Sinai 1914-1918.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a brief story regarding this topic...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

Now a brief account about the geography, the topography, the climate, and the soil, and the lines of communication existing at the outbreak of the war in 1914. Sketches Nos. 1 and 2 included the area with which we will be concerned.

The fertile and habitable part of Egypt consists of the Nile delta and two narrow strips along either side of the river. The remainder is desert. Most of the peninsula of Sinai is desert or waste land. Along the northern coast of the Sinai Peninsula is a narrow plain which is flanked by sand dunes. South of the dune country is a broad plateau. The most prominent feature of the southern zone is the lofty granite mountain range, which rises as high as 10,000 feet. Of the peninsula, as a whole, it may be truly said that no area in the world is more bleak or more desolate. The heat in summer is intense, and in winter bitter winds blow and sandstorms are frequent. There is little vegetation, and there are few signs of human or animal life except along the caravan routes.

The Suez Canal is about 60 miles east of the Nile River. In 1914 the Canal was connected to Egypt proper by a single· track rail line, but there was no road or trail for communication by wheeled vehicles. In fact, other than streets in the cities of Egypt there were no roads, not even paralleling the Canal. For transport outside of the cities the means in use in 1914 were the railroad lines, the Nile and its canals, and pack animals - camels and donkeys.

The towns along the Canal - Suez, Ismailia and Port Said - were, in 1914, entirely dependent upon potable water from the Nile River which reached the canal zone through the Freshwater Canal. This canal, approximately 100 miles in length, parallels in general the rail line, and is bifurcated at Ismailia similar to the rail line.

In some parts of the desert, water is available from welIs. Particularly is this true along the northern coast, whIch has Its regular rainfall annually during December, January and February. During this period, and for some weeks afterwards, water can be found in pools, and all the wells and cisterns are filled. At almost any time of the year, however, water can be obtained by digging on the beatch, and although most of it is brackish, camels will not refuse it entirely. It is for this reason that the principal caravans trail across the Sinai was developed along the coast. This is the route that armies, including those of Alexander and Napoleon, have taken through the centuries.

Now the recount of the events of 1914 in Egypt.

Soon after the outbreak of the war between Great Britain and Germany, in August of 1914, the small garrison of British troops in Egypt was ordered to France. In September, troops from India arrived in Egypt, and following the declaration of war on Great Britain by Turkey at the end of October these reinforcements were moved to the line of the Suez Canal. The small units of the Egyptian Army in Sinai were forced to evacuate the advanced posts at El Arish and Nekhl, under pressure of larger Turkish forces which crossed the Turko-Egyptian boundary. By 15 November there were 9,000 Turkish infantry and 3,000 Arab auxiliaries in EI Arish, about 95 miles from the Suez Canal.

The British high command had decided to defend the Suez Canal along its banks, thereby taking advantage of the Canal as an obstacle. To assist in the defense, British and French warships were stationed in the.Canal. In December 1914, the defense force consisted of two infantry divisions from India, one cavalry brigade, two field artillery brigades, and an Egyptian pack-gun battery.

The supply set-up for this force began on a rather modest scale. Alexandria, the base port for the peacetime garrison, was continued as the base. A supply depot was established at Zagazig, about 45 miles west of Ismailia, on the railroad. Several railheads were established at which reserve supplies were accumulated. Since there were no roads from the railheads to the advanced troop units and wheeled transport was out of the question in the deep sand, pack animals were used. In January 1915, the decision was made to organize a Camel Transport Corps, an organization that expanded rapidly and to which reference will be made later. The need for protection of the installations from sabotage was recognized and troop units of cavalry and infantry were detailed for the purpose. These line of communication troops guarded all critical road and along the Freshwater Canal.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

On the Turkish side of the frontier the line of communication for the army which was being assembled in Southern Palestine was, of necessity, overland from Constantinople. A single track standard-gauge railroad line extended from Constantinople to Rayak, but there were two incompleted portions of the line that required transshipments across mountain passes under very difficult conditions. At Rayak the supplies were transferred from standard-gauge to narrow-gauge cars and moved to Northern Palestine, about 1,100 miles from Constantinople. From the railhead in Northern Palestine supplies were advanced by road to Beersheba (Seven wells), about 100 miles distant. Beersheba, famous since the dawn of history for its wells, was established as the base for the Turkish army in Palestine shortly after the declaration of war.

