The Russian Origins of the First World War

[peterhof]

What happened between the sending of the Czar's Tatischev telegram in the morning of July 30th and the Czar's later decision to "send thousands and thousands of men to their death" was a visit by the warmongering Sasonov who represented the Russian warmongering Generals and militarists who took their courage from French enticement and British silence:

So you are stating that no news of events between Austria and Serbia or messages from Austria or Germany reached Sazonov that might have influenced any decision he took, and that the Tzar changed his mind on a purely random basis with absolutely no new information to hand from when he sent his telegram to the Kaiser? What had the Central Powers done or said that might have altered the Russian attitude in any way? Are you seriously saying that there was absolutely no input whatsoever from them during this period?

That's exactly what I'm saying. I'm saying that weak-willed, vacillating Nikky, who tended to reflect the opinion of whoever spoke to him last, yielded to the warmongers represented by Sasonov.

If there was such "input" as you imply, you are free to cite it.

[favedave]

"I'm saying that weak-willed, vacillating Nikky, who tended to reflect the opinion of whoever spoke to him last, yielded to the warmongers represented by Sasonov."

I'm saying that weak-willed, vacillating Willie, who tended to reflect the opinion of whoever spoke to him last, yielded to the warmongers represented by von Moltke the Younger.

[peterhof]

"I'm saying that weak-willed, vacillating Nikky, who tended to reflect the opinion of whoever spoke to him last, yielded to the warmongers represented by Sasonov."

I'm saying that weak-willed, vacillating Willie, who tended to reflect the opinion of whoever spoke to him last, yielded to the warmongers represented by von Moltke the Younger.

Nice try, but no cigar. Unlike Russia, German foreign policy remained firmly in the hands of the Wilhelmstrasse at all times. It is true that Bethmann agreed to a meeting to be held at noon on July 31st to consider the alarming claims of Russian mobilization measures charged by Moltke and Falkenhayn - all correct as it turned out - but the decision was and remained with Bethmann.

(This is an improvement on your earlier claims that the encircling German right wing was nothing more than a feint, or that there is no proof that Germany transferred troops from Russia to France after Brest-Litovsk. Remember?)

[Terry Duncan]

That's exactly what I'm saying. I'm saying that weak-willed, vacillating Nikky, who tended to reflect the opinion of whoever spoke to him last, yielded to the warmongers represented by Sasonov.

If there was such "input" as you imply, you are free to cite it.

As you seem so shy about revealing any knowledge of the July Crisis I will point out the following events;

28th July, Bethmann told Russia he would bring pressure to bear on Austria to negotiate.

29th July, Austria bombards Belgrade.

Bethmann sends the following communication to Russia;

Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war would be scarcely to be prevented.

Note that Bethmann does not mention mobilisation itself but specifies mobilisation measures, those actions short of mobilisation but intended to speed it up if it is declared later. So it does not matter if Russia actually mobilises, it is enough that she prepares to do so to bring German mobilisation.

Jagow to Sverbeev later the same day on hearing Russia had declared partial mobilisation against Austria alone, something he had previously said would not see a German response;

It was the news of our mobilization against Austria-Hungary with which I had orders to acquaint him. In confirming this news I emphasized—as I had orders to do—that this measure had no point of hostility directed against Germany and I added that the mobilization on the Austrian frontier had all the more foundation as the Hapsburg Monarchy, according to trustworthy
information reaching me, was itself making extensive military preparations in Galicia.

Herr von Jagow denied the alleged preparations and declared that since we had mobilized against Austria-Hungary, Germany was likewise obliged to mobilize; there was therefore nothing else left to be done and the diplomatists must now leave the talking to the cannon.

I could not conceal from my interlocutor the amazement which this statement evoked in me. For still on the previous evening he had been saying to Cambon that our mobilization against Austria would not bring German mobilization in its train. Herr von Jagow answered with great embarrassment: ‘Yes, but as Germany has learnt that Russia is placing her troops ready on
the German frontier, she was of course obliged to mobilize on her part.’

I declared, that, as far as we were concerned, I knew nothing of this, and doubted that this news was correct. Of Germany, on the other hand, I knew definitely from trustworthy information that she was assembling her military strength only against us.

