Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

[South]

Good afternoon Glenn 239,

I can't answer your question. I don't know.

My point that I'm presenting here is that the Battle of Jutland Sound was a key or major indicator that Imperial Germany was NOT "perform[ing] so well in World War I".

I'm relying on a time line to show the German fleet was not bottled up before Jutland. Admiral Von Tirpitz did not consider his submarines bottled up until circa Jutland.

To leave the specifics of my point(s), the strategic political objectives of Germany would be, at the least, hindered without Panama Canal access in some form. It's a form of embargo (economic warfare) like other forms eg denial of access to bank clearing houses in world trade.

Warm regards,

Bob

[JeroenPollentier]

Some of the military achievements were spectacular, but all in a doomed cause, and over an issue that could have been settled without war in the first place.

This perfectly sums up the run-up to the war and the war itself from a German perspective!

[glenn239]

Good afternoon Glenn 239]

My point that I'm presenting here is that the Battle of Jutland Sound was a key or major indicator that Imperial Germany was NOT "perform[ing] so well in World War I".

I'm relying on a time line to show the German fleet was not bottled up before Jutland. Admiral Von Tirpitz did not consider his submarines bottled up until circa Jutland.

That the German fleet performed poorly in WW1 there is no doubt, I'm just not seeing how its strategic inaction related specifically to Jutland, which was literally the one day in the entire war that the German fleet accomplished something in the North Sea.

To leave the specifics of my point(s), the strategic political objectives of Germany would be, at the least, hindered without Panama Canal access in some form. It's a form of embargo (economic warfare) like other forms eg denial of access to bank clearing houses in world trade.

I'm still not seeing the connection, unless by "Panama Canal" you're symbolizing trade with the United States (New York). There were at least three versions of strategic (ie, non-Baltic) naval power available to Germany as a war strategy. It choose for its navy pre-war a Mahanian battle fleet strategy in the North Sea, in which for success it would need at least Russia as an additional ally, and preferably France too. For its army, it was forced to reckon with the Dual Alliance, which was opposite to its naval aims. This points to poor leadership at the top - specifically, the Kaiser overrated the value of colonial aims and underrated the danger of the continental war the fleet was not designed to fight. During the war rather than face inactivity it moved to submarine warfare which created more harm than good in the form of the US declaration of war. (The third version of naval strategy was one based on maintaining trade, similar to the Spanish running convoys past the Royal Navy. In that case convoys of gold or silver bullion coming in from the empire to feed the coffers for the next land campaign, but in Germany's case, also a land power, it would be convoys in from the United States with things like nitrates and rubber, materials for a land power in a continental war more valuable than their equivalent weight in German warships).

[South]

Good morning Glenn,

You could be right. I am personally seeing Jutland as a key point so as to say Germany wasn't performing that well.

I am using "Panama Canal" both to represent the new waterway that reduces costs for users (direct users and indirect users eg importers/exporters) and also, as you mentioned, the United States trade. To keep my points on topic to Futurist's theme and question, I avoided mentioning the newly created US central bank. German planners knew what to expect. Overall, that's why "perform so well" is something I challenge.

In maneuver warfare on land, there's little question the Junkers knew what they were doing. Still, we're discussing war performance.

War performance and the poor leadership definitely gets attached to the Kaiser. Yet, for our purposes, going back earlier than Jutland, to August, 1914, von Tirpitz must be looked at. ("Why did Imperial Germany perform so well...?") He won the arguments against Prince Maximilian of Baden and Chancellor von Bethmann-Holweg with his procedures on submarine warfare.

Thus, Jutland allows the Royal Navy to control the seas and von Tirpitz, with his submarine warfare, sets the stage for US entry into the Great War.

Again, I'm closing with my view that Germany had poor performance in the overall prosecution of the war.

Warm regards,

Bob

[glenn239]

Jutland had little to with the strategic defensive posture of the High Seas Fleet, which pre-existed the war. Historians tend to over rate Jutland's importance because there was no decisive clash in WW1. There was no prospect to any result in the North Sea in 1916 changing this. The entire surface war at sea was a forgone conclusion from the decisions on strategy made in Germany prior to the war. Perhaps if Spee's voyage had ended triumphantly more warship raiders might have been risked in the North Atlantic.

