Mobile Warfare in the West 1914.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more.....................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

On the morning of the 13th, the First Army was ready to repulse the attacks of the adversary, then commencing. The withdrawal of the right wing had required the unwedging of the lines of communication toward the northeast. The railhead, which was to have been transferred to Laon, remained at Chauny, on account of the arrival of the Seventh Army which included Laon in its zone. Chauny was very much exposed and required protection. The convoys refilled directly at the depots of the railhead, in order to permit the reestablishment of the depot columns, in view of the battle which seemed imminent and for which the army commander was preparing all the necessary supplies.

During eight days we have seen that a carefully prepared plan of operations and supply was completely destroyed by the adversary when he, took the initiative. If the army commander nevertheless accomplished his task it was due to improvisations at every instant. With this example, one could easily conclude that carefully prepared plans are useless, because, most frequently, the adversary wiIl not permit their execution, and consequently there will always be improvisation. This conclusion would be totally false. The establishment by the army commander of a complete plan of supply for a difficult operation, as well as having taken as the basis of his operations the possibilities of his supply services, denotes, in a commander, a perfect comprehension of the importance of supply in a modern army and a deep knowledge of the services of the rear. Such qualities are not always, paradoxical as it may appear, those of commanders. To be able to improvise it is necessary to know to the bottom the domain in which one wishes to improvise. Likewise, the plan which is prepared and cannot be executed serves not only as the base of all improvisations, but as the coordinating thread of all improvisation, and permits arrival, albeit by different routes, to the object proposed or prescribed.

If, during the battle of the Marne, the supply of the First Army had assured, normally or by improvisation, and if the commander were able to repair the friction and disorganization in the rear and commence the battle of the Aisne with his services coordinated and ready to function, it was due, aside from the competence of the army commander; to the fact that the direction of all the supply services was centralized in the general staff of the army and in the hand of the army Quartermaster General, Colonel Jochim. Ordinarily the corps organized their own supply ervices, but in case of necessity, these services could be entirely centralize in the general staff of the army.

One of the main lessons to be derived is the necessity of a chief of all supply services in each large organization. Actually this function was supplied by the general staff, but the general staff is deficient in that they are not supply specialists and only serve on these duties for periods of a few years. It is equally as important to have central control of supply services as of command, and this should be obtained at any price.

Colonel Jochim concludes: "The movements accomplished on the Marne and the withdrawal to the Aisne constitute a perfect example of the close connection which exists between combat operations and the supply services and which cannot arbitrarily be thrown out. It is necessary, on the contrary, to proceed with profound studies, to prevision, to place the two in harmony, unless the combat operations are to suffer. Without assured supply the finest victories and all the devotion of the troops will serve nothing, for supply is the primary condition to conserve the combative attitude of the troops for the future operations of the army.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more.....................................

STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE.
["Aufklärung vor der Heeresfront." By v.Gonnermann. Militär Wochenblatt, 23 July 1937.]

On 19 August 1914, von der Marwitz's cavalry corps, consisting of the 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions, advancing on Charleroi, via Walhain St. Paul, covering the advance of the German Second Army, drove back French cavalry in some minor engagements.

Late in the afternoon of 20 August the 9th Cavalry Division, on the right, reached Marbais. There, Captain von Lobbecke, commanding the 5th Squadron, 13th Uhlans, received orders to reconnoiter westward in the area: Marbais-Nivelles-Braine Ie Comte (north boundary)-old road: Marbais-Binche (south boundary).

The same evening, the patrol on the left flank of the reconnaissance squadron clashed with hostile outposts on the banks of the Pieton River west of Gosselies. The reconnaissance zone for 21 August, therefore, was limited in the south to the Canal du Centre as far as Conde, but prolonged in the north to Lille.

Without encountering any further opposition, Captain von Lobbecke reached the French frontier south of the line: Wiers-Peruwelz-Bernissart at noon, 22 August. The following night, however, a messenger reached the reconnaissance squadron in the woods northeast of Wadelincourt with the information that the patrols had drawn heavy fire at the outskirts of Conde. The squadron, therefore, moved on Conde on 23 August. Its reconnaissance revealed that the vicinity and woods north of Conde were held by French Territorial infantry. The enemy was purely on the defensive; there was no reconnoitering cavalry. Simultaneously, it was learned that the ScheIdt crossings as far as Tournai, likewise, were occupied by the enemy.

