilizes EVERYWHERE!

Curiously I posted the communication to Russia from Bethmann made on 29th July, it makes no mention of ceasing on the German border;

Bethmann to Pourtales 12:50 29th July;

Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented.

Any reason you decided to add in the part about the German border that Bethmann never said?

Because it both follows the warning on the 26th:

"Russian preparatory measures that were in any way directed against us would compel us to take countermeasures, which must comprise the mobilization of the army. But mobilization would mean war"

And reiterated on the 29th BEFORE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN PM ARRIVED IN BERLIN AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE THAN THE RUSSIAN SECRET MOBILIZATION:

"Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented."

Whu do you insist on that point when you have already been corrected on the timing of the notes proving categorically there was no German warning on the Russian PM? Add to that Bethmann shooting down Moltke on that very issue and your position becomes absurd.

Pre-mobilization measures were not unusual, they also served a diplomatic purpose and Germany hadnt had a problem with them in the past, this time it was different because THE RUSSIAN WERE MOBILIZING RESERVES, HENCE THE GERMAN OPPOSITION TO THEM.

You mean other than the secret mobilisation of 1912/13 where Russia had 400,000 extra men under arms and border units at above their war strengths as Zuber details in 'The Real German War Plan'?

Yes! The one directed solely at Austria, the one that didnt cause a war since it wasnt aimed at Germany, but ut did warn them about Rusian sneakiness.

When did Bethmann told them that PM would mean war exactly?

Bethmann never even told the Russians that full mobilisation would mean war, he seems to have been very deceitful about that matter doesn't he, so asking to see where he threatened Russia with war is a red herring as the the ultimatum does not even say such a thing.

He told them to cease all activity as noted above.

warning on the 26th:

"Russian preparatory measures that were in any way directed against us would compel us to take countermeasures, which must comprise the mobilization of the army. But mobilization would mean war"

And reiterated on the 29th BEFORE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN PM ARRIVED IN BERLIN AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE THAN THE RUSSIAN SECRET MOBILIZATION:

"Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented."

Bethmann warned them that war would come if they did not stop even their secret mobilization, funny that you or anybody might undertand that such warnings didnt apply to a general mob as well.

I can make the letters larger or use a different color as well.

So, again, Strachan and you (and Albertini for that matter) have no base for that assertion as proved by history.

Yet history proves Moltke's memo got things exactly right. You proclaiming others are wrong means little.

Lol, really? Lets see:

"At a meeting at the Reichskanzlerpalais on 29 July, Falkenhayn again pushed for a decisive German response to Russia's partial mobilization. `Against quiet. very, quiet resistance from Moltke', Bethmann opposed a German mobilization at this point, because his policy relied on Russia mobilizing first, so that she would appear to the German population as the guilty party."

Moreover, Moltke changed his tune and told the Austrians 28h later that Russian PM against Austria would not cause Germany to react:

"Moltke explained to the Austrian liaison officer Hauptmann Fleischmannal on 30 July that, unlike a Russian partial mobilization, German mobilization could be no half-measure and would automatically mean war. Moltke pointed out that a Russian partial mobilization:

gave no occasion for a similar measure on the part of Germany, since German mobilization would only follow upon the beginning of a state of war between the Monarchy [i.e. Austria] and Russia. In contrast to the already customary Russian mobilizations and demobilizations, a German mobilization would inevitably lead to war."

Mombauer, pp.204

So, again, Strachan and you (and Albertini for that matter) have no base for that assertion as proved by history.

Germany would never allow Russia to crush Austria, so if Russia staged a weak and counterproductive attack with only the troops on the Kiev district then Germany would warmly thank Russia, declare war and mobilize.

And yet again, Russian PM caused no German military reaction, why was that? You are trying to form a case around Moltke, his opinion was ignored, what better proof that for Germany Russian PM had not the significance Moltke INITIALLY thought...only to later change his mind!

Germany would never allow Russia to crush Austria, so if Russia staged a weak and counterproductive attack from only the troops on the Kiev district then Germany would warmly thank Russia, declare war and mobilize.

Even partial Russian mobilisation would be much more than one district, and as Moltke pointed out, even a partial Russian mobilisation would force Austria to fully mobilise and that in turn gives Germany casus foederis under the terms of the Austro-German alliance.

And yet it didnt happen... Bethmann said no, and that was it...

Kiev was the only one bordering AH, neither Moscu nor Kazan did.

Ok, why would the PPW end up in war? There is no actual need, those are just a limited number of measures that sets the table for a match, they can be completed or stopped at anytime with no further consequences.

If that is the case then why did Germany declare war on 1st August when they could have continued trying to get a peaceful settlement whilst mobilising and only declaring war when absolutely necessary? I would agrue that the phases should have been able to be curtailed at any point in the process, sadly the people who wrote the timetables did not agree in 1914.

They sent an ultimatum to make the Russians stop, they didnt, hence they had to declare war as a consequence. You cant threaten and then backdown. Once Russia starts mobilizing troops it is over, no one can verify a demobilization, or rather, stop mobilizing trusting that other is doing it as well.

He starts the chapter saying that its is the most likely scenario, sounds reasonable to me since certainty is impossible in this case.

But as you have noted, a far better case can be made against Tankosic, even though that would involve a far more marginal case against Serbia than Clark would want to admit. Even if you take all the original evidence available, all you have is that Apis said 'yes' and had no part in the inception, planning, or enacting, of the assassination. That is far from convincing even if we overlook that even here the accounts are contradictory.

Who on earth would believe that Apis did not know what his aide was doing?

So do you, so why didnt you post it?

You are the one saying the suggestion is somehow significant but decided to post a reply to it rather than the original suggestion Grey sent to Bertie.

That detailed the proposal being made, so what was your point? Was there ever one?

"German Ambassador here seemed to think it not impossible, when I suggested it, that after mobilization on western frontier French and German armies should remain, neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French Government would not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive."

So there is no confusion, this is consistent with Bertie's response and Lichnowsky's interpretation.

When They met again, Grey proposed they "remain facing each other under arms, without attacking each other, in the event of a Russian war." Lichnowsky then asked if he could guarantee French acceptance, to which Grey said that he would find out. At that point L knew it was over, the Frennch would not simply abandon the Russians. Grey went and wired Bertie the aforementioned.

The suggestion from Grey reflects his idea that all the nations should mobilise and then remain at their war stations as the nations tried to solve the crisis, in all probability reflects a desire to preserve the peace as best can be managed.

