Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Glenn,

I don't think I posted anything about Jutland being "decisive", so I don't have to defend such a proposition. What I actually wrote was "Of course the British would have liked a decisive action, but preservation of the status quo was good enough for them to achieve their strategic aims. Thus Jutland was, in the greater scheme of things, a British victory."

At the time it didn't appear so, which was why, to borrow your words, "Beatty and Jellicoe spent the rest of their lives blaming each other for it" not being so. However, with hindsight, yes, I think we can say that Jutland was decisive in sealing the fate of the German High Seas Fleet. Its just that nobody knew this at the time.

You write, "Before Falklands the HSF had eight major warships on the raiding lanes and after it, it was down to one, laid up in Africa. Up to the Falklands the HSF was pondering between two options, after it, one of those options had closed."

None of the "major warships" to which you refer would have stood in the line of battle of the German High Seas Fleet, or even its battle cruiser squadron. Even had they all survived the Falklands, the Germans could do little more with these ships. All had either to hide or run for home because of limited fuel and ammunition. Furthermore, the commerce raiding option was never closed. Instead it was passed over to merchant raiders. No, they were not in addition to warship raiders. As far as I am aware, Germany sent out no warship raiders after the outbreak of war. However, it did send outr merchant raiders.

Must go prematurely,

Sid.

[glenn239]

Not the first time the UK got caught by its own hype... or anyone for that matter.

The RN thought Beatty was probably the better admiral to Jellicoe, and it did so in 1917 with everything on the line. Just because Jellicoe was the nicer guy and Beatty was a bit of an 'a', it can still be the case that they were right. Setting aside rank considerations, I wonder if the optimal arrangement would have been Beatty in charge and Jellicoe as his chief of staff.

By that time I think the Zepps were already more focused on bombing than scouting, so they really never focused on developing its most likely and useful role, but your proposal makes sense no doubt, missed opportunities.

Failure of leadership in Germany. Bombing Britain with dirigibles was an almost useless application of a valuable resource.

[glenn239]

,
I don't think I posted anything about Jutland being "decisive", so I don't have to defend such a proposition. What I actually wrote was "Of course the British would have liked a decisive action, but preservation of the status quo was good enough for them to achieve their strategic aims. Thus Jutland was, in the greater scheme of things, a British victory."

The British had no such objective in May 1916 - they were perfectly aware that the HSF's intentions were a dash-and-run and there was absolutely no need whatsoever for a sortie to preserve the "status quo". The actual British operational aim at Jutland was the same as at Dogger Bank - to destroy the High Seas Fleet scouting squadron. That is the only reason why Jellicoe and Beatty sortied, the only reason why the risk was accepted. The HSF scouting squadron was not only not destroyed, it actually won a significant tactical victory, sinking three of its opposite number for the loss of one of its own. This altered the balance of power between the scouting squadrons, as before Jutland it was 5 Germans on 9 British (1.8 to 1) and after it was 4 Germans on 6 British (1.5 to 1). Repulse and Renown as commissioned were death traps unfit for service against Hipper, whereas Hindenburg was a valuable addition, meaning that the post-Jutland scouting force ratio of 8 to 5 (1.6 to 1) was, even treating the "R's" as real BC's, less favorable then pre-Jutland even ignoring the deficient quality of the R's and I's.

However, with hindsight, yes, I think we can say that Jutland was decisive in sealing the fate of the German High Seas Fleet. Its just that nobody knew this at the time.

With hindsight Jutland was almost completely meaningless except as noted above, where it opened the door to more aggressive HSF scouting squadron tactics. Fortunately for the British the Lutzow was sunk due to a defective anti-flooding system - had she survived Hipper would probably have sought a 5 on 6 battle with the RN BC's, and if he got the same result, then the HSF would have had scouting squadron superiority.

None of the "major warships" to which you refer would have stood in the line of battle of the German High Seas Fleet, or even its battle cruiser squadron. Even had they all survived the Falklands, the Germans could do little more with these ships.

That's true, but not a factor in the question of grand strategy. Before the Falklands the HSF had eight warships conducting a raider strategy. After it, the strategy was shut down and not repeated. The Falklands was absolutely, utterly decisive in causing the HSF to make a final choice between two different war fighting strategies.

All had either to hide or run for home because of limited fuel and ammunition. Furthermore, the commerce raiding option was never closed. Instead it was passed over to merchant raiders. No, they were not in addition to warship raiders. As far as I am aware, Germany sent out no warship raiders after the outbreak of war. However, it did send outr merchant raiders.

Was the HSF's first duty as a fleet in being or as a raiding force? This was being debated in November 1914, with Hipper arguing the latter. The cruise of the Emden showed that even obsolete cruisers could hit above their weight in a global campaign. Falklands ended the argument.

[Terry Duncan]

To school Jellicoe or Monty, yes. To school Patton or Rommel, no. Beatty and Jellicoe represented two doctrines of military leadership, both containing sound and unsound features.

How does Monty come into it? I would love to know what military doctrines Jellicoe and Beatty represented, the latter certainly, as the former was a gunnery expert who contributed to dreadnought design committees. Was Beatty a representative of the 'Tennis First' school?

Beatty's behaviour is irrelevant - his personal courage and cool under fire style is indisputable.

The personal courage of Loftus-Jones or even Jack Cornwall are beyond dispute, it doesnt make either of them fit to command a fleet though.

As was Jellicoe's. Beatty's methods were based on simple action-principles, Jellicoe's tried to micro-manage.

Yet it was Beatty that tried to micro-manage the Dogger Bank battle, leading to him blaming others for following his own pointless and confused signals.

The downside to Jellicoe's methods came that night, when a victory was literally at the end of the barrel and his captains were too afraid to take personal initiative, even in the form of the certain sinking multiple HSF capital ships. Why were they too timid to act? Because in Jellicoe's fleet you did what you were told.

It is apparent you have never read any part of the GFBO Jellicoe wrote, as its entire purpose was to lay down a guide for all captains to follow when in action, without needing to be told what to do by superiors. That many captains did not bother to read the entire document is not disputed, nor that they simply fell back to the Victorian navy idea of doing nothing until told to do so, but that is not what Jellicoe had tried to achieve, nor can he be faulted for the captains not bothering to read the instructions. Both fleets had no doctrine to fight at night, both recognised it to be a lottery and prefered to avoid action during the few hours of darkness, the HSF at Jutland didnt operate on anything beyond trying to escape no matter what the risks, and that is the only reason they had to fight. Certainly the HSF was better equipped for night fighting, but fleet action at night was still seen as something to be avoided if at all possible.

I would love to see some official document or even personal account where Jellicoe stated his GFBO's were intended to make people think they were to only do as they were told?

[Terry Duncan]

Beatty was so unfit to command that the Royal Navy handed him the Grand Fleet as it cashiered Jellicoe, who had quickly lost favor after the great British victory of Jutland.

Jellicoe 'lost favour' with some politicians after Beatty ran around blaming him in private for what was largely Beatty's defeat at Jutland, but even then, he was promoted to First Sea Lord because he was a capable administrator, possibly the only person in the navy up to the task of sorting out the submarine menace. Even his removal from that role was due to politicians, his replacement was certainly not an improvement from any military standpoint. Beatty did his best service post-WWI when he fought to keep the RN funded and to keep some control of the FAA.

The decision to place the fastest battleships (Konig and Bayern Classes) with the scouting forces was sound and, IMO, should have been employed at Jutland. The argument can be extended to the inclusion of the Kaiser Class in the scouting group with the main fleet composed of only the Helgoland and Nassau Classes - whose slightly slower speed was the difference between tactical parity and inferiority with the Grand Fleet.

The Kaiser class as a group were not able to act as a fast wing as Prinzregent Luitpold was missing the diesel engine meant for her center shaft, and thus slower than the rest of the class. There would also bee a problem with Friedrich der Grosse, as the fleet flagship she would need to be in a position to be able to signal to both parts of the fleet, impossible if she were too far ahead of the slower ships. The big problem of the faster battleships taking station with the 1st SG is that they cannot keep up properly, so they will either be left behind or slow the BC's to their maximum speed - the British found the 5th BS to be a similar problem. The odds are also not improved overly if the Germans meet the GF, as there are still 8 BC's plus Glorious and Courageous, and the 5 QE's vs 5BC's (if we wait until Hindenburg is ready) and no more than 6 faster battleships. This scenario is only ok if the Germans do not find themselves in a position of having to run, as if they do, the battleships could all be lost, as any ship slowed will be dealt with by the following GF. It is ok if things go well, but inviting disaster if they go badly.

[Terry Duncan]

The British had no such objective in May 1916 - they were perfectly aware that the HSF's intentions were a dash-and-run and there was absolutely no need whatsoever for a sortie to preserve the "status quo". The actual British operational aim at Jutland was the same as at Dogger Bank - to destroy the High Seas Fleet scouting squadron. That is the only reason why Jellicoe and Beatty sortied, the only reason why the risk was accepted. The HSF scouting squadron was not only not destroyed, it actually won a significant tactical victory, sinking three of its opposite number for the loss of one of its own.

There was no need for the GF to set to sea if there was only an intention of defeating Hipper's1st SG, it was there because it was hoped to catch and destroy any German squadrons that were present, that was the purpose of the distant support role. I think you are confusing what was hoped for with what was needed. The British were quite happy if the Germans ran for home without doing any damage and the status quo was preserved, a decisive battle wasnt needed. Only two ships of any significant value were lost by either side, Lutzow and Queen Mary, the Invincible and Indefatigable were rather badly dated by 1916.

This altered the balance of power between the scouting squadrons, as before Jutland it was 5 Germans on 9 British (1.8 to 1) and after it was 4 Germans on 6 British (1.5 to 1). Repulse and Renown as commissioned were death traps unfit for service against Hipper, whereas Hindenburg was a valuable addition, meaning that the post-Jutland scouting force ratio of 8 to 5 (1.6 to 1) was, even treating the "R's" as real BC's, less favorable then pre-Jutland even ignoring the deficient quality of the R's and I's.

Repulse and Renown were at least as good as the first two classes of British BC's, had far better guns and speed, and could easily outrange their German counterparts who were much slower. They were far from perfect, but the extra armour meant they were at least reasonable long range combatants.

Fortunately for the British the Lutzow was sunk due to a defective anti-flooding system - had she survived Hipper would probably have sought a 5 on 6 battle with the RN BC's, and if he got the same result, then the HSF would have had scouting squadron superiority.

Of course the loss had nothing to do with the massive battering she had recieved, where bulkheads were distorted to the point they were no longer watertight, or that the bow was so riddled with holes that the stem was entirely underwater from quite early on. We could just as easily argue that Queen mary would have survived if Beatty had not insisted on a high rate of fire above anything else, or Indefatigable would have survived if Beatty hadnt left his weakest ships closest to the enemy.

Was the HSF's first duty as a fleet in being or as a raiding force? This was being debated in November 1914, with Hipper arguing the latter. The cruise of the Emden showed that even obsolete cruisers could hit above their weight in a global campaign. Falklands ended the argument.

With no overseas bases or facilities, raiding is not really an option. Emden did well because she could capture enough to keep her at sea, a battlecruiser would struggle to do so from the outset. Small ships could go raiding, but warships are seldom as good as merchants in this role as they are too easily noticed.

[glenn239]

How does Monty come into it? I would love to know what military doctrines Jellicoe and Beatty represented, the latter certainly, as the former was a gunnery expert who contributed to dreadnought design committees. Was Beatty a representative of the 'Tennis First' school?

Beatty -> Jellicoe
Rommel -> Monty

One doctrine is opportunistic, "follow me!". The other relies on meticulous preparations, even at the expense of local opportunity.

The personal courage of Loftus-Jones or even Jack Cornwall are beyond dispute, it doesnt make either of them fit to command a fleet though.

Nelson had a different opinion about personal courage as a precondition for successful admiralling.

Yet it was Beatty that tried to micro-manage the Dogger Bank battle, leading to him blaming others for following his own pointless and confused signals.

Jellicoe was what today would be called a control freak. Beatty was more hands-off, but expected results. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Really good staffs have a strong combination of both.

It is apparent you have never read any part of the GFBO Jellicoe wrote, as its entire purpose was to lay down a guide for all captains to follow when in action, without needing to be told what to do by superiors.

Jellicoe is responsible for the failure of his command to act to win the Battle of Jutland during the night phase. Beatty's command must have been livid that so many had died just so that Jellicoe's captains could have Seydlitz and Moltke in their gunsights at point blank range and then do nothing.

I would love to see some official document or even personal account where Jellicoe stated his GFBO's were intended to make people think they were to only do as they were told?

The Rules of the Game stops the Battle of Jutland at the point where Evan-Thomas, like a complete fool, is sailing straight towards the High Seas Fleet main body unsupported and will not alter course until the flags ordering a course reversal got hauled down on Lion. Literally, the book stops on the spot and then devotes a large section to explain how any admiral could possibly be that dogmatic. The conclusion is that if the instruction hadn't been ordered executed by being hauled down, Even-Thomas would have sailed the four best dreadnoughts of the Royal Navy straight into the mouth of the High Seas Fleet and lost 4 ships and 4,000 men. Anyone willing to lose 4 dreadnoughts over formality should not have been in command. Even-Thomas was a Jellicoe man.

[glenn239]

Jellicoe 'lost favour' with some politicians after Beatty ran around blaming him in private for what was largely Beatty's defeat at Jutland, but even then, he was promoted to First Sea Lord because he was a capable administrator, possibly the only person in the navy up to the task of sorting out the submarine menace. Even his removal from that role was due to politicians, his replacement was certainly not an improvement from any military standpoint. Beatty did his best service post-WWI when he fought to keep the RN funded and to keep some control of the FAA.

So Jutland was a British victory, but also at the same time, Jellicoe was blamed by British leaders for the defeat.

The Kaiser class as a group were not able to act as a fast wing as Prinzregent Luitpold was missing the diesel engine meant for her center shaft, and thus slower than the rest of the class. There would also bee a problem with Friedrich der Grosse, as the fleet flagship she would need to be in a position to be able to signal to both parts of the fleet, impossible if she were too far ahead of the slower ships. The big problem of the faster battleships taking station with the 1st SG is that they cannot keep up properly, so they will either be left behind or slow the BC's to their maximum speed - the British found the 5th BS to be a similar problem

.

The PRL might be too slow to use, true, but as for the rest, the idea is to be either faster than the GF main body or stronger than the GF scouting group.

The odds are also not improved overly if the Germans meet the GF, as there are still 8 BC's plus Glorious and Courageous, and the 5 QE's vs 5BC's (if we wait until Hindenburg is ready) and no more than 6 faster battleships

5 QE's, 4 I's, 3 Cats, R&R plus 6 fast BB's vs. 5 BC's, 4 Konig, 2 Bayern, 4 Kaiser = 20 vs. 15. N^2 upper limit is maybe 12, but on the RN side the 4 I's and R&R aren't 'real' ships of the line, so it's even fuzzier.

[glenn239]

There was no need for the GF to set to sea if there was only an intention of defeating Hipper's1st SG, it was there because it was hoped to catch and destroy any German squadrons that were present, that was the purpose of the distant support role. I think you are confusing what was hoped for with what was needed. The British were quite happy if the Germans ran for home without doing any damage and the status quo was preserved, a decisive battle wasnt needed. Only two ships of any significant value were lost by either side, Lutzow and Queen Mary, the Invincible and Indefatigable were rather badly dated by 1916.

The object to the British sortie was the destruction of Hipper's scouting group. Having been sharply defeated in terms of losses in the scouting forces, after the battle the RN was in a worse-off position with respect to Hipper. Then, the point of the mission changed to 'maintaining the blockade', where a victory could be claimed. Beatty at Dogger Bank wasn't trying to maintain the status quo on the blockade, he was trying to pot 4 German heavy raiders. Same for Jutland. At Dogger Bank, the Blucher was sunk, so there was no need for superfluous rhetoric about the blockade in order for the RN to claim its tactical victory. At Jutland, where the object was also the destruction of Hipper, a different outcome, so out trots the different story on what the objective was.

Repulse and Renown were at least as good as the first two classes of British BC's, had far better guns and speed, and could easily outrange their German counterparts who were much slower. They were far from perfect, but the extra armour meant they were at least reasonable long range combatants.

Repluse and Renown were floating piles of dog s**t as commissioned.

With no overseas bases or facilities, raiding is not really an option. Emden did well because she could capture enough to keep her at sea, a battlecruiser would struggle to do so from the outset. Small ships could go raiding, but warships are seldom as good as merchants in this role as they are too easily noticed.

The Falklands was such a profound defeat that no warship - small or large - was ever sent out for ocean raiding again.

[Terry Duncan]

One doctrine is opportunistic, "follow me!". The other relies on meticulous preparations, even at the expense of local opportunity.

'Follow me' was the suggestion Beatty offered at Jutland when he had no idea where the enemy were or what course they were on, and also managed to steam his ships in a complete circle - something he insisted get rewritten in the official history as it made him look stupid.

Nelson had a different opinion about personal courage as a precondition for successful admiralling.

I cannot recall where Nelson said personal courage was all that was needed, and that it was good to neglect to give instructions to subordinates, as Beatty did to Evan-Thomas despite his constant begging for the 5th BS.

was what today would be called a control freak. Beatty was more hands-off, but expected results. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Really good staffs have a strong combination of both.

Yet as we know, it was Beatty that threw away the chance of a great victory by micro-managing, and Jellicoe who took the hands off approach at Jutland only for captains to not show any initiative, despite the GFBO's stressing its importance.

Jellicoe is responsible for the failure of his command to act to win the Battle of Jutland during the night phase. Beatty's command must have been livid that so many had died just so that Jellicoe's captains could have Seydlitz and Moltke in their gunsights at point blank range and then do nothing.

Jellicoe can hardly be responsible for captains not acting as his written orders said they should. Beatty's command may well have been upset, but they were the ones who had had those same ships under their guns for the best part of 90 minutes and failed to almost any damage. Perhaps some self-reflection on 'why is our gunnery so bad' would have been better for them?

The Rules of the Game stops the Battle of Jutland at the point where Evan-Thomas, like a complete fool, is sailing straight towards the High Seas Fleet main body unsupported and will not alter course until the flags ordering a course reversal got hauled down on Lion.

I didnt know Jellicoe had written 'The Rules of the Game'? Evan-Thomas was known to be a stickler for the rules, Beatty never bothered to explain his method of control to him, the responsibility for the appalling signals from Lion rests entirely with Beatty as he protected Seymour from all criticism until he commited the unforgivable sin of asking to marry Beatty's niece, at which point Beatty blamed him for everything, including losing him three battles, indicating Beatty was about as good at counting as he was at gunnery practice. Even then, when Beatty did signal a turn it was an almost suicidal 'turn in succession' not turn together. At least his tennis must have improved though.

Literally, the book stops on the spot and then devotes a large section to explain how any admiral could possibly be that dogmatic. The conclusion is that if the instruction hadn't been ordered executed by being hauled down, Even-Thomas would have sailed the four best dreadnoughts of the Royal Navy straight into the mouth of the High Seas Fleet and lost 4 ships and 4,000 men. Anyone willing to lose 4 dreadnoughts over formality should not have been in command. Even-Thomas was a Jellicoe man.

Evan-Thomas was certainly a friend of Jellicoe's, but he was also well connected with the royal family, his appointment stemmed from the desire to appoint an officer to command the 5th BS who was not prone to fits of impulse and would do as instructed. This was known to Beatty, indeed it was widely known in the fleet Evan-Thomas didnt have much if any imagination, yet in the time Beatty had the 5th BS stationed at Rosyth in line with his wishes, he never even met Evan-Thomas, much less made him aware how Beatty expected to operate the fleet. Blaming Jellicoe for Beatty's failure to communicate is really rather amusing.

By the way, remember it was only personal patronage from Churchill that got Beatty his post, because he talked a good fight despite never having commanded a squadron in peacetime, that many in the BCF initially were against the appointment, and that almost all the seagoing RN did not want Beatty to replace Jellicoe in 1916. Beatty was a political appointment, lacked the ability, and really was nothing special as an admiral at sea. It would be possible to name half a dozen officers who would have performed better given the chance.

[JAG13]

Not the first time the UK got caught by its own hype... or anyone for that matter.

The RN thought Beatty was probably the better admiral to Jellicoe, and it did so in 1917 with everything on the line. Just because Jellicoe was the nicer guy and Beatty was a bit of an 'a', it can still be the case that they were right. Setting aside rank considerations, I wonder if the optimal arrangement would have been Beatty in charge and Jellicoe as his chief of staff.

Given how he failed to communicate and discipline some of his underlings I cant call him a successful commander nor a good admiral, if he did things different than the rest of the fleet he should have informed ET, once ET went on blindly forward as a dog instead of following he should have made sure he did follow the next time instead of watch him steam past him towards the whole HSF, if the guy that managed his communications screwed up he had to be disciplined, if he did so again he had to be replaced, since he didnt the guy was either blackmailing him or was a loyal fall guy that would bear Beatty's failures...

By that time I think the Zepps were already more focused on bombing than scouting, so they really never focused on developing its most likely and useful role, but your proposal makes sense no doubt, missed opportunities.

Failure of leadership in Germany. Bombing Britain with dirigibles was an almost useless application of a valuable resource.

No argument there.

[glenn239]

'Follow me' was the suggestion Beatty offered at Jutland when he had no idea where the enemy were or what course they were on, and also managed to steam his ships in a complete circle - something he insisted get rewritten in the official history as it made him look stupid.

You asked, I answered. You ask 10 years from now, I will answer in the same way.

I cannot recall where Nelson said personal courage was all that was needed, and that it was good to neglect to give instructions to subordinates, as Beatty did to Evan-Thomas despite his constant begging for the 5th BS.

Probably as you have too, I've stood on the exact spot Nelson stood at on Victory during the battle and looked up into the rigging and imagined the French sharpshooters on the Redoubtable fire down from such a close range, the slugs hitting the deck minute after minute around him, and he just continues to walk around. Anyways, the maxim that a captain can do no worse than lay his ship beside that of an enemy was a Nelsonian action principle more of the Beatty school than of the Jellicoe.

Yet as we know, it was Beatty that threw away the chance of a great victory by micro-managing, and Jellicoe who took the hands off approach at Jutland only for captains to not show any initiative, despite the GFBO's stressing its importance.

I think the victory that Beatty had delivered to Jellicoe on a platter was lost when Jellicoe's captains had the HSF in their gunsights at point blank range and did not open fire. If you want my guess, I would say that this was the moment that Jellicoe would lose the GF.

Jellicoe can hardly be responsible for captains not acting as his written orders said they should.

Yes, the commanding officer is most certainly responsible for the actions of his subordinates - not just making Beatty at fault for Beatty's subordinates. Jellicoe's methods had bred a fleet that would not take action, and to change that, the Cabinet replaced Jellicoe with a 'follow me' type.

[glenn239]

]

Given how he failed to communicate and discipline some of his underlings I cant call him a successful commander nor a good admiral, if he did things different than the rest of the fleet he should have informed ET, once ET went on blindly forward as a dog instead of following he should have made sure he did follow the next time instead of watch him steam past him towards the whole HSF, if the guy that managed his communications screwed up he had to be disciplined, if he did so again he had to be replaced, since he didnt the guy was either blackmailing him or was a loyal fall guy that would bear Beatty's failures...

If E-T loses the 4 best dreadnoughts in the fleet by sailing head-on into the HSF 3rd BS on a signal protocol its his fault, not the flag guy's. It was 100%, entirely, unequivocally E-T's responsibility that he placed his dreadnoughts in danger. There was absolutely no excuse - none - for his conduct in failing to break off his advance towards Scheer at the instance Beatty's BC's passed him at full speed on the reciprocal bearing.

Then, wasn't it E-T that compounded his error by having a BC or two right under his guns that night, and he did nothing?

[JAG13]

]

Given how he failed to communicate and discipline some of his underlings I cant call him a successful commander nor a good admiral, if he did things different than the rest of the fleet he should have informed ET, once ET went on blindly forward as a dog instead of following he should have made sure he did follow the next time instead of watch him steam past him towards the whole HSF, if the guy that managed his communications screwed up he had to be disciplined, if he did so again he had to be replaced, since he didnt the guy was either blackmailing him or was a loyal fall guy that would bear Beatty's failures...

If E-T loses the 4 best dreadnoughts in the fleet by sailing head-on into the HSF 3rd BS on a signal protocol its his fault, not the flag guy's. It was 100%, entirely, unequivocally E-T's responsibility that he placed his dreadnoughts in danger. There was absolutely no excuse - none - for his conduct in failing to break off his advance towards Scheer at the instance Beatty's BC's passed him at full speed on the reciprocal bearing.

Then, wasn't it E-T that compounded his error by having a BC or two right under his guns that night, and he did nothing?

Without a doubt he shares responsibility, he seems to have been a quite unimaginative and almost automaton-like officer that followed orders to the letter and did nothing unless told to do so, and given some other instances of similar lack of initiative in the RN I would venture that it was sort of a cultural stance in the RN.

In any case, Beatty did know that his dimwitted comms officer and dimwitted squadron commander were prone to screwing up, and somehow he wasnt perplexed or worried when 5th BS kept on trucking towards the HSF, Beatty was the guy in command, he is responsible for what happens to his command and should have paid attention given the prior incidents.

In the end, he just ran towards the GF without caring to fight his ships as a single cohesive unit and thus placing them in undue danger, and he did it twice!

[Terry Duncan]

You asked, I answered. You ask 10 years from now, I will answer in the same way.

I dont see Beatty as a good example of 'Follow Me' as any idiot can say it when they have no idea where the enemy is or what he is doing.

Probably as you have too, I've stood on the exact spot Nelson stood at on Victory during the battle and looked up into the rigging and imagined the French sharpshooters on the Redoubtable fire down from such a close range, the slugs hitting the deck minute after minute around him, and he just continues to walk around. Anyways, the maxim that a captain can do no worse than lay his ship beside that of an enemy was a Nelsonian action principle more of the Beatty school than of the Jellicoe.

Not sure how you can conclude that, there is nothing to suggest Jellicoe was more combat adverse than Beatty, indeed it was Beatty who took the fleet to sea less, and kept it further north than previously.

I think the victory that Beatty had delivered to Jellicoe on a platter was lost when Jellicoe's captains had the HSF in their gunsights at point blank range and did not open fire. If you want my guess, I would say that this was the moment that Jellicoe would lose the GF.

Beatty delivered nothing, that would have required signalling useful information regarding what the enemy was doing and where hey were rather than just running towards the GF and hoping Jellicoe would save him. Jellicoe was made First Sea Lord because of the submarine menace, they needed a capable administrator to find ways of combating it.

Yes, the commanding officer is most certainly responsible for the actions of his subordinates - not just making Beatty at fault for Beatty's subordinates. Jellicoe's methods had bred a fleet that would not take action, and to change that, the Cabinet replaced Jellicoe with a 'follow me' type.

No. Having issue detailed, some say too detailed, instructions on what captains should do, it is not Jellicoe's fault when individuals fail to follow those orders. Jellicoe had not bred a fleet what would not take action, that was the legacy of the Victorian years, where anyone below flag rank was not expected to even think. The government replaced Jellicoe with Beatty because he was popular with the press, his appointment was mostly unpopular with the fleet, the people who knew his abilities best. Beatty is at fault for Beatty's subordinates when he spent the war telling everyone there was nothing wrong with a particular subordinate, lets be honest, this means Ralph Seymour, only to then turn on the same subordinate after the war and blame him for every error made, oddly only after Seymour had asked Beatty's permission to marry Beatty's neice! This was also about the time Beatty was trying to have history rewritten to make out he had done far more than he ever had, not to mention reduce the role played by others and blame them for his mistakes. With Seymour dead there was nobody expected to be able to dispell the Beatty Myth, that is until Harper resigned rather than submit to Beatty's demands and went public with the facts and how they were being deliberately distorted. Since then, Beatty has had a very tarnished reputation at best. After all, why try to rewrite history if your role had been at all meritorious?