The Russian Origins of the First World War

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Jon Clarke
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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#61

Post by Jon Clarke » 18 Jun 2014, 12:41

Fay: "Buchanan apparently telegraphed on July 30 at 6:40 P.M., correctly and unambiguously: It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization." (B.D., 347, and explanatory note.)
When discussing what Grey knew about Russian mobilization, it is more than a little bit disingenuous to quote the time Buchanan's telegram was dispatched and not the receipt time which was a full 22 hours later.

As an indication of how Grey viewed general mobilization, we can also look at what happened when they received news from Vienna of the Austrian intention to order general mobilization. Bunsen's telegram was received at 9pm on 30 July (i.e. some 20 hours before Buchanan's telegram regarding Russian mobilization arrived in London) and yet Grey did not react to it at all - his next telegram to Bunsen on 1 August did not mention it at all. If, as is claimed by some, everybody knew that general mobilization meant war, why did Grey not respond immediately to the first indication he received that a Great Power had ordered it? The answer, of course, is that he did not consider that to be the case as his conversation with Lichnowsky on 25 July makes clear:

We should now apparently be soon confronted by a moment at which both Austria and Russia would have mobilised. The only chance of peace would be for the four Powers, Germany. Russia (sic) (1), France and ourselves, to keep together if Russia and Austria did both mobilise, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross frontier till there had been time for us to endeavour to arrange matters between them.

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#62

Post by favedave » 18 Jun 2014, 15:31

Would Russia's agreement to halt mobilization (full, partial or imaginary) have resulted in Austria's not declaring war on Serbia on the 28th and shelling Belgrade's defenses on the 29th?

We have absolutely no indications from any source at any time that Vienna would have backed down regardless of Russian, German, or even Serbian actions. Russia would have fully mobilized publicly on the 30th and Germany would have followed suit.

The point being missed here is that Austria refused to talk with anyone, including her German ally from the first week in July, when she received Germany's unconditional military support in dealing with Serbia, and the 28th when the war began. Ascribing this war to Russia's predicted reaction is ludicrous.


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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#63

Post by peterhof » 18 Jun 2014, 23:36

Jon Clarke wrote:
Quote from McMeekin: Grey had been told by Germany's Ambassador Lichnowsky that Berlin had "received information that Russia was calling in `classes of reserves,' which meant mobilization." Grey dismissed Lichnowsky's complaint out of hand, telling him that "we had no information as to a general mobilization or indeed of any mobilization immediately." With curious conviction, Grey further assured Lichnowsky that the Russian "Ukase to mobilize 1,100,000 men has not been issued." This was not only expressly untrue, but the specificity of Grey's comment suggests the British may have heard something after all. At any rate, Grey was clearly uninterested in investigating further.
Grey was told nothing by Lichnowsky because it was not him who saw the ambassador but Nicolson. The relevant telegram from the British Documents (no 146) is:

(34516) No. 146
Communication by German Ambassador.
July 26, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey, 
Prince Lichnowsky called this afternoon with an urgent telegram from his Government to say that they had received information that Russia was calling in "classes of reserves," which meant mobilisation. If this mobilisation took place on the German frontier, Germany would be compelled to mobilise and France naturally would follow suit. Prince Lichnowsky was, therefore, instructed to request that we would urge the Russian Government not to mobilise. The Germans would not mind a partial mobilisation say at Odessa or Kieff but could not view indifferently a mobilisation on the German frontier.
I told Prince Lichnowsky that we had no information as to a general mobilisation or indeed of any mobilisation immediately. (The Ukase mobilising 1,100,000 men has not been issued.)(1) It would, however, be difficult and delicate for us to ask Petersburg not to mobilise at all when Austria was contemplating such a measure we should not be listened to. The main thing was to prevent, if possible, active military operations and I told Prince Lichnowsky in general terms of the proposals for a meeting … quatre here which you had made at Paris-Berlin-Rome on the condition that Russia, Austria and Servia should suspend active military operations pending results of conference.(2) Prince Lichnowsky liked the proposal.
A. N.
(He was very excited.)


Now either McMeekin is unable to read a document clearly or it's a deliberate distortion. I suspect that it's the latter because he actually provides a more accurate account in July 1914. Indeed it is telling that he actually contradicts his earlier work. For example whereas he writes in that book that 'This was not only expressly untrue, but the specificity of Grey's comment suggests the British may have heard something after all', the later work states that:

While this was literally true, in that Russia’s “partial mobilization” against Austria had not yet been announced, in fact considerably more than 1.1 million men were by now being made mobile—if not officially mobilized—according to the regulations of the Period Preparatory to War.

It certainly does little for his standing as a historian.
Interesting, but a few observations:

-All historians make mistakes - no exceptions.

