Why did the Germans give up?

[Graeme Sydney]

Imperial Germany was a centralised authoritarian militaristic Monarchy, Nazi German was a police state dictatorship.

Really? How was Germany a "centralised" and militaristic country? How was it authoritarian?

"The emperor retained absolute power over ministers and government decisions: he could hire and fire the chancellor (prime minister), determine foreign policy and was commander-in-chief of the armed forces". - See more at: http://alphahistory.com/worldwar1/germa ... i8im9.dpuf

Centralised enough for you?

authoritarian; "1. favouring, denoting, or characterized by strict obedience to authority
2. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) favouring, denoting, or relating to government by a small elite with wide powers"

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/authoritarian

"Both Germany and its parent state, Prussia, had the trappings of a democratic state: constitutions, elected legislatures and multiple political parties. But limited voting rights and restrictive electoral systems ensured that conservative elites maintained their grip on power". - See more at: http://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/ ... ffiKH.dpuf

"1. Glorification of the ideals of a professional military class.
2. Predominance of the armed forces in the administration or policy of the state.
3. A policy in which military preparedness is of primary importance to a state."
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/militaristic

Both German and Prussian militarism is well recognised (and yes was also a factor in France and GB to varying degrees at the time).

[JAG13]

Imperial Germany was a centralised authoritarian militaristic Monarchy, Nazi German was a police state dictatorship.

Really? How was Germany a "centralised" and militaristic country? How was it authoritarian?

"The emperor retained absolute power over ministers and government decisions: he could hire and fire the chancellor (prime minister), determine foreign policy and was commander-in-chief of the armed forces". - See more at: http://alphahistory.com/worldwar1/germa ... i8im9.dpuf

Centralised enough for you?

Sounds pretty much like a standard definition of an executive such as the US president.

He had plenty of leeway... as long as it didnt involve money! The Reichstag had control over the money and therefore could pretty much anything the government wanted to undertake, which is why the government was so adamant on making sure the war guilt would fall on the Russians, they needed not only the peoples support but the Reichstag's in order to have war credits approved.

The poor Kaiser couldnt even raise direct taxes on the country, only the states could do that and it took the Entente's rampant militarism to make a dent on that, a small one, on 1912 to fund a limited expansion of the army.

authoritarian; "1. favouring, denoting, or characterized by strict obedience to authority
2. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) favouring, denoting, or relating to government by a small elite with wide powers"

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/authoritarian

"Both Germany and its parent state, Prussia, had the trappings of a democratic state: constitutions, elected legislatures and multiple political parties. But limited voting rights and restrictive electoral systems ensured that conservative elites maintained their grip on power". - See more at: http://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/ ... ffiKH.dpuf

Yes, so constrained it was that Germany enfranchised 22% of its population to vote for lower chambers, thats higher than Britain's 18% btw... after all, all men 25 and over could vote since 1871... There were restrictions of course, but all countries had them in some form or another at the time, it was after all a monarchy, but is a far cry from the propaganda.

"1. Glorification of the ideals of a professional military class.
2. Predominance of the armed forces in the administration or policy of the state.
3. A policy in which military preparedness is of primary importance to a state."
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/militaristic

Both German and Prussian militarism is well recognised (and yes was also a factor in France and GB to varying degrees at the time).

Lol! Yes, recognized in propaganda!

SO militaristic was Germany that they didnt bat an eye when they were significantly outstripped in military force and spending by the Entente, they only reacted, and mildly, in 1912 when it was already too late and France had shifted into an offensive stance and looked favorably towards war thanks to the military imbalance.

SO militaristic was Germany that it barely recruited half its available male population compared to France's 82%, moreover, the French served for 3 years compared to the Germans 2, which explains why the 40 million France fielded a larger army than 67 million Germany.

So militaristic was Germany that it spent 3,9% of its NNP in the military, peace loving France 4,8%, progressive Russia 5,1%.

Thats how militaristic Germany was, the rest is propaganda.

You can check Ferguson's Pity of War for the data.

[pugsville]

army size.
depends how you measure army size. The French standing army was larger but if you include reserves the German was larger, The German system incorporated reserve formations immediately into the army at the start of a war.

franchise/democracy
The German parliament was mostly sidelined. The Party with the greatest number of seats did not form Government, ministers were not responsible to Parliament. While Germans might have a more inclusive franchise their votes had a much more limited effect on Government Policy.

[JAG13]

army size.
depends how you measure army size. The French standing army was larger but if you include reserves the German was larger, The German system incorporated reserve formations immediately into the army at the start of a war.