Late in 1914 the mission of seizing the Suez Canal and of conquering Egypt was assigned to Djemal Pasha. Pasha's chief of staff was the German colonel, von Kressenstein. By January, 1915, Djemal's force consisted of three small divisions with a strength of about 25,000. Despite the fact that his force was not well balanced and that the arrangements for supply were inadequate, Djemal decided to initiate the advance without delay so as to take advantage of the then existent favorable situation with respect to the water supply along the route. The factor which governed the decision "when" to march was the state of water supply. The march began on 14 January 1915.

The route for the march, likewise, was selected primarily because of conditions of the water supply. There were a number of wells and pools along a route across the central plateau, in particular there was a large pool at Er Rigm, only 20 miles from the Canal. Another factor considered in the selection of the route was the water supply of the British forces. If Djemal could control the Freshwater Canal at the point of its bifurcation near Ismailia, he would have no trouble in effecting early submission of the British garrison and in taking complete control of the Canal.

Therefore, without regard for the precedent set by invading armies of previous centuries, the main Turkish column advanced along the central plateau of Sinai. A smaII column advanced on Kantara and another on Suez for purposes of deception. The central route furnished better footing on the whole than the coastal route. Nevertheless there were long, sandy stretches to cross that gave no end of trouble for the few wheels in the column.

The matériel of the light artillery, of which there were 9 batteries with the main column, was nearly all carried by pack animals. The heaviest matériel on wheels was the battery of two 150-mm howitzers, which was included in the force to fire on the warships known to be in the Canal. There were also 25 pontons, each 22 feet in length, which were on wheeled frames. In the deep sand, trackage for wheeled vehicles was made by placing brushwood or planking successively from the rear to the front of the vehicles, a very slow process.

All supplies were carried on camels. Even though the barest necessities only were carried, the supply trains were cumbersome. The combat trains of the main force consisted of 1,500 camels. The trains that correspond to our service trains consisted of 6,830 camels, of which 4,600 carried water, 1,280 rations, and 950 ammunition. The overhead of camel drivers, even though they required only simple food in small quantities, made this an uneconomical supply train.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

In the attack on the Canal on 2 to 4 February, 1915 about 7,500 Turks and Arabs participated. The efforts to cross the Canal failed owing to a variety of circumstances, important of which was the tenacity of the Indian troops holding the western canal bank.

Inasmuch as this Turkish expedition was planned on the basis of a sudden and successful attack, the supplies for a sustained effort were not provided. Consequently, when the initial effort failed the Turkish commander had no alternative but to order a retreat to his base. Djemal Pasha it is reported, was convinced that all Moslems in Egypt would rise in revolt when he approached, and that he would have little serious combat. Once in Egypt the supplies for the army would be ample.

The net result of the miscalculations was that the retrograde movement to Beersheba was as great a failure as the ten days' march to the Canal had been a success. In the advance to the Canal there were no casualties; the line of retreat, however, was marked by the carcasses of men and animals. Only about one-half of the original number of camels arrived back in Beersheba, Fortunately for the Turkish army, the conditions of water supply east of the Canal prevented the British from conducting a vigorous pursuit.

The Turkish commander had a bold conception of this operation, not unlike Napoleon's plan-for the advance to Moscow. Each assumed that success would be his, and upon reaching his goal that supplies from local sources would be adequate for his forces. So the Turkish crossing of the Sinai desert in 1915 is included in the list of operations of armies that have been destroyed or badly defeated for the reason that the commander failed to plan adequately for the supply of his troops.

The contrast between the conduct of the Turkish crossing of the Sinai desert and the slow, but dogged, advance of the British across this same desert one year later furnishes an interesting lesson.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

The British Army.

