Was the US entry into WWI a mistake?

[paulri]

I did a search (for "US entry mistake") and didn't see a thread that looked like it answered the question, so forgive me if this has been debated ad nauseum.

I have no problem accepting that the world was much better off for the US involvement in helping defeat Germany and Japan in WWII, but I'm wondering if the consequences of WWI were worth the US effort. ASSUMING that Germany was either going to win WWI (or at least, that a truce would have allowed Germany to keep the territory it occupied, from northern France to eastern Europe)---would the world have been better off if Germany won WWI, or at least forced Britain and France to a truce? Of course Germany would have been better off for having won WWI, but I'm wondering if the US hadn't entered the war, and Germany at least got the west to accept a status quo, what the worst would have been for everyone else.

What got me thinking is an article I just read on this topic: http://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayju ... at-mistake

I'm wondering what folks here think of this....

[Rob Stuart]

Powell's essay is seriously flawed on two counts, in my opinion:

1. He glosses over the German provocations that led the US to declare war, as if they could have simply been ignored. But the US could not sit on its hands in the face of the German U-boat offensive which would either sink a lot of US ships or force the US to assist in the German blockade by forbidding its ships from sailing to Europe. There was also the matter of the German offer to Mexico of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Obviously Congress agreed with Wilson's point of view that enough was enough.

2. He assumes that the Central Powers could not have been decisively defeated without US intervention. This is a dubious assumption. The German spring offensives of 1918 were defeated with little or no US assistance, and the U-boat was largely defeated by then too. The British and French offensives of 1918 may well have been weaker without US troops taking over part of the line and thus freeing up British and French reserves, but they would most likely have gained enough success to encourage their own governments and peoples, and the Germans would have been finished in 1919 at the latest.

I for one do not think that US involvement in WW1 was a mistake. (For one thing, the peace imposed on the Germans would have been even harsher if Wilson had not be in Paris.)

[paulri]

Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I was hoping my post wasn't going to be seen as incendiary.

You raised some good points.

[OpanaPointer]

Sorry that I'm weak on WWI, but didn't Germany launch a major assault intended to win the war before the US was there in strength, and it failed? That would reinforce Mr. Stuart's #2, I think.

[glenn239]

Sorry that I'm weak on WWI, but didn't Germany launch a major assault intended to win the war before the US was there in strength, and it failed? That would reinforce Mr. Stuart's #2, I think.

Germany did launch a series of offensives in 1918 attempting to break the Western Front before the US army arrived in force, culminating in July, then leading to Allied counterattacks, (mostly British and French) from August onwards that inflicted defeats on the German army, pushing it eastwards out of its Flanders salient. How much of that would translate with no US involvement, or indeed how the Allies were going to break across the German border (a much more difficult proposition than a Flanders offensive), remains an open question.

[glenn239]

1. He glosses over the German provocations that led the US to declare war, as if they could have simply been ignored. But the US could not sit on its hands in the face of the German U-boat offensive which would either sink a lot of US ships or force the US to assist in the German blockade by forbidding its ships from sailing to Europe. There was also the matter of the German offer to Mexico of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Obviously Congress agreed with Wilson's point of view that enough was enough.

The USW campaign was an issue that the US could have chosen to tolerate, or chosen to make war over. Examining the alternative to making war over it is not 'glossing over' the provocation, it's simply examining the alternative response.

The matter of the German offer to Mexico brings up the issue of how it came to be that a secret diplomatic communications not intended for public consumption, nor translated into any meaningful security threat, came to be published then pronounced a reason for war. As a casus belli invariably involves actions, not words, the Zimmerman Telegram doesn't seem rise to the level of legitimate provocation.

2. He assumes that the Central Powers could not have been decisively defeated without US intervention. This is a dubious assumption. The German spring offensives of 1918 were defeated with little or no US assistance

That question is a very difficult one to answer. The historical pattern suggests a German collapse was possible, but the effect of US entry on keeping flagging Italy and France in the war is evident as well.

and the U-boat was largely defeated by then too.

Insofar as sinking 2.6 million tons of shipping, (ie, at a rate that still far outstripped Entente production minus the USA) in the first 9 months of 1918 can constitute the "defeat" of the U-boats. While new ASW techniques helped, it was also the US contribution that defeated the U-boats by contributing millions of tons of US construction and captured CP ships to the contest.

