>Do you believe that Kerensky should have campaigned for an honourable peace?
Basing on the opiniions of Russian officers, participating in the war in 1917 I can conclude:
the best strategy since March 1917 - passive defence until soldiers got enough training and the Interim Government mounts a new regime;
if we talk about July 1917 when the Army had been brought to the critical point - the best decision would be to leave on positions well paid voluntary units (Kornilov's shock battalions) only, every division had still enough well-bred soldiers and officers to form up one shock battalion (as General Budberg said once: "I'd rather have four hundreds of select soldiers than 40 000 of select sh*t") which would have been able to withstand to the remaining German troops (after a lot of them had been transferred to the West);
and in the period of September 1917, after nothing had been done, the best solution would be to sign a ceasefire with the Germans which would have prevented the Bolsheviks from gaining the power; Kerensky should have said to the Allies: "guys, I'm sorry, but we have already performed all we could, we can help with nothing, finish the war without us"; that would have immediately deprived the comrades from any support.
>...Docent, it would appear that we have similar views in regards to each of our Monarchies, and I'm glad to meet someone who shares my own brand of patriotism!
I'm glad we found something common but I must say that I'm in no way a monarchist (although I respect the British Royal family's job and their traditions very much). I just like Nicholay II as a person and an excellent statesman. IMHO he was one of the best rulers in Russian history.
Tsar Nicholas II and the Russian Revolution(s)
>... lenin, in exile in switzerland was outspoken in not supporting the war effort.
It's interesting that Ilyich was sh*tting mostly not on this damned Tzarist regime but on his dear party comrades living in excile as well at the time. Even these crazy commy zealots and Russia haters, free of any moral limits, couldn't share Lenin's position - so awfully it looked. That was the period when Lenin was so alone as never else. Of course he couldn't remain unnoticed by the German intelligence.
>i don't agree that most russians were not for ending russia's involment in the war.... why would the germans accept a cease fire, relocate thier army units, only to risk the russians restarting the war after being given a chance to reorganize and regroup?
It's interesting that meanwhile (summer of 1917) the Allies were still increasing their military shipments. The first time they woke up was in late November when they warned Lenin - if you don't stop talking with the Germans we may suspend (not cancel totally!) our supplyment.
But really the Germans were rather more correct. The problem was that the Allies were checking the attitude of Russian PUBLIC which was exremaly pro-war - conservatives were dreaming about the fruits of the coming victory, liberals (usually pro-Western in Russia) were worried about their obligations to the Allies, leftists were supporting the idea of a war for democracy (democratic Russia against absolutist Germany); while the Germans were checking the opinion of the ARMY (they already began establishing telephone lines to "Soldier Committees"). These ones were two VERY DIFFERENT opinions. It may sound unbelievably but in autumn 1917 (don't confuse with February 1917) the Army was the most defeatist or "pacifist" part of society. It happened because of the big percentage of untrained newbies within it, of the stupid Kerensky's "reforms" (allow any army's soldiers not to obey to their officers and see what will happen), and of very active German propaganda in the first turn directed on the Army. The process of decay started exactly after Kerensky's order N1 and was enforced by the Declaration of the Soldier Rights (what a crazy idiocy
); June offensive; very weak position of Supreme Commander Brusilov (He didn't only leave intact the massacres of officers but even found it honourable for him to stand together with the killers - these "dear comrades" - at their "meetings" under red banners. Can you imagine anything more destructive for armed forces?), who proved himself an excellent commander but a very bad politician; and German propaganda, allowed by Kerensky to be free of any limits. You may add several else reasons but these ones were decisive. In result the Russian armed forces stopped existing in August 1917. The millions of former soldiers became bacillicarriers of Bolshevism and pounced upon the rest country like a tzunami crashing everything on their way. These gangs of deserters became the base for first Red Army units that polluted the country from Petrograd to Vladivostok.
>the person who effectively ruled in st, petersburg with nicholas II at stavka was the empress and rasputin's corrupt friends.
The Empress lived in Tsarskoe Selo in 1915-1916.
>i know you view many sources of information that disagree with you as being "communist, left wing, etc",
No. Many true anti-Communist former Russian politicians and officials after the Civil War took critical positions toward N. II. But often their intention was just to remove responsibility from their own.
>...perhaps the revisions in current russian history books have gone too far.
Don't you see it a little revisionist - to call the Brusilov Offensive a failure?
>your view of the russian proliteriat in st. petersburg seems at odds with what i have read.
Yes, my view on the "proletarians" is highly negative. You know that during the war criminality extremaly raises up. In 1917 the outskirts of Petrograd were overcrowded by all kinds of criminals - deserters and frauds who managed to avoid the draft. Add to them a lot of unskilled workers (lumpens from other cities) whose number had increased at military factories. Add to them young students, also free of draft, the youths are the most extremist and leftist minded part of every society. It's interesting that after the crowds of hooligans had crashed food stores there were seen loafs of bread left on snow. Very few of these "exhausted workers" was interested to pick up bread, all they were worried about was vodka.
>...the russian armies ranks were being depleted of its best soldiers and officers, and its morale and discipline were collapsing.
Here I agree. It was the most terrible negative effect of the action. But rather bigger reason of demoralization was the stupid military reform of General Gurko conducted in December 1916 and January 1917. In intention to increase the number of units he broke apart old well proved regiments and mixed them with unskilled depressed new drfated soldiers, destroying old traditions, relations between officers and soldiers etc. It's interesting that when this reorganisation turned to the Cossak regiments the Tzar, seeing what had happened to the rest army, emphatically banned any reform on the Cossaks. The most of the Cossaks remained well disciplined until the "October Revolution".
>general kornilov shared the opinion that the russian armies discipine had ceased to exist by late 1916.
Really it happened in 1917, see your own words:
>>...speech given by general kornilov on august 25, 1917.
>i've read that kornilov's appointment was a promotion as a replacemant for busilov, because his offensives were too costly and in the long run, had failed to be sustained.
I guess in that case Kornilov should have been punished as well. He played a significant role in the offensive as a corps commander. But how one guy could be punished and another one awarded for the same job?
