Bizarre Assessment of the "Schlieffen Plan"

[ljadw]

The German Socialists were the same ones who were all too happy to agree that they would not support any war at the last meeting before the war, where they were the leading proponents of the workers refusing to fight and stopping any war this way. As soon as a war happened, they like almost all the other Socialists, supported their nations war efforts.

In 1909 the worst way to provoke a war was to threaten Russia, who was known to not be in a position to fight Germany, far better to let her start a fight with Austria and then cite this as casus foederis as the alliance allowed, and saving fellow Germans from the nasty Slavs is just as easy to sell as what happened in 1914.

There was no chance in 1909 of a war between AH and Russia,such a war could only occur if Germany was intervening .And that was the reason why Germany intervened .The fire was smouldering, the pyroman (Germany) wanted a big fire and put oil on the fire .

[Terry Duncan]

The German Socialists were the same ones who were all too happy to agree that they would not support any war at the last meeting before the war, where they were the leading proponents of the workers refusing to fight and stopping any war this way. As soon as a war happened, they like almost all the other Socialists, supported their nations war efforts.

In 1909 the worst way to provoke a war was to threaten Russia, who was known to not be in a position to fight Germany, far better to let her start a fight with Austria and then cite this as casus foederis as the alliance allowed, and saving fellow Germans from the nasty Slavs is just as easy to sell as what happened in 1914.

There was no chance in 1909 of a war between AH and Russia,such a war could only occur if Germany was intervening .And that was the reason why Germany intervened .The fire was smouldering, the pyroman (Germany) wanted a big fire and put oil on the fire .

Russia was quite capable of fighting Austria without German intervention, Germny intervening ensured no such war would happen, the reason Russia bcked down was because she couldnt fight Germany and Austria.

[ljadw]

I did not say that Russia was not capable to fight Austria without German intervention;I said that Russia was not willing to start a war with Austria for Bosnia-Herzegovina,but that Germany wanted to corner Russia hoping that this would result in a war .

[glenn239]

Yet both did their best to increase the tensions as the crisis went on, neither was willing to back down, and neither was forced to do anything by another power, they took their own decisions.

Austria had an unprecedented level of support from Germany and intended to use it to its fullest. Whether Russia had the same blank cheque from France, (Poincare in St. Petersburg 20th-23rd July) we'll never know, but the Russian policy seems to assume that support was there.

The lack of an instant DOW could simply be that France knew it would not be ready to act for some days and therefore saw no point in acting in such a way, the mobilisation order indicates a willingness to move the troops to the German border to force Germany to fight on two fronts, exactly as the alliance asks for.

The French had no incentive to be sending their DOW's prematurely. So long as they mobilized and could keep to the military accords, the Russians wouldn't care if they delayed matters.

Britain tried to prevent a war yes, but mostly because the balance of power was threatened by any war, so British interests were best served by peace. Britain still went to war when it could have simply refused to do so.

Grey would have preferred no war, but if war there was to be, Britain must be in it. The great question, the one I've never decided upon, is how far Grey would have been willing to go in the Austria vs. Serbia solo department. I suspect the answer is further than might be guessed.

Nothing forced Austria to declare war, Germany pressured for the declaration of war to be moved forward from 12th August to 27th-28th July, but sending a couple of 'hurry up and get on with it' telegrams are hardly 'forcing' anything. Berchtold proved to be perfectly able to be intransigent when it suited him to do so, as he was with all the peace suggestions.

Austria need not declare war - they had their leverage for an extended diplomatic showdown. Berchtold, unfortunately, overrated his hand - he placed more value than warranted on his perception he was acting in the right.

It declared war on Russia while there was no reason for it

You may not agree with the decision but there was a reason. The Russian mobilisation threatened to make the German war plan impossible if it was allowed to move forward too much of German measures, then coupled with The Netherlands and Belgium mobilising too, making the Liege coup-de-main also more risky, then with the Austrians needing to know what Germany would do by 1st August so as to avoid sending Army B to the Balkans too, the Germans were running out of time. I believe they acted too fast, in that they could still have waited two or maybe three more days before declaring war, though they did likely have to mobilise in response to Russian and French actions when they did. This distinction of being able to mobilise without declaring war seems to have been overlooked for no reason better than it was specified in the plan that actions took place at set times.

I believe that Moltke's urgency for the coup de main on Liege was a bit of a soap bubble, that he exaggerated the military value of the gamble so that he could pressure the civilians to stop negotiating. (Moltke's real fear was not so much Liege, IMO, as it was the capacity for the Entente to paralyse German mobilization through endless diplomatic proposals, all of which that would end with the Franco-Russians advancing into Germany).