The Germans were better able to train and integrate reserves into the operational army than the Entente, they were more efficient and took advantage of that, but reserve formations were always weaker at the very least in equipment or support plus in a short conflict the standing army si the one bound to be the decisive one which is why the French was heavy on active formations.

franchise/democracy
The German parliament was mostly sidelined. The Party with the greatest number of seats did not form Government, ministers were not responsible to Parliament. While Germans might have a more inclusive franchise their votes had a much more limited effect on Government Policy.

True, being a constitutional monarchy they had a more limited power than a parliamentary democracy, but by having control of the budget they were certainly in a powerful position and far from being a mere tool or executioner of an authoritarian government.

[Futurist]

Why did the Germans give up in 1918? Were they truly defeated? Were they "stabbed in the back" by subversive domestic elements? Or were they somehow tricked by the Americans and the Allies?

I have my own answers, but am interested in hearing the considered views of others.

A little factual background:

In the latter half of September 1918 the Central Powers suffered a series of serious reverses. On the morning of 28 September Ludendorff, showing great strain, told Hindenburg that Germany must seek peace. Hindenburg endorsed the idea. The government was changed and on the night of 4/5 October an appeal for an armistice was made to America's President Wilson, based on the principles of his Fourteen Points speech of 8 January. After several exchanges (and several hundred thousand more casualties) the Armistice agreement was signed and the fighting ceased on 11 Nov.

Considering that the Hindenburg Line was already broken, that the Entente/Allies were already advancing deep into Belgium, and that all of Germany's allies were already knocked out of World War I, Yes, Germany was truly defeated in World War I. Now, this defeat might not have been as decisive and total as it was during World War II, but it was nevertheless a defeat.

As for the "Stab-in-the-Back" Myth, as far as I know, that myth emerged due to the fact that Germany descended into revolution in October-November 1918 (due to the fact that the German sailors at Kiel refused to fight a suicidal naval battle and thus rebelled, after which point this rebellion spread to the rest of Germany) and experienced regime change as a result of this revolution (with the overthrow of the German monarchy and its replacement by the Weimar Republic) as well as due to the fact that some German generals genuinely (and very likely falsely) believed that Germany could have bled the Entente/Allies to exhaustion had it continued the war and/or due to the fact that some German generals wanted to avoid being blamed for Germany's defeat in World War I.

[The Ibis]

As for the "Stab-in-the-Back" Myth, as far as I know, that myth emerged due to the fact that Germany descended into revolution in October-November 1918 (due to the fact that the German sailors at Kiel refused to fight a suicidal naval battle and thus rebelled, after which point this rebellion spread to the rest of Germany) and experienced regime change as a result of this revolution (with the overthrow of the German monarchy and its replacement by the Weimar Republic) as well as due to the fact that some German generals genuinely (and very likely falsely) believed that Germany could have bled the Entente/Allies to exhaustion had it continued the war and/or due to the fact that some German generals wanted to avoid being blamed for Germany's defeat in World War I.

The stab in the back myth started long before the end of the war. Von Seeckt was referring to it in 1917. I have a vague recollection of earlier use, but its escaping me now.

[LineDoggie]

Sounds pretty much like a standard definition of an executive such as the US president.

Actually no. A US POTUS has to get consent from the US Senate for his cabinet (Secretary or War, Sec Nav, todays Sec Def). He cannot arbitrarily make someone Secretary of war nor appoint a chief of staff of the US Army. He cannot control the funding for the military, the Congress hold the purse strings.

As President he is however Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces. He can relieve any flag officer from command (they hold their commissions from the President) or demand the resignation of a Cabinet member at his pleasure.

[Futurist]

As for the "Stab-in-the-Back" Myth, as far as I know, that myth emerged due to the fact that Germany descended into revolution in October-November 1918 (due to the fact that the German sailors at Kiel refused to fight a suicidal naval battle and thus rebelled, after which point this rebellion spread to the rest of Germany) and experienced regime change as a result of this revolution (with the overthrow of the German monarchy and its replacement by the Weimar Republic) as well as due to the fact that some German generals genuinely (and very likely falsely) believed that Germany could have bled the Entente/Allies to exhaustion had it continued the war and/or due to the fact that some German generals wanted to avoid being blamed for Germany's defeat in World War I.

The stab in the back myth started long before the end of the war. Von Seeckt was referring to it in 1917. I have a vague recollection of earlier use, but its escaping me now.

This would certainly be interesting. Indeed, if possible, can you please try finding the source for this statement of yours?