It's interesting that Ilyich was sh*tting mostly not on this damned Tzarist regime but on his dear party comrades living in excile as well at the time. Even these crazy commy zealots and Russia haters, free of any moral limits, couldn't share Lenin's position - so awfully it looked. That was the period when Lenin was so alone as never else. Of course he couldn't remain unnoticed by the German intelligence.
>i don't agree that most russians were not for ending russia's involment in the war.... why would the germans accept a cease fire, relocate thier army units, only to risk the russians restarting the war after being given a chance to reorganize and regroup?
It's interesting that meanwhile (summer of 1917) the Allies were still increasing their military shipments. The first time they woke up was in late November when they warned Lenin - if you don't stop talking with the Germans we may suspend (not cancel totally!) our supplyment.
But really the Germans were rather more correct. The problem was that the Allies were checking the attitude of Russian PUBLIC which was exremaly pro-war - conservatives were dreaming about the fruits of the coming victory, liberals (usually pro-Western in Russia) were worried about their obligations to the Allies, leftists were supporting the idea of a war for democracy (democratic Russia against absolutist Germany); while the Germans were checking the opinion of the ARMY (they already began establishing telephone lines to "Soldier Committees"). These ones were two VERY DIFFERENT opinions. It may sound unbelievably but in autumn 1917 (don't confuse with February 1917) the Army was the most defeatist or "pacifist" part of society. It happened because of the big percentage of untrained newbies within it, of the stupid Kerensky's "reforms" (allow any army's soldiers not to obey to their officers and see what will happen), and of very active German propaganda in the first turn directed on the Army. The process of decay started exactly after Kerensky's order N1 and was enforced by the Declaration of the Soldier Rights (what a crazy idiocy
); June offensive; very weak position of Supreme Commander Brusilov (He didn't only leave intact the massacres of officers but even found it honourable for him to stand together with the killers - these "dear comrades" - at their "meetings" under red banners. Can you imagine anything more destructive for armed forces?), who proved himself an excellent commander but a very bad politician; and German propaganda, allowed by Kerensky to be free of any limits. You may add several else reasons but these ones were decisive. In result the Russian armed forces stopped existing in August 1917. The millions of former soldiers became bacillicarriers of Bolshevism and pounced upon the rest country like a tzunami crashing everything on their way. These gangs of deserters became the base for first Red Army units that polluted the country from Petrograd to Vladivostok.>the person who effectively ruled in st, petersburg with nicholas II at stavka was the empress and rasputin's corrupt friends.
The Empress lived in Tsarskoe Selo in 1915-1916.
>i know you view many sources of information that disagree with you as being "communist, left wing, etc",
No. Many true anti-Communist former Russian politicians and officials after the Civil War took critical positions toward N. II. But often their intention was just to remove responsibility from their own.
>...perhaps the revisions in current russian history books have gone too far.
Don't you see it a little revisionist - to call the Brusilov Offensive a failure?
>your view of the russian proliteriat in st. petersburg seems at odds with what i have read.
Yes, my view on the "proletarians" is highly negative. You know that during the war criminality extremaly raises up. In 1917 the outskirts of Petrograd were overcrowded by all kinds of criminals - deserters and frauds who managed to avoid the draft. Add to them a lot of unskilled workers (lumpens from other cities) whose number had increased at military factories. Add to them young students, also free of draft, the youths are the most extremist and leftist minded part of every society. It's interesting that after the crowds of hooligans had crashed food stores there were seen loafs of bread left on snow. Very few of these "exhausted workers" was interested to pick up bread, all they were worried about was vodka.
>...the russian armies ranks were being depleted of its best soldiers and officers, and its morale and discipline were collapsing.
Here I agree. It was the most terrible negative effect of the action. But rather bigger reason of demoralization was the stupid military reform of General Gurko conducted in December 1916 and January 1917. In intention to increase the number of units he broke apart old well proved regiments and mixed them with unskilled depressed new drfated soldiers, destroying old traditions, relations between officers and soldiers etc. It's interesting that when this reorganisation turned to the Cossak regiments the Tzar, seeing what had happened to the rest army, emphatically banned any reform on the Cossaks. The most of the Cossaks remained well disciplined until the "October Revolution".
>general kornilov shared the opinion that the russian armies discipine had ceased to exist by late 1916.
Really it happened in 1917, see your own words:
>>...speech given by general kornilov on august 25, 1917.
>i've read that kornilov's appointment was a promotion as a replacemant for busilov, because his offensives were too costly and in the long run, had failed to be sustained.
I guess in that case Kornilov should have been punished as well. He played a significant role in the offensive as a corps commander. But how one guy could be punished and another one awarded for the same job?
-
Balrog
- Member
- Posts: 1248
- Joined: 17 Feb 2003, 16:09
- Location: USA, North Carolina/Manchukuo/Dominican Republic
i will try to respond to your comments.(if i can remember all of them)
the empress was in czar selo, but that was located outside of the city, and she effectively ran the home front in her husbands absence. many officers complained that the empress "meddles a agreat deal in politics". robert massie's book"nicolas and alexandra" and, if i remember correctly, charles shultzberger's "fall of the eagles" places much of the blame from the mess in st. petersburg on the empress and rasputin. kerensky even blamed rasputin for wrecking much of the czarist government.
i didn't exactly call the brusilov offensives a complete failure, more like a "fatal" victory( a victory that is so costly that the victory gained is not worth it...) my point was that while i admit there was short term gains( i agree, huge gains), the cost in soldiers was too terrible. the offensives could not be sustained because of the huge losses suffered directly by the brusilov offensives. i never said that brusilov should have been punished and not awarded some medals for his initial successes. the german generals had successful offensives and still lost the war, and i don't view those generals as failures. i'm not making extreme judgements. i admit they were successful in the beginning. that is the best i can explain right now.
i still think nicholas II was a weak czar. i've only read western books on the czar, and none of them speak highly of the czar's leadership abilities.
i think it was princess olga of greece and denmark. later wife of the regeant of serbia, prince paul, that desrbed the czar, whom she knew personally, as being in "an autocracy without an autocrat." she blamed the czar's personality for most of his problems. i honestly have read nothing that would make me think of czar nicholas II as one of russia's greatest czars. i will just agree that we disagree on this point.
