Did the Battle of Jutland Really Matter?

[USS ALASKA]

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/did ... Redirect=1

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

[USS ALASKA]

http://theconversation.com/jutland-why- ... tory-59415

http://theconversation.com/maths-swayed ... seas-59760

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

[Sid Guttridge]

Probably not. Given the relatively light losses on both sides, compared to their full fleet strengths, strategic outcomes would probably have been little different, whether it had occurred or not.

However, it was decisive in that it confirmed the existing status quo at sea, which greatly favoured the British and their Allies, whose blockade hurt Germany more and more as the war progressed.

After Jutland, the Germans never directly challenged that status quo at sea again and the two main battle fleets didn't sight each other once more until the Germans surrendered theirs intact at the close of the war.

One other thing, Churchill said that Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could have lost the war in an afternoon. Therefore Jutland could have mattered greatly, if the Germans had won. They didn't.

Cheers,

Sid.

[The Ibis]

Jutland is of only passing interest to me but I came across this article and enjoyed it. Perhaps the experts here can enlighten on whether the authors have it right or not. The article is Weight of Shell Must Tell: A Lanchestrian reappraisal of the Battle of Jutland, written by NJ MacKay, C Price, and AJ Wood. I'm attaching it and this is the link: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/99759/1/ ... Review.pdf

[Terry Duncan]

Thanks for posting this. I would tend to agree with what is presented, though I am sure some here will disagree! They could have emphasised the point about the intent of the RN at the Dreadnought stage quite easily, there is a very good reason the next six ships all look a lot like Dreadnought, and that is that they were deliberate close copies with minimal improvements, intended to get as many hulls and guns to sea before the Germans saw their first responses in service, effectively starting the upgraded arms race into a 7 - 4 position, with Britain having the ability to build more hulls, as well as being able to build each hull faster. This reasoning proved quite correct, Germany never could reach parity because of this head start.

There is another, rather unexpected, factor that should be considered. The heavier British shells proved quite capable of inflicting massive damage against the heavier German armour even when they failed to work properly, but when they did work they were devastating as the hits by Revenge on Derfflinger illustrate. Conversely, the largest German shells failed to penetrate even the relatively thin armour on British battlecruisers, the two famous disabling hits on Lion from Derfflinger only drove in the armour a long way, despite striking well below the normal waterline due to the freak conditions of the engagement - which I can try to explain if anyone is interested, though it is not really a field I am personally familiar with, it is something I have read about and discussed with a naval architect (Stuart Slade) many years ago on the old Warships1 boards - these two shells did not penetrate the armour despite it being relatively weak. This left a position where the larger and more numerous number of guns gave a big advantage at longer ranges, something Beatty threw away entirely at Jutland, not only by his almost criminal position error in leaving Indefatigable and New Zealand closer to the enemy than his newer 'Splendid Cats' when the battle started, but by also closing to well inside the German effective range without opening fire.

I am sure the 'but Beatty rushed towards the enemy and was brave' camp will like what is in the paper a lot less, but it will be interesting to hear their take on it.

[The Ibis]

New video: John Maurer: A history lesson on the Battle of Jutland

Published on Jun 2, 2016

Professor John Maurer, "Battle of Jutland," Lecture of Opportunity, U.S. Naval War College, May 31, 2016.

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Jutland, the largest sea fight of World War I. On May 31, 1916, the main fleets of Germany and Great Britain clashed in a hard-fought battle in the North Sea off Denmark’s Jutland peninsula. The battle was a trial of strength at sea between the fleets of a rising challenger, with aspirations to world power, and the reigning superpower, accustomed to thinking itself the indispensable leader of the international system. On the outcome of this battle in the cold waters of the North Sea (or so it was widely thought), nothing less than the fate of empires was at stake. To whom did the future belong—the rising power or the keeper of the system? A single day of combat between the steel giants making up the British and German fleets could decide the vital question of world power or decline for these competing empires. Professor Maurer’s lecture examines the background to the battle, the course of the battle on the day itself, the strategic consequences of the battle, and concludes with some “so what” thoughts about what we in the twenty-first century might learn from remembering an important battle.

Bio: Dr. John H. Maurer serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy in the Strategy and Policy Department.

[yaro]

Given the small losses Germans suffered it would be more logical to have another fight against the royal navy in an attempt to weaken it until the German fleet doesn't have to retreat anymore. Royal navy wasn't able to solve problems with its defective shells until much later, same with the extremely unstable propellant.

