German Cavalry on the Western Front in 1914

[jluetjen]

I've finally gotten around to doing a quick translation and read of the book "Die deutsche Kavallerie im Ersten Weltkrieg" by Alfred Satter. For the size of the book it seems to be packed with interesting information and a lot of footnotes and references -- all in all a handy overview of the subject. Satter makes some interesting points which led to an intriguing conclusion.

1) By 1914 (with a number of notable exceptions) Cavalry tended to be most useful in the roles of mounted infantry, reconnaissance and screening. When the Germany Cavalry strayed from these roles, it usually ended badly. In at least one case when serving as mounted infantry, cavalry were able to flank the enemy and get into position and dismount into an infantry role faster than the mechanized infantry.

2) In regards to reconnaissance and screening, the German Cavalry was actually fairly successful since the French and the British really didn't have much of an idea where the main German forces were during the advance through Belgium and France. Even aerial reconnaissance didn't seem to help them much.

3) The Germans chose to distribute their army level cavalry evenly across the entire front that was to wheel through northern France as part of the current version of the Schlieffen plan.

As a result of this distribution a number of cavalry units (5th, 6th and 7th Kavallerie Divisions) on the southern end of the front (near the hub) advanced only slightly into France before taking defensive positions. There they stayed. Meanwhile those units on the northern side of the front were stretched far out by the large distances that they needed to advance, and by the lengthening gaps between the armies that they needed to screen.

Was this a significant tactical (or potentially strategic) error on the part of the Germans? If they had had more cavalry resources on the right (northern) flank, would it have changed the outcome -- especially when you consider the "March to the Sea" that resulted after the Battle of the Marne? Given the German Cavalry's success in the screening role and as mounted infantry, might they have successfully contained the left flank of the Entente powers and prevented that moving stalemate? Ultimately -- would it have made a difference?

[Latze]

Hi jluetjen,

I also found Satter's book surprisingly good. If you are interested: I have a scan of the complete work of Erich Günther Blau's "Operative Verwendung der deutschen Kavallerie" - if you are interested just tell me.
Concerning your question: I think that the available space (especially dring assembly and the march through the gap at Lüttich) and the logistical constraints precluded the use of more cavalry on the front of 1st and 2nd army. I think that the use of
a) a couple of armored cars
b) fully bicycled mounted Jäger battalions
c) more armored trains with more aggressive leadership
d) possibly one motorized infantry group (pipe dream, I confess)
would have helped a lot, though.

regards
Matt

[jluetjen]

Interesting. I guess without doing the "General staff" type of calculations about the number of solders that can transit a given stretch of road during a particular time interval, it might be hard to confirm your thought.

You said "d) possibly one motorized infantry group (pipe dream, I confess) "

Isn't that really what the Jaegers who were attached to the cavalry division were?

Finally, yes - I would like a copy of "Operative Verwendung der deutschen Kavallerie" if you could share it.

[Latze]

I sent you a DropBox link. Please let me know if that worked.

When talked about a motorized infantry group I envisioned something like the later "bicycle brigades": 4 to six battalions under single command and with a more robust supply organization than the Jäger battalions. But if one looks at the level of motorization the German army had at all and that they desperately tried to create a "Schwerpunkt" of motorized transport for 1st army one can see that this scenario is beyond the realm of possibility.

[Sheldrake]

I've finally gotten around to doing a quick translation and read of the book "Die deutsche Kavallerie im Ersten Weltkrieg" by Alfred Satter. For the size of the book it seems to be packed with interesting information and a lot of footnotes and references -- all in all a handy overview of the subject. Satter makes some interesting points which led to an intriguing conclusion.

1) By 1914 (with a number of notable exceptions) Cavalry tended to be most useful in the roles of mounted infantry, reconnaissance and screening. When the Germany Cavalry strayed from these roles, it usually ended badly. In at least one case when serving as mounted infantry, cavalry were able to flank the enemy and get into position and dismount into an infantry role faster than the mechanized infantry.

2) In regards to reconnaissance and screening, the German Cavalry was actually fairly successful since the French and the British really didn't have much of an idea where the main German forces were during the advance through Belgium and France. Even aerial reconnaissance didn't seem to help them much.

3) The Germans chose to distribute their army level cavalry evenly across the entire front that was to wheel through northern France as part of the current version of the Schlieffen plan.

