Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

Discussions on all aspects of the First World War not covered in the other sections. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#31

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 May 2016, 04:37

JAG13 wrote:False, Jutland wasnt an attempt at breaking the blockade, the purpose of that sortie was simply to kep the HSF active, show the flag and maybe catch some RN cruisers if possible. The original operation that aimed at reeling in the BCF by attacking Sunderland had to be cancelled due to weather and zeppelin/Uboat availability, hence the new and reduced operation taking place nowhere near Britain!
Jutland did not result from an attempt to end the blockade in a single battle, but as part of the HSF need to whittle away the strength of the GF to allow such a battle to take place. The original purpose was to isolate and destroy an isolated squadron of capital ships, hence the original instruction for U-boats to station themselves on the exit routes from the British bases at Scapa and Rosyth.
JAG13 wrote:The HSF outfought the RN and caused more loses to an enemy far stronger, no wonder they are considered to have won, and is the reason why they were quite eager to resume operations as soon as possible.
The HSF put up a good fight, but can hardly be described as having won at Jutland, as naval battles are won by the side that controls the sea afterwards, losses are a secondary factor generally. Both sides can be said to have achived a tactical victory to some degree, the HSF managed to inflict some losses and escape back to base, whilst the British maintained overwhelming superiority at sea and chased the HSF from the open seas. The initial German claims to have won were based around claims of far greater British loses, including Warspite in place of Invincible and at least one other Queen Elizabeth class ship, plus not having lost the Lutzow, or having Seydlitz sink onto Amrun Bank, nor sink again in harbour once she did get there. In terms of losses, the HSF took until the Hindenburg entered service to make good its losses, whilst the GF could make good its losses within two months of Jutland. Naval battles are won by controlling the sea and denying it to your enemy, fleets are only built with that ourpose in mind.
JAG13 wrote:Scheer would sortie again a few months later when not even all the hip were yet ready, in that occasion the RN lost 2 CLs and it nerve, from then on the RN was limited on it liberty as to when actually come out and face the HSF, there were precise geographical constraints in place out of fear of Uboats...
Scheer did indeed sortie again, in August, and ran for home the instant he got a report that British capital units were at sea, hardly a sign he was keen to repeat an engagement anything like Jutland. The only other time he tried to sortie, was the abortive attempt to raid the Scandinavian convoys, where again the HSF set course for home when the risk of encountering the GF was thought too risky. There had always been general constraints on the deployment of the GF within the North Sea due to U-boats, Beatty despite his daring image actually moved the line of active patrols far up the North Sea compared to those Jelicoe used, but as you note, this was due to the U-boats, not any worry about meeting the HSF again.

South
Member
Posts: 3590
Joined: 06 Sep 2007, 10:01
Location: USA

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#32

Post by South » 15 May 2016, 07:43

Good morning JAG 13,

We are in disagreement.

Germany, at first, claimed a victory. The outcome of the battle was that the German fleet retreated and stayed within the fan of the Helgoland guns and minefields.

Naval warfare is less about numerical advantage and more so about strategic outcomes.

For continuity,...in your response to Sid; "show the flag" and not address the blockade ?

I do understand that Von Tirpitz relied on submarines to win the war. Yet the Allies developed successful ASW tactics. Consider the depth charge (typically trinitrotoluol in the "ash cans"), dirigibles called "blimps", etc.

We're discussing the question: "Why did Imperial Germany perform so well...?" Thus, again, we're in disagreement.

Warm regards,

Bob


User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#33

Post by JAG13 » 15 May 2016, 08:24

South wrote:Good morning JAG 13,

We are in disagreement.

Germany, at first, claimed a victory. The outcome of the battle was that the German fleet retreated and stayed within the fan of the Helgoland guns and minefields.

Naval warfare is less about numerical advantage and more so about strategic outcomes.

For continuity,...in your response to Sid; "show the flag" and not address the blockade ?