[The Ibis]

As for the "Stab-in-the-Back" Myth, as far as I know, that myth emerged due to the fact that Germany descended into revolution in October-November 1918 (due to the fact that the German sailors at Kiel refused to fight a suicidal naval battle and thus rebelled, after which point this rebellion spread to the rest of Germany) and experienced regime change as a result of this revolution (with the overthrow of the German monarchy and its replacement by the Weimar Republic) as well as due to the fact that some German generals genuinely (and very likely falsely) believed that Germany could have bled the Entente/Allies to exhaustion had it continued the war and/or due to the fact that some German generals wanted to avoid being blamed for Germany's defeat in World War I.

The stab in the back myth started long before the end of the war. Von Seeckt was referring to it in 1917. I have a vague recollection of earlier use, but its escaping me now.

This would certainly be interesting. Indeed, if possible, can you please try finding the source for this statement of yours?

Sure. From Wilhelm Deist's "The Military Collapse of the German Empire: the Reality Behind the Stab-in-the-Back Myth," (located in War in History vol. 3 (2) 1996) at pages 206-207 (emphasis supplied):

The sudden and chaotic collapse of a system hitherto opposed in principle only by a small political minority deprived the broad middle strata of their general political orientation. It thus prepared fertile ground for wild hypotheses and attempts at explanation, all of which served the purpose of suppressing or making tolerable the bitter and repugnant reality. The stab-in-the-back myth perfectly met this requirement. It used accustomed categories and was, even in its exaggerated form, not new. Major-General von Seeckt had already expressed it in the crisis of July 1917: 'What are we really fighting for? The home front has attacked us from behind, and therefore the war is lost'. 117 This distorting statement was now consciously used as a political weapon. In this area OHL also pointed the way when Ludendorff told officers of the General Staff on 29 September 'now those circles must be brought into the government ... whom we have above all to thank for having brought us to this point ... Let them now eat the broth they have cooked for us.’ 118 The shifting of responsibility for the disaster, long in preparation, now assumed concrete form. At the very moment of defeat the formula was discovered which helped to obscure among large sections of the population the recognition of the causes of collapse, and to give a propaganda ploy the appearance of reality. While recognizing with surprising clarity the real issues, the chairman of the Pan-German League stated to its executive committee on 19 October that ’the situation should be used for a fanfare against Jewry and the Jews as lightning conductors for all injustices’.’ 119 The stab-in-the-back myth was thus endowed with its devastating antisemitic force.

[The Ibis]

Speaking of the stab-in-the-back myth, Roger Chickering in Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 quoted a 1916 newspaper article foreshadowing what was to come. From page 189:

Late in July 1916, as battle raged at Verdun, on the Somme, and on the eastern front, an "Ernest Appeal from the Front" appeared in newspapers throughout Germany. "Are Germans on the homefront still the people they were at the war's beginning," read the inquiry: "or have everyday concerns again taken over? German People! Do not jeopardize the great cause, the lives and future of every German, with your petty discontents."22 By the middle of the war, this motif was already a common marker of the growing tensions between the home and fighting fronts; and it continued to surface regularly among the troops.

Footnote 22 cites "Ein ernster Aufruf aus dem Felde," Die Volkswachc (Freiburg im Breisgau), 21 July 1916.

[The Ibis]

Digging through my files, I remember where I had seen the reference to an early stab-in-the-back myth. It was in Patrick J. Houlihan's Was There an Austrian Stab-in-the-Back Myth? Interwar Military Interpretations of Defeat, but referred to the Habsburgs! Anyway, Houlihan supports a German myth stemming from 1916-17, so there's that.The article can be found in From Empire to Republic: Post-World War I Austria. Vol. 19, Contemporary Austrian Studies (New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2010). The relevant text states (pages 68-69, my bold):

The concept of a stab-in-the-back myth antedates the Great War, with shadowy origins in the nineteenth-century literary imagination in Central Europe that became more feverish as the imagined community became more exclusionary. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch has noted, national mythologies of this era depended heavily on “medieval or pseudomedieval”
epics to establish the rubrics by which nations judged heroes and villains, and furthermore, “the connections between these fictional narratives and historical reality merit close attention.”4 As a theoretically supranational entity, however, the Habsburg monarchy posed considerable conceptual difficulties for nationalists, and the tension between a national abstraction and a multinational experiment forms one of the main tropes of Habsburg history since the French Revolution.5

One of the most eminent Habsburg historians, Robert Kann, once remarked that “probably the first known reference to the Dolchstosslegende” occurred in the “aesthetic dream-world, in which literary aestheticism was over-emphasized to the point of absurdity, and political criticism survived in the emasculated form of literary criticism.” For Kann, this was traceable to Wolfgang Menzel’s Biedermeier philosophy of a Christian-German synthesis that animated the Burschenschaften movement of the early nineteenth century.6 The immense destruction and social reordering of the Great War, however, would ensure that “aesthetic dream-worlds” had a political dimension that was all too real.