At about the time of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, preparations had been begun in Egypt for establishing a base for the forthcoming operation at the Dardanelles. The Suez Canal was to be superseded as a battle area in the Near East. Elements of the defeated Turkish force in Palestine were sent to reinforce the Dardanelles defenses, which , fact being known by the British, permitted the defensive works along the Suez Canal to be held very lightly.

The attention of the British high command in Egypt was now concentrated on administrative problems of great magnitude. The so-called Levant Base was set up at Alexandria, eventually to serve all the forces operating in the Near East, namely at Gallipoli, Saloniki, Sinai and in western Egypt, as well as for handling some of the problems for the Mesopotamian theater of operations. The manner of operation of the ports and the other problems incident to this administration are in many respects similar to those of the base and intermediate sections of the S.O.S. (?), or the Communications Zone, of the A.E.F. in France.

When the effort of the Allies at the Dardanelles collapsed, Turkish forces were released for operations in other theaters, and the Suez Canal again began to receive more than passing attention. In December, 1915, the decision was made to develop a stronger defense for the Canal, and to advance the forward lines of a new zone defense from the banks of the Canal to the east. The construction of this line involved many engineering problems.

By the middle of January, 1916, the work of construction of the new zone defense in the desert east of the Canal, was well under way. Narrow-gauge railways on the Delta had been picked up and transferred to the Canal Zone, and those formed the basic means of transportation from the Canal to the east. Following the laying of these tracks some metalled roads were built. Concurrent with the construction of lines of communication, pipe lines for water were pushed out into the desert positions.

In the construction of this zone defense the British staffs gained valuable experience In meeting the problems of transportation and labor peculiar to the conditions in the theater. This served them well in planning for and in the execution of subsequent operations involving longer lines of communication in the same desert.

At the time that General Maxwell, the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, had the work on the defenses going well, Sir Archibald J. Murray, erstwhile Chief of the Imperial General Staff, arrived in Egypt. The command of all forces east of a line 5 miles west of the Canal was given General Murray, while General Maxwell retained command of the forces in Egypt proper, where there was under way the tremendous task of untangling the personnel and material dumped in Egypt from the ill-fated Gallipoli venture.

General Murray was well acquainted with the situation in Egypt. While Chief of Staff he had advocated that the line of defense of the Canal to the northeast of Kantara should be extended to include the area in the vicinity of Katia and Romani in order that the water supply in that oasis be denied to an enemy force which might advance toward the Canal by the coastal route. This water supply was only two marches from the Canal, and it was estimated that there was sufficient water there to supply a force of 80,000. General Maxwell had objections to the proposition on the ground that the demands on the labor supply and the supply of materials were such that no new undertaking could be initiated at the time. The result was that the planning for the advance of the defense system to Katia was deferred for the time being.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

Murray's Strategical Plan.

However, soon after General Murray took command of the Canal defenses, he embodied this idea in a strategical conception for the defense of the Canal. This plan was included in an appreciation of the situation, dated 15 February 1916, prepared in writing for consideration by the War Office. This document, from the standpoint of clarity and thorougtness, is a gem. It is a good illustration of the practical application of a written estimate of the situation.

The tactical plan proposed was about as follows:

1. Change from passive or semi-passive defense of Canal to active defense.
2. Maintain the present forces in Egypt to 15 April. Thereafter, the following should be adequate: one corps of three divisions to hold the Canal defense line, and one division to occupy the Katia area, and three mounted brigades to be available for general purposes, provided all units be brought to war strength.
3. As soon as practicable, to occupy El Arish with two "mobile" divisions and two mounted brigades, so as:

a. To be able to oppose such enemy forces as might attempt to march against Egypt by the northern caravan route,
b. To be able to attack in flank any enemy force attempting to move via Kossaima.
c. To be able to undertake offensive operations against enemy concentrations in the Beersheba region.

At this time the strategists had given little or no thought to offensive operations in Palestine proper by an advance overland. This plan of General Murray's was a active defense, with the whole conception based on the deduction that the proper defense line for the Canal was the line: El Arish-Kossaima, inasmuch as any Turkis force advancing on the Canal must pass that line.