I do understand that Von Tirpitz relied on submarines to win the war. Yet the Allies developed successful ASW tactics. Consider the depth charge (typically trinitrotoluol in the "ash cans"), dirigibles called "blimps", etc.

We're discussing the question: "Why did Imperial Germany perform so well...?" Thus, again, we're in disagreement.

Warm regards,

Bob
Strategic outcomes? Please, do tell, what was the strategic outcome of Jutland? Furthermore, was was the strategic intent of the KM by leaving port? And, how can a single sortie that was not intended to reach the blockading forces address a blockade?

Wrong, Tirpitz wanted the HSF to engage the RN and he even wanted to do it himself, no one pay to much mind to that.

Best,

JAG

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 6270
Joined: 13 Jun 2008, 23:54
Location: Kent

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#34

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 May 2016, 14:58

JAG13 wrote:Strategic outcomes? Please, do tell, what was the strategic outcome of Jutland?
Germany lost the war. The greatest strategic outcome of all.
JAG13 wrote:Furthermore, was was the strategic intent of the KM by leaving port? And, how can a single sortie that was not intended to reach the blockading forces address a blockade?
The intent of the HSF was to inflict such losses that the overall situation it found itself in would be altered in order to enable a decisive battle to be fought. There was no need to reach the actual blockading forces in a sortie by the HSF, a few old armoured cruisers and auxilliary warships were easy enough to pick off if the GF could be removed from protecting the blockading force, this is why there was no plan to sortie so far north as the blockade line until the GF was unable to prevent such an attack.
JAG13 wrote:Wrong, Tirpitz wanted the HSF to engage the RN and he even wanted to do it himself, no one pay to much mind to that.

Best,

JAG
Tirpitz was rather in two minds on this subject, early on in the war he wished to preserve the fleet so it could be used as a bargaining chip in peace talks, rather like the Kaiser, and opposed it being exposed to needless risks, especially after Heligoland Bight. Late in the war when, all was lost, he did indeed want to lead his fleet on a final suicide sortie despite standing in political disfavour, but even by the time of Jutland he had been replaced from the naval command entirely, being replaced by Capelle.

User avatar
Attrition
Member
Posts: 4006
Joined: 29 Oct 2008, 23:53
Location: England

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#35

Post by Attrition » 16 May 2016, 09:40

The German response to being outnumbered at sea was the same as on land and was the obvious one, to use manoeuvre, skill and surprise to destroy isolated detachments of the opposing force, wearing it down cheaply until what remained could be confronted, with a realistic possibility of a decisive victory. To work, the attrition had to be one-sided but in 1916, the rate of loss the Germans experienced increased too far, despite still being more costly for the Entente and its allies. Jutland is a microcosm, a tactical success for the Germans, despite being brought to the brink of a decisive defeat by the Grand Fleet. As the beginning of a process of depletion of the Grand Fleet it was a success but by itself was a strategic defeat, since British losses were made good before the Germans could continue the process and the nature of the tactical defeat led the British to institute reforms, like better armour piercing ammunition, more attention to communication, better integration of signals intelligence with tactical command and better ammunition safety. The British would have had to make even more unforced errors next time, if the Germans were to continue the wearing-out process but there never was a next time, which surely is the most eloquent verdict on the battle.