As a result of this distribution a number of cavalry units (5th, 6th and 7th Kavallerie Divisions) on the southern end of the front (near the hub) advanced only slightly into France before taking defensive positions. There they stayed. Meanwhile those units on the northern side of the front were stretched far out by the large distances that they needed to advance, and by the lengthening gaps between the armies that they needed to screen.

Was this a significant tactical (or potentially strategic) error on the part of the Germans? If they had had more cavalry resources on the right (northern) flank, would it have changed the outcome -- especially when you consider the "March to the Sea" that resulted after the Battle of the Marne? Given the German Cavalry's success in the screening role and as mounted infantry, might they have successfully contained the left flank of the Entente powers and prevented that moving stalemate? Ultimately -- would it have made a difference?

jluetjen, I notice that you are a Westford MA Resident. Have you ever visited the Western Front, or looked closely at the map of Western Europe? The distance between the Dutch and Swiss frontiers is around 230 miles, not much further than the distance between Gettysburg and Five Forks. But the force densities in WW1 were about ten times higher. There really was very little room for manouvre in 1914, Cavalry was a very fragile asset that crumbled against Belgian infantry at Haerlen, or even a British cavalry Brigade as at Nery. Cavalry weren't the equivalent of ACW mounted infantry. Fire power in WW1 was vested in divisional artillery.

There was a long thread about German cavalry in 1914 a couple of years ago. Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... valry+1914

I am not sure that I would agree about the success of the German cavalry in 1914. In "Achtung Panzer" Heinz Guderian is pretty negative about the performance of German Cavalry in 1914.

[jluetjen]

jluetjen, I notice that you are a Westford MA Resident. Have you ever visited the Western Front, or looked closely at the map of Western Europe? The distance between the Dutch and Swiss frontiers is around 230 miles, not much further than the distance between Gettysburg and Five Forks. But the force densities in WW1 were about ten times higher. There really was very little room for manouvre in 1914, Cavalry was a very fragile asset that crumbled against Belgian infantry at Haerlen, or even a British cavalry Brigade as at Nery. Cavalry weren't the equivalent of ACW mounted infantry. Fire power in WW1 was vested in divisional artillery.

There was a long thread about German cavalry in 1914 a couple of years ago. Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... valry+1914

I am not sure that I would agree about the success of the German cavalry in 1914. In "Achtung Panzer" Heinz Guderian is pretty negative about the performance of German Cavalry in 1914.

Hi Sheldrake; No I haven't explicitly visited the "Western Front", although I've spent considerable time (months) in Europe and travelled through the area, although most of my time was spent in Germany, Austria and Italy. Yes, I've looked at a map of the area, in fact I've mapped out a day-by-day log of my grandfather's unit during the war. I get that the force densities were higher than the American Civil war, but I think that it's a mistake to assume that they were evenly spread-out across that front during August and September 1914. In fact the accounts suggest the opposite -- the German Cavalry was explicitly tasked with screening the gaps between the different German Armies, so there must have been gaps. Furthermore the "Race to the sea" would never have occurred if the area to the north of the engaged armies had been occupied. Not to mention the French spent much of August 1914 not knowing where specific German armies were. So I'm not sure if the facts support your conclusion based on the force densities.

I'll look up the earlier thread. Thanks for the tip. As far as Guderian's thoughts on the subject, I'll have to look them up. I certainly respect his thoughts (and the other reviews), but his is just one viewpoint. At this point I don't know what his agenda(s) were at the time (everyone has them!). Hypothetically he could have been taking that point of view in reaction to other events and positions at the time in the German military. I'm looking at the question strictly based on what they accomplished versus their tasks for August and September 1914. Whether or not cavalry was obsolete as an concept in 1918 (or 1940 in the case of Guderian) is really outside the scope of what I was looking for.

[jluetjen]

I sent you a DropBox link. Please let me know if that worked.

Thanks Latze. I got it. I've only glanced at it so far, but I noticed what appeared to be a passing reference to a 2nd volume (tiel?) in the introduction. Do you know if this exists?

[Latze]

I searched up and down for the second part. I even contacted the publisher in Munich and asked if they perhaps have it in manuscript form in their archive - no luck. I am convinced that the second part was never written because the first part was already to critical of the army institutions. The relevant documents were part of the 'Reichsarchiv' and access to these were tightly controlled. I still find it astonishing that Blau was able to write the first part.

[jluetjen]

There was a long thread about German cavalry in 1914 a couple of years ago. Too few German cavalry divisions in 1914?http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... valry+1914

I am not sure that I would agree about the success of the German cavalry in 1914. In "Achtung Panzer" Heinz Guderian is pretty negative about the performance of German Cavalry in 1914.

I finally got around to reading the link Sheldrake. Thanks for the pointer. I can see that you were invested in the conversation. There were a number of interesting perspectives voiced and some very good points. I'm presently reading the German review of the cavalry actions during the Franco-Prussian war ("Cavalry on Service" by Gerhard von Pelete-Narbonne, D'Arcy Legard, ca 1906). Reading that book in light of the events of the First World War has led me to he following conclusions -- which you are free to disagree with.

(Note that were are exceptions to each of these, often due to the variation in leadership)
1) The primary role of the cavalry (ie. how they spent most of their time) was in reconnaissance and screening. Yes there were attempts to use them strategically in battle (I haven't got this far yet in the 1870 account) but those actions had limited effect at a great loss of life. The secondary role was as mounted infantry.
2) Without the element of surprise, a cavalry unit was at a disadvantage against infantry. In 1870 the German "Needle gun" was inferior to the French rifles, the cavalry's carbines even more so. In addition the cavalry unit would always have fewer guns available given units of the same size since about 25% of the riders would be detailed to manage the led horses. This fact was well understood.
3) Cavalry could raid effectively when led and equipped well. In 1870 it was recognized that they often didn't have the tools needed destroy rail tracks, and some effort was made to rectify this by 1914.
4) In 1870 it appears that when the cavalry were in the field (as opposed to in bivouacs) it seems that they tended to live off of carried rations and forage. It was not uncommon (in either war) for the active cavalry units to be on 36 hour or longer patrols during which they were constantly in the saddle and on the move. In most cases they definitely didn't "spare the horses". That being said, in WWI the Russian cavalry jeered at the German tendency to always keep their horses indoors. So it's not like they weren't aware of the importance of the horse to the mission, but the horses like people would get worn out from 30-50 mile marches with limited sleep and food. It seems like it was perceived as being part of the cavalry's plight. If my memory is correct, even in WWI the cavalry units were not well equipped with "Goulash Cannons". I don't think that they were expected to stop long enough to use them.
5) The success of the cavalry in their roles also depended on success of their opponents. In 1870 for the most part the French cavalry seemed to be fairly ineffectual. In 1914 (with some exceptions) the French seemed to be more active, but not with a whole lot more in the way of results.
6) The German cavalry's attachment to the lance seems curious. While actions with the carbines (as opposed to the lance) seem more numerous in 1870 (and 1914), there were references to "chasing (the opponents) from scene" which would suggest some sort of battle in motion. Once the horses are at a run I could see the preference for the lance (Cossacks excepted). Even in WWI in Poland I came across a reference where dismounted cavalry took up defensive positions in a trench, but since they weren't equipped with any "melee weapons" (such as bayonets ) they ended up taking their lances into the trenches as a close-in weapon!

In both cases (post 1870 and post WWI) the accounts were influenced by the politics of the military and budgets. The personalities involved also play a key part. Just like today there were always people in power who were creative, aggressive and successful risk takers, and then there were the other kind of leaders who inevitably didn't use the resources at their command effectively. The outcomes were greatly effected by both types.

[Sheldrake]

In 1914 the European land powers generally did not consider cavalry as mounted infantry. The lessons they took from 1870 were about scouting and the continuing role of shock action e.g. in Mars le Tour

The British and Americans had a different experience. The Americans came away from the civil war with the concept of cavalry as mounted infantry. The British in the Boer war had cavalry and mounted infantry and afterwards a big debate about whether cavalry should be either - and settled on both. The British cavalry went to war armed and with and trained to use infantry rifles and fight dismounted, while the Germans and french had less effective carbines and much less training in then dismounted role. French cuirassiers manning trenches felt particularly under armed and over dressed.

Then British cavalry were happy to resort ot the sabre. The first Germans casualties on 22 August were caused by the sabres of 4 DG as well as at Le Moncel.