He mentions a Russian war, he clearly is proposing the neutralization of the western front while the CPs crush Great Britain's real enemy... makes a lot of sense for the IK's interests, it might not speak well of Mr grey however...

Any reason you are refusing to post who Lichnowsky said was responsible for the misunderstanding?

What I will ask is who did Lichnowsky say had made the error, and never deviate from blaming? As you, I, and even Strachan were not present, we can only rely on what those present said, what was recorded, and then try to make sense of it as best we can. You may not like Strachan's statement, so tell us what Lichnowsky said on how the confusion arose?

You ahve a point? Make it.

Does it matter? Grey's proposal is clear in writing to and from Bertie.

What Grey wired to Bertie is clear yes, what Lichnowsky wired to Berlin is clear, and we also have Tyrell's input at first. Added to that it is clear both Grey and Lichnowsky were both keen to avoid war, and there was by this point a lot of pressure on them, so mistakes could have easily been made.

And yet no mistake, so who is wrong?

If it doesnt matter who Lichnowsky said was responsible for the misunderstanding, why are you so reluctant to answer the question?

You have a point? Make it. Im done posting things you already have.

[Terry Duncan]

Really? How do you know, detail the German moves as known by the Russians, Dutch and whatever.

You imagine the Dutch and Belgians went to the expense of mobilising for no reason at all?

Yes, I am relying on the work of historians, so what I claim has a far more solid base than Svernejev's empty claims that you try to pass as true.

I am trying to pass nothing off as true, I said the Russians had detected German mobilisation preparations, nothing in relation to the scale, I did not even comment on how accurate the Russian reports were, again, because that is of little importance. What is important is that the Russians thought they were correct and that Germany was preparing to mobilise and go to war.

Lets see what Stevenson says about that:

Sadly the passages you quote from Stevenson say nothing about exactly what had been ordered in Germany or Austria, only that they did not fall into a scale of how the German army saw things.

Bethmann's warning on July 29, however, coupled with news on the same day that Austria-Hungary had followed up its declaration of war on Serbia by shelling Belgrade, hardened Sazonov in the conviction (which he was moving toward anyway) that continental war was inevitable.

Why do you suppose Sazonov had come to believe a war was inevitable? Also please note it was Bethmann's demand that Russia unilaterally cease mobilisation measures that was seen as critical.

Jannen quotes Turner and indicates Sukhomlinov called the 3 year classes the PPW for European Russia allowed him, that would mean a LOT of troops. Yet, for you, scale is unimportant... there is no difference between buying grain and mobilizing reserves...

Scale is unimportant because of the speed of German mobilisation once it was ordered, therefore any measures seen as leading to it were significant to other powers, especially Russia which would take far longer to mobilise. As I keep trying to tell you it was the fact Germany had begun her preparations for mobilisation that was seen as important.

Because it both follows the warning on the 26th:

"Russian preparatory measures that were in any way directed against us would compel us to take countermeasures, which must comprise the mobilization of the army. But mobilization would mean war"

And reiterated on the 29th BEFORE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN PM ARRIVED IN BERLIN AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE THAN THE RUSSIAN SECRET MOBILIZATION:

"Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented."

But this shows a change in the German position perfectly in line with Jagow's own change of mind, first Russian mobilisation against Austria was acceptable, then as soon as Russia started to act, any Russian mobilisation becomes unacceptable. You dont suppose the politicians had actually read Moltke's memo at this time do you?

Whu do you insist on that point when you have already been corrected on the timing of the notes proving categorically there was no German warning on the Russian PM? Add to that Bethmann shooting down Moltke on that very issue and your position becomes absurd.

'Corrected'? A most interesting choice of phrase. I have never said there was a warning about the Russian partial mobilisation.

Yes! The one directed solely at Austria, the one that didnt cause a war since it wasnt aimed at Germany, but ut did warn them about Rusian sneakiness.

Zuber records that it was border units on the German border that were at above their war strengths so your point is wrong.

And reiterated on the 29th BEFORE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN PM ARRIVED IN BERLIN AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE THAN THE RUSSIAN SECRET MOBILIZATION:

"Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented."

This specifies 'progress of Russian mobilization measures' and says nothing at all of a secret mobilisation. Why do you imagine Bethmann was so incapable of saying what he meant?

Bethmann warned them that war would come if they did not stop even their secret mobilization, funny that you or anybody might undertand that such warnings didnt apply to a general mob as well.

Never does Bethmann even mention 'secret mobilisation' and the closest he got to threatening war was to say war would scarcely be avoidable, indicating close but still not war itself.

I can make the letters larger or use a different color as well.

In which case I will remove the entire post containing such pointless behaviour. Up to you.

And yet it didnt happen... Bethmann said no, and that was it...

Bethmann said no and put the decision off for a day or so then fell into the exact pattern predicted by Moltke.

Kiev was the only one bordering AH, neither Moscu nor Kazan did.

Yes, of course. The entire Warsaw district in the Galician saliant has no border whatsoever with Austria-Hungary, nor did troop formations from elsewhere draw troops from within that saliant. How do you propose that Russia defend that area without depolying troops there, an area that also bordered Germany.

They sent an ultimatum to make the Russians stop, they didnt, hence they had to declare war as a consequence. You cant threaten and then backdown. Once Russia starts mobilizing troops it is over, no one can verify a demobilization, or rather, stop mobilizing trusting that other is doing it as well.

No, they can fulfil the consequences laid out in the ultimatum, which in the case of Russia not ceasing all mobilisation measures was that Germany would also mobilise. The ultimatum says nothing at all to Russia about war. Why not? Also if we accept your reasoning, once Russia started mobilising troops it is impossible to verify demobilisation, the German demand for precisely this is utterly dishonest, as she would declare war even if Russia said she was complying as there would be no way to verify this.

You have a point? Make it. Im done posting things you already have.

It is strange you want to imply some significance to this episode, including posting almost anything but the fact that Lichnowsky said that the misunderstanding arose with him and not Grey. You criticise Strachan for saying Lichnowsky was in error when this is exactly what Lichnowsky himself said, yet you wrote;

Strachan claims Lichnowsky was in error, this scathing telegram proves he was quite right and understood Grey perfectly, therefore Strachan is, yet again, wrong.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1891317

This would appear to make you utterly dishonest given you already knew what Lichnowsky said on the matter. Such tactics are not appreciated on a site where the objective is to record accurate history.