-Nicolson says that Lichnowsky "called this afternoon." Does this mean he - Lichnowsky - personally "called" at the Foreign Office? If so, did he not speak at all with Grey but only with Nicolson? Is it reasonable to equate a visit to the Foreign Office with a visit to Grey?

-Is this the same Nicolson who spread Isvolsky's self-serving lie that Russia had been threatened and humiliated by Germany?

-Is this the same Grey who contributed to the Entente deception campaign about the Russian mobilization by inventing the Lokal-Anzeiger myth?

In perusing the British Documents (146-160) I was again struck by the fact that the smallest detail, the tiniest development, the very latest news in the July crisis was reported to the British Foreign Office, as they happened, by a steady stream of telegrams submitted almost daily by Grey's attentive ambassadors. We are supposed to believe that this uninterrupted stream of intricately detailed information excluded the most crucial information of all: Russian mobilization measures. The Russian attitude after all meant the difference between a localized Austro-Serb dispute and a general European conflagration which would almost certainly involve Great Britain. The Germans were informed; France encouraged it, but only Sir Edward Grey remained blissfully unaware. Really?
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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#64

Post by Terry Duncan » 19 Jun 2014, 01:23

I have posted some of McMeekins' reasoning and citations in the opening post and in a subsequent post I quoted McMeekins' citations of Sasonov's attempts to promote a European war that were specific to the July crisis and it is for you to refute or accept it.
I have pointed out that none of the things you quoted are from the July Crisis and therefore were not key to Russian thinking, we have enough information from all sides to say what it was animating Russian policy in the July Crisis, namely, the Austrian intention to attack Serbia.
Fay: ". . . he [Sasonov] gave Buchanan to understand that The order for partial mobilization was signed today, and that it had been decided not to order general mobilization which the military authorities had strongly recommended."(Buchanan to Grey, July 29, 8:40 P.M.; B.D., 276)
Jon has dealt with this, though I fully expected you to try and pass off the dispatch time as the point Grey became aware. It says a lot for your honesty and case that you cannot bring yourself to correctly list the time and then say how much time was left for Grey to act.
McMeekin specifically charged Sasonov with having concealed Russian mobilization measures from London in an attempt to give Russia the appearance of being pacific and cites Sasonov lying to Buchanan in pursuit of this objective. He spends considerable time on what Grey knew about Russian mobilization so this is proper grist for the mill.
So if Sazonov is concealing certain things from Grey, how is Grey responsible? McMeekin at best suspects Grey knew more, see his book 'July 1914', but that is not proof, nor is is automatically correct. It is perfectly possible that Grey did not know until the point we know of.
The facts of Russian mobilization were falsified, obfuscated, misrepresented by all three members of the Triple Entente as documented by Fay.
The Germans and Austrians lied repeatedly about their own actions, curiously not all documented by Fay for some reason, so all you have here is that each alliance lied about anything it had done that could be said to have caused the war.
It is hardly surprising therefore that explicit evidence of Grey's knowledge of Russian mobilization is scarce, or that Grey felt obliged to explain it with his Lokalanzeiger fabrication. At the same time we know that such knowledge was of absolutely central importance to British foreign policy.
The Lokalanzeiger story is interesting as the rumour was running through Berlin and other major cities that Germany had either ordered mobilisation, or was about to do so, Lokalanzeiger just happened to be the ones to put in into print first. The question that arises is what was happening in Germany that led so many to believe this was true, or indeed what had been happening a little earlier that had convinced the Belgians and Dutch that Germany was either in the process of mobilising or about to do so, that led to their own decisions to mobilise? This was some days before Austria even declared war! This is one of the great problems all encountered during the July Crisis, that rumours of what the other nations were doing or about to do were able to create a momentum of their own as nobody felt inclined to trust that the other side were not about to attack. Communications were just not up to dealing with such a rapidly developing situation.

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#65

Post by Terry Duncan » 19 Jun 2014, 01:40

peterhof wrote:Interesting, but a few observations:

-All historians make mistakes - no exceptions.
It is when some do it deliberately to advance their own agenda that it becomes a matter of concern and a reason to treat their works with caution.
peterhof wrote:-Nicolson says that Lichnowsky "called this afternoon." Does this mean he - Lichnowsky - personally "called" at the Foreign Office? If so, did he not speak at all with Grey but only with Nicolson? Is it reasonable to equate a visit to the Foreign Office with a visit to Grey?
IIRC The weekend of 25th/26th was the one when Grey went to his country cottage in Hampshire to relax and go fishing, so a visit to the Foreign Office or a telephone call would not be contact with Grey, and would probably be why Nicholson issued a telegram to him to describe what had been said.
peterhof wrote:-Is this the same Nicolson who spread Isvolsky's self-serving lie that Russia had been threatened and humiliated by Germany?
Yes, though it was clearly not a lie and represented how Russia felt about the Annexation Crisis and the German attitude to Russia, so what? You might dispute the details, but it is clearly how the events were perceived in Russia and how they reacted because of that.
peterhof wrote:In perusing the British Documents (146-160) I was again struck by the fact that the smallest detail, the tiniest development, the very latest news in the July crisis was reported to the British Foreign Office, as they happened, by a steady stream of telegrams submitted almost daily by Grey's attentive ambassadors. We are supposed to believe that this uninterrupted stream of intricately detailed information excluded the most crucial information of all: Russian mobilization measures. The Russian attitude after all meant the difference between a localized Austro-Serb dispute and a general European conflagration which would almost certainly involve Great Britain. The Germans were informed; France encouraged it, but only Sir Edward Grey remained blissfully unaware. Really?
So do some work for yourself and look through the various archives, see if you can find proof for what you suspect. Keep in mind mobilisation measures could be all manner of things, and that they were not uncommon in this period as they routinely happened in times of crisis. Tightening border security, cancelling leave, recalling officers etc, are all mobilisation measures, so is procuring horses and fodder, but these acts are very different from ordering the complete mobilisation of the army and its reserves. Knowledge of which activities are you meaning?

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#66

Post by James A Pratt III » 20 Jun 2014, 19:39

From my reply 34 and reply 35 which it doesn't seem like Nicholas is all that thrilled about a war. Other comments:

Brusilov I believe points out in his memoirs that Nicholas could either go to war and possibly lose his throne or let the Austrians crush Serbia suffer another major humiliation and possibly lose his throne. So you can see it looks like Nicholas is stuck between a rock and a hard place.
There were also people in Russia and elsewhere believed if the Austrians weren't stopped they would go on and overrun the rest of the Balkans.

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#67

Post by peterhof » 20 Jun 2014, 21:47

Czar Nicholas had many options. He had already ordered partial mobilization and was in no military danger from Austria or Germany. He could easily have issued an ultimatum that any crossing of the Serbian frontier by Austrian troops would trigger general mobilization. Instead, he chose to send "thousands and thousands of men to their death."

It seems to be forgotten that earlier that same day, July 30th, there was a friendly exchange of telegrams between Willy and Nikky wherein Nikky had promised to send Tatischev to Berlin "with instructions." What happened in a few hours to cause Nikky to go from sending Tatischev to sending "thousands and thousands of men to their death?"
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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#68

Post by Terry Duncan » 20 Jun 2014, 22:12

peterhof wrote:Czar Nicholas had many options. He had already ordered partial mobilization and was in no military danger from Austria or Germany. He could easily have issued an ultimatum that any crossing of the Serbian frontier by Austrian troops would trigger general mobilization. Instead, he chose to send "thousands and thousands of men to their death."

It seems to be forgotten that earlier that same day, July 30th, there was a friendly exchange of telegrams between Willy and Nikky wherein Nikky had promised to send Tatischev to Berlin "with instructions." What happened in a few hours to cause Nikky to go from sending Tatischev to sending "thousands and thousands of men to their death?"
As the entire Tatischev episode has been gone over with you a few times previously, albeit on another board most recently, and Jon provided quite a few details for you then, why are you asking the same question again? Is it just asking in the hope of getting another answer? Can you really not remember what has been discussed before? Is it that you refuse to accept any information others provide just because you do not like what they tell you?

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#69

Post by peterhof » 20 Jun 2014, 22:26

Terry Duncan wrote:As the entire Tatischev episode has been gone over with you a few times previously, albeit on another board most recently, and Jon provided quite a few details for you then, why are you asking the same question again? Is it just asking in the hope of getting another answer? Can you really not remember what has been discussed before? Is it that you refuse to accept any information others provide just because you do not like what they tell you?
Jon's "details" were about when and how Tatischev was intercepted on his planned journey to Berlin. The Willy-Nikky telegrams are part of the historical record:

“Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatishchev this evening with instructions. The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations. I hope from all my heart that these measures won’t in any way interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.” (Tsar to Kaiser, July 30, 1:20 A.M., received 1:45 A.M.; K.D. 390)

In the early afternoon of that day, July 30, Pourtales demands that Sasonov produce a formula by which peace may be maintained. Sasonov responds with a demand that points 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note be withdrawn. But as Fay notes:

. . . a few hours after proposing his formula, Sasonov secured from the Tsar a second change of mind and final consent to general mobilization.


Fay continues:

But the news of Russia’s wide-reaching military preparations and partial mobilization against Austria, now admitted by the Tsar to have been “decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations” when Austria had carefully avoided preparations against Russia, roused the Kaiser’s indignation. He had been sincerely trying to mediate and bring Austria to accept the “pledge plan” and satisfy Russia by direct negotiations; but meanwhile Russia had been getting a five day’s start in military preparations. “I cannot agree to any more negotiations,” he noted, “since the Tsar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back. It is only a manoeuvre to hold us back and increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end!” (K.D. 390)

As so often with Jon's "details," the manner on how or when or where Tatischev was ordered not to go to Berlin is not important or even relevant.
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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#70

Post by Terry Duncan » 20 Jun 2014, 22:35

So you cannot recall it ever being mentioned what was going on elsewhere, what news had filtered through to St Petersburg between the telegram being written and the later Russian decisions? Are you seriously expecting people to believe Russia was acting in a vacuum and that nothing had happened between Austria and Serbia, or nothing else had been said in Germany or elsewhere to Russia embassy or Foreign Office officials? It seems curious, and slightly, disturbing that the same details have to be discussed over and over with not the slightest sign of learning.

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#71

Post by peterhof » 20 Jun 2014, 22:45

Terry Duncan wrote:So you cannot recall it ever being mentioned what was going on elsewhere, what news had filtered through to St Petersburg between the telegram being written and the later Russian decisions? Are you seriously expecting people to believe Russia was acting in a vacuum and that nothing had happened between Austria and Serbia, or nothing else had been said in Germany or elsewhere to Russia embassy or Foreign Office officials? It seems curious, and slightly, disturbing that the same details have to be discussed over and over with not the slightest sign of learning.
NOTHING happened between the sending of the Tatischev telegram and the order for general mobilization to excuse the fatal order.
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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#72

Post by ljadw » 20 Jun 2014, 23:02

peterhof wrote:Czar Nicholas had many options. He had already ordered partial mobilization and was in no military danger from Austria or Germany. He could easily have issued an ultimatum that any crossing of the Serbian frontier by Austrian troops would trigger general mobilization. Instead, he chose to send "thousands and thousands of men to their death."

"
:P


It is irrelevant who mobilized the first .Nicholas had the right to mobilize .No one can deny Russia this right . The fact is that Germany started WWI by a DOW on Russia,claiming that the Russian mobilization was a danger for Germany .

Unless some one can prove that this was true, we must assume that Germany was lying,as it was lying when it attacked Belgium,France and Luxrmburg .

There are 2 possibilities :

A) Germany had valid reasons to declare war on Russia

B) Germany had no valid reasons to declare war on Russia,but non-valid,secret,hidden reasons : as : to dominate Europe .

As Germany declared war on Russia, it's on the protagonists of the German innocence to prove that Germany was obliged to start WWI .During 100 years, these protagonists have not be able to demonstrate that Germany had valid reasons to declare war on Russia,France,Belgium,Luxemburg .
As long as they have not be able to do this, the logical conclusion (for which there are sufficient proofs) is that Germany intentionally started WWI to dominate the continent .

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#73

Post by Terry Duncan » 21 Jun 2014, 02:59

peterhof wrote:NOTHING happened between the sending of the Tatischev telegram and the order for general mobilization to excuse the fatal order.
That is entirely your opinion and an obvious evasion of answering what I asked. From that people can safely conclude that you do know what had transpired between the two events, and that historical accuracy is something of little importance to you.

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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#74

Post by peterhof » 21 Jun 2014, 04:32

Terry Duncan wrote:
peterhof wrote:NOTHING happened between the sending of the Tatischev telegram and the order for general mobilization to excuse the fatal order.
Terry Duncan replied: That is entirely your opinion and an obvious evasion of answering what I asked. From that people can safely conclude that you do know what had transpired between the two events, and that historical accuracy is something of little importance to you.
What happened between the sending of the Czar's Tatischev telegram in the morning of July 30th and the Czar's later decision to "send thousands and thousands of men to their death" was a visit by the warmongering Sasonov who represented the Russian warmongering Generals and militarists who took their courage from French enticement and British silence:

“Buchanan evidently made no effort to deter Sasonov from his purpose of converting partial into general mobilization [on July 30th]. His failure to do so must have been an encouragement to the Russian Minister.” (The Origins of the World War, Vol 2, P. 471)
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Re: The Russian Origins of the First World War

#75

Post by Terry Duncan » 21 Jun 2014, 04:51

What happened between the sending of the Czar's Tatischev telegram in the morning of July 30th and the Czar's later decision to "send thousands and thousands of men to their death" was a visit by the warmongering Sasonov who represented the Russian warmongering Generals and militarists who took their courage from French enticement and British silence:
So you are stating that no news of events between Austria and Serbia or messages from Austria or Germany reached Sazonov that might have influenced any decision he took, and that the Tzar changed his mind on a purely random basis with absolutely no new information to hand from when he sent his telegram to the Kaiser? What had the Central Powers done or said that might have altered the Russian attitude in any way? Are you seriously saying that there was absolutely no input whatsoever from them during this period?

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