General Murray, in this appreciation, discusses three lines of action with respect to the lines of communication for the El Arish force. The first, supply overland by camel, was considered impractical inasmuch as insufficient camels could be procured to handle the tonnage. The Navy was contacted regarding the sea route and advised the Army that the conditions of the beach and of the surf were such that that line of communication could not be relied upon.

The third possible solution was a step-by-step advance, regulated on the progress of construction of a road or a railroad. Road construction involved serious difficulties of procurement and transportation of materials. While the construction of a rail line would not be simple, the permanence and capacity of the railroad was considered more advantageous than a metalled road. Furthermore, most of the materials for construction of a rail line and for its operation were available in Egypt.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

Suez Canal Defense System, May 1916.

The defense of this line of communication to the east of the Canal was given careful consideration. Covering forces were to be pushed out ahead of the railhead along the proposed route and critical points on the line were to be protected by detachments. Besides these measures, additional security for the line of communication was obtained by the systematic destruction of wells, cisterns, and pools along the routes in the plateau to the south. By thus further restricting the enemy's water supply on the routes still available to him, the danger of attack from the flank, particularly by large forces, would be reduced.

How were the more difficult problems of moving the supplies from the railhead to the troops and of evacuating the wounded to the railhead to be accomplished? Wheels were practically out of the question in the sand of this desert. A few small animal-drawn carts were used successfully.

The answer was the adoption of the old reliable method of the native, the camel. From December, 1915, to May, 1916, the camel strength of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force expanded from 500 in use in the Canal Zone to about 18,000, and procurement did not keep apace with the requirements. Over 30,000 camels were procured in 1916. The rapidity with which the Camel Transport Corps was developed against a number of odds was considered by all concerned as a remarkable piece of work.

In the general plan of supply and evacuation prepared to support General Murray's strategical plan, the item of supply that required special consideration was water. Based upon previous experience the engineers developed a plan of supply by pipe line. Until the pipe line could be constructed, water supply to railhead was to be by rail. In advance of railhead the sole method of transporting water was by camel. Each camel could carry two 12-gallon containers. Since the daily allowance for the Egyptian camel was about 6 gallons, it is evident that if a camel must be watered from the quantity carried by it, it could operate only four days from a water supply point. The conduct of movements in advance of a water supply point are therefore greatly restricted.

The high ratio of transport requirements for water to those for other supplies were indicated previously, An example of this may be of interest, namely, the supply organization of the detachment from the Australian Light Horse Regiment, which proceeded on 21 March, 1916, to destroy certain wells in the plateau of Rinai. Four hundred forty· three (443) camels were used for the transportation of 3 days of supply, all classes, of which 15 camels were required for rations for men, 47 forage for horses, 49 forage for camels, 10 for ammunition, 22 for baggage and miscellaneous, and 300 for water. The distance traveled was 144 miles, and the rate exclusive of halts was 3.8 per hour.

So much for the estimate of the situation and the commander's plan. What happened?

On 27 February, the War Office authorized General Murray to proceed with his plan for occupation of the Katia district, but decision relative to the advance to El Arish was deferred.

The completed defense system is shown on the Sketch No.7. The extension of the rail line east of Kantara to Romani may be seen in the No 3 or North Section. There is also a connection with Port Said by narrow-gauge railroad. The Kantara-Romani rail Iine, 16 miles in length, was built between 10 March and 15 May, 1916.

The construction of the railroad was protected by a small force that was posted in the oases of Katia and Oghratina. In the so-called "affair of Katia" on 23 April, 1916, the Turks surprised a part of the advanced detachment, and liquidated 31/2 squadrons of Yeomanry and a detail of Engineers.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

Suez Canal Defense System, May 1916.

By 19 May, the railhead was at Romani, and four trains a day were running regularly. This made possible the garrisoning of Romani with infantry on a considerable scale, to construct a strong position, and to maintain there a certain amount of artillery for its defense.