I think the amount of time Germany had before action was necessary was about 8-10 days, the timeframe to get the heavy siege cannons to the front at Aachen. Even then, rather than sending summary notes, they just should have advanced into the Ardennes.

[chronos20th]

Britain, or rather Sir Edward Grey and the British War Party on our behalf, went to war to restore the Balance of Power in Europe in its favour.

It was a key British War Aim.


Niail Furguson is correct that is was an old fashioned 18th century Balance of Power war.

It would be untrue that Imperial Germany and A-H had full freedom of action.


As Portales, the capable German ambassador to St.P. kept reminding Sazanov, they were bound by their treaty of alliance with A-H.

We were involved in the 1908-9 Affaire having secretly promised Isvolsky the then Russian foreign minister to open the Straits to the Russian fleet as the price of the 1907 Entente at an international conference when a crisis occurred in the Balkans..


Isvolsky was attempting to cash his post-dated cheque at the Bank of England as the expected crisis in the Balkans had now occurred.

The reason for the Liege affaire and swift action as under the Schlieffen Plan and Great Memorandum Feb.1906 the Battle of Annihilation was expected to be fought just west of Liege, so this bottleneck had to be secured.

Hence the GermanStart Line WEST of Liege and the French Start Line of the Dinant-Breda Line.

[glenn239]

Britain, or rather Sir Edward Grey and the British War Party on our behalf, went to war to restore the Balance of Power in Europe in its favour.

It was a key British War Aim.

Terry mentions France and the lost provinces, and how there were primary and subordinate aims involved. I think the same thing applies to Grey and the question of balance of power. I believe that Grey was willing to allow the balance of power to take its own course if Europe evolved peacefully, but if a war broke out, that it would force him to go in against Germany. Like the lost provinces, the prospect of correcting the balance of power might have tempted him in a crisis moreso than if that motive didn't exist, and if war threatened it he would fight. But in the end, after twenty years of weighing the matter in my own mind, I think that Grey would have preferred an isolated Austro-Serbian war to a world war, even to the point of working towards it, if this could be done without threatening the integrity of the Triple Entente.

It would be untrue that Imperial Germany and A-H had full freedom of action.

Austria had freedom of action - they could have settled for some political concessions rather than going whole hog. Frankly, their decision for war was stupid. They should have concentrated on rebuilding the Ottoman and Bulgarian armies, and integrating them into the Central Powers in 1915.

Then smash Serbia.

Isvolsky was attempting to cash his post-dated cheque at the Bank of England as the expected crisis in the Balkans had now occurred.

The Austrians discovered then what Ukraine has discovered now; that the Russians are very dangerous partners to try to deal with. Today, Britain Germany and France deal with the situation by keeping Russia at arms length. This would have been wise in 1914 as well.

The reason for the Liege affaire and swift action as under the Schlieffen Plan and Great Memorandum Feb.1906 the Battle of Annihilation was expected to be fought just west of Liege, so this bottleneck had to be secured.

Yes, but the coup de main was always a bit of a loose cannon as gambles go - if Moltke thought the odds were particularily good, then why bother with the heavy siege cannons at all? Had the German government been lead by someone more competent than Wilhelm, the coup de main would have been axed and all planning would have assumed about 1 week between Russian mobilization and the need for war in the west, and no war in the west until the siege cannons were ready to advance into Belgium.

Personally, I think there was no chance for peace after Russian mobilization. But the extra week would have set Germany up far better for Versailles and the blame game. Can you imagine the excitement in Britain on, say, 5 August, when the headline reads that the Kaiser has landed at Dover and his "peace train" is advancing to London?

[Terry Duncan]

We were involved in the 1908-9 Affaire having secretly promised Isvolsky the then Russian foreign minister to open the Straits to the Russian fleet as the price of the 1907 Entente at an international conference when a crisis occurred in the Balkans.

So secret I presume you do not intend to provide anyone with some source material to support this claim? After all, that is your usual pattern of behaviour, post a claim, get asked for something to support it, run off and hide, so will you change this time, and provide those sources you promised many years ago, 'sources until the cows come home' etc?

[Terry Duncan]

Terry mentions France and the lost provinces, and how there were primary and subordinate aims involved. I think the same thing applies to Grey and the question of balance of power. I believe that Grey was willing to allow the balance of power to take its own course if Europe evolved peacefully, but if a war broke out, that it would force him to go in against Germany. Like the lost provinces, the prospect of correcting the balance of power might have tempted him in a crisis moreso than if that motive didn't exist, and if war threatened it he would fight. But in the end, after twenty years of weighing the matter in my own mind, I think that Grey would have preferred an isolated Austro-Serbian war to a world war, even to the point of working towards it, if this could be done without threatening the integrity of the Triple Entente.