Herr von Jagow vigorously called in question these alleged preparations and, naturally without success, attempted to persuade me that all that had been done was to recall oflcers on leave and troops which had taken part in manoeuvres.

Note that Jagow admits here that Germany has recalled troops, something that in itself constitutes one of the pre-mobilisation measures Russia herself had enacted.

Then of course we have the news of the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade arriving in Russia during the period of 29th/30th July.

So it is clear that Russia was getting certain signals other than the few you wish to recite, and they point to Bethmann not managing to get Austria to talk, that Bethmann was now threatening pre-mobilisation measures or preparations by Russia will bring forth German mobilisation anyhow even if directed only against Austria, and that the news of Russian partial mobilisation against Austria alone led to the German Foreign Secretary declaring that Germany would mobilise and that there was no point in further talking other than with guns, whilst admitting Germany had started her own pre-mobilisation measures.

Quotations all taken from Albertini's The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol II.

[favedave]

This is an improvement on your earlier claims that the encircling German right wing was nothing more than a feint, or that there is no proof that Germany transferred troops from Russia to France after Brest-Litovsk. Remember?

I believe that "the encircling German right wing" revealed in the 1905 Schlieffen Plan (which was in French hands the year it was written) was a strategic ploy to draw the bulk of the French 4th and 5th Armies (and the BEF) into Belgium, off their logistical bases where they could be encircled and annihilated in Belgium by the German 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies, while the German 4th, 5th and 6th Armies withdrew into Alsace and Lorraine in order to draw the French 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies out of the French Fortress system where they could be bagged as well. This would have placed the two crowned prince generals, Wilhelm III and Rupprecht of Bavaria at the head of the victory parade in Paris about Week Six of the western campaign. Unfortunately for the Germans their First and Second Armies had an extremely difficult time keeping up with the fleeing BEF and French 5th Armies, who retreated to the south towards Paris rather than to the Channel Ports like Dunkirk (remember WWII?) The success of von Kluck and von Bulow in gobbling up French Territory caused the Royal Generals to force von Moltke to allow them to counter attack about a week early, causing the French to recoil back into their forts, sparing enough men to successfully halt the encircling German right wing at the battle of the Marne.

Now this is what happened, not what the German General Staff wanted to happen. I have a load of evidence to support it from a number of historians and participants, though they may not have reached the same conclusions I have. The real prize for Germany in the West was in their hands by the 14th of August, Liege, with its rail yards, its steel production facilities and its abundant iron and coal fields nearby. Beat the Belgians, beat the French and everybody goes home and Germany gets to keep all the iron and coal facilities they captured as a war prize, just like they did in 1870.



Regarding the transfer of troops from the Eastern Front to the Western Front in the Spring of 1918. No records exist of any significant transfers. In December 1917 approximately 40,000 troops and 4,000 heavy guns were transferred to the west in preparation for the Spring offensives. But the Eastern German Army under Max Hoffmann remained intact and moved the front line east to Brest Litovsk where the treaty was signed on March 3rd. Those troops stayed in Russia. The Eastern Front received no part of the 1918 class of 18 year olds, which was probably the genesis of the transfer to the west (and British Intelligence which said in January with the defeat of Russia the Germans could transfer 1,300,000 troops west). Again, the fact is they simply didn't.


My final point is this. What happened in the last two days of July,1914 would not have made any difference. The Austro Hungarian Army was bombarding Serbian soil and had declared war on Serbia. Russia was expected to come to Serbia's aid and had been since the first week of July. The German Government and the Dual Monarchy's government took steps then to make sure it happened and did not deviate one jot from that course. Now, once again you are invited to produce some evidence that the Kaiser and the Emperor didn't know what would happen for the entire month of July if Austria-Hungary suddenly attacked Serbia for crimes committed by Austro-Hungarian Subjects, on Austro-Hungarian soil, in the Austro-Hungarian city of Sarajevo.

[ljadw]

What is the opinion about "The outbreak of the first world war" (by Levy and Vasquez) and the contribution in it from Ronald Bobroff about the Russian role, with as title :"war accepted but unsought "?