[glenn239]

Given the small losses Germans suffered it would be more logical to have another fight against the royal navy in an attempt to weaken it until the German fleet doesn't have to retreat anymore. Royal navy wasn't able to solve problems with its defective shells until much later, same with the extremely unstable propellant.

It doesn't seem likely that strategy could ever lead to the RN eventually being so weakened that the HSF could then exercise a grand strategy beyond the North Sea. At best, the HSF might get lucky and damage the GF such that it retreated to the Irish Sea, beyond the range of HSF torpedo boats. Other possible strategies that might have had more of a payoff would be to actively seek engagements against RN destroyer forces (to attrite these in indirect support of the U-boat offensive) or to contest the blockade without having defeated the Grand Fleet.

In terms of Revenge vs. Derfflinger, weren't those hits scored at about 10,000 yards? That's too close for a BC to be engaging vs. 15" guns.

[Terry Duncan]

It doesn't seem likely that strategy could ever lead to the RN eventually being so weakened that the HSF could then exercise a grand strategy beyond the North Sea. At best, the HSF might get lucky and damage the GF such that it retreated to the Irish Sea, beyond the range of HSF torpedo boats. Other possible strategies that might have had more of a payoff would be to actively seek engagements against RN destroyer forces (to attrite these in indirect support of the U-boat offensive) or to contest the blockade without having defeated the Grand Fleet.

I would sort of agree, but there were plenty of operational options open to the HSF. The most effective would likely have been the so called tip and run raids, which could have become critical if the GF had been forced into the Irish Sea or west coast of Scotland anchorages. Couple such raids with Zepellin or Gotha raids and public morale could have become a grave concern for the British government.

In terms of Revenge vs. Derfflinger, weren't those hits scored at about 10,000 yards? That's too close for a BC to be engaging vs. 15" guns.

From memory, somewhere about that range, yes. However, Derfflinger was as well armoured as the HSF dreadnoughts, she just had less guns, being far closer to a fast battleship concept than many give credit for. That said, even ranges of 18,000 yards would not have been sufficient if the Briish shells worked properly, and the damage done by shells that were 'failing' was bad enough to convince the HSF it really wasnt worth a second round.

[glenn239]

I would sort of agree, but there were plenty of operational options open to the HSF. The most effective would likely have been the so called tip and run raids, which could have become critical if the GF had been forced into the Irish Sea or west coast of Scotland anchorages. Couple such raids with Zepellin or Gotha raids and public morale could have become a grave concern for the British government.

Germany was a land power, Britain was a sea power. As a land power, Germany's fleet was entirely expendable. That is to say, so long as Germany won the war on land it didn't matter if the very last ship in the whole German navy was sunk the previous day, whereas for Britain, if they win the battle on the continent but lost their navy in the process it could get quite serious indeed.

Looking at options for the HSF, these break out as follows (I might miss some) -

1. Historical (fleet in being interspersed with brief periods of activity trying to win a 'trophy' victory against a detached British squadron).
2. Commerce Warfare, (U-boat and surface).
3. Raids, (both tip and run and of the infantry raiding force variety)
4. Port attack (find the GF's base and attack it all-out in port with the HSF in a winner-take-all showdown).
5. Convoy warfare (use the HSF to run convoys between the Americas and Norway, where loads could transship onto neutral steamers for movement in coastal waters to Germany).

For a land power, which strategy is best? All of them, I think, but not "fleet in being" and with land power paramount, "convoy warfare" has the biggest potential impact on the CP's war fighting potential, assuming that imports focus on strategic materials, (ie, low shipping volume but of very high value to the German economy).

From memory, somewhere about that range, yes. However, Derfflinger was as well armoured as the HSF dreadnoughts, she just had less guns, being far closer to a fast battleship concept than many give credit for. That said, even ranges of 18,000 yards would not have been sufficient if the Briish shells worked properly, and the damage done by shells that were 'failing' was bad enough to convince the HSF it really wasnt worth a second round.

Right, it's my understanding that the shell problems were fixed after Jutland. Commenting directly on design philosophy, I think the RN was more on the correct path to emphasise gun power than the HSF was with armor. But the shell defects sort of hid the correctness of the RN decision, but robbing the British of a number of "certain" kills at Jutland, (the Derfflinger being one of them).