I dont think Grey wanted war if it were avoidable within the existing alliance structures, he wasnt going to break the Entente's just to allow Austria to crush Russian influence in the Balkans, but if Russia and Austria were able to come to some agreement that meant a war didnt spread beyond the Balkans, I dont see Grey being vaguely interested in it rather as he said to Lichnowsky. He would fight to prevent Germany dominating the continent, he would fight to stop France being crushed, but not just to stop yet another Balkan war or a war where a single great power was involved if that were possible.

Austria had freedom of action - they could have settled for some political concessions rather than going whole hog. Frankly, their decision for war was stupid. They should have concentrated on rebuilding the Ottoman and Bulgarian armies, and integrating them into the Central Powers in 1915.

Then smash Serbia.

Given the Serbians had won the wars and were pretty much exhausted, to the extent they thought they needed until the mid 1920s to recover, any rebuilding of the Bulgarians is likely to take just as long, and it is going to be hard to rebuild the Ottoman armies without causing a clash with Italy too. Quite how Germany views that is open to guesses, but neither are of great value as allies as they are not as industrialised and their goals are rather different.

[glenn239]

I dont think Grey wanted war if it were avoidable within the existing alliance structures, he wasnt going to break the Entente's just to allow Austria to crush Russian influence in the Balkans, but if Russia and Austria were able to come to some agreement that meant a war didnt spread beyond the Balkans, I dont see Grey being vaguely interested in it rather as he said to Lichnowsky. He would fight to prevent Germany dominating the continent, he would fight to stop France being crushed, but not just to stop yet another Balkan war or a war where a single great power was involved if that were possible.

Agreed generally. Grey was willing to let Austria have a go at Serbia if the Russians didn't mind. But he was unwilling to risk the Entente, and also unwilling to admit that a Balkans matter of concern to Russia (but not France) could drag Britain into a continental war just as quickly as if Britain had some sort of direct Balkans interest.

In the end, I think the verdict on Grey's Entente policy was that it was a disaster waiting to happen, since behind all the denials and smoke screens, the British are dragged into a war by the Russians, via the French. What was really needed was for Grey to go, and another foreign minister to aim for a new policy based on ententes with Austria and France, alliance with the United States.

Given the Serbians had won the wars and were pretty much exhausted, to the extent they thought they needed until the mid 1920s to recover, any rebuilding of the Bulgarians is likely to take just as long, and it is going to be hard to rebuild the Ottoman armies without causing a clash with Italy too. Quite how Germany views that is open to guesses, but neither are of great value as allies as they are not as industrialised and their goals are rather different.

The Bulgarians don't have to rebuild to defeat some theoretical army, just the Serbians. Since the Bulgarians and Austrians crushed the Serbians in 1915, it follows that by 1915 the Austrians could have, instead of going to war in July 1914, crushed Serbia by focusing on an offensive military alliance with Bulgaria.

[Terry Duncan]

In the end, I think the verdict on Grey's Entente policy was that it was a disaster waiting to happen, since behind all the denials and smoke screens, the British are dragged into a war by the Russians, via the French. What was really needed was for Grey to go, and another foreign minister to aim for a new policy based on ententes with Austria and France, alliance with the United States.

Nice idea but not practical in 1914 or years close to it. Austria wasnt looking to Britain and could offer nothing that would be worth getting Britain into a war with Russia over, France was already allied to Russia and that was one reason for the 1907 Entente anyhow, so taking France leads to taking Russia, and the US simply is not looking as it is almost totally isolationist at this time. Britain has nothing the US wants as such, and Britain has nothing the US wants, so what lure for the US to come out of isolation?

The Bulgarians don't have to rebuild to defeat some theoretical army, just the Serbians. Since the Bulgarians and Austrians crushed the Serbians in 1915, it follows that by 1915 the Austrians could have, instead of going to war in July 1914, crushed Serbia by focusing on an offensive military alliance with Bulgaria.

But that simply repeats the great power war on the client state of another great power and will lead as surely to war as the July Crisis did, to avoid that Bulgaria would have to fight Serbia alone, not with Austrian aid.

[glenn239]

Nice idea but not practical in 1914 or years close to it. Austria wasnt looking to Britain...