The decision to renew USW warfare was linked to a gloomy perception of the war situation as declining during 1916. This was not entirely accurate - the Germans were simply unaware of how much damage the Entente had taken in the 1916 fighting, how close to default they were in the United States, and that Russia was about to exit the war. The Entente was in desperate straights by 1917 and USW was not the answer to causing the French to collapse. The Chancellor lost the debate, but with more accurate information on the enemy situation, he may have won it. No link in these calculations to Jutland.

[South]

Good afternoon Glenn,

Of course we disagree on the significance of Jutland.

When war broke out, Germany was the second greatest sea power. My view is that Germany's fleet and Jutland constituted a decisive clash. The actual battle(s) was won by Germany yet the strategic objectives to prosecute the war were won by the UK.

The accuracy in re Germany's USW is not critical.....at least from my point of view. Germany's modified submarine warfare served as the trigger mechanism for the US to become a belligerent.


Warm regards,

Bob

[glenn239]

Comparing Falkland Islands and Jutland, Spee's catastrophic defeat was probably the more important outcome (IMO) to the strategic conduct of the war at sea.

[South]

Good morning Glenn,

Acknowledging receipt.

Bob

[Terry Duncan]

Comparing Falkland Islands and Jutland, Spee's catastrophic defeat was probably the more important outcome (IMO) to the strategic conduct of the war at sea.

Just curious as to how you reach this conclusion? Spee was going to be hard pushed to achieve any more than he did, his big ships used about half their ammunition at Coronel, they had no bases, or ability to refit, any closer than Germany, and their general progress had been tracked so their route was rather obvious even if the time of their arrival off South America was not. On the other hand, if the HSF had managed to return to Germany without losing significant numbers of ships, then they would have reduced the odds against them, been more likely to look for further fleet engagements, and less likely to decide their only hope lay in resuming the USW campaign that was accepted would be likely to cause the US to enter the war the longer it lasted.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi South,

I agree that Jutland was clearly far more important than the Falkands. In practice, Spee could only intern himself in a neutral port, or make a run for home, where his vessels would add little to the strength of the German High Seas Fleet.

However, I would question whether the Germans won the battle(s) of Jutland. The only measure on which this can be advanced is that British losses were higher. However, on those grounds the Red Army would be considered to have lost WWII.

Despite sailing secretly, they were surprised by the British fleet while at a disadvantage. Their main fleet's "T" was crossed twice, indicating they were tactically outmanoeuvred. I would suggest that they ran for home because they knew they were probably beaten if a fleet action had continued and wanted to conserve as much of their fleet as possible. The British failure was not to capitalize on the sacrifices made by their battlecruisers in bringing the whole German high Seas Fleet to action under unfavourable conditions for the latter.

The Germans could be relieved that they had got away from a difficult predicament while British losses were still the higher and pleased that their vessels seemed to have a definite technical edge.

The best evidence that the Germans did not win at Jutland is that the British Grand Fleet told its admiralty that it was ready to sail again within 24 hours, whereas the German High Seas Fleet never took to the open North Sea again and mutinied when it was mooted that it might attempt a last ditch fleet action in November 1918.

Cheers,

Sid.

[glenn239]

Just curious as to how you reach this conclusion? Spee was going to be hard pushed to achieve any more than he did, his big ships used about half their ammunition at Coronel, they had no bases, or ability to refit, any closer than Germany, and their general progress had been tracked so their route was rather obvious even if the time of their arrival off South America was not. On the other hand, if the HSF had managed to return to Germany without losing significant numbers of ships, then they would have reduced the odds against them, been more likely to look for further fleet engagements, and less likely to decide their only hope lay in resuming the USW campaign that was accepted would be likely to cause the US to enter the war the longer it lasted.

The Battle of Jutland had no strategic significance. Before the battle Scheer was tooling around close to German shores looking for a tactical victory, after Jutland he continued doing so with increasingly less enthusiasm until it was clear that the entirety of 1916 naval campaigning season had been wasted in the North Sea for no gain.

Spee, OTOH, fought Coronel at the zenith of the moment for the raiders. After that, Emden went down, Karlsruhe blew up, Spee was annihilated. Before Falklands, the raider school of thought was looking good. Afterwards, it was totally discredited. Had Spee returned in triumph the Germans might have switched to a more aggressive raiding strategy.