The myth that the German Army during the Great War had been “unbeaten in the field” abroad (im Felde unbesiegt) and thus “stabbed in the back” (Dolchstoss) by subversive elements at home was one of the most pernicious beliefs of the authoritarian right. The stab-in-the-back myth was a denial of culpability, reflecting an inability to accept German defeat in war and the consequent realities of the postwar world. Across a wide spectrum of the political right-wing, responsibility for German defeat and postwar misery was foisted upon a projected conspiracy of Jews and Bolsheviks. In the right-wing imagination, these shiftless, alien, deceitful, cosmopolitan groups had undermined the German war effort and betrayed the nation in a shameful dictated peace treaty. The “betrayers” continued to put their narrow economic self-interest ahead of the well-being of the German nation, even by fomenting international revolution associated with
the developments in Soviet Russia. Although the seeds of this myth were planted during the conflict itself around 1916-17, the legend of a “stab-in-the-back” became politically consequential during the interwar period. The myth was disseminated by two German Army commanders whose political importance in the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich as well as the Weimar Republic was absolutely crucial: Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The legend became central to Nazi ideology, which proclaimed a mission to avenge the perceived treachery.7

[Terry Duncan]

Hi there Ibis and welcome to the AHF.

It could even be argued that the 'stab in the back' or something similar was being considered from Sept 1914 when Moltke reputedly said 'we have lost the war' at The Marne, as scapegoats were being lined up by the GGS from that point onwards, Moltke and Hentsch had failed the great Schlieffen, but most importantly both were dead by the end of the war and unable to put their side of events forward, the diplomats had failed by not securing British neutrality, despite it being the German attack on Belgium that ensured it, people like Bethmann had failed by not ensuring all of Germany's potential allies joined them by putting out a convincing story of how Germany was the poor innocent attacked by all her neighbours who had conspired against her, and even Austria had betrayed Germany by refusing to talk to Italy and by supposedly not keeping Germany informed of her intended actions. The one thing that was to be maintained at all costs was that the GGS had in no way failed or been responsible for the situation Germany found itself in, and this later changed into how they were not responsible for the outcome of the war or in seeking terms.

[The Ibis]

Hi Terry. Thanks for the welcome.

Re the Marne - I've seen that point made before. Zuber goes into the GGS blame game in Inventing The Schlieffen Plan in one of the more interesting chapters of that book. If I recall right he says Lyncker was first off the mark.

[iangreenhalgh]

I think that the bankers have to be spoken of in any discussion of the 'stab in the back'

Germany financed the war through bank loans whereas France introduced an income tax to finance the war, similar measures were taken in the other allied countries, therefore Germany was getting more and more in debt to the banks the longer the war went on.

Kaiser Wilhelm said in a 1922 interview with the Chicago Tribune: "The Jews are responsible for Bolshevism in Russia, and Germany too. I was far too indulgent with them during my reign, and I bitterly regret the favors I showed the prominent Jewish bankers."

This shows the kind of thinking that gave rise to the anti-semitism of Hitler and the right wing of German politics. Certainly many of the most prominent bankers in Germany were Jewish, such as Max Warburg, but bankers are bankers, regardless of race or religion and Germany was hardly alone in having many prominent Jewish bankers and financiers; Paul Warburg had moved to the USA and played a key role in creating the Federal Reserve, Britain and France also had many Jewish families prominent in their banking systems too.

The difference in the German post war distaste for their Jewish bankers came about because Germany lost the war - they had to blame someone and they chose to blame the bankers; add to this the fact that the Bolsheviks who tried to seize power through revolution in 1918-19 were lead by Jews such as Rosa Luxembourg, Alfred Rosenberg, Karl Leibknecht, Leo Jogiches and Paul Levi and you have the basis of the Nazis 'stabbed in the back by Jewish communists and bankers' rhetoric.

Of course, the origins of the 'stab in the back' lie earlier than 1918, but it cannot be overlooked that after the war, the stab in the back became inexorably entangled with the politics of the German right wing and it's anti-semitism which no doubt obscured any other origins and causations of the stab in the back theory.

[joerookery]

The one thing that was to be maintained at all costs was that the GGS had in no way failed or been responsible for the situation Germany found itself in, and this later changed into how they were not responsible for the outcome of the war or in seeking terms.

So true Terry but they really balled it up.