The British and French offensives of 1918 may well have been weaker without US troops taking over part of the line and thus freeing up British and French reserves, but they would most likely have gained enough success to encourage their own governments and peoples, and the Germans would have been finished in 1919 at the latest.

The notion that the British and French alone could have ruptured German defenses in the heavy terrain along the common border seems optimistic.

I for one do not think that US involvement in WW1 was a mistake. (For one thing, the peace imposed on the Germans would have been even harsher if Wilson had not be in Paris.)

But it was the very fact that Wilson had offered lenient terms which caused the armistice in the first place.

[ljadw]

You are confounding the armistice conditions and the peace treaty conditions : in november 1918,Germany begged for an armistice because and the home front and the army had collapsed .

[Rob Stuart]

1. He glosses over the German provocations that led the US to declare war, as if they could have simply been ignored. But the US could not sit on its hands in the face of the German U-boat offensive which would either sink a lot of US ships or force the US to assist in the German blockade by forbidding its ships from sailing to Europe. There was also the matter of the German offer to Mexico of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Obviously Congress agreed with Wilson's point of view that enough was enough.

The matter of the German offer to Mexico brings up the issue of how it came to be that a secret diplomatic communications not intended for public consumption, nor translated into any meaningful security threat, came to be published then pronounced a reason for war. As a casus belli invariably involves actions, not words, the Zimmerman Telegram doesn't seem rise to the level of legitimate provocation.

The Zimmerman Telegram was an order from the German government to its ambassador in Mexico to offer the Mexican government the three US states if it would attack the US. You and I are both Canadians, but I think our US friends here would all agree that this is not simply a matter of words.

The British and French offensives of 1918 may well have been weaker without US troops taking over part of the line and thus freeing up British and French reserves, but they would most likely have gained enough success to encourage their own governments and peoples, and the Germans would have been finished in 1919 at the latest.

The notion that the British and French alone could have ruptured German defenses in the heavy terrain along the common border seems optimistic.

Why would they have to? The Germans threw in the towel in November 1918 without their border defences (shouldn't you be using Cdn spelling? ) having been even attacked. They were defeated in Belgium. Why would it be necessary for the Allies to advance further than they did historically?

[pugsville]

(1) The result might not have been altered, they were factors such as
Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria all sought peace terms in 1918 as they were mostly incapable of continuing. Even if the Germans fight on, their allies would have collapsed. This would have released a lot more resources to the western front. The German economy was suffering and there was increasing gap in the production of Armaments.

(2) Any German Victory in ww1 was likely to be much more unstable than an allied one. Germany had developed sustainable war aims that involves complete domination of Europe, annexations and creation of puppet states. IF Austria Hungary and Turkey survive they are also unstable. What happens to this large unstable Europe is very hard to say. The German Empire had serve governance issues, social problems, and a habit of brutally when challenged.

Why is there any assurnace that GErman winning ww1 would be any better for anybody?

[glenn239]

You are confounding the armistice conditions and the peace treaty conditions : in november 1918,Germany begged for an armistice because and the home front and the army had collapsed .

The German collapse was deeply intertwined between the current defeats, the economic suffering, the impossible odds in 1919 with the AEF, and the division and confusion caused by Wilson's original lenient terms and the subsequent public exchanges. Of those four factors, the US as a beligerent influenced them all.

[glenn239]

The Zimmerman Telegram was an order from the German government to its ambassador in Mexico to offer the Mexican government the three US states if it would attack the US. You and I are both Canadians, but I think our US friends here would all agree that this is not simply a matter of words

The Zimmerman Telegram was a secret communication not intended for public viewing and not intended to be hacked and used for public accusation, offering Mexico an alliance if and only if the US and Germany went to war. Slice it any way you want, but wars are not generally started over secret offers with inherent preconditions attached, and even less likely to be caused by offers with no chance of being accepted.

Wilson could have ignored the Zimmerman Telegram and let the Mexicans reject the offer - which, BTW, they did.

Why would they have to? The Germans threw in the towel in November 1918 without their border defences (shouldn't you be using Cdn spelling? ) having been even attacked. They were defeated in Belgium. Why would it be necessary for the Allies to advance further than they did historically?

Because Germany controlled Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Finland, Poland and Ukraine. That level of hegemony just might become a problem for France and Britain at a later date.