about general kornilov and 1916, yes, i should have written 1917.
on the workers, bolsheviks, etc of st. petersburg. i still don't agree they were as rotten as you make them out to be. many were ex soldiers who had suffered years at the front with lack of ammunition, equipment, supplies, etc. they had had millions of there comrades killed, and were exhuasted, disillusioned, and hungry. i think the bolsheviks had some real support from many decent people who had fought bravely and were tired of russia under the czar. remember, 40% of the red army oficer corps was ex czarist officers, so many of the elite were disillusioned as well as the common worker and soldier. another point i will agree to disagree with you.
as far as lenin. you say he was a sh*t on, but i disagree. the war really was about alliances and balance of power. about a war between austria and serbia that mattered little to the average russian worker. lenin saw this as just another imperialist war with millions of workers as cannon fodder for the elite to send off to be killed. of course he would not back the war. many left wing political groups in other nations did back the war, but lenin stuck to his principles/beliefs, he was not caught up in any kind of war euphoria. i know you hate lenin/communists, so nothing i can say will make much difference. i admire lenin's discipline. he did eventually meet with success.
as far as mixing new recruits with combat veteren soldiers, most armies did that in the war. it was normal to team up the inexperienced with the toughend survivors. i think it is not so easy to blame the new boys for the influence of communism in the russian army. perhaps the veteren soldiers were so disillusioned with the war that they infected the new recruits with defeatist ideas themselves? i think that is more than likely. the new guys didn't know how bad the front was, the older guys did. in ww2, htiler decided to keeep the hitler youth units from mixing too much with regular army troops because the boy fighters had unrealistic expectations on the war and the regular soldiers could see that germany was finished. so, mixing units can be effective and it could be bad, but the bad can be from either old or new troops.
you mentioned to moulded don't mix up "greens" with "whites" dealing with the jewish massacres. who were the "greens" in the civil war?
the empress was in czar selo, but that was located outside of the city, and she effectively ran the home front in her husbands absence. many officers complained that the empress "meddles a agreat deal in politics". robert massie's book"nicolas and alexandra" and, if i remember correctly, charles shultzberger's "fall of the eagles" places much of the blame from the mess in st. petersburg on the empress and rasputin. kerensky even blamed rasputin for wrecking much of the czarist government.
i didn't exactly call the brusilov offensives a complete failure, more like a "fatal" victory( a victory that is so costly that the victory gained is not worth it...) my point was that while i admit there was short term gains( i agree, huge gains), the cost in soldiers was too terrible. the offensives could not be sustained because of the huge losses suffered directly by the brusilov offensives. i never said that brusilov should have been punished and not awarded some medals for his initial successes. the german generals had successful offensives and still lost the war, and i don't view those generals as failures. i'm not making extreme judgements. i admit they were successful in the beginning. that is the best i can explain right now.
i still think nicholas II was a weak czar. i've only read western books on the czar, and none of them speak highly of the czar's leadership abilities.
i think it was princess olga of greece and denmark. later wife of the regeant of serbia, prince paul, that desrbed the czar, whom she knew personally, as being in "an autocracy without an autocrat." she blamed the czar's personality for most of his problems. i honestly have read nothing that would make me think of czar nicholas II as one of russia's greatest czars. i will just agree that we disagree on this point.
about general kornilov and 1916, yes, i should have written 1917.
on the workers, bolsheviks, etc of st. petersburg. i still don't agree they were as rotten as you make them out to be. many were ex soldiers who had suffered years at the front with lack of ammunition, equipment, supplies, etc. they had had millions of there comrades killed, and were exhuasted, disillusioned, and hungry. i think the bolsheviks had some real support from many decent people who had fought bravely and were tired of russia under the czar. remember, 40% of the red army oficer corps was ex czarist officers, so many of the elite were disillusioned as well as the common worker and soldier. another point i will agree to disagree with you.
as far as lenin. you say he was a sh*t on, but i disagree. the war really was about alliances and balance of power. about a war between austria and serbia that mattered little to the average russian worker. lenin saw this as just another imperialist war with millions of workers as cannon fodder for the elite to send off to be killed. of course he would not back the war. many left wing political groups in other nations did back the war, but lenin stuck to his principles/beliefs, he was not caught up in any kind of war euphoria. i know you hate lenin/communists, so nothing i can say will make much difference. i admire lenin's discipline. he did eventually meet with success.
as far as mixing new recruits with combat veteren soldiers, most armies did that in the war. it was normal to team up the inexperienced with the toughend survivors. i think it is not so easy to blame the new boys for the influence of communism in the russian army. perhaps the veteren soldiers were so disillusioned with the war that they infected the new recruits with defeatist ideas themselves? i think that is more than likely. the new guys didn't know how bad the front was, the older guys did. in ww2, htiler decided to keeep the hitler youth units from mixing too much with regular army troops because the boy fighters had unrealistic expectations on the war and the regular soldiers could see that germany was finished. so, mixing units can be effective and it could be bad, but the bad can be from either old or new troops.
you mentioned to moulded don't mix up "greens" with "whites" dealing with the jewish massacres. who were the "greens" in the civil war?
>i've only read western books on the czar, and none of them speak highly of the czar's leadership abilities.
The first thing everyone must notice about N II is this super grandiouse, giant, fantastic, astronomical amount of sh*t that has been put on his head by the Communist propaganda. In this area N II (politely reffered by the Comrades as Nicholay the Bloody) is absolutely uncomparable. IMHO he managed not only to beat the records of Vlasov and Wrangel but probably of all negative (in Communist interpretation of course) historical person taken together. Why? What did they need to cover?
You know that the Communists executed the Tzar secretly. Why didn't they declare it openly if people allegedly disliked him anyway? And at last in the 70s dear comrade Yeltsin (later so great "democrat") destroyed the Ipatyev's house - the place where the Tzar was killed because too many people pilgrimed there. Again - what was the problem with the house? Why some crazy zealots caused so big attetion from the Party? The Communists somehow were very afraid of his humble person. The only explanation is that they were hiding something interesting. What were the Comrades afraid of - this is the first question every historian must begin with.
In other words N II made something that forced the Commies to frighten for several decades. IMHO this is already enough reason to respect him.
>charles shultzberger's "fall of the eagles" places much of the blame from the mess in st. petersburg on the empress and rasputin.
It may be said in another way: Leftists and German spies used Rasputin's image in their propaganda to provoke mess in Petrograd. And BTW Rasputin wasn't already alive during the February Revolution.
>...many were ex soldiers who had suffered years at the front
Do you mean deserters? No soldier could have been demobilized during a war - excepting deserters or totally disabled persons. But the guys who began crushing vodka stores didn't look disabled.
>i think the bolsheviks had some real support from many decent people who had fought bravely and were tired of russia under the czar.
At first they had absolutely no (and couldn't have) support as well as any popularity in February 1917. Nobody even knew who the Bolsheviks were until Lenin arrived in April 1917.
>40% of the red army oficer corps was ex czarist officers, so many of the elite were disillusioned
Seemly it has been counted with a Krivosheev's method
. There were very few scums among Russian officers - like Bonch-Bruevich or Mironov (they are the only ones I can remember) who joined the Reds at the beginning of the Civil War but the most of these "officers" were like the first Red Supreme Commander (shortly "verkhoprap") warrant officer Krylenko (a horseman in a pack train) who even had been promoted WO after the February Revolution - what a great "elite" 
. And of course many Red division commanders had been squad or even platoon commanders in the Russian Army but it doesn't confirm that any sufficient part of the officers liked Lenin.
>as far as lenin. you say he was a sh*t on, but i disagree.
No. Please don't deform my words. I didn't exactly say that he was sh*t. In the beginning of the 20th cnetury there were too many crazy commy scums in some countries who were inventing the ways to build a new light future, society free of any kind of explotation, and other awfull stinking pleasures for all people despite these people wouldn't be asking them about. Some of them got problems with the law and had to flee abroad. In other words they were the dirtiest sh*t burped out by the Russian nation. But Lenin wasn't a part of them - even this human rubbish weresn't able to accept his ideas, how nastily they looked. In result Lenin managed to be burped again - now by the rotten Russian "social democracy". So he wasn't simple sh*t - he was selected sh*t in the front of sh*t.
>lenin saw this as just another imperialist war with millions of workers as cannon fodder for the elite to send off to be killed.
I'm afraid I need to buy a Newspeak dictionary to translate this Marxist qualktalk.
>i admire lenin's discipline.
So do you suppose that Lenin always kept so steady anti-Russian due to his "discipline"? I'm not sure. I'd rather explain by his extremal uncomparable hatred to Russia and Russian nation and at last to all the humanity in whole. The unexplanable super-hatred was this mysterious force that helped Lenin to survive in excile, to return to Russia and to lead his "revolution" despite all difficulties and problems.
As well as Bin Laden's super sophisticated terrorist actions and irrational wish to destroy America says more not about Bin Laden's discipline but about his anti-American hatred.
>as far as mixing new recruits with combat veteren soldiers, most armies did that in the war.
Yes, and Russian Army successfully did it in 1915 and 1916 without big consequences. But Gurko's idea to crush the regimental structure (3 battalions instead 4) to increase the number of new regiments was bad. Every Russian regiment had it's own nickname, traditions, history and was completed by soldiers from the same area. Nothing of that existed in new formed units. As I said Cossak units, that had avoided the reform, remained well serving until November 1917. Later the Cossaks (uninfected by the Bolshevik's propaganda) contained the backbone of the White Forces.
>perhaps the veteren soldiers were so disillusioned with the war that they infected the new recruits with defeatist ideas themselves?
A good idea but it contradicts to every evidence. For example General Budberg in his memoirs (an excellent source) give this episode:
The general came to a soldiers' "meeting". One very loud agitator was calling to kill all the officers. In his speech he constantly repeated: "Comrades, we have been bloodsheding already for three years!... We have been bloodsheding already for three years!.." etc. The situation was worsening every second. Some soldiers started already reloading their rifles. So Budberg caught a moment of silence, came on the tribune and asked the orator: "when were you drafted, dear exhausted comrade?" The Bolshevik immediately shut up and one of the nearby standing soldiers answered instead him: "He has been serving only for three weeks". All the crowd (where were a lot of veterans) began laughing. The officers were saved.
The first thing everyone must notice about N II is this super grandiouse, giant, fantastic, astronomical amount of sh*t that has been put on his head by the Communist propaganda. In this area N II (politely reffered by the Comrades as Nicholay the Bloody) is absolutely uncomparable. IMHO he managed not only to beat the records of Vlasov and Wrangel but probably of all negative (in Communist interpretation of course) historical person taken together. Why? What did they need to cover?
You know that the Communists executed the Tzar secretly. Why didn't they declare it openly if people allegedly disliked him anyway? And at last in the 70s dear comrade Yeltsin (later so great "democrat") destroyed the Ipatyev's house - the place where the Tzar was killed because too many people pilgrimed there. Again - what was the problem with the house? Why some crazy zealots caused so big attetion from the Party? The Communists somehow were very afraid of his humble person. The only explanation is that they were hiding something interesting. What were the Comrades afraid of - this is the first question every historian must begin with.
In other words N II made something that forced the Commies to frighten for several decades. IMHO this is already enough reason to respect him.
>charles shultzberger's "fall of the eagles" places much of the blame from the mess in st. petersburg on the empress and rasputin.
It may be said in another way: Leftists and German spies used Rasputin's image in their propaganda to provoke mess in Petrograd. And BTW Rasputin wasn't already alive during the February Revolution.
>...many were ex soldiers who had suffered years at the front
Do you mean deserters? No soldier could have been demobilized during a war - excepting deserters or totally disabled persons. But the guys who began crushing vodka stores didn't look disabled.
>i think the bolsheviks had some real support from many decent people who had fought bravely and were tired of russia under the czar.
At first they had absolutely no (and couldn't have) support as well as any popularity in February 1917. Nobody even knew who the Bolsheviks were until Lenin arrived in April 1917.
>40% of the red army oficer corps was ex czarist officers, so many of the elite were disillusioned
Seemly it has been counted with a Krivosheev's method
. There were very few scums among Russian officers - like Bonch-Bruevich or Mironov (they are the only ones I can remember) who joined the Reds at the beginning of the Civil War but the most of these "officers" were like the first Red Supreme Commander (shortly "verkhoprap") warrant officer Krylenko (a horseman in a pack train) who even had been promoted WO after the February Revolution - what a great "elite" . And of course many Red division commanders had been squad or even platoon commanders in the Russian Army but it doesn't confirm that any sufficient part of the officers liked Lenin.>as far as lenin. you say he was a sh*t on, but i disagree.
No. Please don't deform my words. I didn't exactly say that he was sh*t. In the beginning of the 20th cnetury there were too many crazy commy scums in some countries who were inventing the ways to build a new light future, society free of any kind of explotation, and other awfull stinking pleasures for all people despite these people wouldn't be asking them about. Some of them got problems with the law and had to flee abroad. In other words they were the dirtiest sh*t burped out by the Russian nation. But Lenin wasn't a part of them - even this human rubbish weresn't able to accept his ideas, how nastily they looked. In result Lenin managed to be burped again - now by the rotten Russian "social democracy". So he wasn't simple sh*t - he was selected sh*t in the front of sh*t.
>lenin saw this as just another imperialist war with millions of workers as cannon fodder for the elite to send off to be killed.
I'm afraid I need to buy a Newspeak dictionary to translate this Marxist qualktalk.
>i admire lenin's discipline.
So do you suppose that Lenin always kept so steady anti-Russian due to his "discipline"? I'm not sure. I'd rather explain by his extremal uncomparable hatred to Russia and Russian nation and at last to all the humanity in whole. The unexplanable super-hatred was this mysterious force that helped Lenin to survive in excile, to return to Russia and to lead his "revolution" despite all difficulties and problems.
As well as Bin Laden's super sophisticated terrorist actions and irrational wish to destroy America says more not about Bin Laden's discipline but about his anti-American hatred.
>as far as mixing new recruits with combat veteren soldiers, most armies did that in the war.
Yes, and Russian Army successfully did it in 1915 and 1916 without big consequences. But Gurko's idea to crush the regimental structure (3 battalions instead 4) to increase the number of new regiments was bad. Every Russian regiment had it's own nickname, traditions, history and was completed by soldiers from the same area. Nothing of that existed in new formed units. As I said Cossak units, that had avoided the reform, remained well serving until November 1917. Later the Cossaks (uninfected by the Bolshevik's propaganda) contained the backbone of the White Forces.
>perhaps the veteren soldiers were so disillusioned with the war that they infected the new recruits with defeatist ideas themselves?
A good idea but it contradicts to every evidence. For example General Budberg in his memoirs (an excellent source) give this episode:
The general came to a soldiers' "meeting". One very loud agitator was calling to kill all the officers. In his speech he constantly repeated: "Comrades, we have been bloodsheding already for three years!... We have been bloodsheding already for three years!.." etc. The situation was worsening every second. Some soldiers started already reloading their rifles. So Budberg caught a moment of silence, came on the tribune and asked the orator: "when were you drafted, dear exhausted comrade?" The Bolshevik immediately shut up and one of the nearby standing soldiers answered instead him: "He has been serving only for three weeks". All the crowd (where were a lot of veterans) began laughing. The officers were saved.
-
Balrog
- Member
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- Joined: 17 Feb 2003, 16:09
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i know that rasputin was dead by feb 1917. but the damage his caused was done before he died.
i believe your story about the new recruit causing trouble, but i think there were veteran soldiers who wanted revolution too. i hardly think the general's story was universal throughout the russian army. remember, even general kornilov described the czarist army as having lost all discipline and being a greater danger to russia than the invading germans. so there were real problems in the frontline ranks.
yes, i asssume most of the soldiers who were active with the bolsheviks were deserters, but so what? the germans who revolted in october- november 1918 were partially made up of deserters. the war was too terrible, and many felt it had become a lost cause. many soldiers gave up and went home.
as for your view of lenin. i don't really following the burping argument too well. i can tell you really hate the bolsheviks, but i really am not sure why.
i have read that 40% of the red officer corps was czarist officers. is that not true then?
as far as the support from decent people. i still think that many people looked to the bolsheviks as a way out of the war. "bread ,land, and peace". the reds seemed to offer the average russian what they wanted. when general wrangel returned to st. petersburg in the winter of 1917, even his taxi driver was wearing a red badge. wrangel wrote it seemed to be the fashion for most. the taxi driver talked about the coming revolution, and this was said to a czarist general. this occured before lenin arrived in russia. so, many russians wanted revolution before lenin showed up.
i believe your story about the new recruit causing trouble, but i think there were veteran soldiers who wanted revolution too. i hardly think the general's story was universal throughout the russian army. remember, even general kornilov described the czarist army as having lost all discipline and being a greater danger to russia than the invading germans. so there were real problems in the frontline ranks.
yes, i asssume most of the soldiers who were active with the bolsheviks were deserters, but so what? the germans who revolted in october- november 1918 were partially made up of deserters. the war was too terrible, and many felt it had become a lost cause. many soldiers gave up and went home.
as for your view of lenin. i don't really following the burping argument too well. i can tell you really hate the bolsheviks, but i really am not sure why.
i have read that 40% of the red officer corps was czarist officers. is that not true then?
as far as the support from decent people. i still think that many people looked to the bolsheviks as a way out of the war. "bread ,land, and peace". the reds seemed to offer the average russian what they wanted. when general wrangel returned to st. petersburg in the winter of 1917, even his taxi driver was wearing a red badge. wrangel wrote it seemed to be the fashion for most. the taxi driver talked about the coming revolution, and this was said to a czarist general. this occured before lenin arrived in russia. so, many russians wanted revolution before lenin showed up.
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Balrog
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- Joined: 17 Feb 2003, 16:09
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i havecome across inforamtion that several cossack units in petrogrd in 1917 refused to fight against the reds. the 1st,4th, and 14th don cossack regiments as well as the elite guards cossack regiment refused to fight the reds and even went over to the rebels. when the food riots broke out in 1917, the cossacks refuse to crush the rebels. they were tired of the war and the czarist government too.
it seems that the rebellion against the czar was not limited to the poor working classes but there was open rebellion among the czar's most elite and supposedly loyal cossack regiments.
it seems that the rebellion against the czar was not limited to the poor working classes but there was open rebellion among the czar's most elite and supposedly loyal cossack regiments.
>robert massie's book"nicolas and alexandra" and, if i remember correctly, charles shultzberger's "fall of the eagles" places much of the blame from the mess in st. petersburg on the empress and rasputin.
I can't pretend to be a good expert of the Rasputinshina so I don't have a well-determined opinion. Instead I'd like to put the opinion of one of the best explorer of this thread - Edward Radzinsky (rather popular in the West, you must have heard about him), who showed a long documentary traffic film about Rasputin on the Russian TV a year ago (unfortunately very late at night, so it was hard to watch it, nevertheless I did). Radzinsky's main effort was to disprove the fairy-tales about high Rasputin's "influence" which as he explained basing on documents was nothing but gossips and slander used in court intrigues and spread by the yellow press (of course later willingly repeated and broadcasted by dear comrades). I can recommend to find Radzinsky's book about Rasputin if you are interested in the topic.
>who were the "greens" in the civil war?
I'm sorry I forgot to answer last time. So "the Greens" was the name for the Anarchists - gangs of robbers fighting without any determined ideology and led by such guys as Bat'ka Makhno, Bat'ka Angel, Ataman Grigor'ev and so on. In fact they were the same Reds once dissappointed of Lenin but still accepting his main slogan "grab grabbed".
>hardly think the general's story was universal throughout the russian army.
It was universal throught the all Russian Army. Budberg describes the situation not only in his units but over all the Northern Front. If you doubt him you may check any memoirs else. I'm sure you'll find the same.
>even general kornilov described the czarist army
He said nothing about the "czarist" army. His words were about the "Revolutionary Army" built up by Kerensky with the German spies' help. That was why I underlined the date of his interview.
>most of the soldiers who were active with the bolsheviks were deserters, but so what?
A deserter of course couldn't have a legal job. His main way to feed himself was robbery. So lets don't mix the gangs tired of robbery and exhausted of lacking vodka with soldiers "exhausted of the war".
>i can tell you really hate the bolsheviks, but i really am not sure why.
Can you tell me if your view on Lenin is popular in the US now (of course among ones interested in Russian history)?
>so, many russians wanted revolution [what revolution?] before lenin showed up.
The fact that someone was a worker and wore a piece of red rags didn't mean that he fell in love to Lenin. For example the best unit in the Kolchak's army was the Izhevsky Battalion that consisted of workers from Izhevsk and had it's own red banner.
>i have read that 40% of the red officer corps was czarist officers. is that not true then?
Can you say at first what year it was written about?
>several cossack units in petrogrd in 1917 refused to fight against the reds. the 1st,4th, and 14th don cossack regiments as well as the elite guards cossack regiment refused to fight the reds and even went over to the rebels.
At first there were not Cossack regiments (which were at the Front at the time, i. e. the 1st and 4th Don Cossack Rgts at the time were in Romania within the 1st Don Cossack Division, 3d Cavalry Corps, that later played the key role in the Kornilov's raid on Petrograd) but the RESERVE SQUADRONS of Cossack Regiments - these are VERY different things. The same was about the Guard Regiments dislocated in Petrograd (Pavlovsky, Volynsky etc.). Their soldiers mainly were either former criminals released from prison or frauds who somehow had managed to get hidden from the draft for more than 2 years. In other words they were ready to use any opportunity to avoid participation in battles. The "Revolution" was such an opportunity and they didn't miss it. Actually this contingent was even worse than the city "proletariat" (as you call them) because many really good workers were free from draft unlike unskilled workers, lumpens and beggars (there were no limits in the draft to these units). Actually in 1917 the Guards were not elite units anymore.
At second they not refused to deal with the riots but more exactly they WERE NOT ORDERED to. Some units were put in cordons. But the government forgot to give clear orders. Furthermore the chief army commanders were afraid to set untrained newbies on crowds because of probable big casualties. Instead they decided to move well trained combat units from the battlefield but unfortunately these replacements were too late. Besides the reserve battalions other units staying in Petrograd remained loyal to the government. For example the cadets of Petrograd officer colleges asked their chiefs to allow them to deal with the riots. But the chiefs rejected because they found immoral to use future officers in police actions. Instead the cadets were ordered to continue usual exercises. Meanwhile Colonel Kutepov collected several hundred soldiers (REAL soldiers granted in leave) and put them in a cordon but then he wasn't given any order.
It was of course a stupid idea to place so unreliable units in the capital. The Tzarist government didn't have a good communist tradition to keep the most loyal division within the Kremlin.
Matt H must share my view since he called the Feb Revolution spontaneous. May be he will add some comments?
I can't pretend to be a good expert of the Rasputinshina so I don't have a well-determined opinion. Instead I'd like to put the opinion of one of the best explorer of this thread - Edward Radzinsky (rather popular in the West, you must have heard about him), who showed a long documentary traffic film about Rasputin on the Russian TV a year ago (unfortunately very late at night, so it was hard to watch it, nevertheless I did). Radzinsky's main effort was to disprove the fairy-tales about high Rasputin's "influence" which as he explained basing on documents was nothing but gossips and slander used in court intrigues and spread by the yellow press (of course later willingly repeated and broadcasted by dear comrades). I can recommend to find Radzinsky's book about Rasputin if you are interested in the topic.
>who were the "greens" in the civil war?
I'm sorry I forgot to answer last time. So "the Greens" was the name for the Anarchists - gangs of robbers fighting without any determined ideology and led by such guys as Bat'ka Makhno, Bat'ka Angel, Ataman Grigor'ev and so on. In fact they were the same Reds once dissappointed of Lenin but still accepting his main slogan "grab grabbed".
>hardly think the general's story was universal throughout the russian army.
