Tsar Nicholas II and the Russian Revolution(s)

[dead-cat]

I don't it was the matter. 1917 was the year of German's failure. Basing on all accounts Germany must have suffered an unavoidable defeat. From another side no honourable peace while the Germans were on the Russian territory was possible.

please explain. i see 1917 as the most favourable year of the war for the Central Powers. The western front has been successfully held, Italy almost defeated and it was the year that broke what was left of fighting spirit in Russia.

We may blame Tzar for his bad military command but the fact is that under his guidance (in 1916 and early 1917)

by spring 1917 all gains of the summer 1916 were lost. and 1916 the german focus was on the western front (Verdun, Somme) and Balkans (Romania). 1917 the focus shifted to the eastern front with disastrous results for Russia (as it happened 1915 in a similar situation).

There was reached a great victory on the Turkish Front.

because the creme of the turkish army was exhausted since Gallipoli.

to concentrate main efforts around a big geographical object totally ignoring enemy forces like he did during the offensive in the East Prussia when he directed Rennenkampf on Koningsbierg (of course it looked as a very big spot on a map) instead of to help to Samsonov

Rennkampf didn't advance on Königsberg. he kept in place after Gumbinnen and advanced very slowly only on Samsonows repetitive requests when it was too late allready.
the Russian army wasn't battle ready yet. clear text wireless transmissions, lack of transport capacity for the supplying units, 2 weeks foot march (read " August 1914" and it becomes quite obvious).
besides, Rennkampf didn't want to help Samsonow.

Nevertheless even in these bad conditions the Tzar managed to reach significant successes in the war.

which were? i'm having a hard time seeing the Brussilov offensive as success.

[Matt H.]

In other words the Tzarism crushed because of lacking of democracy and liberalism. Seemly it was a wide-spread opinion in the Russian society in 1917. They were sure that all the disasters had been caused by some government's limitations in the political life (most of them were necessary during the war) and as soon as all the limits were cancelled everything would become well. That was why the Interim Government were making one act of liberalization to another. But the history proved they were wrong - the IG crashed rather more miserably and quickly than their "authoritarian" predecessors.

Docent, I agree with you. I, in no way, believe in the Marxist theory of political inevitability, and I also believe that the Tsar could very well have remained in power had it not been for the Great War.

What I intended to state was that the Tsar should have acted upon the advice of the gradual reformers (such as the Kadets and the Octobrists) and not repealed the October Manifesto by issuing the Fundamental Laws of 1907.

What I can't agree with is that Nicholay II was anyhow worse as a commander than his uncle. May be lacked military education (which is not the key point for a supreme military leader as the WW2 proved) but nevertheless the Tzar proved himself as an excellent strategist especially in the front of these "great experts" (I mean Front Commanders) as Ivanov (later the main responsible person for the February 1917), Evert, Ruzsky, Bonch-Bruevich (damned commy-scum) or Kuropatkin (super famous since the Russo-Japan War). The dull system of appointment created by Nicholay Nicholayevich didn't allow to put a better officer in charge of someone elder. Unfortunately it took too much time for Nicholay II to crush this damned system and to make really usefull appointments like ones of Brusilov and Kolchak.

The Russian Army needed more characters of the Brusilov ideal, certainly. The largest failure for the army was not the result of the Tsar's planning, but Kerensky's. The offensive of June 1917 resulted in substantial gains for Germany and Austria-Hungary on Russian soil.

It was Kerensky's offensive that pushed the resiliance of the army to it's very limits.

One reason I add this as a "what if", is because that in his absence, the Russian Monarchy became considerably undermined by the influence of Rasputin. It was under the "guidance" of this "Mad Monk" that the worst political decisions were made. Nicholas was in no position to countermand these decisions (he was on the front line) and Alexandra was a puppet in Rasputin's hands...most unfortunate...

