Were the British and French genuinely close to achieving a breakthrough in the Battle of Passchendaele?

[Futurist]

After all, I have previously heard someone make this claim, but I am unsure if this claim is accurate.

Indeed, any thoughts on this?

Also, for the record:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Passchendaele

[Sheldrake]

The attack on the 4th October 1917 left the Germans with no reserves. Had the BEF pressed forwards after the capture of Broodseinde ridge by the Australian Corps and 7th Div they could have broken through.

Though it is hard to understand exactly what a Breakthrough would mean. Would it just be a bigger (and vulnerable) salient, ripe for counterattack?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Sheldrake,

In the absence of the means of deep exploitation, yes, it probably would have resulted in a deeper salient.

However, whether it was "vulnerable" or "ripe for a counter-attack" is another matter, as reasonable means of consolidation were available and the Germans had yet to deploy storm troop-trained units.

After the Battle of the Somme left a deeper salient, the Germans withdrew to the Hindenberg Line rather than try to mount a strategic counter-offensive.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Attrition]

A breakthrough wasn't intended. One reason for attacking in Flanders was the lack of room for German tactical withdrawals, which made them make a maximum effort to hold off the Anglo-French short of Passchendaele Ridge and Houthoulst Forest. It was the effort to do this that was intended to cause the Germans to collapse and have no choice but to abandon the Belgian coast and rally on the Lys. Haig thought that with one thing and another only the first part of the plan, to capture Passchendaele Ridge, might be possible which turned out to be right. The likes of Ludendorff and Rupprecht thought by early October, that a retirement at Ypres, sufficient to force the abandonment of the coast was imminent. According to Ludendorff, Poelcappelle and 1st Passchendaele were not the disasters that English writers tend to purport.

PS I wrote most of the Wiki page a few years ago.

[Sheldrake]

Hi Sheldrake,

In the absence of the means of deep exploitation, yes, it probably would have resulted in a deeper salient.

However, whether it was "vulnerable" or "ripe for a counter-attack" is another matter, as reasonable means of consolidation were available and the Germans had yet to deploy storm troop-trained units.

After the Battle of the Somme left a deeper salient, the Germans withdrew to the Hindenberg Line rather than try to mount a strategic counter-offensive.

Cheers,

Sid.

As attrition has "writted" Ludendorf may have had a "Black Day" on 4th October and it would have been the Great War 1914-1917

[Attrition]

That said, Ludendorff cheered up soon after and told Rupprecht to hang on for the autumn rains, using a revised defensive scheme to contain British attacks.

[Michate]

There was never the chance for a breakthrough during that battle, the German defenses were too thick and deep, behind each position had already been established another reserve position, and there were never any real holes in the German front that could be exploited.

The British achieved some limited successes in September / early October precisely for the reason that they limited their advances to a depth of roughly 1,500 meters, so that they had enough time to prepare and parry the German counter attacks. But that does not mean that there were holes in the German front.

Also, what is usually forgotten, the German command crisis was solved after a few days, the Germans changed their defensive tactics again, abandoning their short time regression to forward placing of reserves in favour of even greater depth, and when the British tried the next time in October, they got their noses bloodied.

[Attrition]

The British never attempted to break through, their purpose was to force an attrition battle on the Germans, to induce a collapse. The modest revival of the German defence in October was greatly assisted by the autumn rains but this only slowed the British advance, unlike in August when the German defence managed to retain most of the Gheluvelt Plateau.

In British writing the successes of 20 and 26 September and 4 October are usually treated as a unit but for Ludendorff and the German official historians 4, 9 and 12 October are treated together and described in superlatives, as the period when a collapse was feared. Contingency plans for retirements were made, which would have led to the abandonment of the Belgian coast; the 4th Army was saved by the weather.

[Michate]

Late response, but:

The British never attempted to break through, their purpose was to force an attrition battle on the Germans, to induce a collapse. The modest revival of the German defence in October was greatly assisted by the autumn rains but this only slowed the British advance, unlike in August when the German defence managed to retain most of the Gheluvelt Plateau.