It was universal throught the all Russian Army. Budberg describes the situation not only in his units but over all the Northern Front. If you doubt him you may check any memoirs else. I'm sure you'll find the same.
>even general kornilov described the czarist army
He said nothing about the "czarist" army. His words were about the "Revolutionary Army" built up by Kerensky with the German spies' help. That was why I underlined the date of his interview.
>most of the soldiers who were active with the bolsheviks were deserters, but so what?
A deserter of course couldn't have a legal job. His main way to feed himself was robbery. So lets don't mix the gangs tired of robbery and exhausted of lacking vodka with soldiers "exhausted of the war".
>i can tell you really hate the bolsheviks, but i really am not sure why.
Can you tell me if your view on Lenin is popular in the US now (of course among ones interested in Russian history)?
>so, many russians wanted revolution [what revolution?] before lenin showed up.
The fact that someone was a worker and wore a piece of red rags didn't mean that he fell in love to Lenin. For example the best unit in the Kolchak's army was the Izhevsky Battalion that consisted of workers from Izhevsk and had it's own red banner.
>i have read that 40% of the red officer corps was czarist officers. is that not true then?
Can you say at first what year it was written about?
>several cossack units in petrogrd in 1917 refused to fight against the reds. the 1st,4th, and 14th don cossack regiments as well as the elite guards cossack regiment refused to fight the reds and even went over to the rebels.
At first there were not Cossack regiments (which were at the Front at the time, i. e. the 1st and 4th Don Cossack Rgts at the time were in Romania within the 1st Don Cossack Division, 3d Cavalry Corps, that later played the key role in the Kornilov's raid on Petrograd) but the RESERVE SQUADRONS of Cossack Regiments - these are VERY different things. The same was about the Guard Regiments dislocated in Petrograd (Pavlovsky, Volynsky etc.). Their soldiers mainly were either former criminals released from prison or frauds who somehow had managed to get hidden from the draft for more than 2 years. In other words they were ready to use any opportunity to avoid participation in battles. The "Revolution" was such an opportunity and they didn't miss it. Actually this contingent was even worse than the city "proletariat" (as you call them) because many really good workers were free from draft unlike unskilled workers, lumpens and beggars (there were no limits in the draft to these units). Actually in 1917 the Guards were not elite units anymore.
At second they not refused to deal with the riots but more exactly they WERE NOT ORDERED to. Some units were put in cordons. But the government forgot to give clear orders. Furthermore the chief army commanders were afraid to set untrained newbies on crowds because of probable big casualties. Instead they decided to move well trained combat units from the battlefield but unfortunately these replacements were too late. Besides the reserve battalions other units staying in Petrograd remained loyal to the government. For example the cadets of Petrograd officer colleges asked their chiefs to allow them to deal with the riots. But the chiefs rejected because they found immoral to use future officers in police actions. Instead the cadets were ordered to continue usual exercises. Meanwhile Colonel Kutepov collected several hundred soldiers (REAL soldiers granted in leave) and put them in a cordon but then he wasn't given any order.
It was of course a stupid idea to place so unreliable units in the capital. The Tzarist government didn't have a good communist tradition to keep the most loyal division within the Kremlin.
Matt H must share my view since he called the Feb Revolution spontaneous. May be he will add some comments?
Well, firstly, I believe that the February Revolution was spontaneous because it was not an act of political dissent, and secondly, I agree with Docent about the ineptness of the units defending the Russian Capital. There was no organisation to the series of riots, and those soldiers who did defect were often deserters from the front without any specific assignment to a particular unit. I cannot imagine the elite Cossack Guards Regiments deserting their Tsar...Matt H must share my view since he called the Feb Revolution spontaneous. May be he will add some comments?
>I agree with Docent about the ineptness of the units defending the Russian Capital.
These reserve units would have turned not against the Tzar only but against any regime if it wished to move these guys to the battlefield. Absolutely in the same way they responded to weak Kerensky's wish to move them to the Front. The soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison conducted a meeting and accepted the resolution that they are going to "defend the Russian Revolution in Petrograd and nowhere else - which Kerensky had to accept with. Furthermore the same reaction was on the Lenin's appeals to defend Revolution in Jan 1918 (from Kaledin) and Feb 18 (from the Germans). The crowds of drunk "Red Guards" were robbering Petrograd civilians and vodka stores with impunity and didn't want to interrupt their sweat life. When someone tried to tell them "Lenin wants you to go to fight..." they replied - "who is this son of a **** Lenin? **** (A lot of unprintable words) him. If we dislike him we will hung him immediately." Everyday Lenin was lucky not to be killed by his own "Red Guards". Especially in October and early November until the Comrades started completing their loyal forces from former German and Austrian POWs - so called Internationalists. The fear of these anarchic gangs (aka Red Guard) forced Lenin to move to Moscow in March 1918.
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>Anyone read Orson Welles "Ten days that shook the world"?
I know only about John Reed's one. This commy crap is available here:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/reed/works/1919/10days/
Is it the same?
These reserve units would have turned not against the Tzar only but against any regime if it wished to move these guys to the battlefield. Absolutely in the same way they responded to weak Kerensky's wish to move them to the Front. The soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison conducted a meeting and accepted the resolution that they are going to "defend the Russian Revolution in Petrograd and nowhere else - which Kerensky had to accept with. Furthermore the same reaction was on the Lenin's appeals to defend Revolution in Jan 1918 (from Kaledin) and Feb 18 (from the Germans). The crowds of drunk "Red Guards" were robbering Petrograd civilians and vodka stores with impunity and didn't want to interrupt their sweat life. When someone tried to tell them "Lenin wants you to go to fight..." they replied - "who is this son of a **** Lenin? **** (A lot of unprintable words) him. If we dislike him we will hung him immediately." Everyday Lenin was lucky not to be killed by his own "Red Guards". Especially in October and early November until the Comrades started completing their loyal forces from former German and Austrian POWs - so called Internationalists. The fear of these anarchic gangs (aka Red Guard) forced Lenin to move to Moscow in March 1918.
-------------
>Anyone read Orson Welles "Ten days that shook the world"?