I don't it was the matter. 1917 was the year of German's failure. Basing on all accounts Germany must have suffered an unavoidable defeat. From another side no honourable peace while the Germans were on the Russian territory was possible.

What I meant was, an honourable peace to save Tsarism, not pacify Germany.

IMHO the Tzar's appointment of himself to the Supreme Commander was his best decision of all his life.

But who would have been able to assume control in Petrograd in his absence? Alexandra? Grand Duke Michael? Prince Yusopov?

[Docent P]

>general wrangel is quoted as saying that is was nicholas II that was personally responsible for ruining russia. not just making a mess of the war, but of appointing government ministers who were bad for russia.

Undoubtly Nicholay II must carry out his big part of responsibility for the Russian disasters as the head of the state. Nevertheless lets don't confuse his mistakes with the efforts to correct them.

>by the end had cost russia 500,000 dead soldiers.

I'm not sure it's the correct number. In 1916 Russian government (as well as German or British or any one else) regularly published the numbers of losses with a better accuracy (the tradition of classification own casualties came on later). May be 500,000 is an estimate made by the Germans?

The success or failure of any action must be determined not by the number of one side's losses but by the RATE of losses. I can't give the exact rate of losses of the Brusilov offensive but I'm sure that it was the best for the Russians over all the war. The beginning of the offensive was the only time when we lost less soldiers than the enemies on the western fronts.

>brusilov was russia's best generals, but he wasn't able to save the situation and was replaced by general kornilov in early 1917.

It sounds like Brusilov was so dull that he had to be removed. Actually he became the Supreme Commander at the time.

>yes, it is true that many in the duma voted to support the war in 1914,

Softly speaking - "many". Actually EACH deputy (including the craziest leftists as well) supported the government. The same was about all politician in general (not only Duma members). Even crazy Marxists like Martov were consolidating with the defensivist ("oboronets" in Russian) position.

>but, by 1917, most people in russia did not want the war to continue.

It's not totally correct again. I don't even talk about the Interim Goverment (remember who initiated the June offensive). But leftist Petrosovet was not totally defeatist as well. The most radical part of them (besides the Bolsheviks) - the left Eser's were suggesting only a CEASEFIRE. Even after the October coup when the bolsheviks kicked out more or less moderate parties from Petrosovet they managed to collect just 50+very few votes for "peace" (actually capitulation). But even then in December 1917 Petrosovet (already cleaned of non-leftists) rejected the peace on the German conditions. Lenin (who wasn't enough strong as a dictator at the time) had to ask the Germans to conduct a small scale attack on Pskov and Narva to frighten his opponents (left Esers and some provincial Bolsheviks).

>if it had been a democratically elected and powerful part of the government, it would have voted russia out of the war.

Again the problem was that Russia had no possibilities to choose between war and peace. It was faced by an agression like one in 1812. If there had been a democratically elected government in 1812 - whether they would have voted Russia out of the war? Would Napoleon have been respecting their verdict?

[Docent P]

>please explain. i see 1917 as the most favourable year of the war for the Central Powers.

Just in two words. IMHO the real date when the Germans' lost the war must be 6/01/1916 - the date of the Jutland battle. Afterward the question was not if German would loose the war but when would it happen and what price each member of the coalition would obtain (that was why the US joined the Allies in the early 1917, when they saw the end of the war pre-determined). All the accounts called on the middle of 1917 as the end of the war. The allies were planning a large scale well coordinated offensive to end up with the exhausted and demoralized starving enemy. The Russian June offensive for example wasn't the result of that a stone fell on Kerensky's head - indeed it was an already perspectiveless element of that global plan. The Allies forced (or convinced) Kerensky to perform his part of the program while there had been already no conditions for a success.