[Delta Tank]

I would sort of agree, but there were plenty of operational options open to the HSF. The most effective would likely have been the so called tip and run raids, which could have become critical if the GF had been forced into the Irish Sea or west coast of Scotland anchorages. Couple such raids with Zepellin or Gotha raids and public morale could have become a grave concern for the British government.

Germany was a land power, Britain was a sea power. As a land power, Germany's fleet was entirely expendable. That is to say, so long as Germany won the war on land it didn't matter if the very last ship in the whole German navy was sunk the previous day, whereas for Britain, if they win the battle on the continent but lost their navy in the process it could get quite serious indeed.

Looking at options for the HSF, these break out as follows (I might miss some) -

1. Historical (fleet in being interspersed with brief periods of activity trying to win a 'trophy' victory against a detached British squadron).
2. Commerce Warfare, (U-boat and surface).
3. Raids, (both tip and run and of the infantry raiding force variety)
4. Port attack (find the GF's base and attack it all-out in port with the HSF in a winner-take-all showdown).
5. Convoy warfare (use the HSF to run convoys between the Americas and Norway, where loads could transship onto neutral steamers for movement in coastal waters to Germany).

For a land power, which strategy is best? All of them, I think, but not "fleet in being" and with land power paramount, "convoy warfare" has the biggest potential impact on the CP's war fighting potential, assuming that imports focus on strategic materials, (ie, low shipping volume but of very high value to the German economy).

From memory, somewhere about that range, yes. However, Derfflinger was as well armoured as the HSF dreadnoughts, she just had less guns, being far closer to a fast battleship concept than many give credit for. That said, even ranges of 18,000 yards would not have been sufficient if the Briish shells worked properly, and the damage done by shells that were 'failing' was bad enough to convince the HSF it really wasnt worth a second round.

Right, it's my understanding that the shell problems were fixed after Jutland. Commenting directly on design philosophy, I think the RN was more on the correct path to emphasise gun power than the HSF was with armor. But the shell defects sort of hid the correctness of the RN decision, but robbing the British of a number of "certain" kills at Jutland, (the Derfflinger being one of them).

When did the British know that their AP shells did not work correctly? Before the war? During the war? After the War? Did they test these shells before the War? And if so why did the British get it wrong and the Germans got it right?

Mike

[Terry Duncan]

When did the British know that their AP shells did not work correctly? Before the war? During the war? After the War? Did they test these shells before the War? And if so why did the British get it wrong and the Germans got it right?

Mike

This is a good question and has a surprising answer. The problem had been identified by the time Jellicoe left office as Third Sea Lord in 1912 and he had put in place a report recommending changes to the shells. However, once he left office he had no method to check if his recommendations had been acted upon and it seems nobody bothered to take any further action (I can search out more precise details from my books if you need, but I am working from memory at present). There should have been more tests ordered at this time at least. The next indicator something might have been wrong was at The Falklands in 1914 where Invincible and Inflexible fired a large number of shells at the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, scoring anything between 30 - 50 hits on each depending on the sources and came close to running out of ammuntion. In 1915 at Dogger Bank the Blucher again took an estimated minimum of 50 hits before sinking. In both cases the majority of hits took place at very close range in a short amount of time. The problem in both battles was the appalling accuracy of the longer range gunnery though, so it is unclear if anyone was aware that hits were simply not doing the expected internal damage, instead crediting the German ships with great survivability - rather like Bismarck in WWII where the armoured raft preserving bouyancy was already submerged, making it an almost impossible target, whilst shell after shell went through the superstructure and other parts of the ship above the armour belt.

After Jutland there was an investigation into the shell fuses, and a program to rectify them put in place. This resulted in the 'Greenboy' shells that started arriving in April 1918 and equipped the fleet by the end of the war. The British were not the only ones to suffer problems with shell fuses though, there seems to have been a similar problem with the US 14" shells that was fixed in the 1930s, which somone on the Navweaps site may be able to help you with the exact details of as I am recalling details from there over 20 years ago.

[Delta Tank]

Terry,

Thank you very much. I just re-read “Castles of Steel” and “Rules of the Game” and I couldn’t remember in which book that it mentioned that Jellicoe was concerned about the AP Shells. I am assuming it is in “Castles of Steel” and with your answer I will be able to find it in the index.

Thanks again.

Mike