I know only about John Reed's one. This commy crap is available here:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/reed/works/1919/10days/
Is it the same?
Would it have been possible to transfer loyal Cossack cavalry regiments to supplement the Petrograd Officer Corps in their defence of the city? Surely the "Red Guard" would be no match for such a force...These reserve units would have turned not against the Tzar only but against any regime if it wished to move these guys to the battlefield.
What do you think?
>Would it have been possible to transfer loyal Cossack cavalry regiments to supplement the Petrograd Officer Corps in their defence of the city? Surely the "Red Guard" would be no match for such a force...
I totally agree. Just remember the Krasnov's advance on Tsarskoe Selo - where 50 Cossacks dispersed a crowd of more than a thousand "Red Guards" and "Revolutinary mariners".
The idea of deployment of some reliable units (exactly the 3d Cav Corps) belonged to Kornilov. But his attempt to relocate the Corps was called "Kornilov's mutiny" by Kerensky. Corps Commander General Krymov was invited by Kerensky to Petrograd for "negotiations" and was shot down in the Kerensky's room. But if Kornilov had been successfull the Bolsheviks would have never won.
I totally agree. Just remember the Krasnov's advance on Tsarskoe Selo - where 50 Cossacks dispersed a crowd of more than a thousand "Red Guards" and "Revolutinary mariners".
The idea of deployment of some reliable units (exactly the 3d Cav Corps) belonged to Kornilov. But his attempt to relocate the Corps was called "Kornilov's mutiny" by Kerensky. Corps Commander General Krymov was invited by Kerensky to Petrograd for "negotiations" and was shot down in the Kerensky's room. But if Kornilov had been successfull the Bolsheviks would have never won.
Docent P. How you can’t trust boshvic cammaraden !!!
Thei be lied only to Keiser Germany, Poland, Belorus, Lithunia
Stalin sed „life became simpler, life became more funny" and It realy das like in this pictures
P.s. One of west europe socilist sed to me ... comunizm is exelent system but Russians can faild iven this Ideal system !!! - no comments
Thei be lied only to Keiser Germany, Poland, Belorus, Lithunia
Stalin sed „life became simpler, life became more funny" and It realy das like in this pictures
P.s. One of west europe socilist sed to me ... comunizm is exelent system but Russians can faild iven this Ideal system !!! - no comments
As far as I know, those in the "Red Guard" were merely disgruntled workers and deserters from the front. No match for loyal Cossack Guards Regiments and the Petrograd Officer Corps.I totally agree. Just remember the Krasnov's advance on Tsarskoe Selo - where 50 Cossacks dispersed a crowd of more than a thousand "Red Guards" and "Revolutinary mariners".
You mean if Kornilov had been allowed to deploy his force in Petrograd to disperse the Bolshevists? Was Kornilov initially loyal to the provisional government? I would be very surprised if he was, Kerensky was an ex-Socialist Revolutionary, and hostile to conservatism in most senses. Russia needed a co-operation between the moderate and conservative politicians (Milyukov and Guchkov) and the military. The military and the Kerensky government were never the best of friends, to say the least.The idea of deployment of some reliable units (exactly the 3d Cav Corps) belonged to Kornilov. But his attempt to relocate the Corps was called "Kornilov's mutiny" by Kerensky. Corps Commander General Krymov was invited by Kerensky to Petrograd for "negotiations" and was shot down in the Kerensky's room. But if Kornilov had been successfull the Bolsheviks would have never won.
>You mean if Kornilov had been allowed to deploy his force in Petrograd to disperse the Bolshevists? Was Kornilov initially loyal to the provisional government?
Yes, I think so. On August 24 Kerensky's envoy Savinkov met Kornilov and gave him Kerensky's message where Kerensky had expressed his agreement with the "Kornilov's plan" (which included deploying forces to the capital and creating reliable Petrograd Army). Later Kornilov demanded an open trial where he could prove his loyality to the Kerensky's government basing on this message as the main proof.
>Russia needed a co-operation between the moderate and conservative politicians (Milyukov and Guchkov) and the military.
Yes, I agree, furthermore it was a popular idea among Kornilov's officers as well as politicians in Petrograd. Knight L'vov for example gives in his memoirs this dialog with Kerensky: L: "if our cooperation is unsuccessful will you go away from the power?" (I present not the exact words but just their subject) - K-y: "yes, I will. I have no ambitions to keep the personal power in any way". Meanwhile K-y brings up his own conversation: L: "You must leave the government and give us all power" - K-y: "Can you at first tell me who YOU are?" - L: "Good buy", turned around and went away.
IMHO L'vov's version looks more believable. As about Kornilov, he considered dismissing Kerensky only as the last measure if no cooperation is possible anymore (what he was critisized by Denikin for). In Kornilov's listing of ongoing ministers Kerensky was the first. Milyukov, L'vov and Rodzyanko (Octyabrist leader) were included also.
Yes, I think so. On August 24 Kerensky's envoy Savinkov met Kornilov and gave him Kerensky's message where Kerensky had expressed his agreement with the "Kornilov's plan" (which included deploying forces to the capital and creating reliable Petrograd Army). Later Kornilov demanded an open trial where he could prove his loyality to the Kerensky's government basing on this message as the main proof.
>Russia needed a co-operation between the moderate and conservative politicians (Milyukov and Guchkov) and the military.
Yes, I agree, furthermore it was a popular idea among Kornilov's officers as well as politicians in Petrograd. Knight L'vov for example gives in his memoirs this dialog with Kerensky: L: "if our cooperation is unsuccessful will you go away from the power?" (I present not the exact words but just their subject) - K-y: "yes, I will. I have no ambitions to keep the personal power in any way". Meanwhile K-y brings up his own conversation: L: "You must leave the government and give us all power" - K-y: "Can you at first tell me who YOU are?" - L: "Good buy", turned around and went away.
IMHO L'vov's version looks more believable. As about Kornilov, he considered dismissing Kerensky only as the last measure if no cooperation is possible anymore (what he was critisized by Denikin for). In Kornilov's listing of ongoing ministers Kerensky was the first. Milyukov, L'vov and Rodzyanko (Octyabrist leader) were included also.