>and 1916 the german focus was on the western front (Verdun, Somme) and Balkans (Romania). 1917 the focus shifted to the eastern front with disastrous results for Russia

Really it was quite opposite. Only in 1917 the Germans got an opportunity in the first time to concentrate ALL their resources on the Western Front. It happened because demoralized by Germans employed agitators stopped remaining any significant force. Since June 1917 Germany wasn't fighting anymore on the two fronts. It was a great unexpected gift of heaven for the Germans who had already lost any hope by the time. And they used it with their best - autumn of 1917 was the period of harsh desperate German attacks at the Ypre. The attacks were stronger than before because the Germans used all available troops transferred from the Eastern Front where they left a battalion (and a warehouse of propagandist papers) against every Russian division.

>because the creme of the turkish army was exhausted since Gallipoli.

I don't think that the Turkish in Caucaus were anyhow weaker than ones at Gallipoly or Salonika.

>(read " August 1914" and it becomes quite obvious).

Do you mean The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman?

>besides, Rennkampf didn't want to help Samsonow.

I have already talked a lot this idiotic fairy-tale about a hand-to-hand battle between R-f and S-nov at the old MHF. It will sound boring to remind that this stupid bullsh*t, invented by the some dirty leftist yellow sheet and then loudly repeated by the Communists, was publicly rejected by all the Russian observers immediately after it's birth (see for example Denikin's The Way of a Russian Officer). Every more or less respected Russian historian considered it beyond his reputation even to mention it. Nevertheless it came to the West from Communist propagandist issues and lives by it's own life. Every time I have a talk about R-f - there is ALWAYS someone who says: "oh, this is one who punched Samsonov" .

>i'm having a hard time seeing the Brussilov offensive as success.

There have been said a lot that Russia should have signed peace BEFORE 1917 but it's interesting that almost the same problem was with Austro-Hungary in 1916. After the Brusilov's offensive it was on the very edge to surrender. It may be said that Brusilov almost kicked it out of the war. Since that we were faced by primarily German forces on this front.

[Docent P]

>What I intended to state was that the Tsar should have acted upon the advice of the gradual reformers (such as the Kadets and the Octobrists) and not repealed the October Manifesto by issuing the Fundamental Laws of 1907.

Yes, it may be right. But what should he have made in practice - to cancel military censorship, to cancel death execution, to appoint Lenin to the Prime Minister? Any of these steps only would have accelerated the fall.

>The largest failure for the army was not the result of the Tsar's planning, but Kerensky's. The offensive of June 1917 resulted in substantial gains for Germany and Austria-Hungary on Russian soil.

Here I totally agree. This offensive was the dullest idea that could have come to Kerensky's mind. This guy's only wish was to collect popularity in any possible way - to become the Great Defeater of Germany. He couldn't see even an evident thing - that the Army was unable to carry out such a brutal experiement. In practice it meant that young conscripts who hadn't seen any training (except defeatists agitators at the camps) were delivered to the frontline and told: "now guys, advance on all these machineguns, minefields, barbedwire etc." Meanwhile officers were deprived of the right to wear shoulder-borders, to order anything and to punish anyone. All their steps had to be supervised by the "Soldiers Committees" which consisted of Bolsheviks and other kinds of Leftists. In these circumstance any offensive would be a suicide for the Army and a real massacres for the officers.

>But who would have been able to assume control in Petrograd in his absence?

In 1916 the threat of 130 German divisions looked more dangerous than the threat of a couple thousand constantly drunk "proletarians". Nicholay II concentrated on the main danger.

At the time Russia extremaly needed a strategist it Nicholay II was the only one. It's interesting that he determined the key priorities in early 1915 - when he was only one who saw that the key to the victory isn't in the Western Front but in Bosporus. At that time he ordered N. N. to prepare two corps for an assault on Stambul in spring 1915. N. N. simply ignored this order - the both corpses were brought to the useless Lodz offensive. It required two years for the Tzar to force his generals to listen to his order and to collect enough resources again. This last decisive action was arranged on spring 1917. If it had happened it wouldn't only have meant a brilliant Russian victory but also Russian control over the Straits giant amount of other political benefits. Now it looks as the best Russian chance to win the war (especially if it had happened as early as possible). Although N. II was too late with this action but if he hadn't taken the Supreme Command who else would be have been able to conduct this decision? IMHO even the most talented Russian commanders as Brusilov or Alekseev didn't have such a wide strategical range of vision as the Tzar. It was very sad of course and unfortunately N. II wasn't enough fast, strict and decisive but anyway he was the best at that place.