The information about this new work was kindly provided by The Ibis at the Armchair General Forum .

[aiwac]

Speaking of McMeekin and Russia, historian John Schindler (Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice on the Western Front) recently wrote a blog post where he argues that:

a) Serbian government knew of the assassination plot beforehand

and b) Artomonov (or perhaps the Russian government itself) funded it. The sources for this argument are supposed to be in his upcoming book on the Eastern Front, but I'll bring the critical quote here:

"Little new has emerged in recent decades to flesh out the background to the Sarajevo assassination, mostly because relevant paperwork on the Serbian side, if it ever existed, was long ago destroyed. What is not in doubt is that Apis and his staffers were the drivers of the plot, making the assassination an unambiguous case of state-sponsored terrorism. Myths about alleged specific warnings given by Belgrade to Vienna, yet misplaced, have been debunked long ago, but significant questions remain about major aspects of the conspiracy.

While it has long been apparent that senior members of Serbia’s civilian government had foreknowledge of the plot, and the matter was discussed in some fashion en cabinet before Franz Ferdinand set out for Sarajevo, details are sparse, though it is evident that Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and Stojan Protić, his interior minister, were aware of Apis’s machinations by mid-June, yet they demurred from taking on the fierce colonel, who after all had overseen the brutal murder of Serbia’s king and queen a decade before. Civil-military relations in Serbia were marked by strong fears of mad colonels, and not wanting to know.

Less defined and more sensational still is the matter of Russian involvement. While none have questioned that Apis had a close relationship with Colonel Viktor Artamonov, the Russian military attaché in Belgrade, accessible records do not explain what role, if any, Artamonov had in the plot. To make matters murkier still, just before his execution by his own government at Salonika in June 1917, after being accused of involvement in yet another plot, this time against his own leaders, Dimitrijević boasted in writing of his role behind the Sarajevo plot and admitted that Artamonov funded the terrorist operation, something that Yugoslavia’s Communists revealed in 1953 to discredit the royal regime that preceded them in power in Belgrade. As Artamonov died in exile in 1942 without fully explaining his role in the assassination, the matter is likely to remain unresolved in perpetuity, especially the tantalizing question of whether Artamonov’s support to the plot was his own initiative or something undertaken by direction from St. Petersburg.

Given that Russian radio intelligence was able to read Austro-Hungarian diplomatic ciphers before the war, it seems likely that St. Petersburg was aware of what Vienna’s probable reaction to the assassination would be and, as Sean Meekin has recently observed, the Russians subsequently acted as if they have something to hide: “gaps in the record strongly suggest a good deal of purging took place after 1914,” to cover whatever tracks Artamonov left behind. The attaché conveniently managed to be out of Belgrade on the day of the assassination, yet it was well known in Serbian military circles that, in the weeks before the assassination, he and Apis saw each other almost daily. A Serbian colonel who was close to Apis conceded that Artamonov had encouraged the plot: “Just go ahead! If you are attacked you will not stand alone!” While the colonel later retracted his statement, it seems very likely that St. Petersburg knew more about the plot that it later proved politic to admit.

Given the sometimes discombobulated nature of the Imperial Russian system, with their penchant for obfuscation and provocation even inside their own government, it cannot be ruled out that spies and generals took it upon themselves to help their “brother Serbs” with financing the assassination plot without authorization from “the top.” Given the lack of evidence, there is room for speculation, but there is no serious doubt that Apis was behind the conspiracy and the Russians funded it. A century later, however, there is no reason to think the complete story will ever emerge."

Are his conclusions warranted by what we know? Or is this all educated guesswork?

[ljadw]

It's all and only publicity for his new book .

May I also remind you that in his letter to the Kaiser, the Austrian Emperor FJ said : it is impossible to prove Serbian responsability .

[AJFFM]

I think we already went over Serbian responsibility in another thread but to say Russia had anything to do with the assassination is way out there in cuckoo land.