Sid The best evidence that the Germans did not win at Jutland is that the British Grand Fleet told its admiralty that it was ready to sail again within 24 hours, whereas the German High Seas Fleet never took to the open North Sea again and mutinied when it was mooted that it might attempt a last ditch fleet action in November 1918.

The British won such a victory at Jutland that Beatty and Jellicoe spent the rest of their lives blaming the other for it. OTOH, the Germans won such a victory that nothing at all had changed. Jutland only receives attention because there were no other major fleet battles to look at.

[South]

Good morning Sid,

Re para 2; I completely agree with you. Any confusion as to my position is clearly based on my cloudy rambling.

The RN won Jutland - (although) when doing a typical battle calculation, eg KIA, WIA, tonnage sunk, vessels sunk, .....it was a rough battle for the British.

Again, from the nation-state perspective in prosecuting a war, the British won Jutland. The German fleet was bottled up for the duration.

I did not introduce Falklands to the thread's discussion. It is not an event involving "Why did Imperial Germany perform so well.....? ". Stanley ( a close sailing from US territory [Panama Canal Zone] ) and this South Atlantic event doesn't fit into the specific question Futurist posed.

Warm regards,

Bob

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Glenn239,

A continuance of the status quo was good enough for the British as their blockade was slowly strangling Germany.

On the other hand, the Germans had to win a decisive main fleet action to break this blockade.

The only time the two main fleets came into contact was at Jutland, and the Germans were fortunate to get off so lightly, given that they were surprised and outmanouvred at a fleet level.

Jutland was the only time the German High Seas Fleet attempted to break the British blockade and it failed.

At Jutland the German aim failed, while the British preserved a favourable status quo. If one is looking for a victor, it was the British.

The Germans fought well, inflicted more damage, their technology proved a bit superior, they escaped a difficult situation without crippling loss, and they were not outfought, but these redeeming facts could not hide a strategic failure.

If at any time after Jutland the German High Seas Fleet had wanted to challenge the British in another fleet action. it could easily have done so, as the British were spoiling for such an fight. Jutland was the German High Seas Fleet's only major action for a reason - the battle appears to have unnerved its leadership's self confidence and begun to undermine morale on its lower decks. The mutinies of late 1918 were the belated consequence.

Cheers,

Sid

[JAG13]

The Kaiser's fleet got bottled up after Jutland for the duration of the war.

That is imply not true, a common myth, the HSF did sortie afterwards in an attempt to further reduce the RN's numerical advantage and eventually make the odds good enough for a general engagement, in fact, it was the RN which scaled back its operations first after losing 2 CLs during one of such outings after Jutland.

[JAG13]

Jutland was the only time the German High Seas Fleet attempted to break the British blockade and it failed.

At Jutland the German aim failed, while the British preserved a favourable status quo. If one is looking for a victor, it was the British.

The Germans fought well, inflicted more damage, their technology proved a bit superior, they escaped a difficult situation without crippling loss, and they were not outfought, but these redeeming facts could not hide a strategic failure.

If at any time after Jutland the German High Seas Fleet had wanted to challenge the British in another fleet action. it could easily have done so, as the British were spoiling for such an fight. Jutland was the German High Seas Fleet's only major action for a reason - the battle appears to have unnerved its leadership's self confidence and begun to undermine morale on its lower decks. The mutinies of late 1918 were the belated consequence.

Cheers,

Sid

False, Jutland wasnt an attempt at breaking the blockade, the purpose of that sortie was simply to kep the HSF active, show the flag and maybe catch some RN cruisers if possible. The original operation that aimed at reeling in the BCF by attacking Sunderland had to be cancelled due to weather and zeppelin/Uboat availability, hence the new and reduced operation taking place nowhere near Britain!

The HSF outfought the RN and caused more loses to an enemy far stronger, no wonder they are considered to have won, and is the reason why they were quite eager to resume operations as soon as possible.

Scheer would sortie again a few months later when not even all the hip were yet ready, in that occasion the RN lost 2 CLs and it nerve, from then on the RN was limited on it liberty as to when actually come out and face the HSF, there were precise geographical constraints in place out of fear of Uboats...