Hello dear friends! need help from you!
I edit Wikipedia article "Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes". I have a problem with the number of losses of the German army. I have seen information on different sites that the losses of the German army were 16,200 kia,wia,mia in this battle. but these sites unauthoritative sources. Can you point me the real number of German losses from serious book, I could point this book in wikipedia as a source of information?
Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
Yura,
the German official history (Reichsarchiv "Der Weltkrieg" vol. 7 "Die Operationen des Jahres 1915. Die Ereignisse im Winter und Frühjahr", Berlin 1931) gives the following numbers at the end of operations at 22nd of February 1915:
Russian POW in German hands: 92.000 (including 9 generals)
295 Russian artillery pieces captured
170 Russian machine guns captured
Russian sources are quoted to the effect that four Russian divisions lost all their artillery, 1859 vehicles and 5446 horses
German XXI. AK had lost 120 officers (including one general and two regimental commanders) and 5600 other ranks - but these are explicitly only combat casualties and do not casualties due to attrition due to marching and weather.
German XXXVIII. RK and XXXIX. RK both had about 3% combat casualties but were at two thirds of their regular combat strength due to illness, frostbite, etc. I think one can assume that XXI. AK had suffered accordingly.
regards
Matt
the German official history (Reichsarchiv "Der Weltkrieg" vol. 7 "Die Operationen des Jahres 1915. Die Ereignisse im Winter und Frühjahr", Berlin 1931) gives the following numbers at the end of operations at 22nd of February 1915:
Russian POW in German hands: 92.000 (including 9 generals)
295 Russian artillery pieces captured
170 Russian machine guns captured
Russian sources are quoted to the effect that four Russian divisions lost all their artillery, 1859 vehicles and 5446 horses
German XXI. AK had lost 120 officers (including one general and two regimental commanders) and 5600 other ranks - but these are explicitly only combat casualties and do not casualties due to attrition due to marching and weather.
German XXXVIII. RK and XXXIX. RK both had about 3% combat casualties but were at two thirds of their regular combat strength due to illness, frostbite, etc. I think one can assume that XXI. AK had suffered accordingly.
regards
Matt
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
92 000 prisoners - too high number. All the Russian troops in this area were off 126 000 men stregth. According to Russian historian Kersnovsky Russian army in this battle lost 56 000 killed, wounded and missed.
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
teg,
what casualties does Kersnovsky give for the German side? And does he give the ration strengths of the four divisions that were surrounded by the Germans before the battle? The German claim of nearly 100.000 prisoners might well be to high but given the destruction of 10th army I find the 56.000 a bit low if it included the prisoners.
Ah, lots of questions - would be great if that book was available in English or German!
best regards
Matt
what casualties does Kersnovsky give for the German side? And does he give the ration strengths of the four divisions that were surrounded by the Germans before the battle? The German claim of nearly 100.000 prisoners might well be to high but given the destruction of 10th army I find the 56.000 a bit low if it included the prisoners.
Ah, lots of questions - would be great if that book was available in English or German!
best regards
Matt
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
The other Russian military historian Nicolai Golivine worked in Reichsrachiv in interwar perios. He quoted official German documents according to which German army on all sectors of Eastern front (from Neman to Dnester) between 1.1.1915 and the first march of 1915 captured 55 000 prisoners. Of course, in this case they could hardly capture 92 000 only in Masuarian lakes area. The other confirmation that the German claims are too high: Russian 10th army was of course severely defeated in this operation and its losses were high but just within one or two week it was able to recover, counterattack and capture near 10 000 German prisoners. Of course, it can hardly be if the Russian 10-th army was entyrely destroyed losing 92 000 only taken prisoners. Russian sources claim that Germans encircled only 20-th armycorps and the other units, with some losses, broke the the kessel. Even being fully complectated Russian army corps consisted of 45 000 including non-combatants. Two infantry regiments broke through the encirclement and thousands of Russian soldiers died in battle. Therefore the number of total losses 56000 seems more or less reliable. It is a pity but Kersnovsky s book was not translated to Western languages but it can be found in internet in Russian language
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
Latze, the official German military history of WW1 - a serious source, thank you. Can you specify a page with information on German losses?
About Russian losses - 20 Army Corps had not two, but four infantry divisions: 27, 28, 29, 53. This may well be 90,000 people.
About Russian losses - 20 Army Corps had not two, but four infantry divisions: 27, 28, 29, 53. This may well be 90,000 people.
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
The discussion of German and Russian losses is on page 237. In a footnote it is also said that probably "weak elements" (schwache Teile) of 28th and 53rd Russian infantry division escaped the encirclement.
The later loos of 10.000 German POW is attributed not to the supposedly destroyed 10th army but to Russian 1st (parts of XIX. Corps) and 12th army (Guards, parts of V. Corps, II and IV. Siberian Corps, ...).
In my view these 10.000 POW have to be included in the German losses for the whole operation. An up to date, detailed operational history of the Eastern Front of World War 1 - integrating Russian, Austrian and German sources is sorely missing. I fear that our efforts here will remain largely guess work.
The Russian source cited by the Reichsarchiv is M.P. Kamenski "Der Untergang des XX. Korps", Leningrad 1921
It would be of course highly interesting to know if that book by Kamenski is still available or quoted by Kersnovsky.
The later loos of 10.000 German POW is attributed not to the supposedly destroyed 10th army but to Russian 1st (parts of XIX. Corps) and 12th army (Guards, parts of V. Corps, II and IV. Siberian Corps, ...).
In my view these 10.000 POW have to be included in the German losses for the whole operation. An up to date, detailed operational history of the Eastern Front of World War 1 - integrating Russian, Austrian and German sources is sorely missing. I fear that our efforts here will remain largely guess work.
The Russian source cited by the Reichsarchiv is M.P. Kamenski "Der Untergang des XX. Korps", Leningrad 1921
It would be of course highly interesting to know if that book by Kamenski is still available or quoted by Kersnovsky.
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
According to Russian sources, two Russian regiments and the weak elements of the other units of 20-th corps broke the encirclement line. One half of German prisoners was captured by the fresh troops but one half - by the remaining units of the 10-th army. The book of Kamensky is available on www.grwar.ru alongside with the other books concerning this battle. In this year it will be edited a Russian encyclopedia of WWI Eastern front where will be a detailed article on this battle, based on recent researches made in Russian archives.
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
This might be of interest. Max Schwarte (ed.) "Weltkampf um Ehre und Recht", Leipzig 1921, vol. 1, chapter 7 gives the following numbers within the narrative text:
8th of February: Group Litzmann made 4.000 POW
10th of February: German 76. RD makes 10.000 POW from Russian 56.RD
14th of February: at Lyck 8.000 POW from Siberian III. Corps are made
16th of February: German 75. RD makes 5.000 POW north of Augustow
21th of February: 30.000 POW in the Augustow wood
The final result of the battle is then given with 110.000 POW - which clearly to high.
8th of February: Group Litzmann made 4.000 POW
10th of February: German 76. RD makes 10.000 POW from Russian 56.RD
14th of February: at Lyck 8.000 POW from Siberian III. Corps are made
16th of February: German 75. RD makes 5.000 POW north of Augustow
21th of February: 30.000 POW in the Augustow wood
The final result of the battle is then given with 110.000 POW - which clearly to high.
Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
Hello to all 
; a little complement......................................
THE GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE WINTER BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES, FEBRUARY 1915.
The 50th, 51st and 52nd aviation squadrons were assigned to the tenth Army, while the 14th, 16th and 49th were assigned to the Eight Army. Aerial reconnaissance was initiated 8 February. It was necessary to determine whether the Russians were attempting to reinforce the flanks. The aerial missions assigned were to observe the railway as far as Kovno and to reconnoiter those zones in which the flanks might be threatened-in the north along the Niemen in the vicinity of Jurburg, in the south the area in the vicinity of the Ostrolenka and Lomza fortresses. Eventually the reconnaissance was ordered to cover the terrain along which the forward movement was progressing --in the north the area Pillkallen-Wirballen, In the south the area Lotzen-Arys-Lyck.
On 8 February only the 14th and 16th squadrons were ready, the others having been held up by the snow. Despite the difficulties encountered due to the severity of the weather, the squadrons employed carried out their assigned missions. Following the reports made by seven observers, all fears concerning any Russian reinforcements were allayed. The various squadrons reported themselves ready in the following order: the 51st on 9 February, the 50th on 12 February, the 52d on 13 February and the 49th on 17 February. On the 9th, as well as the 14th, nine reconnaissance flights were carried out, and on the 10th, fourteen. On the 9th observers spotted that the enemy was beginning a general withdrawal. From the 9th to the 14th they reported that all movement along the railway to Kovno was limited to departing transports only. The observers also covered the fortified cities of Kovno, Olita, Grodno, Osowiec and Lomza; the double-track railways that run eastwards from Kovno and Grodno that part of the Niemen River between these two cities. The reconnaissance reports concerning the Russian withdrawal were not only rich in their significance, but were rendered to the High Command of the Tenth and Eighth Armies with such timely dispatch that the latter were able to get a perfect picture of the withdrawal. The reports on the situation of the German troops were highly significant in the interest of command, as communication between the various units and between these and their higher command posts were, due to the severity of the weather, often completely broken off. On the evening of 14 February the mass of the Russian Tenth Army was compressed in the Augustow-Suwalki area. Retreat toward the east was blocked by the XXI Army Corps which constituted the left flank of the Tenth Army, but was open toward the southeast and south along the snow covered forest lanes of the extensive Augustow Forest. This exit, however, was closed by the XXI Army Corps which was ordered to circumvent the forest and march toward the area northwest of Grodno. Due to inclement weather no reconnaissance flights could be undertaken on 15 and 16 February.
Between 17 and 20 February planes were assigned the missions to observe the railroad from Pilwiszki to Kovno, to secure information on the unloading of troops at Grodno and to reconnoiter the right flank in the area occupied by the fortified positions from Lomza to Osowiec. Accordingly, on 17 February five reconnaissance flights were carried out, on the 18th ten, and on the 19th nine. Their reports informed the higher command of the following situation: On 17 February the divisions of the northern and southern flanks, were combined in the vicinity of Augustow. Parts of the Russian Tenth Army, which up to 20 February had been attempting to get through the Augustow Forest toward Grodno, were completely imprisoned. On 21 February the enemy failed in his last attempt to crash through, and his resistance began to weaken. The grand operation for encircling the Russian Tenth Army had come to an end. The German Eighth and Tenth Armies had captured 120,000 men and 300 pieces of artillery and inflicted equally heavy casualties upon the enemy. The Army of General Siewers had ceased to exist.
The Support which was rendered by the flying personnel cannot be lightly passed over. Between 8 and 20 February the squadrons assigned to the Eighth and Tenth Armies carried out 73 reconnaissance missions, making flights which totaled 10,674 miles.
Source: Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Vol XX. Nº 79. Dec 1940.
Cheers. Raúl M
.
; a little complement......................................THE GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE WINTER BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES, FEBRUARY 1915.
The 50th, 51st and 52nd aviation squadrons were assigned to the tenth Army, while the 14th, 16th and 49th were assigned to the Eight Army. Aerial reconnaissance was initiated 8 February. It was necessary to determine whether the Russians were attempting to reinforce the flanks. The aerial missions assigned were to observe the railway as far as Kovno and to reconnoiter those zones in which the flanks might be threatened-in the north along the Niemen in the vicinity of Jurburg, in the south the area in the vicinity of the Ostrolenka and Lomza fortresses. Eventually the reconnaissance was ordered to cover the terrain along which the forward movement was progressing --in the north the area Pillkallen-Wirballen, In the south the area Lotzen-Arys-Lyck.