[JAG13]

Really? How do you know, detail the German moves as known by the Russians, Dutch and whatever.

You imagine the Dutch and Belgians went to the expense of mobilising for no reason at all?

Dutch: "Did you see the newspaper?"

Belgians: "Yep"

Dutch: "Didnt the German plan..."

Belgians: "Yep"

Dutch: "Should we..."

Belgians: "Already did"

Yes, I am relying on the work of historians, so what I claim has a far more solid base than Svernejev's empty claims that you try to pass as true.

I am trying to pass nothing off as true, I said the Russians had detected German mobilisation preparations, nothing in relation to the scale, I did not even comment on how accurate the Russian reports were, again, because that is of little importance. What is important is that the Russians thought they were correct and that Germany was preparing to mobilise and go to war.

A Russian ambassador claimed so, more than that is needed since they themselves where enacting far reaching measures and would be interested in creating A FALSE EQUIVALENCY in order to justify theur own measures... sound familiar?

Can you point out a similar comment by Sazonov?

Lets see what Stevenson says about that:

Sadly the passages you quote from Stevenson say nothing about exactly what had been ordered in Germany or Austria, only that they did not fall into a scale of how the German army saw things.

Lol, he created a table to give some value to the measures ordered by each country and explicity said Germany's were pretty minimal, D1 stuff not the worrysome actions you want them to be, that is pretty clear, and that Russia's were far reaching and pretty much a mobilication.

What is so hard to understand?

Bethmann's warning on July 29, however, coupled with news on the same day that Austria-Hungary had followed up its declaration of war on Serbia by shelling Belgrade, hardened Sazonov in the conviction (which he was moving toward anyway) that continental war was inevitable.

Why do you suppose Sazonov had come to believe a war was inevitable?

Because he had been proping Serbia against AH for years, hardened their position when they were ready to submit to the AH ultimatum, started a secret mobilization and now the CPs were showing signs of not taking it, threatened war unless they stop mobilizing and AH went ahead and declared war on Serbia, finally presenting the bill for years of Sazonov's "Balkan policy".

So now he would have to eat it knowing that he bore a great deal of responsibility and was ultimately responsible for the crisis and now Russian humilliation... or decide for war... he prefered a world war thank you very much.

Also please note it was Bethmann's demand that Russia unilaterally cease mobilisation measures that was seen as critical.

Which one? The one that threatened war on the 26th or the one that threatened war for the very same reason on the 29th?

Glad to see you at least not are insisting on that absurd PM stuff, so it is agreed it did not cause German measures and therefore Strachan is wrong?

Jannen quotes Turner and indicates Sukhomlinov called the 3 year classes the PPW for European Russia allowed him, that would mean a LOT of troops. Yet, for you, scale is unimportant... there is no difference between buying grain and mobilizing reserves...

Scale is unimportant because of the speed of German mobilisation once it was ordered, therefore any measures seen as leading to it were significant to other powers, especially Russia which would take far longer to mobilise. As I keep trying to tell you it was the fact Germany had begun her preparations for mobilisation that was seen as important.

LOL!!!!!!!!!

Read Stevenson again, you seem to be having a hard time understanding it.

Because it both follows the warning on the 26th:

"Russian preparatory measures that were in any way directed against us would compel us to take countermeasures, which must comprise the mobilization of the army. But mobilization would mean war"

And reiterated on the 29th BEFORE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN PM ARRIVED IN BERLIN AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE THAN THE RUSSIAN SECRET MOBILIZATION:

"Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented."

But this shows a change in the German position perfectly in line with Jagow's own change of mind, first Russian mobilisation against Austria was acceptable, then as soon as Russia started to act, any Russian mobilisation becomes unacceptable. You dont suppose the politicians had actually read Moltke's memo at this time do you?

Jagow didnt change his mind, he reacted heatedly to the PM news, was called on it, and backed down, he even said that he would need further instructions before communicating Germany's position.

Whu do you insist on that point when you have already been corrected on the timing of the notes proving categorically there was no German warning on the Russian PM? Add to that Bethmann shooting down Moltke on that very issue and your position becomes absurd.

'Corrected'? A most interesting choice of phrase. I have never said there was a warning about the Russian partial mobilisation.

Lets see:

"Actually it was Moltke who said this was the case, not me. See his Memo to Bethmann. It is hardly my fault he said what he did, and much as you may not like what he said, you have nothing to prove him wrong other than opinion. Indeed even your opinion would seem to be very much in the minority on this issue as even Glenn and Peterhof have agreed that Germany would never allow Russia to crush Austria through either full or partial mobilisation, which means Germany must act, and that means Germany will mobilise to support Austria, as Moltke said in his communication to Conrad, the moment Austria mobilised it would provide casus foederus for Germany."

"Jagow also shows you to be wrong, even partial mobilisation against Austria is going to set Germany to go to war."

You are implying Russian PM was a cause for mobilization based on a memo by Moltke that I have proved was ignored, not only that, Moltke himself changed his mind 48h later as proved by quotes; you also make a partial quote from Jagow, neglecting to say he retracted and indicated he would get further instructions on the issue.

So, there are no communications no threats to the RUssians indicating the German govt gave PM the weight you claim

Yes! The one directed solely at Austria, the one that didnt cause a war since it wasnt aimed at Germany, but ut did warn them about Rusian sneakiness.

Zuber records that it was border units on the German border that were at above their war strengths so your point is wrong.

Quotes and context.

And reiterated on the 29th BEFORE NEWS OF THE RUSSIAN PM ARRIVED IN BERLIN AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE THAN THE RUSSIAN SECRET MOBILIZATION:

"Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented."

This specifies 'progress of Russian mobilization measures' and says nothing at all of a secret mobilisation. Why do you imagine Bethmann was so incapable of saying what he meant?

Lol, that is your defense? It doesnt say "secret"? Please...

You have already been shown the Russians were mobilizing troops under the guise of the PPW, thats unacceptable and the reason why the German gave that warning.

Thats just silly.

Bethmann warned them that war would come if they did not stop even their secret mobilization, funny that you or anybody might undertand that such warnings didnt apply to a general mob as well.

Never does Bethmann even mention 'secret mobilisation' and the closest he got to threatening war was to say war would scarcely be avoidable, indicating close but still not war itself.

Lol, again?