Diplomats are paid to figure out the best strategy and ruthlessly go after it. For Britain in 1914, that was alliance with the United States. Instead of keeping Wilson at arm's length, Grey needs to draw him in, and use the Americans to drive a wedge between France and Russia.

In terms of an entente with Austria, the purpose to that would be to relieve Germany of its heavy security load in the Balkans, not because Britain and Austria otherwise shared much in the way of common interests. Bethmann was always going on about a political deal with Britain. But neither Germany nor Britain required that. What they both required was a British political deal with Austria, and not crucial but a nice bonus, a naval treaty with Germany.

But that simply repeats the great power war on the client state of another great power and will lead as surely to war as the July Crisis did, to avoid that Bulgaria would have to fight Serbia alone, not with Austrian aid.

Maybe, but deferring into 1915 when an offensive alliance with Bulgaria could be reached also smashes Serbia right at the start and leaves Austria in position to mobilize its reserves to Galicia. In the meantime, the Austrians use the Sarajevo crisis to double or triple their defence spending - I believe the Hungarians - ie, Tisza - would have jumped at a massive increase in defence spending if the other choice was to risk war with Russia in 1914.

[Terry Duncan]

Nice idea but not practical in 1914 or years close to it. Austria wasnt looking to Britain...

Diplomats are paid to figure out the best strategy and ruthlessly go after it. For Britain in 1914, that was alliance with the United States. Instead of keeping Wilson at arm's length, Grey needs to draw him in, and use the Americans to drive a wedge between France and Russia.

Getting rather off topic but what exactly does the US want in this period that Britain can offer it? This is where Chamberlain fell down, there was nothing that Britain, Germany, and the US, had in common, and even leaving out Germany doesnt help until you can somehow convince the US that the rest of the world matters and that isolation is not the answer. Short of a major war it is hard to see what will make the US accept this line of reasoning, after all, they didnt really accept it until WWII even after being pulled into one world war. Even then, an alliance with Russia is better than one without just for the manpower alone.

In terms of an entente with Austria, the purpose to that would be to relieve Germany of its heavy security load in the Balkans, not because Britain and Austria otherwise shared much in the way of common interests. Bethmann was always going on about a political deal with Britain. But neither Germany nor Britain required that. What they both required was a British political deal with Austria, and not crucial but a nice bonus, a naval treaty with Germany.

Britain doenst need to relive Germany of any burdons though, especially as Germany set itself up as a rival. Britain really has no interest in Austria either way by 1900 (iirc there had been some diplomatic falling out to a degree after 1866, though I cant remember why at this point), and would have much rather neither Russia nor Austria drag it into Balkan problems as only Greece had ever really interested Britain in that area.

[glenn239]

Getting rather off topic but what exactly does the US want in this period that Britain can offer it?

From Britain's perspective, the question is what is the replacement if the Ententes weren't going to work? Russia would have to be ditched, who stands in? Has to be the United States. Would Wilson have taken more interest in Europe if approached? I think so - he wanted his League of Nations project.

Britain doenst need to relive Germany of any burdons though, especially as Germany set itself up as a rival

Britain wants to avoid a world war, and the way that's going to start is some damn fool thing in the Balkans. Britain needs to support Austria more and Russia less in this region, to prop up the imbalance in power between Russia and Austria, relieving the burden on Germany. While at the same time, siding with France.

Britain really has no interest in Austria either way by 1900 (iirc there had been some diplomatic falling out to a degree after 1866, though I cant remember why at this point), and would have much rather neither Russia nor Austria drag it into Balkan problems as only Greece had ever really interested Britain in that area.

Britain's interest with Austria were the same as ever - Britain was far better off with Austria existing than Austria not existing, and it was not at all clear that the will-o-the-wisp to an entente with Russia spoke convincingly against that.

[favedave]

I think that Britain's pre-war involvement in the region was far more concerned with Turkey and the Ottoman Empire and the about to be opened Berlin to Baghdad rail link than anything in Greece, or Serbia or Russia.

[chronos20th]

Unhappily Britain and Sir Edward Grey was increasingly involved with Russia. One reason being he feared Russia might break away from her friendship with Britain and return to an attitude of hostility.

See the introduction to Gooch and Temperley's British documents on the Origin of the War.


As Glenn says Grey needed to SUPPORT A-H against Russia in the Balkans to maintain the Balance of Power which he failed to do.

His concern for Ottoman - see "The Millstone" - it's online - failed to extend to preventing Russia from seizing The Straits, totally upsetting the Balance of Power from the British FO's point of view.


The famous editorial in the Manchester Guardian, a liberal newspaper, of 4th August argued this in detail.