You whisked the British and French armies across the heavy terrain of the Saar, the Ardennes, the Rhine, and took Metz-Thionville all in one paragraph. Don't underestimate the chances that the BEF and French armies were on the edge of exhaustion themselves, and that without 4 million American troops in Europe or coming, and without all the blockade and financial backing implied by US participation, that rupturing the difficult border line might have proven beyond their capacity or endurance.

[Rob Stuart]

The Zimmerman Telegram was an order from the German government to its ambassador in Mexico to offer the Mexican government the three US states if it would attack the US. You and I are both Canadians, but I think our US friends here would all agree that this is not simply a matter of words

The Zimmerman Telegram was a secret communication not intended for public viewing and not intended to be hacked and used for public accusation, offering Mexico an alliance if and only if the US and Germany went to war. Slice it any way you want, but wars are not generally started over secret offers with inherent preconditions attached, and even less likely to be caused by offers with no chance of being accepted.

Wilson could have ignored the Zimmerman Telegram and let the Mexicans reject the offer - which, BTW, they did.

The fact that this offer was made in secret to the Mexicans made it all the more galling once it was revealed. Furthermore, because the British had cut Germany's overseas telegraph cables, the Americans had permitted the German foreign ministry to send some of its messages over State Department circuits. The Zimmerman Telegram, encoded, was in fact forwarded, for at least part of its journey, over State Department lines, thus adding perfidy to insult and intended injury. The fact that the Mexicans rejected the offer, and no doubt would have even if it had not been made public, is neither here nor there. The German offer was a provocation in and of itself. The US might not have declared war if this was the only provocation, but of course it wasn't. You mentioned earlier that it's actions, not words, which count. By the same token, there came a point where US protests (i.e., words) were not enough and it had to take action.

[Rob Stuart]

Why would they have to? The Germans threw in the towel in November 1918 without their border defences (shouldn't you be using Cdn spelling? ) having been even attacked. They were defeated in Belgium. Why would it be necessary for the Allies to advance further than they did historically

Because Germany controlled Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Finland, Poland and Ukraine. That level of hegemony just might become a problem for France and Britain at a later date.

How does this answer my question? The fate of these eastern territories was settled at Versailles in 1919. There is no reason to suppose that their fates would have been any different if the US had not been involved in the treaty-making which formally ended the war.

You whisked the British and French armies across the heavy terrain of the Saar, the Ardennes, the Rhine, and took Metz-Thionville all in one paragraph. Don't underestimate the chances that the BEF and French armies were on the edge of exhaustion themselves, and that without 4 million American troops in Europe or coming, and without all the blockade and financial backing implied by US participation, that rupturing the difficult border line might have proven beyond their capacity or endurance.

No. I'm suggesting that the Germans, their armies defeated while still well forward in Belgium, would have asked for an armistice well before they fell back on the areas you name, as they actually did. The Allied armies would then simply march through these areas and across the Rhine unopposed, as they did historically.

[woneil]

If Cato tells you the time of day, immediately check your watch. Not only to confirm the time (which they almost surely have wrong) but to ensure that they haven't lifted it. I'm sure they've been right on something, but I can't remember the last time. I'd love to see a good analysis of just why the U.S. leadership chose to go to war in the spring of 1917, but Cato's certainly isn't it.

[woneil]

The matter of the German offer to Mexico brings up the issue of how it came to be that a secret diplomatic communications not intended for public consumption, nor translated into any meaningful security threat, came to be published then pronounced a reason for war. As a casus belli invariably involves actions, not words, the Zimmerman Telegram doesn't seem rise to the level of legitimate provocation.

The first thing to understand is that nothing of this sort ever remains secret for very long in Washington. (I've lived there and worked in and for the government for decades.) Once the Brits offered the forbidden fruit of the knowledge that the message existed and how it could be broken it was all completely determined, just as Whitehall had calculated. The Administration could either hold on to the secret until the newspapers got hold of it and pilloried them, or they could take the initiative and have some control. Only Cato could be obtuse enough to think they made the wrong choice.

Americans of that day were highly sensitive to European slights and the implications of the Telegram inflamed public opinion greatly. And hair-splitting European legalisms about what was and wasn't legitimate casus belli meant nothing whatever. It didn't make Wilson's choice for war inevitable or unavoidable, but it gave a strong shove in that direction.