[Matt H.]

Yes, it may be right. But what should he have made in practice - to cancel military censorship, to cancel death execution, to appoint Lenin to the Prime Minister? Any of these steps only would have accelerated the fall.

Not particularly, merely to continue the reforms set out by Alexander II, the "Tsar Liberator". Had the Fundamental Laws been repealed (they were issued in 1907), then the Duma may have grown into a constitutional body. However, I also place relevance upon the assassination of Stolypin, another one of the Duma's reformers. Stolypin was, according to my knowledge, close friends with Guchkov, leader of the Octobrists, and championed private enterprise and the free market economy - both ideals of the Russian "Westernisers"...

I believe that the "Westernisers" rather than the "Slavophiles" held the key to the sustainment of Tsarism...

Here I totally agree. This offensive was the dullest idea that could have come to Kerensky's mind. This guy's only wish was to collect popularity in any possible way - to become the Great Defeater of Germany. He couldn't see even an evident thing - that the Army was unable to carry out such a brutal experiement. In practice it meant that young conscripts who hadn't seen any training (except defeatists agitators at the camps) were delivered to the frontline and told: "now guys, advance on all these machineguns, minefields, barbedwire etc." Meanwhile officers were deprived of the right to wear shoulder-borders, to order anything and to punish anyone. All their steps had to be supervised by the "Soldiers Committees" which consisted of Bolsheviks and other kinds of Leftists. In these circumstance any offensive would be a suicide for the Army and a real massacres for the officers.

Yes, it was a complete failure.

Do you believe that Kerensky should have campaigned for an honourable peace? Or attacked the German lines elsewhere?

Although N. II was too late with this action but if he hadn't taken the Supreme Command who else would be have been able to conduct this decision? IMHO even the most talented Russian commanders as Brusilov or Alekseev didn't have such a wide strategical range of vision as the Tzar. It was very sad of course and unfortunately N. II wasn't enough fast, strict and decisive but anyway he was the best at that place.

Didn't Tsarina Alexandra attempt to influence his decisions? I remember that she proposed to halt a successful Russian offensive on the Carpathians (which was conducted under Nicholas' orders)...and it would seem that the offensive was actually halted...

...Docent, it would appear that we have similar views in regards to each of our Monarchies, and I'm glad to meet someone who shares my own brand of patriotism!

[Balrog]

as far as the duma voting for war, i didn't know that 100% voted for it. what i did read was that lenin, in exile in switzerland was outspoken in not supporting the war effort. he was not in any elective office, none the less, the german communists did support the war effort in 1914, lenin and his russian group were the exception.

the 500,000 dead is from british sources. the offensives brusilov launched had initial success, captured some 200,000 prisoners, but it was a victory thats cost was too high. russia had suffered greater losses earlier in the war, but 500,000 dead came after millions of russians had already been killed and wounded, so that a was huge additional loss. and the gains the offensive made(huge gains) could not be maintained, the cost in lives was too high.

i don't agree that most russians were not for ending russia's involment in the war. you can argue, justs a cease fire, whatever, but why would the germans accept a cease fire, relocate thier army units, only to risk the russians restarting the war after being given a chance to reorganize and regroup? i really don't believe that germany would have risked such a cease fire. the germans were going for the knock out blow and territory, and doing everything possible to insure victory in the east, including putting lenin on a train for the russian empire.

the person who effectively ruled in st, petersburg with nicholas II at stavka was the empress and rasputin's corrupt friends. the empress made a mess of it. when news of rasputin's murder reached the czar, he had little to say, showed no saddness at all. perhaps his time away from the direct influence of rasputin had "broken the spell" rasputin had over him.(my opinion) but rasputin died too late to save the home front situation.

i still disagree that nicholas II was a good commander. the problem with nicholas II was not that his generals would not listen to him, but that he would not listen to his generals. i know you view many sources of information that disagree with you as being "communist, left wing, etc", but i have never read any book that thinks the czar did a good job at stavka. not one. i know that nicholas II is enjoying a lot of popularity in modern russia now, perhaps the revisions in current russian history books have gone too far. ( i don't mean that mean spiritedly, but sincerely)

your view of the russian proliteriat in st. petersburg seems at odds with what i have read. i have not read them as a pack of losers, cowards,drunkards, etc. instead as men who were exhausted by war, and represented the feelings of many russian citizens( i've always understood it to be the majority). you so so much hostility towards the prolietariat, and the provisional government, that it seems more of an emotional attack than one based on facts.

and from what i read, grand duke nicholas was not removed because the czar was unhappy about russian army losses, but because the grand duke nicholas threated to hang rasputin off the gates of stavka if he showed up to visit the army command headquarters.(stavka) rasputin had cried to the empress about it, and the empress presurred the czar to get rid of grand duke nicolas.

i've read that kornilov's appointment was a promotion as a replacemant for busilov, because his offensives were too costly and in the long run, had failed to be sustained. perhaps brusilov was given a "promotion" to save face, but it was not because he had done a great job.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

i've read that kornilov's appointment was a promotion as a replacemant for busilov, because his offensives were too costly and in the long run, had failed to be sustained. perhaps brusilov was given a "promotion" to save face, but it was not because he had done a great job.

You are unfair to Brusilov - a general who with minimum resources managed to conduct the most successful Russian offensive -even it was suppose to be a diversionary effort. He did far more than anyone expected of him and if there is fault then it is not with him but with other Front commanders who failed with their respectful efforts.

[Balrog]

no, you misunderstand me oleg, perhaps i didn't make myelf clear enough. i wrote that brusliov was russia's best general of ww1. docent implied that his replacement by kornilov was not a demotion, but a promotion. it is that point i disputed, not brusliov's abilities as a general.

i agree, he did his best with what he had, but, as i wrote, he could not save the russia given the situation which it was in.

and, the reality was, his offensives were successful, but, the number of dead russian soldiers involved was huge. the russian armies ranks were being depleted of its best soldiers and officers, and its morale and discipline were collapsing.

general kornilov shared the opinion that the russian armies discipine had ceased to exist by late 1916. (please read my korniolv/white russian thread on kornilov)

[Lord Gort]

The only offensive of the war to be named after a General if I recall correctly.........






regards,

[Matt H.]

The only offensive of the war to be named after a General if I recall correctly.........

What about the "Nivelle Offensive" on the Western Front? I believe it was that attack that pushed the French Army to the brink of mutiny, and unlike Brusilov, Nivelle was unsuccessful.

[Victor]

Since June 1917 Germany wasn't fighting anymore on the two fronts. It was a great unexpected gift of heaven for the Germans who had already lost any hope by the time.

Actually in July - August 1917 there was somepretty heavy fighting on the Romanian front.

[dead-cat]

Docent P wrote:
Since June 1917 Germany wasn't fighting anymore on the two fronts. It was a great unexpected gift of heaven for the Germans who had already lost any hope by the time.


Actually in July - August 1917 there was somepretty heavy fighting on the Romanian front.

and Operation Albion took place in Oct. 1917

[Lord Gort]

Damm you Matt H , ofcourse Nivelle knew the 'secret' of victory...... :roll:




regards,

[Matt H.]

Damn you Matt H, of course Nivelle knew the 'secret' of victory......

Nivelle was replaced by Pétain, according to my knowledge, who went on to be known as the "Saviour of Verdun".