The greater part of the cargo of the railway trains was water. The plan of water supply for the advanced detachment at Katia was based on the construction of pipe lines similar to the lines laid in the defensive zone to the south. The transport of the pipes was dependent, largely, upon the railroad. For this reason, together with the time required for shipment of pipes from overseas, the pipehead was generally in rear of the railhead.

With pipehead behind railhead, water was hauled by rail from pipehead to canvas reservoirs at the railhead. On 4 June, 1916, pipehead reached Romani.

By this time advanced depots of all classes of supplies were set up in Romani, and from the G-4 standpoint everything was moving along in fairly good shape. There were some difficulties, however, particularly because of the water situation during this, the "hot" season. The temperature at Romani during May and June, 1916, did not register below 100º for 56 consecutive days, and for four consecutive days the maximum was 114 to 117 in the shade. In such heat the men and animals demanded more water than usual and fresh water was absolutely necessary. The water from the wells In the oasis, even though slightly saIine, could in emergency be used by men and horses in the cooler weather, but it was not acceptable by either at this time of the year.

On 9 July, 1916, the Turks initiated a second raid on the Suez Canal. A force of all arms, eonsisting of about 18,000 men, advanced along the coastal route, with the Katia Romani area as the first objectIve. The advance was carefully planned, with reseryes of supplies established along the route of advance. At midnight, 3-4 August, an attack was made on the British defensive position at Romani. The enveloping movement of the Turks had been anticipated by the British and their forces were disposed to meet it. The enveloping force was successfully attacked in flank with the result of a serious defeat for the Turks. They lost about half of their force, of which 4,000 were taken prisoners. The pursuit by the British was none too successful, since the Turks retired to successive positions previously .prepared, and besides the pursuing cavalry soon had to return for water.

In the retreat, the Turkish army did not suffer from lack of supplies, as was the case of their retreat in 1915. However, it was necessary for the Turks to destroy some of their supplies in their retreat. In the 1915 attack on the Canal by the Turks we criticized them because provision was not made for a reserve of supplies near the area of battle; in the Romani operation the implication is that more supplies than necessary were placed in the forward dumps. Of course, the ideal solution in stockage of supplies in depots or dumps is to have sufficient of all classes to meet all requirements, but not excessive amounts so that supplies will be lost in event of tactiral reverses. Since so many of the factors which govern estimated requirement of supplies are in the realm of conjecture, the ideal will not often be attained. The Wise G-4 will usually recommend to his commander that a reasonable factor of safety be authorized in the quantity of battle reserves to be accumulated, because he will prefer to risk the loss of supplies to the risk of loss of the battle or of suffering excessive casualties.

Following the British success at Romani, the War Office definitely approved the second principal step of General Murray's strategical plan, that is, the advance of a part of the defense force to EI Arish.

Railway material was available and construction beyond Katia was begun on 10 August. The line was laid at the rate of about 20 mile, per month. Egyptian labor was available in adequate quantities, and it was handled systematically by means of labor companies. The labor forces were gradually increased until by 15 December, 1916, 30,000 laborers were engaged on the line of communication.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

Sinai Peninsula, 1917.

The pipehead continued at Romani for several months, owing to a shortage of pipes. On 10 September a shipload of 12-inch pipes arrived from the United States and the extesion of the pipe line was begun. Until the line was extended much of the rail traffic, therefore, was engaged in the movement of water to the advanced water refilling point at the railhead.

On 21 December, the British troops drove the Turks out of El Arish, and on 4 January, 1917, the first train pulled into the village of El Arish, 11 months after the advance began from Kantara, a distance of 95 miles. The pipehead reached El Arish one month later.

Soon after the British, occupied El Arish, ships arrived with supplies. Landings of these supplies were made on the open beach, but with considerable difficulty owing to the heavy surf. This delivery of supplies greatly alleviated the transportation problem. An advanced depot was soon established to supply the operations of a force of three infantry divisions and one cavalry division, as the plan now contemplated a further advance.

The Turks resisted the advance and several battles were fought between El Arish and Gaza in each of which the British forces were successful. By the end of February the Turkish force had withdrawn into Gaza.