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#36

Post by Sheldrake » 16 May 2016, 10:57

Attrition wrote:The German response to being outnumbered at sea was the same as on land and was the obvious one, to use manoeuvre, skill and surprise to destroy isolated detachments of the opposing force, wearing it down cheaply until what remained could be confronted, with a realistic possibility of a decisive victory. To work, the attrition had to be one-sided but in 1916, the rate of loss the Germans experienced increased too far, despite still being more costly for the Entente and its allies. Jutland is a microcosm, a tactical success for the Germans, despite being brought to the brink of a decisive defeat by the Grand Fleet. As the beginning of a process of depletion of the Grand Fleet it was a success but by itself was a strategic defeat, since British losses were made good before the Germans could continue the process and the nature of the tactical defeat led the British to institute reforms, like better armour piercing ammunition, more attention to communication, better integration of signals intelligence with tactical command and better ammunition safety. The British would have had to make even more unforced errors next time, if the Germans were to continue the wearing-out process but there never was a next time, which surely is the most eloquent verdict on the battle.
I think the wrong question is being asked. Instead of marveling at the Germans tactical and ship building expertise, the key question is what the Germans thought they could do with a navy that could never dominate the Royal Navy given #1 relative economic strength. #2 National Priorities #3 Geography? I suspect support for a German Navy was more about a cause behind which middle class nationalists could unify than a rational instrument of policy.

Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#37

Post by Sid Guttridge » 16 May 2016, 13:04

Hi JAG13,

One must judge victory or defeat by the results.

You write, "Jutland wasn't an attempt at breaking the blockade, the purpose of that sortie was simply to kep the HSF active, show the flag and maybe catch some RN cruisers if possible. The original operation that aimed at reeling in the BCF by attacking Sunderland had to be cancelled due to weather and zeppelin/Uboat availability, hence the new and reduced operation taking place nowhere near Britain!"

Yup, that is the tactical reasoning, and pretty unambitious it was given that the British blockade was slowly strangling Germany.

However, on a strategic level, the breaking of the blockade by winning mastery of the seas was the fundamental raison d'etre of the German High Seas Fleet, and it failed. The only moment when this was even possible was at Jutland, as no other fleet actions occurred. The result of Jutland was that the German High Seas Fleet had to run for home rather than continue the action under unfavourable circumstances. This was failure. It was said that Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon. He didn't. His fleet was ready to sail again within 24 hours. The German High Seas Fleets wasn't, and took no substantive risks to achieve its war aims after Jutland.

Of course the British would have liked a decisive action, but preservation of the status quo was good enough for them to achieve their strategic aims. Thus Jutland was, in the greater scheme of things, a British victory.

Furthermore, Hitler's strategic actions in WWII were heavily informed by the effects of the British blockade in WWI. The result of Jutland was still impinging on German decision making decades after 1916.

Cheers,

Sid.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#38

Post by glenn239 » 16 May 2016, 18:46

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Glenn239,

A continuance of the status quo was good enough for the British as their blockade was slowly strangling Germany.

On the other hand, the Germans had to win a decisive main fleet action to break this blockade.
I see the problem. The thinking is a German victory at Jutland could somehow effect the enforcement of the blockade. But it couldn't. All a uber-Jutland could do for Germany was cause the shuffling of Entente naval assets from elsewhere to adjust for any losses, and cause the change in tactics to a more passive stance (like the RN after August 1916). The blockade itself could not be eliminated by any naval victory that Germany could hope to achieve.
Jutland was the only time the German High Seas Fleet attempted to break the British blockade and it failed.
The Germans were not attempting to break the blockade at Jutland. Scheer was looking for a prestige victory, a tactical success.
At Jutland the German aim failed, while the British preserved a favourable status quo. If one is looking for a victor, it was the British.
As I said, the British victory of Jutland was such that Beatty and Jellicoe spent the rest of their lives blaming each other for it.
If at any time after Jutland the German High Seas Fleet had wanted to challenge the British in another fleet action. it could easily have done so, as the British were spoiling for such an fight.
The most important battle for the Germans in terms of naval strategy was the Falklands, because it was there that the German navy ended all thoughts about a surface raider strategy.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#39