That was the 2nd warning and Pourtales drove the point home, mob=war, you are just grasping at straws now.

I can make the letters larger or use a different color as well.

In which case I will remove the entire post containing such pointless behaviour. Up to you.

I seem to recall you using colors as well... in any case, we are clear the Germans did threaten war, right?

And yet it didnt happen... Bethmann said no, and that was it...

Bethmann said no and put the decision off for a day or so then fell into the exact pattern predicted by Moltke.

You mean the same guy who said on the 30th that a Russian PM was grounds for nothing? Given that the Russians kept their secret mob in spite of the German threats the situation couldnt remain unresolved and would force the German hand in any case, hence the pressure to mobilize.

You still have no grounds to sustain that PM pushed the Germans farther or even thought along those lines, beyond Moltke, and he changed his mind.

Kiev was the only one bordering AH, neither Moscu nor Kazan did.

Yes, of course. The entire Warsaw district in the Galician saliant has no border whatsoever with Austria-Hungary, nor did troop formations from elsewhere draw troops from within that saliant. How do you propose that Russia defend that area without depolying troops there, an area that also bordered Germany.

They didnt include Warsaw on their PM, it was however included on their PPW since all European Russia was.

They sent an ultimatum to make the Russians stop, they didnt, hence they had to declare war as a consequence. You cant threaten and then backdown. Once Russia starts mobilizing troops it is over, no one can verify a demobilization, or rather, stop mobilizing trusting that other is doing it as well.

No, they can fulfil the consequences laid out in the ultimatum, which in the case of Russia not ceasing all mobilisation measures was that Germany would also mobilise. The ultimatum says nothing at all to Russia about war. Why not? Also if we accept your reasoning, once Russia started mobilising troops it is impossible to verify demobilisation, the German demand for precisely this is utterly dishonest, as she would declare war even if Russia said she was complying as there would be no way to verify this.

They had already threatened war over the PPW, unless the Russians were complete idiots they would understand the message... and they did.

It was the first day, barely anything had happened by then, the soldiers even had 24h to put their affairs in order. SImple.

You have a point? Make it. Im done posting things you already have.

It is strange you want to imply some significance to this episode, including posting almost anything but the fact that Lichnowsky said that the misunderstanding arose with him and not Grey. You criticise Strachan for saying Lichnowsky was in error when this is exactly what Lichnowsky himself said, yet you wrote;

Strachan claims Lichnowsky was in error, this scathing telegram proves he was quite right and understood Grey perfectly, therefore Strachan is, yet again, wrong.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1891317

This would appear to make you utterly dishonest given you already knew what Lichnowsky said on the matter. Such tactics are not appreciated on a site where the objective is to record accurate history.

L was not well regarded in Berlin, if Grey made him think he was wrong when the notes show he was right L is just evidencing why Berlin thought poorly of him...

I am sorry, exactly how I am being dishonest?

[Terry Duncan]

I seem to recall you using colors as well... in any case, we are clear the Germans did threaten war, right?

Moderation staff need to make sure requests to behave reasonably are taken notice of, making them stand out works very well for this purpose, and they are not points under discussion. Such methods in general posting and hardly necessary. If replicating an original document where colour was used then it is ok.

L was not well regarded in Berlin, if Grey made him think he was wrong when the notes show he was right L is just evidencing why Berlin thought poorly of him...

I am sorry, exactly how I am being dishonest?

Lichnowsky had been very well thought of in Berlin, he went out of favour for not reporting what Berlin wanted to hear, just as Metternich before him had been replaced for reporting the German naval increases would see Britain side with France and Russia in a war and should be scaled back if Germany wanted good relations with Germany. Lichnowsky was also lied to by Bethmann and Jagow during the July Crisis so he would not reveal German intent to the British, so he was told what they wanted Britain to believe, not the truth. None of this has anything to do with the proposals made between Lichnowsky and Grey though, and it is far from clear exactly what had happened there even now.

Where you are being dishonest is in trying to claim Strachan is wrong in accepting the word of one of the two or three men who would be the only people to know what did happen (Tyrell, Grey, and Lichnowsky) and notably the one who said he was at fault and had made the critical mistake. You were quite happy to post all different parts of the incident in an attempt to make your case, but refused to post an answer to the question of who Lichnowsky said was at fault, probably because it makes your actions in using the incident to show Strachan was inaccurate in a poor light. We have no reason to disbelieve Lichnowsky in saying the original misunderstanding arose with him, and no really detailed accounts of what was said, and we certainly have no indication Grey made him think he was wrong - indeed I have never seen this claimed anywhere previously, so it would be interesting where you get this idea from.

[Terry Duncan]

The following is from Hamilton & Herwig's Decisions For War 1914-17. p109-111;

Shortly before noon on Saturday, 25 July, Nicholas approved the Council of Ministers’ proposal for partial mobilization, affecting
1.1 million men in the Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan military districts and in the Black and Baltic Sea fleets. He also declared that, if Austro-Hungarian troops violated Serbia’s borders, Russia would declare mobilization and war preparations would begin. Even then, he stated, it would proceed only in the districts adjacent to Austria. Russia would in any case enter the “period preparatory to war” during the night of 25—2 6 July. All troops would return to winter quarter from leave or furlough, and all fortresses on the western frontier would transition to a war footing.

Ianushkevich ordered his planners (still without Danilov’s leadership) to activate plans for the transition to “the period prior to mobilization,” a military phase of the “period preparatory to war.” This required officers to return to their regiments from leave and instantly converted all “probationary” General Staff officers to permanent status. He next prepared the draft declaration of partial mobilization for the tsar’s signature.

Neither the war minister nor his chief of General Staff had any background in the details of mobilization planning. Neither was familiar with the intricacies of Russia’s mobilization schedule or the assumptions on which it had developed. Neither understood the relative inflexibility of Russia’s mobilization plan and thus the limitations on their choices in ordering partial mobilization. Neither anticipated the stridency of the professional staff’s technical arguments against partial mobilization when it Learned of their recommendation to the tsar. In fact, the mobilization experts in the General Staff greeted the tsar’s order for the extemporization of a partial effort with horror.