On 21 March, 1917, the railhead was established at Rafa, 140 miles, from Kantara. The capacity of the line was 13 trains daily, which was adequate for the force. Six of the trains were required for railway construction and maintenance or for evacuation of sick and wounded; seven were used for supply and troop movements. Later on in 1917 the lIne was double-tracked to accommodate the increased force made avaiable to General Allenby.

The Turks also had done some railroad construction. Beersheba was connected by a standard-gauge line from the north and to Gaza by a narrow-gauge line. The standard gauge line had been extended southwest from Beersheba to El Auja but this extension was used but little. The original plan was to build the line across the plateau to the Suez Canal.

The fact that the Turks were building this rail line was known by the British high command, but the decision not to turn inland with their own line of communication was based on the premise that the Turk, with inferior forces, would be obliged to withdraw his detachments from El Auja and abandon the rail line if the British continued to push to Rafa and beyond. Besides, the railroad construction along the coast was much easier,
more water was available, and supply by rail could be augmented at Rafa by the sea route.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

The capture of Gaza, 1917. First battle.

By the early part of 1917, 12,000 tons of pipe for water supply had been laid across the desert by the British. Notwithstanding the supply by the pipe line was none too plentiful. Of the 600,000 gallons pumped into the pipe line at Kantara only 36,500 gallons reached the terminus of the line, indicating the quantity required by men and animals serving along the line of communication. In the Rafa area, large wells developed by the British engineers made possible the augmentation of the force in men and animals for the next operation, which was to be the capture of Gaza.

Rafa was rapidly developed into a large depot. The supplies stocked there were adequate for the contemplated offensive. The difficult problem of transporting these supplies in advance of the railhead remained, even though the camel strength of divisions was greatly increased. However, the soil in the new area now permitted of limited movement of wheeled vehicles, and the trains of the divisions were reorganized so as to provide a greater radius of action of the force. Fifteen supply trains were improvised, each with a capacity of 70 tons, consisting of camels, limbered wagons, and trucks. Even with this new organization, the maximum radius of action from a water supply point for the mounted units was 20 miles.

A word about evacuation. At the railhead, patients were accommodated temporarily in field ambulances. Hospital stations were set up at several of the oases along the rail line. Stationary or evacuation hospitals were established at Kantara, Port Said, and on the coast north of Katia. General hospitals were located in Egypt proper. By March, 1917, three hospital trains were in use on Sinai railway. The great difficulty in evacuation here, as in any combat area, was the removel to aid stations.

The British attacked Gaza on 26 March and succeeded in surrounding the town. By dark the cavalry was in need of water. Its withdrawal was necessary. Therefore, in order to prevent the infantry flank from being left in the air, with Turkish reinforcements approaching, the withdrawal was ordered. The coup de main failed when victory was within grasp. The British casualties approximated 4,000.

General Murray prepared at once for another attack. The railroad was pushed to Deir el Belah by 5 April. Additional supplies were landed on the beach. Some roads were built and crossings over the Wadi Ghuzzee were improved. The Turks in the meantime reinforced the garrison and extended the flank.

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; last part...............................

Supply of Forces in Sinai During the World War I 1914-1918·

The capture of Gaza, 1917. Second battle.

On 19 April the second attack on Gaza was launched against a prepared position. No envelopment was possible owing to distance of the new east flank from the water supply. By evening the British casualties were about 7,000, the supply of artillery ammunition was low and a success of the frontal attack seemed improbable. The British withdrew.

Sir Archibald Murray, the retiring commander, received great credit from General Allenby who replaced him, for Creating the line of communication which made possible the victories in Palestine which made AlIenby famous.

It is apparent from the foregoing that the nature of a theater of operations may require extensive adjustments of usual means and methods of supply. This the British did in Egypt and Palestine and with success. The most impressive lesson to be derived from a study of these operations is the close relationship that will and must obtain between strategical or tactical plans and the execution of these plans, and those unheralded matters that are labelled "supply and evacuation."

Source: Academic Notes. Military Review Nº 77. June 1940.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .