Why did Imperial Germany perform so well in World War I (in spite of its ultimate defeat and loss)?

[Terry Duncan]

If E-T loses the 4 best dreadnoughts in the fleet by sailing head-on into the HSF 3rd BS on a signal protocol its his fault, not the flag guy's.

The RN would view that the fault would rest with Beatty and Seymour in this case, as leaving signals flying would indicate to any subordinate that the admiral did not intend the order to be executed yet, and as the subordinate would not have all the information to hand, it might be playing part of some greater scheme he knew nothing about. Beatty expected his signals to be obeyed, but despite the disaster at Dogger Bank he had still by far the worst signalling of any admiral at Jutland, and rather like Churchill he was prone to making pointless signals too. It would have taken a very different man to Evan-Thomas to disobey a direct order in action.

It was 100%, entirely, unequivocally E-T's responsibility that he placed his dreadnoughts in danger.

No, it is down to Evan-Thomas that he didnt disobey Beatty's order earlier, but it is the responsibility of Beatty that the signals did not reflect what he wanted to happen. Indeed with his battlecruisers rather badly shot up, he may well have intended the 5th BS to take up the rear of his line, closer to the enemy, I am not aware he ever said Evan-Thomas should have disobeyed his direct orders as displayed by the flag signal Beatty was flying?

There was absolutely no excuse - none - for his conduct in failing to break off his advance towards Scheer at the instance Beatty's BC's passed him at full speed on the reciprocal bearing.

If Beatty expected Evan-thomas to take a place at the rear of his line this would have to happen, and it would also make more sense when allowing for how the BCF and 5th BS were expected to take up positions when merging with the GF. At the point the BCF and 5th BS passed each other, Beatty still had an impending direct order flying, and did not signal his intent to execute it, or indeed to let anyone else know his signal yards were damaged, so signalling was going to be imprecise.

Then, wasn't it E-T that compounded his error by having a BC or two right under his guns that night, and he did nothing?

The best documented example is Leveson's ships of the 2nd BS 2nd Div that sighted the Seydlitz at close range and even challenged her, but when they recieved the wrong reply, she was allowed to retreat as they thought she was a destroyer due to how low in the water she was. By the time the eror was realised, Seydlitz had vanished. However, opening fire would have given away the position of the fleet, opening it to torpedo attacks, so hindsight is a wonderful thing in this case, it was far less clear at the time.

If you really want to talk of compounding errors, maybe you could remind me what ship it was that had 'forgotten' the night challenge for the RN and needed to ask for it to be signalled to them, only for German ships to also see it, allowing them to get past the destroyer line at night with far more ease than if they had not had this information???

[glenn239]

Without a doubt he shares responsibility, he seems to have been a quite unimaginative and almost automaton-like officer that followed orders to the letter and did nothing unless told to do so, and given some other instances of similar lack of initiative in the RN I would venture that it was sort of a cultural stance in the RN.

You're saying it was an RN thing, I'm saying it was also a Jellicoe thing.

In the end, he just ran towards the GF without caring to fight his ships as a single cohesive unit and thus placing them in undue danger, and he did it twice!

Beatty delivered the HSF to Jellicoe on a platter, then Jellicoe proceeded not to sink it.

[glenn239]

Not sure how you can conclude that, there is nothing to suggest Jellicoe was more combat adverse than Beatty, indeed it was Beatty who took the fleet to sea less, and kept it further north than previously.

I didn't say it was a Beatty vs. Jellicoe thing. I said personal courage was a crucial component of successful leadership.

Jellicoe was made First Sea Lord because of the submarine menace, they needed a capable administrator to find ways of combating it.

Demotion by promotion.

No. Having issue detailed, some say too detailed, instructions on what captains should do, it is not Jellicoe's fault when individuals fail to follow those orders. Jellicoe had not bred a fleet what would not take action, that was the legacy of the Victorian years, where anyone below flag rank was not expected to even think.

Jellicoe was responsible for the fleet that went to fight at Jutland and its failures, just like Beatty was responsible for the performance of the Battlecruiser fleet. That's why he got replaced after the campaigning season was over.

this means Ralph Seymour, only to then turn on the same subordinate after the war and blame him for every error made, oddly only after Seymour had asked Beatty's permission to marry Beatty's neice!

Yes, Beatty was a disreputable character that expected aggression and results, and certainly a meaner SOB than 'good old boy' Jellicoe. That's why I think his leadership style was overall better for the fighting qualities of the fleet.

This was also about the time Beatty was trying to have history rewritten to make out he had done far more than he ever had, not to mention reduce the role played by others and blame them for his mistakes. With Seymour dead there was nobody expected to be able to dispell the Beatty Myth, that is until Harper resigned rather than submit to Beatty's demands and went public with the facts and how they were being deliberately distorted. Since then, Beatty has had a very tarnished reputation at best. After all, why try to rewrite history if your role had been at all meritorious?

I think I get it - you like Jellicoe and dislike Beatty? What does that have to do with anything?

[glenn239]

The RN would view that the fault would rest with Beatty and Seymour in this case, as leaving signals flying would indicate to any subordinate that the admiral did not intend the order to be executed yet, and as the subordinate would not have all the information to hand, it might be playing part of some greater scheme he knew nothing about. Beatty expected his signals to be obeyed, but despite the disaster at Dogger Bank he had still by far the worst signalling of any admiral at Jutland, and rather like Churchill he was prone to making pointless signals too. It would have taken a very different man to Evan-Thomas to disobey a direct order in action.

Correct, it would have taken a different man than Evan-Thomas, which is the entire point.

The best documented example is Leveson's ships of the 2nd BS 2nd Div that sighted the Seydlitz at close range and even challenged her, but when they recieved the wrong reply, she was allowed to retreat as they thought she was a destroyer due to how low in the water she was. By the time the eror was realised, Seydlitz had vanished. However, opening fire would have given away the position of the fleet, opening it to torpedo attacks, so hindsight is a wonderful thing in this case, it was far less clear at the time.

I asked whether 5th BS had an opportunity to sink some of Hipper's BC's and you replied evasively. E-T's squadron allowed German BC's to survive that were under his guns that night, yes or no?

[Terry Duncan]

You're saying it was an RN thing, I'm saying it was also a Jellicoe thing.

Then maybe you ned to actually prove what you are saying? You can go on being wrong and biased all you like, but if you look back into Jellicoe's service history you will see the best example of it being endemic in the RN, as Jellicoe was on the Victoria when she was rammed and sunk by Camperdown, and all this happened because a captain would not consider either questioning an admiral or disobeying them.

Beatty delivered the HSF to Jellicoe on a platter, then Jellicoe proceeded not to sink it.

Hardly. That would involve Beatty actually telling Jellicoe where the German fleet was, what course it was on, and how many of them he had seen, he only managed one of these things, and only after a direct request. Jellicoe managed to deploy his fleet on almost no information to a degree the naval staff could not better it even by the 1930's with full knowledge of where the HSF was and what it was doing. Beatty failed to deploy his force initially, failed again to use the powerful ships he had begged for, then steamed across the front of the GF masking its ships at a critical point in the deployment. Would you like to look at a balance of the damage caused by the BCF Vs the GF over the battle? This of course would leave you having to deal with the fact that the BC's under Beatty had done very little damage, so I guess that isnt going to happen any time soon.

[Terry Duncan]

Demotion by promotion.

Hardly. Have a look at the options to get to grips with the submarine war and there are almost no other candidates. By the time Jellicoe was moved to the Admiralty it was clear very little was going to be seen of the HSF again, so very much more a case of putting the best man for the job in the place he could do it.

Jellicoe was responsible for the fleet that went to fight at Jutland and its failures, just like Beatty was responsible for the performance of the Battlecruiser fleet. That's why he got replaced after the campaigning season was over.

Err...there is no 'campaigning season' for naval warfare in the North Sea, Dogger Bank is a good illustration. If Jutland had been as bad as you make out, Jellicoe would have been removed almost instantly, the RN did this with unsuitable admirals in WWI even if they didnt have them shot. Senior officers are not responsible for people under them failing to follow instructions, there is such a thing as individual responsibility. They are responsible for training and instructing their commands, an area Jellicoe was obviously far superior to Beatty.

Yes, Beatty was a disreputable character that expected aggression and results, and certainly a meaner SOB than 'good old boy' Jellicoe. That's why I think his leadership style was overall better for the fighting qualities of the fleet.

Beatty expected results so much Lion was second only to Tiger in gunnery performance, sadly in the competition for the worst gunnery, and Tiger was crewed by a large number of defaulters and deserters! Jellicoe was popular throughout the fleet and often seen mingling with the rank and file, Beatty was so disliked he needed an armed guard to walk about on his own flagship! Given almost every senior captain and admiral was against Beatty taking command of the GF, it is perfectly clear what the navy thought. Beatty was a political appointment to please the press, and put in command at a time he could do little harm due to the inactivity of the HSF.

I think I get it - you like Jellicoe and dislike Beatty? What does that have to do with anything?

I think Beatty was not suitable to command the forces he was given, and his efforts to rewrite history show that he knew her performed poorly, yet you somehow feel the one admiral to be consistently outfought at Jutland was in some way an asset to the RN, despite his mismanagement at Dogger Bank indicating Jutland was not a one-off poor performance!

[Terry Duncan]

Correct, it would have taken a different man than Evan-Thomas, which is the entire point.

What entire point though? The Admiralty appointed admirals, only asking the CinC to approve of the appointment after a decision had been made, or asking for his recommendations before they decided, but in the end, Jellicoe did not appoint his admirals. Of course if you want to blame Jellicoe for Evan-Thomas you need to consider that Beatty disapproved of Evan-Thomas so much he let him stay in command of the 5th BS after he took control of the fleet, right through until the end of the war.

I asked whether 5th BS had an opportunity to sink some of Hipper's BC's and you replied evasively. E-T's squadron allowed German BC's to survive that were under his guns that night, yes or no?

I pointed out that the most notable incident was with Thunderer sighting Seydlitz, along with some others in the division, an incident that was documented from both sides. I cannot recall an incident with the 5th BS with the German BC's during the night, there may have been one, there may not, I cannot remember for sure. However, the 5th BS was missing Warspite by the time of the night actions. Without knowing that such an encounter took place and its circumstances it would be wrong to say yes or no. Do you have a time, range, or details of the ships sighting the German BC's you mentioned for the 5th BS to hand?

[Robohistorian]

Because German Army did not perform well. Actually most of the german army performance was just a lie. Germens never fought in Balkans for example, or anywhere else.

[glenn239]

Hardly. Have a look at the options to get to grips with the submarine war and there are almost no other candidates. By the time Jellicoe was moved to the Admiralty it was clear very little was going to be seen of the HSF again, so very much more a case of putting the best man for the job in the place he could do it.

I wasn't aware Jellicoe requested a transfer from the GF to a desk command.

Err...there is no 'campaigning season' for naval warfare in the North Sea, Dogger Bank is a good illustration.

The major fleet ops tended to come between March-October though.

I think Beatty was not suitable to command the forces he was given, and his efforts to rewrite history show that he knew her performed poorly, yet you somehow feel the one admiral to be consistently outfought at Jutland was in some way an asset to the RN, despite his mismanagement at Dogger Bank indicating Jutland was not a one-off poor performance!

Beatty was given command of the Grand Fleet, at the expense of Jellicoe, so the Royal Navy disagreed with your assessment.

[glenn239]

Without knowing that such an encounter took place and its circumstances it would be wrong to say yes or no. Do you have a time, range, or details of the ships sighting the German BC's you mentioned for the 5th BS to hand?

I'll have to review.

[Terry Duncan]

I wasn't aware Jellicoe requested a transfer from the GF to a desk command.

A silly thing to say, promotion to 1st Sea Lord is not something an admiral requests. The reason for the appointment was made clear at the time, unless you have any actual evidence to prove otherwise it would appear you are offering nothing but opinion.

The major fleet ops tended to come between March-October though.

Yet the famous 'tip and run' raids too place outside of these dates. The GF tended to put to sea whenever there was a chance the HSF was also at sea.

Beatty was given command of the Grand Fleet, at the expense of Jellicoe, so the Royal Navy disagreed with your assessment.

Oh dear, didnt you know the appointment to 1st Sea Lord was one made by politicians, not the RN?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Glenn239,

You write, "The actual British operational aim at Jutland was the same as at Dogger Bank - to destroy the High Seas Fleet scouting squadron."

No. The British aim was to draw the German High Seas Fleet onto the Grand Fleet. It succeeded. Both sides were dangling their battlecruisers as bait, but the British got the bigger catch, though at heavy cost.

You don't think the British were after a decisive fleet action in May 1916? They wanted it every day of the war. It was the Nelsonian tradition. It was the Germans who fought shy of one, especially after Jutland.

However, the status quo, with the slow strangulation of Germany due to blockade was good enough for the British to achieve their strategic aims. It was the Germans who couldn't survive the status quo - as history proved.

You can count all the battlecruisers you want, and postulate as many fictitious later alternative outcomes as you like, but the fact remains that the strategic outcome of Jutland favoured the British and the overall balance of forces was little changed. Indeed the British Grand Fleet was ready to sail within 24 hours. The German High Seas Fleet was not.

Jutland was arguably decisive because it maintained a status quo that was slowly strangling Germany. Not only couldn't the German High Seas Fleet do anything about it, but after it fled Jutland it didn't dare to try to close with the Grand Fleet again. This only became apparent when the High Seas Fleet surrendered intact - perhaps the logical outcome for a force whose main achievement was to remain as a fleet-in-being by avoiding serious risks.

Is it really true that, "Before the Falklands the HSF had eight warships conducting a raider strategy"? My impression was that before the Falklands the Germans had a baseless Far East Squadron in survival mode trying to find a way out of a serious predicament while doing as much damage as it could on the way. If it was pursuing a raider policy, it had some inappropriate larger vessels and would have been better advised not to stay together.

You ask, "Was the HSF's first duty as a fleet in being or as a raiding force?" I would suggest neither. The German High Seas Fleet was totally inappropriate as a raiding force. It had a limited range, no fleet train and no overseas bases. Furthermore, its main vessels were designed to sustain a main fleet action of the sort fought at Jutland. If this was never a practicable proposition (and the outcome of Jutland indicated it was probably not) then the safe fall back option was the unexciting fleet-in-being strategy. This was anti-climactic for the British, but still served their strategic goal of blockading Germany. It just meant they had to stay on their toes 24/7 for the duration, which they successfully did.

And as I mentioned before, quite apart from the damage the blockade inflicted to Germany in WWI, its effects were still influencing German strategy in WWII. Jutland had a long reach.

Cheers,

Sid.

[glenn239]

No. The British aim was to draw the German High Seas Fleet onto the Grand Fleet. It succeeded. Both sides were dangling their battlecruisers as bait, but the British got the bigger catch, though at heavy cost.

It was not known that the HSF main body was even at sea until Beatty ran into it. Beatty sortied to destroy Hipper's scouting group, with Jellicoe in support just in case. Beatty delivered Hipper to Jellicoe, but the GF did not close the deal.

You don't think the British were after a decisive fleet action in May 1916? They wanted it every day of the war. It was the Nelsonian tradition. It was the Germans who fought shy of one, especially after Jutland.

Once Beatty saw Scheer he wanted to take him to Jellicoe. Doesn't change the fact that when he put to sea his idea was to finish the job started at Dogger Bank.

However, the status quo, with the slow strangulation of Germany due to blockade was good enough for the British to achieve their strategic aims. It was the Germans who couldn't survive the status quo - as history proved.

The blockade had nothing to do with it. Beatty wanted Hipper dead because Hipper used terrorist tactics against the British east coast towns and villages. The bigger picture of blockades and such came about after the battle as it became clear the Germans had gotten lucky and eeked out a tactical victory.

You can count all the battlecruisers you want, and postulate as many fictitious later alternative outcomes as you like, but the fact remains that the strategic outcome of Jutland favoured the British and the overall balance of forces was little changed. Indeed the British Grand Fleet was ready to sail within 24 hours. The German High Seas Fleet was not.

The HSF had spent almost the entire war at anchor doing nothing. A few more months of inactivity waiting for BC's to repair was right in its wheel house.
.

Jutland was arguably decisive because it maintained a status quo that was slowly strangling Germany

You do get how this comes across kinda like a shopping trip to avoid admitting that Scheer got lucky and won an improbable (and meaningless) tactical victory?

Is it really true that, "Before the Falklands the HSF had eight warships conducting a raider strategy"? My impression was that before the Falklands the Germans had a baseless Far East Squadron in survival mode trying to find a way out of a serious predicament while doing as much damage as it could on the way. If it was pursuing a raider policy, it had some inappropriate larger vessels and would have been better advised not to stay together.

What strategy do you propose Spee was doing while raiding the Falkland Islands, if not a raiding strategy?

The German High Seas Fleet was totally inappropriate as a raiding force. It had a limited range, no fleet train and no overseas bases.

You literally just argued that the HSF was trying to break the blockade, now you argue in the same post that the HSF had no capacity for high seas logistics even as a raiding force. Which is it? Was the HSF trying to break the blockade at Jutland or did the HSF have no capacity to operate in the Atlantic?

The voyage of the Karlsruhe showed that modern German CL's made excellent raiders. Older ships such as Emden were also useful, but couldn't outrun British cruisers, as Sydney demonstrated. The consequence of the HSF's doctrinal decision after Falklands was that its modern CL's were wasted as scouts for the HSF - instead of being sent out as raiders - and the building priorities were for useless capital ships instead of more light cruisers. Think of it this way - if the Baden and Bayern had been cancelled at the start of the war for 10 modern CL's for raiding, what sort of impact on the war at sea and North Sea operations?

Furthermore, its main vessels were designed to sustain a main fleet action of the sort fought at Jutland. If this was never a practicable proposition (and the outcome of Jutland indicated it was probably not) then the safe fall back option was the unexciting fleet-in-being strategy.

Close your eyes and picture for a second that after Spee won at the Coronel Islands, he pulled into Chile. Instead of wasting time, let's say he filled his emptier merchant ships (from the Pacific voyage) with nitrates - let's say 25,000 tons worth - and then sortied into the South Atlantic with the intention of running his little convoy through to Norway, where he would unload the nitrates then have them shipped to Germany via Sweden. Getting into Germany he has to run Scotland-Norway line. But getting to Norway, heck, the chances of that weren't bad.

25,000 tons of nitrates was more valuable to the German war effort than the 25,000 tons of warships of Spee's armored cruiser squadron.

And as I mentioned before, quite apart from the damage the blockade inflicted to Germany in WWI, its effects were still influencing German strategy in WWII. Jutland had a long reach.

The German WW2 construction was designed as a high seas fighting force and operated effectively as such until airpower made the Atlantic too dangerous.

[glenn239]

I wasn't aware Jellicoe requested a transfer from the GF to a desk command.

A silly thing to say, promotion to 1st Sea Lord is not something an admiral requests. The reason for the appointment was made clear at the time, unless you have any actual evidence to prove otherwise it would appear you are offering nothing but opinion.

Anyways, I checked the night action. Jellicoe went to bed in the middle of the battle. According to Castles of Steel, 649, he literally was snoring logs on his cot while the HSF was approaching to under the guns of the Grand Fleet. The fact the HSF got away was his fault. At 2000 had it in the bag. All he had to do was not go to bed in the middle of the most important naval battle of the war. Maybe a dozen battleships had valid information about the HSF, had Jellicoe remained at his post, inquired of his units, and properly directed the fleet.

I also see I remembered correctly - Evan-Thomas compounded his bad performance that day by having identified German capital ships in his gunsights at point blank range, (6,000 yards) and didn't give the order to open fire. He should have been sacked for that before he even reached port. (Beatty later (1917?) came in and took over his flagship, which suggests his opinion of E-T's performance that day).

[Attrition]

Have you not considered that the course of the battle was a bit like a German defensive battle on the Western front? All the Germans had to do was not lose, which is a simpler task than breaking down the German defences and forcing open warfare on them. The German fleet sailed into the T of the GF and then scarpered, just like so many Franco-British infantry attacks in France. This time it was for the British to do the simpler thing and for the Germans to leg it.