Schlieffen-Plan article by Terence Holmes

[woneil]

In August 2014 there was a WW I conference at Queen Mary College, University of London. Most of it was focused on more or less obscure corners of the war, of interest largely to specialists, but Terence Holmes presented a brief but quite interesting paper on the Schlieffen Plan, which is now available on line.

The conference Web site is http://www.qmul.ac.uk/worldwarone/, while the paper starts on p. 55 of the collection available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/588 ... papers.pdf.


Note: Holmes explains that he had not become aware of my book, The Plan That Broke the World <http://williamdoneil.com/Schlieffen-Plan/>, before he submitted the paper. As you may see, his conclusions parallel mine in certain areas. But there is much that is fresh and original in what he says. Of those who have participated in the Schlieffen-Plan debates over the past decade and more, Holmes is the only one for whom Terence Zuber expresses any real respect.

[Terry Duncan]

Thanks for posting this, it is an interesting read. It also indicates that the often discussed idea that France would invade Belgium even if Germany did not do so, was not considered by the French as a viable war plan, and that they did indeed intend to throw troops across the common frontier. There is one subject not mentioned though, namely the inclusion of Italian troops on the left of the German line, which has been mentioned in a few more recent works, and their inclusion as part of the left wing is interesting, even possibly in line with the 'Cannae' type battle mentioned by Zuber in 'Inventing the Schlieffen-Plan'. As we often still hear the left wing was only ever intended to defend, and I recall reading recently that Moltke was still hoping Italian troops would line up with the Germans in 1914, why was there ever a plan to augment the German forces on the left?

[steverodgers801]

von Moltke the younger changed it and the prince changed the plan to attack despite the plan working

[glenn239]

On pg 55 Holmes indicates that Schlieffen scored a large 'map' exercise victory by remaining on the defensive and counterattacking the French left coming through Belgium from the direction of the lower Rhine. I've suggested in the past that this might have been Moltke's best bet - if the French were actually dumb enough, as he later suggests, to impale their army in Lorraine while covering Belgium with inadequate forces, then the German left would be free to either advance through Belgium once the French right was fully committed to the offensive, or entrain forces to defeat Russia in detail in the east. An actual counteroffensive straight into the French Lorraine offensive does not seem appealing.

[AJFFM]

The paper confirms what Zuber have been arguing for a long time, that there was no "Schlieffen Plan" as propaganda would like us to believe.

While the French did not plan an invasion of Belgium in case the war started, a reverse in Lorraine (especially on the magnitude mentioned in the article as well as the results of the German staff rides) would have forced the French to use the Strategically deployed 5th Army to invade Belgium especially with guaranteed British blessing and Belgian acquiescence.

What I found lacking in this piece is the fact that the French did fall into the Lorraine trap and sent the 1st and 2nd armies into the gauntlet and it was the mismanagement of the counterattack by the Germans that saved the French from total annihilation after the initial victory.

The Germans lost not because of the Marne, the Marne was the last of a series of strategic mistakes that cost the Germans the ultimate victory, mistakes that began the moment the war began.

[woneil]

What I found lacking in this piece is the fact that the French did fall into the Lorraine trap and sent the 1st and 2nd armies into the gauntlet and it was the mismanagement of the counterattack by the Germans that saved the French from total annihilation after the initial victory.

The Germans lost not because of the Marne, the Marne was the last of a series of strategic mistakes that cost the Germans the ultimate victory, mistakes that began the moment the war began.

I believe you'd find a lot of interest in the following book chapter: Dieter Storz, “ ‘This Trench and Fortress Warfare Is Horrible!’ The Battles in Lorraine and the Vosges in the Summer of 1914,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross, Zabecki, David T. (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2014). In this well researched and clearly written piece Storz explores the actions and thoughts of Krafft von Delminsingen as Stabschef of the Sixth (Bavarian) Army under Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern in Aug-Sep of 1914. He shows that Krafft believed that the French advance was much too cautious to permit them to be drawn into a sack as Schlieffen and the younger Moltke had counseled, prompting the counterattack instead. Storz lays out the obstacles that stood in the way of any decisive defeat of the French on the Lorraine-Vosges front.

The plan, here as elsewhere, had been to fix the French by strong attacks on their front while enveloping forces turned their flanks for the decisive blow. This almost always failed throughout the campaign as even the most obtuse of French commanders had enough sense of self-preservation to pull back rather than be caught by flank attacks. Under the conditions of war as they were in 1914 the idea that a vigorous attack could actually prevent a pullback proved illusory, as the Germans should have been able to tell for themselves through prewar exercises.

As I observe in my book, The Plan That Broke the World, the best chance the Germans would ever have in the entire war was lost already by 24 Aug, with the failure of the First, Second, and Third Armies to trap and crush the greatly inferior forces of the French Fifth Army and BEF at Charleroi and Mons.

[glenn239]

AJFFM What I found lacking in this piece is the fact that the French did fall into the Lorraine trap and sent the 1st and 2nd armies into the gauntlet and it was the mismanagement of the counterattack by the Germans that saved the French from total annihilation after the initial victory.

That’s surely an exaggeration – it was the proximity of the French fortified zone right behind 1st and 2nd armies that prevented any German counterattack on this front from holding out hope to any strategic result. At best they could make the French fall back.

woneil This almost always failed throughout the campaign as even the most obtuse of French commanders had enough sense of self-preservation to pull back rather than be caught by flank attacks.

Agree to everything in your post, except I’d substitute “win the campaign” for “win the war”. In terms of alternatives, allowing the French left to pass through the Ardennes then dropping the hammer from the direction of the Rhine I think was the potential war winner, with the gamble, (the French choosing not to invade Belgium) actually no gamble at all. Assuming the Germans advance you write,

with the failure of the First, Second, and Third Armies to trap and crush the greatly inferior forces of the French Fifth Army and BEF at Charleroi and Mons.

Which touches on the key failure of Moltke’s concept of an advance – despite years of study he still had no clear idea what he was trying to accomplish by advancing into France in the first place. His plan seems to have been push everywhere and see if the French will just surrender en
mass.

I think the key missed opportunity was, as you say, isolating and destroying in particular the entire BEF, with the French 5th Army as the second bonus. If the British were ejected from the continent and their whole expedition lost, it might be quite some time before they returned. The second key objective (you probably mention it in your book) was Amiens. If Moltke takes that, he anchors his right all the way down the Somme to Le Crotoy.

As importantly, taking Amiens takes Calais and Boulogne by default, meaning that the navy can place coastal artillery across from Dover and allow German light (even heavy) forces unfettered access to the Channel. Heck, put enough minefields and coastal artillery in the region the HSF could have been a factor in the Channel campaign because under its own coastal guns the HSF becomes so strong even the Grand Fleet might not dare to challenge.

No question in my mind - once Moltke broke into France he really had to go all-out for Amiens and the BEF. He should have anticipated the mobility problem and placed most of his cavalry divisions in his 1st and 2nd armies and, I would add, his staff had a long time to figure out that 1st Army needed a bicycle corps, like the IJA in Malaya in 1941.

[Terry Duncan]

Destroying the BEF is hardly likely to see Britain leave the war, if anything the exact opposite would be true, though it might delay the next real deployment in strength into 1915 this is not too different to what happened anyhow, the Kitcheners Armies etc would just get less training, not that they were overly well trained by 1916 anyhow. To harm the Entente war effort in any conclusive form the Germans must catch and destroy the French army, in this case the 5th, before more French troops turn up on their flanks. There are not enough German troops to extend to holding Calais or even getting close to it unless they remove a considerable part of the French army. As to mounting guns opposite Dover, it was done, as was the positioning of counter batteries (I live not too far from the area they were in and some still exist in basic form), during WWII and had very little effect, British shipping used ports on the west coast (further down the channel would be the case in WWI) and the German line is very stretched. You need to remove one or two armies from the French order of battle to establish a major advantage, and this doesnt seem to be possible.

I am less sure the problem rests entirely with Moltke in 1914, from what we have seen published the Germans never really had a plan that could end the war quickly, but a lot of studies telling them a long war was going to be impossible to win. Moltke may well have been left an impossible task and had to pick the option he felt offered the best chance of winning.

[AJFFM]

I believe you'd find a lot of interest in the following book chapter: Dieter Storz, “ ‘This Trench and Fortress Warfare Is Horrible!’ The Battles in Lorraine and the Vosges in the Summer of 1914,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross, Zabecki, David T. (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2014). In this well researched and clearly written piece Storz explores the actions and thoughts of Krafft von Delminsingen as Stabschef of the Sixth (Bavarian) Army under Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern in Aug-Sep of 1914. He shows that Krafft believed that the French advance was much too cautious to permit them to be drawn into a sack as Schlieffen and the younger Moltke had counseled, prompting the counterattack instead. Storz lays out the obstacles that stood in the way of any decisive defeat of the French on the Lorraine-Vosges front.

Thanks for the references above. As for the reason why the Germans abandoned the advance well you are the real historian not me and indeed I read in a number of references that this was the case and a legitimate one too, both German armies lost around 40k men each by September 1st and with little reserves the offensive's success would have been limited although I think it would have been decisive in that it would have prevented the French from moving the critical 3 corps between 1st and 2nd Armies to the Marne region which would have changed the situation dramatically especially for the beleaguered French 9th Army.

As I observe in my book, The Plan That Broke the World, the best chance the Germans would ever have in the entire war was lost already by 24 Aug, with the failure of the First, Second, and Third Armies to trap and crush the greatly inferior forces of the French Fifth Army and BEF at Charleroi and Mons.

The Germans could have won the war in the west even after the Marne, provided they only fought a war on a single front which meant a compromising peace with Russia which, after the defeat at Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes, I am sure that they were quite open to.

Bad policy, a fatalistic Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff and of course unreliable allies all lead to the final defeat.

[glenn239]

Destroying the BEF is hardly likely to see Britain leave the war, if anything the exact opposite would be true, though it might delay the next real deployment in strength into 1915 this is not too different to what happened anyhow,

Yes, I did not mean that Britain would leave the war, only that the "continentalists" would be discredited and the "periphery" school might become predominant in London.

There are not enough German troops to extend to holding Calais or even getting close to it unless they remove a considerable part of the French army

Disagree. After the Battle of the Frontiers Moltke had a clear shot at Amiens, and Calais falls to the Germans along with Amiens. This was the fault of the German navy - being completely incompetent in the fashioning of any coherent strategy, I've never read where Moltke was even aware how important Amiens/Calais was to the German prospects for war in the Channel. Moltke cannot plan for what he doesn't even know is a factor.

As to mounting guns opposite Dover, it was done, as was the positioning of counter batteries (I live not too far from the area they were in and some still exist in basic form), during WWII and had very little effect, British shipping used ports on the west coast

I didn't suggest that coastal guns would interdict British shipping. I said that they would allow the German navy (ie subsurface and surface) full access to the Channel and could also allow the HSF to face the Grand Fleet in open battle, provided this was under the coastal defences on the German side of the Channel.

[glenn239]

The Germans could have won the war in the west even after the Marne, provided they only fought a war on a single front which meant a compromising peace with Russia which, after the defeat at Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes, I am sure that they were quite open to.

The Russians had absolutely no intention whatsoever of seeking peace with Germany after Tannenberg.

[AJFFM]

The Germans could have won the war in the west even after the Marne, provided they only fought a war on a single front which meant a compromising peace with Russia which, after the defeat at Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes, I am sure that they were quite open to.

The Russians had absolutely no intention whatsoever of seeking peace with Germany after Tannenberg.

Precisely, the Austrians handed them a strategic position on a silver plate. Had the Austrians forced a Tannenberg style reverse on the Russians they would have been far more likely to accept a compromise peace to fight the revolution on their hand.

[glenn239]

Precisely, the Austrians handed them a strategic position on a silver plate. Had the Austrians forced a Tannenberg style reverse on the Russians they would have been far more likely to accept a compromise peace to fight the revolution on their hand.

If that were so the Russians would have asked for an armistice after Gorlice-Tarnow.

[woneil]

It's worthwhile to note that the Russians showed no reluctance at all in signing the Treaty of London, pledging inter alia to make no separate peace.

The danger of revolution was not really very well appreciated by those at the top until the winter of 1915-1916.

In the East it came down to a question of whether it would be the Russian or Austro-Hungarian empire that would collapse and fragment first. The deciding factor was that the Allies in the West had far more difficulty in propping up Russia than Germany had with adjacent Austria-Hungary.

[AJFFM]

Precisely, the Austrians handed them a strategic position on a silver plate. Had the Austrians forced a Tannenberg style reverse on the Russians they would have been far more likely to accept a compromise peace to fight the revolution on their hand.

If that were so the Russians would have asked for an armistice after Gorlice-Tarnow.

Gorlice-Tarnow was decisive in that it saved Austria from collapsing not that it defeated the Russians. The Russian retreat was almost exclusively against German Armies not Austrian (to my limited knowledge on this front of the war). There was no incentive for peace when you know that half your enemy is to weak too exploit your retreat.

Plus do not forget Gallipoli and the great probability of a Romania punch under the Austrian belt that would have probably definitely come if the Turks were knocked out of the war in 1915.