General Danilov, head of mobilization planning, had viewed war with the Dual Monarchy as the trigger for German mobilization. Thus, partial mobilization, regardless of any usefulness it might serve as a “diplomatic telegraph,” threatened to paralyze Russia’s war fighting ability when (rather than if) Germany declared mobilization. Furthermore, Schedule No. 19 (Rev.) comprised a single, integrated, general mobilization; parts could not be pried off and jettisoned. To carry out Nicholas’ order would have required the preparation of an entirely new schedule that addressed only select military districts — and with no assurance that the partial measure would “fit” with Schedule No. 19 (Rev.), should Germany subsequently take offense and the tsar have to declare general mobilization.

The final act of the drama began on 28 July when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The General Staff technicians believed general mobilization was essential, and thus the urgency of advising Nicholas of the implications of a partial mobilization became acute. The following day, 29 July, Petersburg learned that Austria’s gunboats had bombarded Belgrade. Count Friedrich von Pourtalès, Germany’s ambassador to Petersburg, warned that if Russia did not cease and reverse all military activity immediately, Germany would mobilize. Sazonov, already doubting the wisdom of partial mobilization before that threat, wrote: “As we cannot fulfill Germany’s desires, it remains for us to speed up our armament and count on the true inevitability of war.” On 30 July Sazonov, Sukhomlinov, and Ianushkevich agreed to urge Nicholas unequivocally to declare general mobilization.

Nicholas sustained the hope that through direct communications with his German cousin, Wilhelm II, the emperors together could eliminate the disagreements into which their respective governments had seemingly locked them. Even at that crucial moment, Sazonov, Sukhomlinov, and Ianushkevich believed that even general mobilization by no means implied war with both Vienna and Berlin. The slow pace of Russia’s shift to a wartime footing— twelve to sixteen weeks — in their view offered extensive room for maneuver and negotiation. Danilov later wrote that, in principle, a declaration of general mobilization affected only the empire’s ability to defend itself and to place its forces in readiness.

Powerful as the military imperative for mobilization might have appeared, it did not convince Nicholas II on 30 July when, in a series of meetings with Sazonov and others, he labored long over the decision. Nicholas refused to take any of the urgent telephone calls from the General Staff that morning as he mulled over a telegram from his cousin: the kaiser declared that the decision for European war rested solely on Nicholas’ shoulders! Wilhelm II assured him that he would not be able to hold back events if Nicholas’ government took unilateral military steps.

That afternoon, Nicholas’ ministers urged him to act. Sazonov noted that Berlin had demanded “from us a capitulation to the Central Powers, for which Russia would never forgive the Sovereign, and which would cover the good name of the Russian people with shame.” Krivoshein argued that Russia was not the weakened state of 1908, but could again assert itself with confidence as a great power. Krivoshein’s strong conservative position, balancing considerations of strategic danger and domestic stability, gave him defacto leadership of the Council, eclipsing Goremykin whose deferential views of Council authority would lead to continued inaction.

Sazonov knew of Berlin’s diplomatic threats to Paris of the previous day and communicated this news to Nicholas. When confronted with this, his German cousin’s apparent deception, Nicholas II agreed to order general mobilization. Sazonov immediately called Ianushkevich with the imperial order — and told him to smash his telephone, to forestall any imperial second thoughts. The order went into effect on 31 July; Germany declared war the following day.

Conclusion

Did Russia’s leaders have a realistic grasp of the implications of their mobilization? Did they comprehend the nature of Germany’s policy sufficiently clearly to choose the best course for Imperial Russia? An important distinction should be noted: Russia mobilized; Germany declared war. Neither Russia’s entry into war with Germany, nor the empire’s eventual collapse from within, were over-determined by the political, economic, and social crises facing the country before 1914. Nor was military defeat preordained. At the beginning of 1915, much of Austrian Galicia as well as part of East Prussia were in Russian hands. Even a year into the war, Russia’s military prospects, if not sanguine, were far from bleak, in spite of setbacks. The German army had advanced no more than a few score kilometers from the East Prussian border and had not reached the Bug River. Even after the disastrous loss in the 1915 Gorlice campaign and even in December 1917, when Germany extracted a punitive armistice from Russia’s new Bolshevik regime, the front still had yet to reach the Russian core.

The conservative statesman Petr Durnovo from the Ministry of the Interior had written directly to Nicholas in February 1914 of the danger Russia faced if it confronted Germany. He declared that, “in the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable.” His prediction reveals just how little understanding Russia’s statesmen had of the quarter from which danger to the dynasty and state would come. The government’s gross inability to govern through the usual means available to a “well-ordered state” in times of either peace or war meant that its enemies, external or internal, would ultimately profit as crises turned to chaos.

[JAG13]

L was not well regarded in Berlin, if Grey made him think he was wrong when the notes show he was right L is just evidencing why Berlin thought poorly of him...

I am sorry, exactly how I am being dishonest?

Lichnowsky had been very well thought of in Berlin, he went out of favour for not reporting what Berlin wanted to hear, just as Metternich before him had been replaced for reporting the German naval increases would see Britain side with France and Russia in a war and should be scaled back if Germany wanted good relations with Germany. Lichnowsky was also lied to by Bethmann and Jagow during the July Crisis so he would not reveal German intent to the British, so he was told what they wanted Britain to believe, not the truth. None of this has anything to do with the proposals made between Lichnowsky and Grey though, and it is far from clear exactly what had happened there even now.

On the contrary, the cables makes the situation quite clear regarding the offer, neutralization of the west front including Britain, whcih is what the Germans heard and accepted provided Britain guaranteed such neutralization.

Where you are being dishonest is in trying to claim Strachan is wrong in accepting the word of one of the two or three men who would be the only people to know what did happen (Tyrell, Grey, and Lichnowsky) and notably the one who said he was at fault and had made the critical mistake. You were quite happy to post all different parts of the incident in an attempt to make your case, but refused to post an answer to the question of who Lichnowsky said was at fault, probably because it makes your actions in using the incident to show Strachan was inaccurate in a poor light. We have no reason to disbelieve Lichnowsky in saying the original misunderstanding arose with him, and no really detailed accounts of what was said, and we certainly have no indication Grey made him think he was wrong - indeed I have never seen this claimed anywhere previously, so it would be interesting where you get this idea from.

Im getting my idea from facts! L might believe he shot Kennedy but if the facts say otherwise, why would anyone believe that other than for selfserving purposes?

I posted both Greys and Berties cables and there is no doubt that what I am claiming is true and what Strachan says is wrong, HOW THE HELL DOES THAT MAKE ME DISHONEST? I am supposed to disregard reality just because of a delusional guy thought he was at fault in spite of all the evidence on the contrary? Please...

Whos being dishonest here...

[Terry Duncan]

Here is Terence Zuber's account of the Russian 'secret mobilisation' during the Balkan Wars Crisis. From 'The Real German Warplan 1904-14. p116 - 118;

On 18 October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece on one side and Turkey on the other. The Bulgarians pushed to the gates of Constantinople, while the Serbs overran northern Albania and reached the Adriatic. The Austrians were opposed to the Serbs gaining a base on the Adriatic. Austria began to mobilise in November and December to stop the Serbs; the Russians began to mobilise to support the Serbs. The German army issued sixteen intelligence estimates during the big-power crisis, five of which (21 November, and 20 December 1912, and 2 January, 28 January, and 18 February 1913) were preserved at the Kriegsarchiv in Munich.

It was clear to the Germans on 21 November that the Russians were conducting a gradual undeclared mobilisation. The Russians did not discharge the oldest group of draftees, as they normally would have done. This meant that the peacetime strength of the Russian army increased by 400,000 men. The active army regiments in the military districts of Vilna and Warsaw, opposite East Prussia, rose to a present-for-duty strength of 3,400 men, higher than the wartime strength. Especially in October, practice mobilisations and reserve training became unusually frequent. The Germans reached the conclusion that under these conditions, on mobilisation, and before the declaration of war, the Russians would launch raids on the German border. The Russians had begun mobilisation of their rail assets: empty trains were assembled and coal reserves topped off, sometimes by confiscation. Railway personnel were being augmented. The railway lines in western Russia were under military guard. Austrian sources reported of reservists being recalled and of the movement of mobilised units from the interior of Russia to the Austrian border. On the other hand, there were no indications that the French were taking any mobilisation measures, and the French border population and press were unruffled, in contrast to the anti-German attitude during the second Moroccan crisis in the summer of 1911.

The intelligence estimate of 10 December said that German suspicions had been confirmed: the Russians had initiated an extensive series of pre-mobilisation measures. The only measures that pointed to deployment were the preparation of the railway lines for long-term high-intensity service. Large-scale troop movements had not yet taken place. The training of the newest recruit class was to be completed in six weeks instead of the usual four months. Equipment such as vehicles, searchlights, telegraphs and telephones were being purchased overseas in conspicuous quantities and with short delivery times. This was in contrast to France, where the mood was calm. Politically informed sources said that the French did not approve of the Russian actions. (This was wrong. In fact, the French had let it be known to the Russians that if Russia went to war, so
would France.)

The 2 January 1913 intelligence estimate showed a continuation of the previous Russian measures to increase readiness. Individual reservists had probably been called up. Mobilisation plans had been reviewed at all levels. The rail system repeatedly conducted practice mobilisations. Overseas, the Russians were buying small-arms ammunition, field railway equipment, gasoline-driven personnel and cargo vehicles in 'extraordinary numbers'. Recently a news blackout concerning military matters was promulgated, closing off 'open source' intelligence to the Germans. Although there were no movements of troops from the interior, war-strength units on the border were continually conducting field training exercises. This reinforced the German belief that, simultaneous with their mobilisation, the Russians would conduct raids to disrupt German mobilisation.

The French had taken no obvious military measures, but since the beginning of November the British fleet had been at the highest state of readiness possible short of mobilising.

By 28 January 1913 the accelerated training of the 1912 recruit class should have been completed, while the class that was to have been discharged in 1912 was still with the colours. Russian infantry companies on the western border, therefore, had a present-for-duty strength of 215, little short of the war strength of 250. According to French newspapers, the Russian war minister said that the Russian army was ready, more so than ever before, a statement that the German intelligence section agreed with.

On 18 February the Germans estimated that when the Russian army announced mobilisation, it would in fact already have mobilised (this was underlined in pencil in the original document), and Russian mobilisation meant the beginning of Russian hostilities.

After 18 February the crisis began to wind down. The fact that it would have been impossible to conduct major offensive operations in the middle of winter, and that the political pot would not continue to boil until the summer campaigning season arrived, was certainly a major factor in preserving the peace. Europe now set out on an even more massive arms race.

Such extensive Russian use of pre-mobilisation measures came as an unpleasant surprise to the Germans and immensely complicated war planning. Pre-mobilisation measures offered the Russians a means to significantly speed up their actual mobilisation and deployment, reducing the disparity between the completion of French and Russian deployments. The Germans were faced not only with the prospect of a war on two fronts, but of near-simultaneous attacks on both fronts.

[Terry Duncan]

An interesting section from Stevenson on the causes of WWI plus the issue of 'war aims' Germany developed during the July Crisis, and where he deals with the work of Trachtenberg and Fischer. From The Outbreak Of The First World War. p28-31;

We now come to Germany’s decision to start a European war. It came on 31 July, with the ultimata to St Petersburg and Paris and the proclamation of the Kriegsgefahrzustand, or ‘Condition of Danger of War’, a state of alert and preparation similar to Russia’s pre-mobilisation measures, which was followed by general mobilisation on 1 August. In contrast to the blank cheque, this decision followed three days of hesitation and debate, not least because it was understood to mean hostilities not just against Russia and France but almost certainly against Britain.

Events between 28 and 30 July exposed the superficiality of the consensus among the German leaders established at the start of
the crisis. ‘When Wilhelm returned from his cruise he tried to back off. Early on the 28th he wrote to Bethmann that Serbia’s
reply removed all need for war, and suggested that the Austrians should halt in Belgrade, just across the border, holding the city as a guarantee that Serbia would honour its pledges. But Bethmann had no intention of being so deflected, and in communicating Wilhelm’s message he stripped it of much of its force, saying that he did not wish to hold Vienna back so much as to avoid a world war, and if one came anyway to make Russia seem to blame. On the 29th, however, he too changed tack, urging Austria-Hungary to accept the ‘Halt in Belgrade’ arrangement, which was now also being proposed by Britain. Although Fischer has questioned his sincerity there seems no reason to doubt it, and there are persuasive explanations of his behaviour

The first was German public opinion. The authorities were in contact with the SPD leaders, who were willing to accept mobilisation if the government did not repress them and St Petersburg was clearly the aggressor. Second, Marc Trachtenberg has suggested that impending Russian partial mobilisation made Bethmann hesitate, but according to Jack Levy the principal influence (and certainly the one the Chancellor cited to the Austrians) was a belated warning from Sir Edward Grey on 29 July that Britain would quickly intervene in a Franco-German conflict. If Levy is right, it would support Fischer’s insistence that the Germans gave the blank cheque in a mistaken expectation of British neutrality. This implies that an earlier British warning migh have led them to restrain Vienna while Russian preparations were less advanced and there was less pressure of time.