On 8 February only the 14th and 16th squadrons were ready, the others having been held up by the snow. Despite the difficulties encountered due to the severity of the weather, the squadrons employed carried out their assigned missions. Following the reports made by seven observers, all fears concerning any Russian reinforcements were allayed. The various squadrons reported themselves ready in the following order: the 51st on 9 February, the 50th on 12 February, the 52d on 13 February and the 49th on 17 February. On the 9th, as well as the 14th, nine reconnaissance flights were carried out, and on the 10th, fourteen. On the 9th observers spotted that the enemy was beginning a general withdrawal. From the 9th to the 14th they reported that all movement along the railway to Kovno was limited to departing transports only. The observers also covered the fortified cities of Kovno, Olita, Grodno, Osowiec and Lomza; the double-track railways that run eastwards from Kovno and Grodno that part of the Niemen River between these two cities. The reconnaissance reports concerning the Russian withdrawal were not only rich in their significance, but were rendered to the High Command of the Tenth and Eighth Armies with such timely dispatch that the latter were able to get a perfect picture of the withdrawal. The reports on the situation of the German troops were highly significant in the interest of command, as communication between the various units and between these and their higher command posts were, due to the severity of the weather, often completely broken off. On the evening of 14 February the mass of the Russian Tenth Army was compressed in the Augustow-Suwalki area. Retreat toward the east was blocked by the XXI Army Corps which constituted the left flank of the Tenth Army, but was open toward the southeast and south along the snow covered forest lanes of the extensive Augustow Forest. This exit, however, was closed by the XXI Army Corps which was ordered to circumvent the forest and march toward the area northwest of Grodno. Due to inclement weather no reconnaissance flights could be undertaken on 15 and 16 February.
Between 17 and 20 February planes were assigned the missions to observe the railroad from Pilwiszki to Kovno, to secure information on the unloading of troops at Grodno and to reconnoiter the right flank in the area occupied by the fortified positions from Lomza to Osowiec. Accordingly, on 17 February five reconnaissance flights were carried out, on the 18th ten, and on the 19th nine. Their reports informed the higher command of the following situation: On 17 February the divisions of the northern and southern flanks, were combined in the vicinity of Augustow. Parts of the Russian Tenth Army, which up to 20 February had been attempting to get through the Augustow Forest toward Grodno, were completely imprisoned. On 21 February the enemy failed in his last attempt to crash through, and his resistance began to weaken. The grand operation for encircling the Russian Tenth Army had come to an end. The German Eighth and Tenth Armies had captured 120,000 men and 300 pieces of artillery and inflicted equally heavy casualties upon the enemy. The Army of General Siewers had ceased to exist.
The Support which was rendered by the flying personnel cannot be lightly passed over. Between 8 and 20 February the squadrons assigned to the Eighth and Tenth Armies carried out 73 reconnaissance missions, making flights which totaled 10,674 miles.
Source: Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Vol XX. Nº 79. Dec 1940.
Cheers. Raúl M
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James A Pratt III
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Re: Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
More on this battle and its effects can be found in the books:
"The Foe Within that deals with the Miasoedov affair about the Russian LTC hung on trumped up charges of being a German spy and the aftermath of it which helped cause the Feb/mar 1917 revolution.
Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard, As it says the diary of the I GC which was sent to this area to stop the German breakthrough
"The Foe Within that deals with the Miasoedov affair about the Russian LTC hung on trumped up charges of being a German spy and the aftermath of it which helped cause the Feb/mar 1917 revolution.
Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard, As it says the diary of the I GC which was sent to this area to stop the German breakthrough