The identification of French Territorials at Conde was a very important piece of information. It disclosed the left flank of the British Army, as Territorial troops had never been used previously in the first line of defense and, therefore, it was correctly deduced that they were being used exclusively for security purposes.

In the morning of the 24th, patrols of the 9th Cavalry Division, operating in a southerly direction, identified, for the first time, British cavalry and infantry. In the afternoon of the same day, patrols of the IX and VII Corps reported that the British zone extended eastward to a point half-way between Binche and Fontaine l'Eveque. With the knowledge that French Territorials were holding Conde, the extent of the British zone of operations was established, since it was also known that a group of French regular army units, constituting the left flank of the French Army, was concentrated at Charleroi.

On 20 August, Sordet's Cavalry Corps withdrew across the Charleroi-Brussels canal in the direction of Fontaine l'Eveque and occupied the canal crossings between Marchienne-au-Pont and a point south of Seneffe. On the 21st, the British Army Cavalry arrived at the area: Binche-Canal du Centre, from Boussoit to St. Ghislain, screening the advance of the British Expeditionary Forces. On the 22d, the British cavalry, after being relieved by infantry, joined the left flank of the British Army, covering the canal crossings as far as Conde.

As early as 14 August, General Joffre had requested the War Ministry to block the region from Maubeuge to the coast against German cavalry raids. However, the Territorial units of General d'Amade, designated for this purpose, were not ready to assume their mission until 22 August. Orders were issued by 8:00 AM, 22 August, to occupied the line of security leading via Valenciennes-Conde-Tournai to Dunkerque and the main line of resistance: Solesmes-Douai.

In this way we reached the battle of Mons............................

Source: Abstracts-Foreign Articles. RML Nº 67. Dec 1937.

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!

[joerookery]

I found that very interesting – thank you. I was not aware of that source. Is there more? Quite interesting even the term strategic reconnaissance seems odd.

[joerookery]

The identification of French Territorials at Conde was a very important piece of information. It disclosed the left flank of the British Army, as Territorial troops had never been used previously in the first line of defense and, therefore, it was correctly deduced that they were being used exclusively for security purposes.

Who did this analysis and who was it reported to? Kluck did not seem to know. What was the position of By v.Gonnermann. at this time in the war?

[tigre]

Hello joerookery ; thanks for your comments..........................

Quite interesting even the term strategic reconnaissance seems odd.

Agree with you. I guess "Strategic" is the title of the translator ... the German title is Recce ahead/in front of the army..................

Who did this analysis and who was it reported to?

Just guessing again, I think the analysis was carried out by the Ic Officer (Intel) and looking at the maps, the 9th Cavalry reconnoitered ahead of the 2nd Army of von Bulow .......

The 9th Cavalry Division identified the hostile exterior flank. However, distant reconnaissance to the west should have been combined with limited reconnaissance to the south beyond the Canal du Centre around the supposed French left flank. This would have disclosed the existing gap. When the division cavalry eventually went out on reconnaissance, the enemy had been able to close the gap and had established a continuous security line..(see the previous third map - the left flank was of the Lanrezac's Army, so the cavalry belonged to the German Second Army)

What was the position of By v.Gonnermann

U/K for me. Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!

[joerookery]

the German title is Recce ahead/in front of the army..................

make sense and

I am chasing this guy, v.Gonnermann, but he wasn't anyone in the big staff.

9. K.D.
Kdr.: Gen. Maj. Graf v. Schmettow (Eberhard)
Ia: Maj. Herwarth v. Bittenfeld
Ib: Hptm. Braemer
13. Kav. Brig. (Oberst Seiffert): K. R. 4, H. R. 8
14. Kav. Brig. (Oberst v. Heuduck): H. R. 11, U. R. 5
19. Kav. Brig. (Oberst Frhr. v. Zedlitz u. Leipe): D. R. 19, U. R. 13
MG-Abt. 7
reit. Abt. / Feld-Art. Rgt. 10
sourceThe Great War Dawning

Just guessing again, I think the analysis was carried out by the Ic Officer (Intel) and looking at the maps, the 9th Cavalry reconnoitered ahead of the 2nd Army of von Bulow .......