Anglo-German relations have remained among the most disputed aspects of the crisis, and Luigi Albertini, among others,
condemned Grey for not acting sooner. The evidence is contradictory. Britain had supported France in both Moroccan Crises, in the second via a public declaration in the July 191] Mansion House Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George. The ‘War Council’ had followed another warning that Britain would assist France in a struggle with Germany. But since 1912 Anglo-German relations had improved, and the Germans may have believed that the entente ties were weakening. By the spring of 1914, Tirpitz, Jagow and the Foreign Ministry’s chief British expert, Wilhelm von Stumm, were optimistic that London might stay neutral. On the other hand, Fischer’s critics have emphasised the depression caused in Berlin by the Anglo—Russian naval discussions, which suggested that encirclement was tightening its grip. A possible reconciliation between these viewpoints may be that after moving away from its partners Britain seemed abou to move closer again, which strengthened the case for resolving matters now. Furthermore, Grey’s initial caution in the crisis probably encouraged German illusions. He implied to the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, that Britain would stay out of a war involving ‘four’ Continental Powers, and on 23 July Betlimann advised Wilhelm that ‘it is improbable that England will immediately come into the fray’. By the 29th the Chancellor was confident enough to make a crass neutrality bid, offering not to annex Belgian territory (which was practically admitting that Germany meant to invade) or French territory in Lurope (though not overseas) if Britain kept out. The bid crossed with Lichnowsky’s telegram reporting Grey’s warning, on receiving which the Chancellor belatedly tried to put his diplomatic machine into reverse gear.

Like Poincaré’s and Viviani’s appeal to Russia on 30 July, Bethman’s appeal to Austria—Hungary came very late in the day.
Turner and Trachtenberg have questioned the idea that it failed because it was undermined by Moltke. It is true that on
the 30th Moltke telegraphed to Conrad, urging him to mobilise against Russia and saying Germany would do likewise. As Joffre
feared a Russian concentration against Austria—Hungary, Moltke feared an Austrian one against Serbia, which indeed was what
Conrad had already begun. Moltke’s action exceeded his authority (though he may have had Wilhelm’s approval for it), and
made it easier for Berchtold to reject Bethmann’s pleas. But before Berchtold’s reply arrived Bethmann had already decided
during the night of 30/31 July to call off his initiative, the chief reason being the overwhelming evidence now arriving of French
and Belgian as well as Russian military measures, in the light of which Moltke joined the War Minister, Erich von Falkenhayn, in
pressing for the Kriegsgefahrzustand. The Chancellor conceded that there must be a decision in any event by midday on the
31st, but confirmation arrived that morning of Russia’s general mobilisation, giving him the pretext that he needed to blame
St Petersburg and to carry the SPD.

The preparations made by Belgium and the Entente Powers, especially Russia, were the immediate reason for Germany’s actions. This does not, however, vindicate Bethmann’s apologias that Russian mobilisation had destroyed his peace initiative, that the crisis had got out of control, and that no government had wanted war. If Germany had stood by while its enemies got ready, the Schlieffen—Moltke Plan would have become inoperable and it would have had to choose between military suicide and diplomatic humiliation. But this was a dilemma that Berlin itself had largely created. Although there were two days of conflict on 29—30 July while Bethmann requested delay until he could put Russia in the wrong, there was much common ground between civilians and military. Bethmann and Jagow were ignorant of the details of the Schlieffen—Moltke Plan (including the seizure of Liege), but they understood it in outline, and the pressure that Germany would face once the Triple Entente started preparing. War against Russia and France was a contingency they had reckoned with from the start. No German leader, on the other hand, wanted war with Britain, although Moltke seems to have been indifferent about whether London came in. As late as 1 August, the Chancellor and Wilhelm jumped at a report that Grey was willing to stay aloof, and for a few hours they suspended the march to the west, overriding the CGS’s protests. When the news proved misleading, they let operations go ahead. This incident — the so-called ‘misunderstanding’ — demonstrates that the Emperor and the civilians rather than the military were in charge; but its outcome underlines that they too would accept the likelihood of war with Britain in preference to doing nothing while France and Russia armed.

If it is not true that the German authorities ‘lost control’ or were dictated to by Moltke, they certainly displayed outstanding
incompetence. Having misjudged Russia’s commitment to Serbia and Britain’s to France, they went to war with little idea of how to defeat either Power. Even against France, it now seems that although the General Staff expected early successes they were unsure about whether a decisive victory was possible. Nor did the Germans think much about their war aims and about exactly how using force would solve their difficulties. It is true that Bethmann’s neutrality bid betrayed his interest in French colonies, and on 31 July Wilhelm said that Russia must lose Poland. African expansion and a Central European customs union had been under consideration in the Chancellery since at least 1912, although in January 1914 the government had agreed that Germany’s existing customs tariffs were satisfactory. These straws in the wind, as well as the speed, once hostilities broke out, with which work began on war aims, suggest that Fischer is right to suppose that the government had some idea of what it wanted, and the July Crisis was not simply a preventive manoeuvre against encirclement. But this does not mean that Germany went to war in a premeditated bid for World-Power status. The decision-making in July was incremental and reactive: First a decision to use the Sarajevo pretext to start a local war and risk a Continental one; then a further decision to open hostilities with Russia and France; and from this latter decision the ultimatum to Brussels and the breach with London followed. The German leaders felt that they were acting defensively against encirclement and a deteriorating military balance, as well as propping up their ally. But their means of self-defence was attack, and their solution to their problems, though still waiting to be worked out, was Continental and global expansion.

[ljadw]

Here is Terence Zuber's account of the Russian 'secret mobilisation' during the Balkan Wars Crisis.

On 18 February the Germans estimated that when the Russian army announced mobilisation, it would in fact already have mobilised (this was underlined in pencil in the original document), and Russian mobilisation meant the beginning of Russian hostilities.

Europe now set out on an even more massive arms race.

The Germans were faced not only with the prospect of a war on two fronts, but of near-simultaneous attacks on both fronts.[/b]

[/quote]

Zuber is wrong at at least 4 points .