[AJFFM]

In 1914 the European land powers generally did not consider cavalry as mounted infantry. The lessons they took from 1870 were about scouting and the continuing role of shock action e.g. in Mars le Tour

The Germans were tending towards establishing mounted infantry. Between 1906 and 1913 13 Jager regiments that were in effect "Mounted Rifles" (Jager zu Pferde). As I recall from other sources the Germans wanted to convert many of the old cavalry regiments into this type and even increase the numbers but it did not happen.

As for the lessons in 1870, I think the biggest lesson was the effectiveness of cavalry screening was successfully achieved by the Germans in the West and especially the east. Remember French cavalry (Sordet's corps) went deep and wide into Belgium pretty much the same day the Germans invaded but failed to make contact with the German infantry due to heavy screening by the German cavalry.

[Sheldrake]

The first chapter of Guderian's Achtung Panzer! explains how positional warfare came about and includes a discussion of cavalry in 1914. He analyses the battle of Haerlen 12 August 1914 in which the Belgian cavalry, fighting a dismounted action repulsed two divisions of von Marwitz's corps, costing them 800+ horses and 400+ men. This action took place on the extreme right wing of the German advance, not very far from the Dutch Border.

His analysis quotes:-

- The German 1909 cavalry regulations as stating that "Mounted action is the predominant way in which cavalry fights" and criticised the proportion of time spent training to perfect horsemanship, drilling in close formations and mounted attack at the expense of dismounted fighting.

- von Schleiffen's description of modern battlefield "Not a horseman will be seen. The cavalry will have to accomplish its tasks outside the range of the infantry and artillery. Breech loaders and machine guns will have banished the cavalryman quite mercilessly from the battlefield."

- The Reicharchiv's official history. "It became only too clear at the outset of the war, and along the whole battlefield that in peacetime altogether excessive hopes had been pinned on strategic reconnaissance by large bodies of cavalry. As a general rule the probing cavalry managed to identify the enemy outpost line, but tey were never able to break through and ascertain what was going on in the enemy rear areas"

[Latze]

The Germans were tending towards establishing mounted infantry. Between 1906 and 1913 13 Jager regiments that were in effect "Mounted Rifles" (Jager zu Pferde). As I recall from other sources the Germans wanted to convert many of the old cavalry regiments into this type and even increase the numbers but it did not happen.

I would be very much interested in the source for that. As far as I know the Jäger zu Pferde were regular German Einheitskavallerie and in no meaningful way mounted infantry or affiliated with regular Jäger troops.

[Latze]

- The Reicharchiv's official history. "It became only too clear at the outset of the war, and along the whole battlefield that in peacetime altogether excessive hopes had been pinned on strategic reconnaissance by large bodies of cavalry. As a general rule the probing cavalry managed to identify the enemy outpost line, but tey were never able to break through and ascertain what was going on in the enemy rear areas"

This is from vol. I, p. 126.

I think one has to ask the question if the Austrian, Russian, British and French cavalry was even less successful in their mission of strategic reconnaissance and screening. A very thorough discussion of the various cavalry missions (and examples of mission success) can be found in "Cavalry Combat" published by the US Cavalry School in 1937.

[AJFFM]

The Germans were tending towards establishing mounted infantry. Between 1906 and 1913 13 Jager regiments that were in effect "Mounted Rifles" (Jager zu Pferde). As I recall from other sources the Germans wanted to convert many of the old cavalry regiments into this type and even increase the numbers but it did not happen.

I would be very much interested in the source for that. As far as I know the Jäger zu Pferde were regular German Einheitskavallerie and in no meaningful way mounted infantry or affiliated with regular Jäger troops.

Zuber* talks about general expansion of the German army in that period which was met by opposition from politicians, he briefly discusses the general issue of the future of cavalry which as others here not everyone was convinced about.

Cron** also discusses the issue in more detail although he maintains that mounted infantry was not the primary task of the "Jager zu Pferde" regiments and that regiments that were given a mounted infantry task were re-designated "Schutzen" later in the war. Jager zu Pferde differed from normal German cavalry in their use of rifles instead of carbines just as the British cavalry.

* Inventing the Schlieffen Plan.
** Imperial German Army 1914-1918.