This is why I asked the question in the first place. There was no 1c.

The Staff Problem
In an army corps, the chief of staff was normally a full colonel. In an HKK, the chief of staff was either a major or a lieutenant colonel. In addition, a normal corps had a full staff with four sections, four General Staff officers, three adjutants, and a host of other officers and Beamten. The HKK had only two officers: the chief of staff and one other, the Ib. There were no intendants or Iva’s in the HKK staffs. This hierarchy meant that the chief had to do many jobs. It seems as though the chief also had to be the Ia. The cavalry division staffs also had only one Ia and a Ib officer. Examination of Appendix F in which those officers are identified reveals an anomaly in the assignment of the Ib officers at both the HKK and the division level. These individuals are captains. They are not the traditional cavalry rank of captain-Rittmeister. So the officer running the logistics function of the cavalry was not a cavalry officer but rather someone with General Staff training. He would not have had the background of having served in a mounted unit for his entire career. Although the HKKs were often referred to as cavalry corps, and obviously treated as such by higher commanders, they could at best assume a coordination role, but they could not replicate all the functions of a corps staffs, leading and supplying their troops. While the cavalry divisions had their own IVa intendancy branch, this was completely missing at the HKK level. So the entire logistics of the cavalry formations had to be overseen by the Ib officers, in cooperation with the IVa intendancy officials of the division with very few subordinates. The division intendant (IVa) had an assistant secretary (Intendantur-Sekretariats-Assistant), three intendance secretaries (Intendantur-Sekretäre)—usually one attached per cavalry brigade—and a handful of lower ranking intendance officials with NCO ranks. The entire staff of a cavalry division was about 80 officers, NCOs, and EM and had about 70 horses.

sourceThe Great War Dawning

The Command Problem

While considering cavalry operations, it is necessary to define the scope of the subject clearly. In a previous chapter, distinct cracks were identified in the organizational structure of the cavalry. This section aims to expand on those points. The highest pure cavalry organization was called the HKK. This abbreviation stands for Höherer Kavallerie-Kommandeur. The HKK was a corps-sized unit but it was not an army corps. Many inaccurate or mistaken works refer to these as cavalry corps. That is an easy but inexact English translation. Some works used the word Heereskavalleriekorps. That is not correct and gives the wrong impression. Heeereskavalleriekorps is what they became in 1915, after the organization received a staff and a logistical function. They were renamed then and became much more like normal corps. It is not what they were in 1914. Interestingly, the editors of the 1940 book attributed to the commander of HKK 2, General von der Marwitz, frequently called the organization Kavallerie-Korps in their commentary designed around his letters. The first impression might be, “Who cares? What is in a name?” But that belies the issue. At the very top was the Kaiser. The individual below him, who was in charge of executing his war plan, was the Chief of the General Staff, Moltke the Younger. He was trying to control eight separately numbered armies. In peacetime, the individuals who were destined to become army commanders were the commanders of the eight army inspections. Each one of the inspections oversaw about three army corps. Each army corps, with the exception of the Guards, had a geographical responsibility over an entire corps area. These were extremely powerful men. The army corps commanders, the so-called commanding generals, and the inspectors each had the right of immediate access (Immediatvortragsrecht) to the Kaiser. They could exercise this right without anyone else being present.

When mobilization occurred, these inspectors were mobilized as numbered army commanders. In addition, many reserve corps were mobilized and these reserve corps did not have a geographic responsibility. They also did not have Immediatvortragsrecht. Neither did the commanders of the HKKs. In contrast to the infantry in peacetime, the cavalry had four cavalry inspections. The cavalry inspectors had the rank of division commanders. The Prussian cavalry inspections reported into a general inspection (Generalinspekteur) of the cavalry. The General Inspector of the cavalry became one of the Höhere Kavallerie-Kommandeure commanders, and each of the four cavalry inspectors took over a cavalry division. The General Inspector alone had the same immediate access to the Kaiser as the commanding general of an army corps. So by this right alone, the commander of the HKK was not on the same level as the commanding general of an active army corps or the commanding general of an army.

Armies were composed of a group of corps, some active and some reserve. Corps were composed of a series of divisions and, as explained in Chapter 6, these formations were caught in a tug of war between the War Ministry and the General Staff concerning who would control the assets. The War Ministry wanted only division-sized cavalry organizations that were integral to the army and worked for the army commander. The General Staff wanted a corps-sized cavalry organization that worked directly for OHL bypassing the army commander. The compromise was the HKK.

Confusion also arises because of the nomenclature used in 1914 to distinguish between Divisionskavallerie—the cavalry formations assigned to the infantry corps upon mobilization—and Heereskavallerie—the cavalry formations mobilized in cavalry divisions within the HKKs. All cavalry reserve formations were mobilized as Divisionskavallerie. There were four HKKs created upon mobilization, but they were not all of equal size. HKKs 2 & 3 each had three divisions, while HKKs 1 & 4 each had two divisions.

We're working on that reconnaissance for our next book. Your discussion is extremely interesting!

[tigre]

Hello joerookery ; thank to you for shedding light on this subject (The Staff Problem), very interesting indeed . Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; speaking of cavalry, here goes a brief story and two queries.............................

THE 4TH LIGHT BRIGADE AT THE FRONTIER AUGUST 1914.

The author commanded this brigade composed of the 2d and 4th Hussars, assigned a covering mission in northern Woevre in the sector of the II Corps. He cites the concentration orders and describes the dispositions of the brigade from 30 July to 4 August. He points out that forbidding French troops within 6 miles of the frontiers permitted the Germans to detrain at the frontier, while the French had to detrain 25 miles to the west. He states that had not this restriction been made, the Germans would have been forced to detrain 21 miles to the east, and that the meeting would have taken place at the frontier; thus terrain would not have been sacrificed and the Brey iron mines would not have been given up without combat.

Early on 6 August the brigade was relieved of its covering mission in the Woevre in the vicinity of Spincourt, and with the remainder of the 4th Cavalry Division passed to command of Sordet, commander of the cavalry corps of the north. During 6 August the brigade entered Belgium near Montmedy, and halted for the night near St. Vincent in the valley of the Semoy, west of the Arlon Gap.

On 7 August, the 4th Cavalry Division marched east with the mission of reconnoitering the defile at Stockem and Arlon to determine whether or not it was occupied by the enemy. The 4th Brigade, under his command, formed the advance guard for the division. The division halted at Etalle in position in readiness awaiting information from reconnaissance agencies. During the halt the 4th Brigade was disposed to protect the division. A squadron of German cavalry accompanied by motorcycles approached the division from the south and was fired on by motorcyclists, but withdrew without loss. Halting to reform, it was attacked mounted by a platoon of French cavalry and completely dispersed with heavy loss.

Another detachment of the 4th Brigade was sent to reconnoiter Stockem and Arlon; it completed the reconnaissance mission and obtained information that indicated the strength and composition of German troops in the vicinity. One squadron of the detachment encountered a squadron of German cavalry supported by machine guns in motors; it attacked mounted, completely dispersed the German squadron, and captured prisoners, motors and machine guns.

Summarizing results of the operations of 4 to 7 August, General Requichot states that reconnaissance in northern Woevre located the German 6th Cavalry Division and a division of infantry covering the German detrainment at Hagondage. At Arlon the reconnaissance located the German 3d Cavalry Division. Further, French cavalry gained a moral ascendancy over German cavalry that prevented German's from meeting French cavalry mounted during the entire war.

Sources: Taken from: [Le 4e Brigade Iegere du 30 Juillet au 5 octobre 1914.] General Requichot. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 74. Sep 1939 and RML Nº 75 Dec 1939.

The queries: first text in bold Why?; second text in bold How true it was? TIA. Raúl M .

[joerookery]

The first statement does not make any sense. Was it not a function of the rail heads?

The second statement is just not true. Some sort of chest thumping.

[tigre]

Hello joerookery ; thanks for your asnwer..................

Was it not a function of the rail heads?

I tend to think nope.....maybe some political instructions in order to avoid incidents and to present the other side as the aggressor?? (my guess so)................Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; Montauban is a commune in the Somme, famous in 1916, but first let's see its capture in 1914...........................

Maricourt, Montauban-Carnoy, September 1914. See sketch No 1.

On September 27, 1914 the IIb A. K. was with the 3rd Infantry Division between Montauban and Maricourt with security in Curlu and Hern and the 4th Infantry Division (less 1. Brig) between Montauban and Contalmaison. The day before the Corps was at the turning point (wrapping the French left wing) north of the Somme with only half its strength, tired and jaded about the plan. The enemy had initially quick free way.

But in the evening the 3rd Infantry Division approached Maricourt, the enemy was holding this important, large and solid town with many forces such that the exhausted German troops were not able to break the resistance. And yet here it was present only a fraction of the troops of the French XX. Army Corps. Apparently in Maricourt were only quickly gathered elements who arrived at the last minute. On the morning of September 27, 1914, the 3rd Infantry Division began the attack on Maricourt with the 6th Infantry Brigade. The attack was carried out by the IR 18 and IR 17 advancing from the north and south with the effort on their outer wings. The assault took place at the bayonet without firing a single shot and still in the dark.

At the beginning everything went well for IR 18, but as the day dawned they found that the two frontline battalions had fallen into a cauldron; the French opened a deadly fire from the height 122 and from the northwest edge of the town and from the right in Carnoy the artillery joined. Heavy casualties took place, the enemy had not been caught and the battalions had to carry out a withdrawal. The IR 17 fared no better. During the morning the division drew up a new plan with the effort on the right; for this purpose two groups of attack were organized, one south under Commander of the 5th Inf. Brig with five battalions and other north under the Commander of the 6th Inf. Brig. with ten battalions. The latter group would attack south of the road Maricourt - Carnoy after a demonstration of the northern group. The north group would attack east of the road Montauban - Carnoy to the west of Maricourt, but first the IR 22 should seize Montauban to get a starting position for the attack on Carnoy.

Meanwhile the 4th Infantry Division had reached Montauban and therefore could reject towards the Somme the enemy fighting on the left wing of the 3rd Division. But this plan did not work, the IR 17 was no longer able to launch an attack and reinforcements not improved the situation; north the IR 18 was doomed to inactivity before Montauban. The rest of the group, particularly the IR 22, went on the attack between Bois Favière and Bois des Trônes up to the brick walls of Montauban. But there they came under effective crossfire from Maricourt and Montauban and the French batteries from Carnoy. The companies withdrew. The 4th Division had arrived too late to tip the balance.

On September 28, 1914 the focus was on the 4th Division which was to reach the Somme in Bray. The 3rd Division was to follow the attack and keep Maricourt under fire; South group should engage the enemy while the northern group would stick to the plan. Thus began the struggle for Montauban; a powerful artillery support would be followed by the assault of the Bavarian I. / IR 5. The battalion jumped out against hostile trenches, but along the front were wire entanglements as high as a man, the battalion was soon crowded together and surrounded and suffered heavy casualties. A Platoon was drawing the fire and the rest retreated to the northern border to attack that position. The houses were set on fire one after another, as were not available troops to encircle the town, the attack was concentrated in the center and the church. This area was heavily defended, especially the houses around the wide, tree-lined square. Finally the enemy was reduced and after a battle that lasted hours the French III./ IR 69 was forced to leave Montauban.

Source: Der Kampf um Ortschaften. Von Oblt. Jaggi. Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse svizzera = Gazetta militare. Band (Jahr): 85 = 105 (1939). Heft 1

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows...........................

Maricourt, Montauban-Carnoy, September 1914. See sketch No 1.

The 4th Infantry Division moved timely between Montauban and Contalmaison. The position of the enemy between the two cities formed an angle whose apex was at Mametz. At first the division got strong fire from the flanks and rear of these two bastions, until they were conquered by the neighboring troops. At night, the French evacuated Mametz voluntarily. The artillery fired all day on Maricourt. The result was:... "Before the 3rd Infantry Division Maricourt resists firmly in place Although the II b A.K. had gained ground and conquered 2 villages (Montauban and Mametz), the enemy was not defeated, demonstrated that the strength of the defenders was still strong. "

On September 29, 1914 the left wing of the 3rd Infantry Division would remain east of Maricourt, while the effort of the II b. A.K. fall on the area Mametz - Carnoy. It is thus expected that with the capture of Carnoy to pinch off Maricourt. The attack between Fricourt and Mametz to the heights south of Mametz gained ground slowly due to the flanking fire from Carnoy and effectiveness of the French artillery.

The 3rd Division was assembled for the attack to the area Carnoy and Maricourt. The attack focused on Carnoy, which offered the opportunity for the defenders to shoot to the flank from Maricourt. The attack in the sector between the two locations had failed. The commander of the Bavarian 6th Infantry Brigade realized that both towns should be taken as first task. During the day the Germans took note that Carnoy was at the limit of the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the day before there had been a vacuum in front of it. Although the artillery of both divisions had fired on the area, the village located in a flat ground did not allow a good observation. Maricourt had again proved to be an insurmountable bastion.

A fourth attack was launched on September 30, 1914 towards Height 122 under the cover of darkness. Weaker elements reached the height, but the fire of own artillery prevented the assault itself. It began to dawn and an annoying flanking fire played down any chance of success. The II b. A.K. was forced to dig down in front of these two bastions and so began the long period of trench warfare.

Source: Der Kampf um Ortschaften. Von Oblt. Jaggi. Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse svizzera = Gazetta militare. Band (Jahr): 85 = 105 (1939). Heft 1

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows...........................

Change of attack direction.

Units of the 4th Bavarian Division were facing northwest on the line: Longueval—Flers; they were completely deployed in shallow, linear formations, in the order: 7th, 5th, 9th Infantry and 2d Jaeger.

Orders for the next morning required a change of front to the southwest, to assist in an encircling movement against Montauban. Ordinarily, a turn to the left would have changed the present front into a general march column via Longueval; however, enemy resistance was expected in the vicinity of Montauban and a partial development, in the new direction, was indicated; this required the formation of at least two columns; an order was issued to that effect at 9:50 AM. Right column: 7th and 5th Inf., 1 Bn. 11th F.A., to assemble east of Longueval and advance on Montauban. Left column: 9th Inf. and 2d Jaeger, 2d Bn. 11th F.A., to advance via Ginchy (G'y)—Guillemont (G'mt).

The order was received at Flers at 10:45 AM; the dispatch consumed almost an hour, although it was but a distance of 6 kms. A "warning order" dispatched at 9:25 AM by motor did not arrive until 11:18 AM. The reason for this delay was confusion as to the exact location of unit headquarters; this was a combat situation and staffs were in concealment.

The right column started out; they received information that the woods "B" northwest of Longueval were held by the French; it was clear that the march on Montauban was practicable only after this threat to the right flank was removed; the regiment changed direction at Longueval and deployed at 1:30 PM. on the northwest edge of Longueval, for attack on woods "B."

The left column started out at 11:30 AM. but ran into the 7th Cavalry and was delayed; enemy harassing fire, at that period, forced a cross-country march and it was not until 2:30 PM. that this column reached Ginchy. The French held Montauban; artillery fire was heavy; Guillemont and Ginchy were in flames; enemy resistance had stiffened. The division commander, knowing the "larger picture," realized that these units were crowding to the south and that the new front, to be effective in the framework of the larger operation, would have to be re-oriented on the line B'n—Longueval. Staff officers, in motors, intercepted the columns; individual battalions and detachments were turned off by the shortest routes toward Longueval.

The right column, through its attack on woods "B," had actually cleared space for these movements. However, it was not until 5:00 PM. that the units were approximately in line, on the new front. The march to the left flank and the development of the 4th Division had consumed 6 to 7 hours, although the road distances varied from 5 to 10 kms only. In peace-time maneuver situations, such movements are accomplished in short order and are calculated as involving a much lesser time element.

Source: FMFRP 12-13 Maneuver in War.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Solder1234]

Hi does anyone have any info on the German a7v ww1 tank inside the tank pictures please

[Sheldrake]

Hi does anyone have any info on the German a7v ww1 tank inside the tank pictures please

Not in 1914......
But if you use a search engine you can finds lots of pictures...
https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=A7V&e ... QQ_AUIBigB