1)That the Russian mobilisation meant the start of Russian hostilities is plainly wrong : in 1913 Russia mobilised and there were no hostilities .

2)I like to see the proof that after 1913 Europe was set out on an even more massive arms race .

3)That the Germans were faced with the prospect of a war on 2 fronts ,is irrelevant and wrong : a DOW on and war with Russia was essential for a war with France wich was the important war.

4)Near-simultaneous attacks on both fronts would be impossible,because,this implies a French intervention,which was out of the question .

On 25 february 1909,Pichon (French foreign minister) gave the following instructions to his ambassador in Russia:tell Izvolsky that France would support Russia IF the Russian vital interests were threatened,but not in the problem of BH,where only the Serbian interests were at stake . (source :les relations franco-russes à la fin fu 19 ieme siècle et au début du vingtième siècle).


And,who would decide when the vital interests of Russia were threatened ? Paris of course .

In 1912,Poincaré said that his aim was to slow down Russian Policy in the Balkans .

And,it was the same in 1914.

Why would 1913 be an exception ?

[ljadw]

An interesting section from Stevenson on the causes of WWI plus the issue of 'war aims' Germany developed during the July Crisis, and where he deals with the work of Trachtenberg and Fischer. From The Outbreak Of The First World War. p28-31;

[b



If it is not true that the German authorities ‘lost control’ or were dictated to by Moltke, they certainly displayed outstanding
incompetence. ]

This is more than questionable: the Germans knew very well what they wanted and they got what they wanted : general war .Stevenson is also wrong when he is saying that Germany wanted a local war : a local war would not improve Germany's position .
The problem (for Germany) was that it as depending on the willingness of other countries to do what was necessary to realize her dream.

It was depending on AH to invade Serbia,it was depending on Russia to declare war on AH when this invaded Serbia,and it was depending on France to declare war when Germany attacked Russia .(Britain was secundary)
But these countries refused to follow the path that Germany had imposed them .

If it was proven that Serbia was guilty for Sarajevo,AH would attack,but Russia would do nothing and if the innocence of Serbia was proven, AH would not attack.

The halt in Belgrado proposal was not proving Germany's desire for peace : if Serbia was innocent, it would be to much,if Serbia was guilty,it would be insufficient .

Other flaw from Stevenson : while he is mentioning the attitude of the SPD, he is limiting this to war with Russia, while from the beginning,the SPD openly expressed her hostility to a war with France :only a war with Russia could force the SPD to change her POV .

One can not enough emphasize the decisive,influential importance of the SPD :without her approval,there would be no war .This explains the post war conspiracy of the SPD with Dr Stieve and his henchmen to conceal Germany's responsability for the outbreak of the war .

[LWD]

4)The comparison with Poland is flawed : France did not declare war because Germany attacked Poland (a French ally): there was nothing in the alliance with Poland that obliged France to declare war on Germany:in fact,France was willing to abandon Poland,if Germany would not use force;if Germany has attacked Romania,or Holland,France also would have declared war.The reason for the French DOW in 1939 was a moral one : some one (Germany) started an unjustified attack on a neighbour .

???? Sounds to me like you just said France didn't declare war on Germany because Germany attacked Poland but because Germany attacked Poland. Care to be a bit more coherent?

Sigh :roll:


In 1939,France (and Britain) did nor declare war because Germany attacked Poland,not because Poland was an ally,not because of the strategic importance of Poland.

As far as I can tell that's pretty much pure speculation on your part, except perhaps for the "ally" part.

If Germany had attacked an other country (ex:Denmark)which was not an ally,which was strategically not important,France (and Britain) also would have declared war : the reason for the DOW was a moral principle : France(and Britain) could not remain idle when a European country started a war of agression ;that in september 1939 the victim was Poland,was secundary,even irrelevant .

Yep, pure speculation/opinion. As a counter point why didn't they declare war with Germany invaded Austria or Checkoslavakia?

[ljadw]

Very simple : because there was no war in february 1938 and in march 1939 .

If Austria had opposed the Anschluss ,if the Czechs had opposed the German entry, if Lithuania had opposed the cession of Memelland, Britain and France would have intervened .

In november 1937,Britain had told Hitler that it would not oppose German domination of Eastern Europe,AS LONG it happened without fighting .

Britain and France did not declare war about German domination of Eastern Europe, not about the anschluss of territories to Germany,but on a principle : the German invasion of an other country .They could/would never allow this .

An invasion without fighting : no problem . An invasion with fighting means war .

It is as simple as that .

[ljadw]

4)The comparison with Poland is flawed : France did not declare war because Germany attacked Poland (a French ally): there was nothing in the alliance with Poland that obliged France to declare war on Germany:in fact,France was willing to abandon Poland,if Germany would not use force;if Germany has attacked Romania,or Holland,France also would have declared war.The reason for the French DOW in 1939 was a moral one : some one (Germany) started an unjustified attack on a neighbour .

???? Sounds to me like you just said France didn't declare war on Germany because Germany attacked Poland but because Germany attacked Poland. Care to be a bit more coherent?

Sigh :roll:


In 1939,France (and Britain) did nor declare war because Germany attacked Poland,not because Poland was an ally,not because of the strategic importance of Poland.

As far as I can tell that's pretty much pure speculation on your part, except perhaps for the "ally" part.

If Germany had attacked an other country (ex:Denmark)which was not an ally,which was strategically not important,France (and Britain) also would have declared war : the reason for the DOW was a moral principle : France(and Britain) could not remain idle when a European country started a war of agression ;that in september 1939 the victim was Poland,was secundary,even irrelevant .

Yep, pure speculation/opinion.

No speculation : there was no guarentee to Poland in march 1939,but to a lot of countries ,to prevent Hitler from invading these countries . It was not about Poland .

[LWD]

... No speculation : there was no guarentee to Poland in march 1939,but to a lot of countries ,to prevent Hitler from invading these countries . It was not about Poland .

Indeed speculation and faulty logic. Because other countries did or din't recieve the guarantees at a particular time doesn't mean that it wasn't about Poland. Indeed Checkoslavakia had such guarantees did it not? Of course what I was predominantly aiming at with the speculation comment was your assumption that it was simply a "moral" decision. While that likely was a factor I have yet to see any strong argument for it being the sole or even overwhelming one.

[ljadw]

Czechoslovakia had no guarantees from Britain,anf the French guarantee was that theoretical that it was meaningless .