- In terms of attrition, the battle must be judged as a failure. British losses during the battle were higher than German losses, and in winter 1917/18, the British army was in a worse position than the German army, manpowerwise.
- British territorial gains in the July/August attacks were as large as those in the September/October battles. The difference is that in July the British and French made somewhat greater advances temporarily, from which the German counterattacks forced them to abandon some part. in Septmeber/October the British stopped after very modest territotial gains, from which the German counterattacks failed to kick them back. The net result was not much different.
- In addition, the level of losses as well as the relation between German and British losses for the last July decade as compared to late September/early October was not dramatically different.
- There is no indicication that some kind of German collapse was around anywhere soon. While the battle was in progress, the Germans attacked - successfully - at the Eastern front (Riga) and in Italy, using some of their best forces there. AFAICS, only two divisions were redirected towards the Western front because of the Flanders battle. When the British later did break a hole into the German line for once at Cambrai, the Germans did bring up strong forces and counterattacked in force, and successfully.
- What you call "a modest revival", succeeded in bringing down German losses sharply; IOW, it was the final nail in the coffin of any attrition strategy.

In British writing the successes of 20 and 26 September and 4 October are usually treated as a unit but for Ludendorff and the German official historians 4, 9 and 12 October are treated together and described in superlatives, as the period when a collapse was feared. Contingency plans for retirements were made, which would have led to the abandonment of the Belgian coast; the 4th Army was saved by the weather.

Did you ever actually read the German official history (can be found online here: http://digi.landesbibliothek.at/viewer/ ... 17667/101/)?

Because it say nothing of the kind. It says that, after the British had changed their tatcics, the German counterattack tactics did no longer work as intended (unsurprisingly as they had been developed to stop Big Push attacks, not limited objective attacks). The German response to this was at first erroneous - less elasticity, more forward defense. Thus, after their uselessness became apparent, it was changed again after a few days - more elasticity, use the most foreward and threatened territory within the own line as "sacrifical territory" and hold back the bulk of own troops outside of it - which managed to cut own losses.
The German commanders certainly felt strained, but this applies to most other battles as well. They did contigency plans concerning additional British successes, and established some further fallback lines. This was also just normal business and a regular occurrence during many battles. Army group Rupprecht (von Kuhl) was prepared to retreat to these lines, if necessary, but AOK 4 was determined to hold fast onto the current lines. In addition, own larger scale attacks against the flanks of the forming British salient were considered. Nothing is said about fear of any kind of collapse.

To me, it seems use of superlatives for this short period in September/October is rather the result of overoptimism on behalf of British commanders, amplified by hyperbole in the later British histories.

[Attrition]

The British army was part of a coalition far superior in manpower than the Central Powers so a football-score analysis of attrition is misleading. The ratio of casualties is a better criterion and was much closer to 1:1 for the French in the Nivelle Offensive and the British early on at Arras and at Ypres. The German army couldn't last at that rate.

Yes I have (poorly) translated my way through the Weltkrieg chapters and also Rupprecht and Kuhl's views, as quoted in the likes of Sheldon and Wynne. The book is seriously deficient in detail for 3rd Ypres, particularly after 4 October (as is OH 1917 II). The British changed their tactics but not by much, it was more of a revision of the organisation of limited-distance attacks enabled by reinforcement, not a change away from breakthrough attempts; none of the Anglo-French attacks at Ypres were "Big Push" attacks. When the rain stopped the Entente attacks were irresistible.

It seems to me that the same material is being interpreted according to taste. For me the defeat at Broodseinde was a serious shock to the 4th Army and the army group HQ as were Poelcapelle and 1st Passchendaele. I think your routine-contingency-plans-move-along-please-nothing-to-see-here is a little disingenuous.

[Michate]

The British army was part of a coalition far superior in manpower than the Central Powers so a football-score analysis of attrition is misleading. The ratio of casualties is a better criterion and was much closer to 1:1 for the French in the Nivelle Offensive and the British early on at Arras and at Ypres. The German army couldn't last at that rate.

No army can face attrition forever. The German army did not need to, because at the same time that the Flanders battle was being fought, it cleared matters on the Eastern Front and handed the Italians a serious kick - both things meant the Germans would be in the forehand until the Americans would arrive.

As to the alleged success of the attrition strategy, part of the problem is the absence of any firm figures on casualties, that would allow a detailed comparison. All kinds of authors present widely different casualty figures, due lack of understanding of the original casualty figures, or often even based completely on thin air, it seems.

What can be said on attrition is that the British faced a manpower crisis in Winter 1917/18, and also that in comparison to other periods of the war, the second half of 1917 does not stick out as a particularly casualty intense period for the Germans - rather the contrary. Juts compare the 217,000 casualties suffered during 5 months of Flanders battle with the 248,000 casualties suffered by the three attack armies during just 14 days in late March/early April 1918.

The British changed their tactics but not by much, it was more of a revision of the organisation of limited-distance attacks enabled by reinforcement, not a change away from breakthrough attempts; none of the Anglo-French attacks at Ypres were "Big Push" attacks. When the rain stopped the Entente attacks were irresistible.

I may repeat myself, but on 31 July, the British and French had advanced 3-4 km, when they were hit by the German Eingreif divisions and thrown back 1-2 km, for a net gain of 2-3 km. BTW, the German counterattacks on afternoon of this day also suffered from rain that had set in - something the British with their weather obsession tend to forget. The Germans measured success on that day by the fact that the British and French had not achieved a breakthrough - the limited loss of territory was less important.

In September/October the British attacks stopped after 1,500-2,000 meters. Though the net result in ground gained is similar, the crucial difference is that these smaller advances could be completed during the early morning hours, when the German defense still suffered from low visibility, and it also gave the British time to consolidate before the German reserve divisions could hit them. IOW, these attacks were "irresistible", because they were more limited in terms of advance than those of late July. Just as the - even more limited - German attack on Nieuport in early July proved "irresistible" for the Brits.

But you do not get any breakthroughs from these kind of attacks and little advances - you do not even come close. And that is, to remind you, actually the original question of this thread, and the object of speculation by some of the people here.

It seems to me that the same material is being interpreted according to taste. For me the defeat at Broodseinde was a serious shock to the 4th Army and the army group HQ as were Poelcapelle and 1st Passchendaele. I think your routine-contingency-plans-move-along-please-nothing-to-see-here is a little disingenuous.

Well, I have limited my description to the facts that can be found in the (German) official history, as I have little taste for wishy-washy formulations like "serious shock" that prove nothing and that everyone interprets differently. And what I have read there perfectly fits the term "contigency planning".

Anyway, it is unclear to me what we are actually arguing about, viz the original question, as your positions aparently is that a breakthrough was never tried and the best thing that may have come out of this battle is a limited withdrawal of the Germans from the Flanders coast.

[Attrition]

A "limited withdrawal of the Germans from the Flanders coast".... how wishy washy. The German counter-attacks on 31 July succeeded on the XIX Corps front and the right of the XVIII Corps against three brigades. The defensive success on the Gheluvelt Plateau was a much more significant event. Have you had a look at the British OH on the effect of weather on both sides?

The purpose of the offensive was to inflict casualties and to capture ground, it did both and the German counter-attacks were destroyed, except when visibility was poor so the tactical importance of observation was the same for both sides. It should also be noted that both sides had fewer casualties at Ypres than on the Somme. Changes of defensive tactics only altered the speed of the Allied advance and the cost to both sides. There was nothing routine about the Third Battle of Ypres. I'll see your Nieuport and raise you Hill 70 and Verdun.

[jluetjen]

As far as interpretation is concerned, I wonder if we sometimes in hindsight perceive all battles as being a zero-sum game, when in real time they may not. For example, my grandfather was involved in a minor battle (skirmish) known as the Battle of Zorees in 1914. In a nutshell, a column of German cavalry ride into a village and encounter a column of French cavalry. There was a lot of gun fire and men died on both sides, Finally the French Cavalry retreated.

To the Germans it was a victory as they accomplished their objective and successful cleared the French forces from the area.

To the French it was a victory as they successfully stalled the Germans while providing rear-guard protection to the retreating infantry.

Both achieved their objectives for the day.

Returning to Ypres -- both sides had strategic objectives, and tactical objectives. In some cases they are not mutually exclusive and in fact sometimes both sides can achieve their tactical objectives while protecting their strategic objectives. As many military philosophers have pointed out, the objective is not to defeat the enemy's army, but to defeat their strategy.

[Attrition]

I have a bit of an attachment to 3rd Ypres because I'm the only person who seemed to have noticed that the two most notable facts about it are bogus. If I could afford it, I'd study the 5th Army records of the August attacks, because writers in English have written them off to quickly. Despite the lack of writing in English, I managed to knock out a Wiki essay on the German gegenangriff of 25 September and think I can do one for 1-4 October too. The August punch-up at Inverness Copse is a bit too sparse though; without a fair bit of detail about German offensive and British defensive operations the real story of the campaign remains to be told.