Post by glenn239 » 16 May 2016, 18:56

JAG13 wrote:
Strategic outcomes? Please, do tell, what was the strategic outcome of Jutland? Furthermore, was was the strategic intent of the KM by leaving port? And, how can a single sortie that was not intended to reach the blockading forces address a blockade?
There was none - the German fleet was a North Sea raiding force the day before Jutland, it was a North Sea raiding force the day after. Jutland changed nothing. The strategic posture of the navy was set before the war and remained constant throughout. The only moment in the entire war where the strategy of the High Seas Fleet had the potential to change was in October-November 1914 when Hipper was making a pitch to take the battlecruisers into the Atlantic. This debate in Berlin was ended by Sturdee and Spee in the far off south Atlantic.
Wrong, Tirpitz wanted the HSF to engage the RN and he even wanted to do it himself, no one pay too much mind to that.
Personally, I think the N-squared law was more bogus than true for fleet engagements because the mechanics of long range gunnery meant that neither side could get their entire "N" onto the pitch all at once. So the German navy could have gone out to fight and might win/lose a battle to the tune of two or six capital ships, but probably not the whole fleet. Tirpitz might have sensed that, but what he didn't realise is that the German navy was at heart a different animal than the German army. The navy was willing to fight at the unit level, but its leadership was more a prestige club. Scheer and Hipper seem the exception, not the rule. OTOH, in the British navy, it was the opposite. The RN was not a prestige club. It was fight club.

User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#40

Post by JAG13 » 16 May 2016, 23:49

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi JAG13,

One must judge victory or defeat by the results.
Indeed! And the RN suffer heavier losses, the KM kept trying to further diminish the RN material advantage so the result was what Campbell said:

"However, it had never been any part of Scheer's plan to engage the whole of the Grand Fleet, and though he had doubtless hoped for a still more favourable loss ratio, he could at least claim partial success, the most usual result in any operation of war. "

That is just it, it was a KM success that changed little, it moved the balance slightly in its favor, there were no strategic outcomes in this battle.
You write, "Jutland wasn't an attempt at breaking the blockade, the purpose of that sortie was simply to kep the HSF active, show the flag and maybe catch some RN cruisers if possible. The original operation that aimed at reeling in the BCF by attacking Sunderland had to be cancelled due to weather and zeppelin/Uboat availability, hence the new and reduced operation taking place nowhere near Britain!"

Yup, that is the tactical reasoning, and pretty unambitious it was given that the British blockade was slowly strangling Germany.
THat was the purpose of he operation, a very limited scope, and since it didnt aim at nor intended to change the strategic situation it cant be construed as a failed attempt to do that, cant it?
However, on a strategic level, the breaking of the blockade by winning mastery of the seas was the fundamental raison d'etre of the German High Seas Fleet, and it failed. The only moment when this was even possible was at Jutland, as no other fleet actions occurred. The result of Jutland was that the German High Seas Fleet had to run for home rather than continue the action under unfavourable circumstances. This was failure. It was said that Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon. He didn't. His fleet was ready to sail again within 24 hours. The German High Seas Fleets wasn't, and took no substantive risks to achieve its war aims after Jutland.
Nope, breaking of blockade was not its raison d'etre, specially since the blockade as it existed was utterly illegal and didnt even enter into nobody's calculations until very shortly before the war.

Again, no, you cant fail at doing something when you are simply not even attempting to do it, much less doing it! The HSF had NO INTENTION OF ENGAGING THE GF THAT DAY NOR TO TAKE ON THE BLOCKADE ON ANY MEANINGFUL WAY! It was a fortuitous encounter for them and one they didnt wish to take place, so once they became aware of the odds they sensibly turned round after getting the better of the fight.

Have the HSF destroy a third of the GF, it would have still made no strategic impact on the blockade, the artificial stick you are using to measure HSF success, hell, sink it all! That would STILL fail to place a dent on the blockade, that would entail putting KM ships in the GIUK to clear the AMC patrols...

Jellicoe's fleet was ready to sail because most of the ships that were hit to any degree of seriousness went up in flames... the KM ships took a beating, but survived to fight another day... I have no doubts about which ships anyone would have rather been if given a choice, a battered one or one that would explode and take down its whole crew with it...

Oh, the HSF sailed twice after Jutland in 1916 alone, the GF only sailed once, after losing two CLs called it quits and wouldnt leave unless the HSF would get really close...
Of course the British would have liked a decisive action, but preservation of the status quo was good enough for them to achieve their strategic aims. Thus Jutland was, in the greater scheme of things, a British victory.
Lol, I am sorry but that is simply absurd, it implies giving the German different motives and capabilities in order to torture a favorable result to the RN out of a rather unpalatable engagement.
Furthermore, Hitler's strategic actions in WWII were heavily informed by the effects of the British blockade in WWI. The result of Jutland was still impinging on German decision making decades after 1916.

Cheers,

Sid.
The blockade yes, Jutland no, that is simply rubbish.

Best,

User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#41

Post by JAG13 » 16 May 2016, 23:59

glenn239 wrote:
JAG13 wrote:
Strategic outcomes? Please, do tell, what was the strategic outcome of Jutland? Furthermore, was was the strategic intent of the KM by leaving port? And, how can a single sortie that was not intended to reach the blockading forces address a blockade?
There was none - the German fleet was a North Sea raiding force the day before Jutland, it was a North Sea raiding force the day after. Jutland changed nothing. The strategic posture of the navy was set before the war and remained constant throughout. The only moment in the entire war where the strategy of the High Seas Fleet had the potential to change was in October-November 1914 when Hipper was making a pitch to take the battlecruisers into the Atlantic. This debate in Berlin was ended by Sturdee and Spee in the far off south Atlantic.
Wrong, Tirpitz wanted the HSF to engage the RN and he even wanted to do it himself, no one pay too much mind to that.
Personally, I think the N-squared law was more bogus than true for fleet engagements because the mechanics of long range gunnery meant that neither side could get their entire "N" onto the pitch all at once. So the German navy could have gone out to fight and might win/lose a battle to the tune of two or six capital ships, but probably not the whole fleet. Tirpitz might have sensed that, but what he didn't realise is that the German navy was at heart a different animal than the German army. The navy was willing to fight at the unit level, but its leadership was more a prestige club. Scheer and Hipper seem the exception, not the rule. OTOH, in the British navy, it was the opposite. The RN was not a prestige club. It was fight club.
I dunno, Beatty was certainly from the prestige club, had no business on the deck of a warship, much less commanding any type of fleet!

The Kaiser was the actual head of the KM, he liked ships, he didnt want to lose them, he failed to grasp the meaning of the word war in WARship and likely lost the war a a consequence.

Yes, fleets had gotten too large and unwieldy to manage in a classic battle line, but there were no people around with the imagination AND clout to try something different.

User avatar
Attrition
Member
Posts: 4006
Joined: 29 Oct 2008, 23:53
Location: England

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#42

Post by Attrition » 17 May 2016, 11:34

Sheldrake wrote:
Attrition wrote:The German response to being outnumbered at sea was the same as on land and was the obvious one, to use manoeuvre, skill and surprise to destroy isolated detachments of the opposing force, wearing it down cheaply until what remained could be confronted, with a realistic possibility of a decisive victory. To work, the attrition had to be one-sided but in 1916, the rate of loss the Germans experienced increased too far, despite still being more costly for the Entente and its allies. Jutland is a microcosm, a tactical success for the Germans, despite being brought to the brink of a decisive defeat by the Grand Fleet. As the beginning of a process of depletion of the Grand Fleet it was a success but by itself was a strategic defeat, since British losses were made good before the Germans could continue the process and the nature of the tactical defeat led the British to institute reforms, like better armour piercing ammunition, more attention to communication, better integration of signals intelligence with tactical command and better ammunition safety. The British would have had to make even more unforced errors next time, if the Germans were to continue the wearing-out process but there never was a next time, which surely is the most eloquent verdict on the battle.
I think the wrong question is being asked. Instead of marveling at the Germans tactical and ship building expertise, the key question is what the Germans thought they could do with a navy that could never dominate the Royal Navy given #1 relative economic strength. #2 National Priorities #3 Geography? I suspect support for a German Navy was more about a cause behind which middle class nationalists could unify than a rational instrument of policy.
I read somewhere that the growth of the German navy used resources efficiently, to prompt the British to spend more money on the RN instead of the Expeditionary Force. It seems plausible to me, along with the usual reasons of military spending being welfare for the rich, keeping part of the "capitalist" economy inside the state-command economy and using money not available for the army, because of the legal limits established in 1871. (It's for reasons like this that the British state is going to replace Trident.)

Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#43

Post by Sid Guttridge » 17 May 2016, 11:43

Hi Glenn,

No problem. Without German victory in a major fleet action, the British blockade couldn't even be challenged, so it was an essential first step on the ladder. Certainly the Allies would reshuffle their resources to try to compensate for losses, but these would necessarily be inferior in quality or co-ordination to the first line British fleet that putatively lost uber-Jutland. Maybe further actions would be necessary. However, Jutland indicated that Germany couldn't even get its foot on the bottom rung of the ladder to conventional naval victory. It never risked another attempt.

If Scheer was looking for a tactical success, he failed. He was consistently outmanoevred and had to run for home. Only in breaking off the action did he secure a belated tactical advantage.

Yup, "the British victory of Jutland was such that Beatty and Jellicoe spent the rest of their lives blaming each other for it". I note that you concede the word "victory", which rather relieves me of having to address this further.

The Falklands was a footnote. The Germans had no way of sustaining a major squadron after the loss of their colonies. The only German light cruiser to survive the Falklands had to hide up a river in east Africa.

What the Germans were particularly good at was in finding a way round their naval problems. Fleet actions were not likely to prove productive, especially after Jutland, so they started unrestricted submarine warfare to try to turn the blockade weapon against the UK. When conventional warships proved impractical for raiding, they turned to auxiliary merchant cruisers.

Cheers,

Sid.

Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#44

Post by Sid Guttridge » 17 May 2016, 11:45

Hi Attrition,

The growth of the German High Seas Fleet began in the decade before the Entente Cordiale between the UK and France made any British Expeditionary Force likely.

Indeed, it was the creation and expansion of the German High Seas Fleet that pushed the UK closer to France in the Entente Cordiale.

The High Seas Fleet was, for all its high quality, arguably a massive, counter-productive, white elephant. It failed to achieve anything beyond irritation to its enemy in the only war it fought and in the decade before that diverted financial and industrial resources away from the German Army to the point that France could mobilize a significantly higher proportion of its manpower in its army in 1914 than could Germany.

The absence of a High Seas Fleet (amongst other things) might have kept the UK out of a European war in 1914 and might have allowed Germany to build a greater preponderance of ground forces over France, thereby making victory over it more likely before Russian intervention.

I would suggest that there was a significant downside to the creation of the High Seas Fleet for which its existence as a "fleet in being" did not fully compensate.

Cheers,

Sid.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

#45

Post by glenn239 » 17 May 2016, 15:16

JAG13 wrote: I dunno, Beatty was certainly from the prestige club, had no business on the deck of a warship, much less commanding any type of fleet!
Hipper seemed to have a different impression.
The Kaiser was the actual head of the KM, he liked ships, he didnt want to lose them, he failed to grasp the meaning of the word war in WARship and likely lost the war a a consequence.
The failure in German leadership stemmed at the Kaiser's front gate. The German army (with longer experience dealing with kings) was able to better isolate their operations and planning from his interference.
Yes, fleets had gotten too large and unwieldy to manage in a classic battle line, but there were no people around with the imagination AND clout to try something different.
I think the upper limit to the value of "N" before other factors started to erode it (visibility, overlap in fall of shot observations, difficulties in formation) was about 12?

Post Reply

Return to “First World War”