[Terry Duncan]

A post from this Peterhof was removed by this moderator in line with the warning posted here;

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4#p1883454

[James A Pratt III]

I don't think the Russians or the Serbs or anyone else would have thought the Austrians would have been stupid enough to send franz Ferdinand on a visit to Sarajevo. A area where there had been terrorist attacks on Austrian officials. On the holiest of Serb holy days 28 june the date of the 1389 battle of Kosevo with no security to speak of. Then to act in the most inept manner possible after the first bomb was thrown and missed. This is after they were warned that something might happen.

The Tatischev mentioned is General Count Ilya Tarischev Adjutant General of the Imperial Suite. Post abdication he stayed with the Tsar and was shot by the Cheka (Soviet secret police) 10 July 1918 outside Ekaterinburg along with Prince Vasily Dogorsky

[aiwac]

What exactly was the connection between Artamonov and Apis?

[AJFFM]

I don't think the Russians or the Serbs or anyone else would have thought the Austrians would have been stupid enough to send franz Ferdinand on a visit to Sarajevo. A area where there had been terrorist attacks on Austrian officials. On the holiest of Serb holy days 28 june the date of the 1389 battle of Kosevo with no security to speak of. Then to act in the most inept manner possible after the first bomb was thrown and missed. This is after they were warned that something might happen.

The Tatischev mentioned is General Count Ilya Tarischev Adjutant General of the Imperial Suite. Post abdication he stayed with the Tsar and was shot by the Cheka (Soviet secret police) 10 July 1918 outside Ekaterinburg along with Prince Vasily Dogorsky

Sending Franz Joseph to Bosnia was nothing strange nor "insensitive" given that Serbs were a minority both in Sarajevo and Bosnia. The manoeuvres were scheduled long before they took place and their date was not strange since if I am not mistaken all manoeuvres A-H conducted were done around that time.

And terroristic activity by Serb organisations only support the case for A-H to assert their authority and demand Serbian official action or else face consequences.

Finally the death of the Archduke was irrelevant in creating the war per se. Had the Governor-General been killed or even the mayor the end result would have been the same since state collusion existed where it didn't exist when the wife of the emperor was assassinated in Switzerland.

[Terry Duncan]

What exactly was the connection between Artamonov and Apis?

Artamonov was the military attache at the Russian embassy, so had regular dealings with Dimitrijevic as part of his job. This seems to have extended to passing money to Dimitrijevic to finance various activities, though in the confession from the Salonika trials, Dimitrijevic said Artamonov was unaware of what he intended to use the money for. As the entire support for Princip seems to have amounted to a few pistols and hand grenades, the Serbian state was hardly in need of Russian support for this, and Princip and co seem to have provided their own money for the trip - Dedijer covers this in The Road To Sarajevo.

Artamonov is a somewhat untrustworthy witness, Albertini interviewed him after the war and came to the conclusion he was possibly hiding something, but was not certain what. The best that can be said is that after 100 years of trying to find a link, nobody has ever come close to proving any link to the assassination despite many trying hard to find it.

[Terry Duncan]

Sending Franz Joseph to Bosnia was nothing strange nor "insensitive" given that Serbs were a minority both in Sarajevo and Bosnia. The manoeuvres were scheduled long before they took place and their date was not strange since if I am not mistaken all manoeuvres A-H conducted were done around that time.

The maneuvers were always conducted at around the same time of year due to the need to gather the harvest. They were not always held in Bosnia though, and there was suspicion it was a prelude to an attack due to the strained relations after the Balkan Wars.

And terroristic activity by Serb organisations only support the case for A-H to assert their authority and demand Serbian official action or else face consequences.

The attack took place on Austrian territory, and was conducted by members of Mlada Bosna, a terrorist organisation native to Bosnia, not Serbia. Beyond that, it was down to Austria to give Serbia evidence to investigate if they claimed involvement on the Serbian side of the border. It would be difficult for Serbia to investigate much until they were told what the allegations were.

Finally the death of the Archduke was irrelevant in creating the war per se. Had the Governor-General been killed or even the mayor the end result would have been the same since state collusion existed where it didn't exist when the wife of the emperor was assassinated in Switzerland.

The problem with this is that in 1914 the Austrians had no evidence of Serbian state involvement, there was no mention of any senior Serbian figure like Dimitrijevic, only that the students had originated their plot in the cafes of Belgrade.